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MENTAL     PHYSIOLOGY 


MENTAL    PHYSIOLOGY 

ESPECIALLY    IN    ITS    RELATIONS    TO 

MENTAL     I)  I  SO  III)  E  lis 


THEO.    B.    HYSLOP,    M.D. 

LECTURER  ON  MENTAL  DLSEASES  TO   ST.   MARV's   HOSPITAL   MEDIC  Vr,  SCHOOL, 

ASSISTANT  PHYSICIAN  TO  BETHLEM  ROYAL  HOSPITAL, 

FORMERLY  ASSISTANT  MEDICAL  OFFICER,   ROYAL  ALBERT  ASYLUM  FOR  IDIOTS    AND 

IMBECILES,    LANCASTER, 

DEPUTY-PATHOLOGIST  AND  ASSISTANT  MEDICAL  OFFICER,   WEST  RIDING 

ASYLUM,    WAKEFIELD 


'  Non  eiiim  tarn  auctoritatis  in  disputauilo,  quam  ratioiiis  momenta  qiineremla  sunt 

Cicero 


PHILADELPHIA 
BLAKISTON,     SON     &     CO 

]01i>   WALNUT   STREET 

18  95 


GEORGE    H.    SAVAGE,   Esq.,    M.D..  F.R.C.P., 

IX    GRATEFUL    ACKNOWLEDGMENT    OF    MANY    ACTS    OF    KINDNESS 

AND    ENCOURAGEMENT,    AND    AS    A    MARK    OF 

APPRECIATION    OF    HIS    TEACHINGS    AND    WIDENESS    OF    VIEW, 

THIS    BOOK 

Us    gciiiratcir 

BY    HIS    FRIEND    AND    PUPIL, 

THE    AUTHOR. 


P  11  E  F  A  C  E. 


In  the  following  pages  an  attempt  is  made  to  bring  together 
some  of  the  more  prominent  phenomena  of  the  brain  and  of 
the  mind,  both  in  their  normal  and  morbid  aspects.  To  the 
metaphysical  and  philosophical  bearings  of  the  various  assump- 
tions involved  in  such  an  attempt,  little  or  no  prominence  is 
given.  In  philosophy  we  are  free  to  choose  between  a  natural 
dualism  and  a  h}^Dothetical  realism,  or  we  may  be  materialists 
or  idealists  :  in  empirical  psychology  or  physiology  it  would, 
j)resumably,  be  a  work  of  supererogation  to  enter  at  length 
upon  questions  of  epistemology  or  metaphysics. 

In  discussing  the  relations  of  the  outer  world  as  the  mind 
knows  it,  the  assumption  that  complex  mental  experience  is 
only  an  inner  representative  of  a  genuine  externality  has  been 
adhered  to,  without  entering  into  any  philosophical  account 
of  the  method  whereby  the  existence  of  the  whole  outer  world 
is  inferred  through  its  representative  images. 

In  dealing  with  many  hypotheses  which  have  been  given 
to  account  for  mental  events  in  physical  terms,  objection  has 
been  taken  throughout ;  and  little  or  no  attempt  has  been 
made  to  speculate  as  to  the  ultimate  nature  or  quality  of 
nervous  or  mental  events. 

In  an  elementary  work  of  this  description  it  is  obvious, 
that  an  exhaustive   account   of  the   anatomy,  physiology,  and 


viii  PREFACE. 

pathology  of  the  brain  would  defeat  its  own  object — viz., 
conciseness.  The  author  has,  therefore,  merely  sought  to 
bring  into  apposition,  as  it  were,  some  of  the  more  important 
cerebral  and  mental  facts,  and  no  pretence  has  been  made 
to  furnish  the  student  with  an  elaborate  treatise  upon  any 
department  of  the  subject-matter. 

In  the  preparation  of  the  work  the  author  has  much 
pleasure  in  acknowledging,  with  thanks,  the  valuable  assist- 
ance and  advice  of  his  friend,  Mr.  W.  A.  Haigh.  His  thanks 
are  also  due  to  his  friends,  Mr.  H.  F.  Harding,  for  revisal  of 
the  proof-sheets,  and  Dr.  Maurice  Craig,  for  the  preparation 
of  the  index. 

T.  B.  H. 


Bethlem  Royal  Hospital,  S.E 
August,  1895. 


CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION. 

PA«E 

The  value  of  Hypotheses — Boundaries  of  our  Subject — Psycholosfy 
as  a  Science — The  Relation  of  Psycho-physiology  to  the 
General  Study  of  Mind — Mind  Relative  or  Absolute  ? — Defini- 
tion of  Mental  Physiology — Mental  Pathology — Physiological 
Pyschology — Relations  of  Mind  to  Body — Empirical  Psycho- 
logy—  Speculative  Psychology  —  Spiritual  Theories  —  Occa- 
sionalists — Pre-established  Harmony — Theory  of  Animists — 
Associationists — Dualism  —  Monism — Automatism — Material 
Monadism 1 


CHAPTER    I. 

Anatomy  of  Cortex:  Arrangement  of  Cortical  Structures  —  The 
Iserve-Cell  —  Processes  of  Nerve-Cells  —  Nerve-Fibres  —  The 
Relation  between  Cells  —  The  Neuroglia,  or  Connective 
Tissue  Basis — Cell  Elements — Caudate  Fibre-Cells — Stellate 
Fibre-Cells — Protoplasmic  Glia  Cells — Physiology  of  Nerve- 
Cell  :  Nutritive  Function — Transmission  of  Nerve  Impulses 
— Excitability  and  Conductivity — The  Functions  of  Nerves — 
Negative  Variation 24 


CHAPTER    11. 

Chemical  Properties  of  Nerve-substance:  Specific  Gravity — 
Percentage  of  Water — Albumin — Potash  Albumin — Nuclein 
—  Neuro-Keratin  —  Cholesterin  —  Cerebrin  (Homocerebrin 
Encephalin)  Lecithin — Protagon — Vascular  Supply  of  the 


CONTENTS, 

PAGE 

Brain:  Basal  Arterial  System — Anterior  Cerebral  Arteries — 
Middle  Cerebral  Arteries  —  Posterior  Cerebral  Arteries  — 
Arterioles  of  Cortex — Lymphatic  System  of  the  Brain  : 
Regulation  of  Cerebral  Pressure  ^ — ^  Lymph-Cisterns  —  Peri- 
vascular Channels  —  Cerebro-Spinal  Fluid  —  Pacchionian 
Granulations  —  Subarachnoid  Space  —  Venous  Circulation — 
Quantitative  Relations  between  Blood  and  Cerebro-Spinal 
Fluid  —  Brain-Movements  :  Pulsatile  —  Respiratory  —  Vas- 
cular— Nutrition  of  Nerve-elements — Functional  Hyperaemias 
— A^aso-motor  Centres — Influence  of  the  Sympathetic     .         .     56 


CHAPTER   III. 

Scheme  of  the  Central  Nervous  System — Sensory  Paths — Cere- 
bral Localisation  for  Touch  —  Course  of  Sensory  Fibres  — 
Special  Senses :  Sight,  Hearing,  Smell,  Taste — Motor  Nerves  : 
Cerebral  Localisation  —  Projection  Systems  :  Association 
Fibres,  Fibrse  Proprise — Value  of  our  Knowledge  of  Cere- 
bral Localisation :  Phrenology,  Experimental  Research,  Com- 
parative Anatomy,  Morbid  Anatomy — Sensori-Motor  Areas 
and  their  Relations  to  Mental  Faculties :  Views  of  Hitzig, 
Ferrier,  Munk,  Waller,  etc. — Conclusions         .... 


CHAPTER   IV. 

Localisation  of  the  Mental  Faculties  {continued) :  Sensory 
and  Motor  Areas  subserve  Mental  Events  ^ — Localisation 
— Diffuse  Localisation — Indifferentism — The  Frontal  Lobe 
— Intelligence  not  limited  to  Local  Areas  —  Ratiocinative 
Theories  :  Neural  Inference  Scheme  of  Hughlings-Jack son ; 
Meynert's  View  of  the  Forebrain  ;  Wallers  View,  based  upon 
Psychological  Inference  —  Value  of  the  Logical  Mode  of 
.symbolising  Neural  Inference — Praefrontal  Lobes:  Experi- 
mental Researches  ;  Pathological  Evidences — Consciousness 
pertaining  to  Lower  Centres— Local  Memories — Subjectivity 
of  the  Mind — Objective  Contents  of  Consciousness — Specific 
Functions  of  Nerve-Cells — \A'allerian  Scheme  of  the  Four  R's 
—  Specific  Quantifications  of  Motion  —  Negative  Value  of 
Physical  Formulae  —  The  Doctrine  of  "  Invariable  Con- 
comitance"   '.         .        .         .  123 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER   Y. 

PAGE 

Mind  :  Scope  and  Methods  of  Study — Total  Resources  at  our  com- 
mand for  the  Study  of  Mind — Subjective  Methods — Subject- 
Consciousness  and  Object-Consciousness  —  The  Objective 
Method — Logical  Methods — Inductive  Method  —  Deductive 
Method  —  Evolution  Theories  —  Biological — Psychological — 
Presentationism — Mind-Stuff  Theories — Atomistic  Hylozoism 
— Parallelism — Psychological  Import  of  the  Theory  of  Self- 
Compounding  of  Mental  Facts — Unconscious  Cerebration — 
Arguments  for  and  against  the  Theory 149 


CHAPTER   VI. 

Sensation  :  Analysis  of  Sensations  and  Sense  Percepts— Relation  of 
Sensations  to  Perception — ^  Molar  Motions — Atomic  and 
Molecular  Motions — Motions  of  Ether — The  Theory  of  Elec- 
tricity— Latent  Chemical  Energy — Power  of  Selection  pos- 
sessed by  Sense  Organs— Characters  of  Sensation — Intensity 
or  Degree — Liminal  Intensity — Forms  of  Excitation — Weber's 
Law — Discriminative  Sensibility  —  Maximum  Intensity  — 
Fechner's  Psycho-Physical  Interpretation  of  A\'eber's  Law — 
Wundt's  Psychological  Interpretation — The  Physiological 
Interpretation — Validity  of  Weber's  Law — The  Estimation 
of  Magnitudes  by  Comparison  —  Measurement  of  Absolute 
Mental  Magnitudes  Impossible  —  Quality  of  Sensations  — 
Generic  and  Specific  Quality — Duration — Local  Characters 
of  Sensations — Taste — Smell — Touch — Specific  Functions  of 
Tactile  Corpuscles  or  End  Bulbs — Pressure  Spots — Tempera- 
ture Sense  —  Common  Sensation  —  Peripheral  Reference  of 
Sensations  —  Muscular  Sense  —  Hearing  —  Sight — Pressure 
Phosphenes — Quality  of  Sensations  of  Sight — Simple  and 
Mixed  Colours  —  Colour- Blindness  —  Young  -  Ilelmholtz — 
Hering — Wundt — Yon  Kries — Franklin  .  ...  170 


CHAPTER   YII. 

PERCEPnoN  :  External  and  Internal  Perception — Apperception — 
Physiological  Conditions  of  Perception — Space  Form — Nati- 
vistic  and  Empiristic  Theories  of  Perception — Perception  of 
Spatial  Order — Theory  of  Local  Signs— Eccentric  Projection 
of  Sensations — Spatial  Discrimination— Special  Channels  of 


xii  CONTENTS. 

PAGK 

Perception :  Perceptions  of  Smell  and  Taste :  Hearing ; 
Touch ;  Muscular  Sensation  ;  Sight  (Pietinal,  Monocular, 
Binocular) 205 


CHAPTEE   VIII. 

Sensory  Perversioxs  :  The  Origin  and  Development  of  Sensory 
Perversions — Abnormal  Conditions  of  Perception — Definition 
of  Illusion — Sources  of  Illusion — Classification — Passive  Illu- 
sions— Exoneural  —  Esoneural — Active  Illusions — Voluntary 
— Involuntary — Secondary  Sensations  —  Sound  Photisms — 
Light  Phonisms — Taste  Photisms— Odour  Photisms — Pain 
Photisms  —  Chromatisms  —  Gustatisms  —  Olfactisms — Laws 
concerning  Secondary  Sensations 


CHAPTEPt   IX. 

Hallucinations  :  Distinction  between  Illusion  and  Hallucination 
— The  Transition  from  Illusion  to  Hallucination — Pielation  of 
Imagination  to  Hallucination  —  The  Neural  Process  in  Hal- 
lucinations— -The  "Bucket  Theory" — Anatomical  Regions 
for  Hallucinations  and  Sensations — Varieties  of  Hallucina- 
tions— Classifications — Clinical  Considbbations  :  Statistics 
of  1,000  Cases — Perversions  of  Taste — Hypergeusia — Hypo- 
geusia — Ageusia — Parageusia — Perversions  of  Smell — Hyper- 
osmia  —  Hyposmia  —  Anosmia  —  Parosmia — Perversions  of 
Sight — Entoptical  Causes  —  After  Images  —  Perversions  of 
Hearing — Hyperakusis  —  Hypakusis  —  Akusis — Parakusis — 
Perversions  of  Tactual  Perception — Ilypersesthesia — Anaes- 
thesia—  Pselaphesia — Algia — Perversions  of  the  Muscular 
Sense — Kina^sthesia — Illusions  and  Hallucinations  in  Dreams 
— Hypnagogic  Illusions — Dreams  in  the  Insane       .         .         .  248 


CHAPTER    X. 

Mental  Processes. 

Attention:  Definition — Psycho-Physical  Process  of  Attention — 
Psychical  Theory  of  Attention  —  The  Neural  Processes  in 
Attention  —  Monoideisra — Polyideism  —  Reflex  Attention — 
Voluntary  Attention — Adjustment  of  Attention — Attention 
and  Genius — Morbid  Conditions — Hyper-attention— Inatten- 
tion— In  Mental  Disorders — Conception  :  Definition — Concept 


CONTENTS. 


— Psychological  View — Psycho-Physical  Theories  of  Concep- 
tion— Physiological  Theories — Association — Double  Nature  of 
Brain — Consciousness  the  Accompaniment  of  Nerve  Action — 
The  Theories  of  Dischai'ge  and  Resistance  —  Judgment  : 
Definition — Degree  of  Perfection  of  Judgments — False  Induc- 
tions— False  Deduction — The  Perception  of  Reality — Relief — 
The  Insanity  of  Doubt  —  Imagination  :  Definition  —  Differ- 
ences between  After-Images  and  Imagination-Images — The 
Neural  Process  of  Imagination — Morlnd  Conditions — Simple 
Delusional  States — Sensory  Types — Emotional  or  Affective 
Types — Clinical  Considerations  .         .         •         .         .         .291 


CHAPTER    XL 

Memory  :  Elementary  Memory  —  Memory  Proper  —  Secondary 
Memory  —  Relation  of  Memory  to  Belief — The  Process  of 
Recollection — First  Impressions  —  Suggestion  —  Contiguity, 
Similarity,  and  Contrast  —  Associative  Force  —  Complex, 
Convergent,  Divergent,  Obstructive — Methods  of  Cultivating 
Memory — Psycho- Physical  Theory  of  Memory — Latent  Mental 
Images — Relation  of  Primary  Image  to  Revived  Image — 
Disorders  of  Memory:  Forgetfulness — Amnesic  States — 
Congenital  Defects  —  Temporary  Loss  —  Periodic  Amnesia 
in  Hypnotic  States — Progressive  Amnesia — Partial  Amnesia 
— Agraphia,  Aphasia,  Aphemia,  etc.— Hypermnesic  States- 
Congenital  —  Temporary  —  Periodic  —  Partial  —  Paramnesic 
States — Simple  States— By  Association  or  Suggestion — By 
Identification 332 


CHAPTER  XII. 

Feelings:  States  of  Feeling — Relation  of  Feeling  to  Knowing — 
Instincts  and  Emotions — Theory  of  the  Emotions — Tempera- 
ments— Laws  of  Pleasure  and  Pain— Tone  of  Feeling — 
Physiological  Theory  of  the  Feelings — Feeling  of  Effort — 
Varieties  of  Feelings  —  Classifications  —  Disorders  of  the 
Feelings  and  Emotions  :  Sense  Feelings  —  Feelings  con- 
nected with  Ideas —  Intellectual  Feelings — Rational  Feelings — 
Disorders  of  Childhood,  Puberty,  Adolescence        .        .        .  373 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 


The  Will  :  Definition  —  Deliberation — Choice — Resolution — Self- 
determination — Delayed  Reflex — Influence  of  Habit — Desire 
— Psycho-Physical  Processes  of  Volition — Volition  not  to  be 
explained  Anatomically,  Physiologically,  Developmentally, 
or  Pathologically — Reflex  Acts — Periphero-Motor — Centro- 
Motor — Automatic  Acts — Voluntary  Acts — Motor  Images— 
The  Will  Power  in  Hypnosis — The  Feeling  of  Effort — Intro- 
spective Evidences  —  Physiological  Inhibition  —  Nervous 
Resistance  —  Movements  —  Central  —  Peripheral  —  Simulta- 
neous —  Sequential — Speech  Movements— Disorders  of  the 
Kinsesthetic  Word  Apparatus  —  Deaf  Mutism  —  Acquired 
Defects  of  Speech  —  Alliteration  —  Verbigeration — Akata- 
phasia  —  Speech  Defects  in  the  Insane — In  Sleep  and  its 
Associated  Conditions  —  Conduct  —  Nervous  Mechanism  of 
Conduct  —  Conclusions  as  to  the  Existence  of  a  Will  — 
Impairment  of  Will  Power — Irresolution  —Defective  Impul- 
sion— Excess  of  Impulsion — Defective  Voluntary  Attention 
— Absence  of  Will— Conclusions 409 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

The  Factors  of  the  Insanities  :  Growth  and  Development  of  the 
Mental  Faculties — Developmental  Processes  in  the  Infant — 
Microkinesis  —  Micropsychosis  —  Reversion  in  Adults  — 
Factors  of  Development.  Internal  Factors  : — Original  Capa- 
cities— Genius  —  Degeneration  and  Genius — Balance  as  the 
test  of  Mental  Health— Genius  a  Sociological  not  a  Psycho- 
logical Concept  —  Hallucinations  not  Incompatible  with 
Sanity — Mental  Health  not  to  be  Estimated  Entirely  from 
an  objective  Standpoint — The  Degenerate  Advocates — Unre- 
liability of  Statistics — Inherited  Dispositions — The  Views  of 
Spencer  and  W'eismann — Hereditary  Factors  in  Insanity- 
Consanguinity  —  Phthisis,  Scrofula,  Gout,  Rheumatism, 
Syphilis  —  Alcohol  —  Diabetes  —  Neurotic  Manifestations. 
External  Factors  :  —  Social  Environments  —  Psychopathic 
Epidemics  —  Children's  Pilgrimages — Lycanthropy — Rapha- 
nia — Sensory  Types — Religious  Impostures— Sympathy  and 
Mimicry  —  Endemic  and  Epidemic  Psycopathies  —  Folie  a 
(jeu-c  —  Religion  —  Physical  Environment — Seasons—  Climate 
— Occupation — Town  and  Country  Life 455 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER   XV. 

PAGE 


The  Factors  of  the  Insanities  {continued) :  Physiological  Periods 
of  Life — Infanc}^ — Causes  of  Idiocy  and  Imbecility — Types  of 
Infantile  Mental  Defect  —  Night-Terrors  —  Dreams  —  Night- 
mares— Somnambulism — Infantile  Insanity — Causes — Heat 
— Fevers — Masturbation  —  Puberty  —  Adolescence  —  Puer- 
perium  —  Menopause  —  Senescence  —  Bodily  Affections  as 
Factors  —Genital  —  Urinary  —  Digestive  — Circulatory  —  PtC- 
spiratory — Factors — Other  Diseases  —  Neuroses — Spinal — 
Sympathetic  — Cerebral  —  Intoxicants  —  Immediate  Factors 
— Vaso-Motor — Vascular — Nutritional — Hughlings-Jackson's 
Scheme  of  Factors — Conclusions       .         .         .         .         .         .  49s 


Appendix  A — Hypnotism 529 

Appendix  B — Psycho-Physics 53.> 


MENTAL  PHYSIOLOGY. 


INTRODUCTION. 

The  Value  of  Hypotheses — Boundaries  of  our  Subject — Psychology  as  a 
Science — The  Relation  of  Psycho-physiology  to  the  General  Study 
of  Mind — Mind  Ptclative  or  Absolute  ? — Definition  of  ^lental  Phy- 
siology, Mental  Pathology,  Physiological  Psychology-^rKelations 
of  Mind  to  Body — Empirical  Psychology — Speculative  Psychology 
— Spiritual  Theories— Occasionalists — Theory  of  Pre-established 
Harmony —  Animists  — Associationists  —  Dualism  —  Monism  — 
Automatism — Material  Monadism. 

In  a  system  of  philosophy  every  affirmation  is  liable  to  have 
its  truth  determined  by  a  variety  of  tests.  These  tests  must 
not  only  be  in  accordance  with  our  manifold  conditions  of 
knowledge,  but  they  must  also  be  proportionately  varied. 
The  student  would  do  well  to  proceed  according  to  the  admir- 
able advice  of  Goethe: — "Let  the  inquirer  consider  himself  as 
one  summoned  to  sit  on  a  jury.  His  part  is  merely  to  see  ho\\' 
far  the  indictment  is  borne  out  b}^  the  evidence."  Truth  and 
distinctness  of  object  are  of  primaiy  importance.  The  multi- 
tude of  facts  at  our  disposal  must  be  carefully  sifted.  We  must 
discriminate  between  the  essential  and  the  accessor}-,  the 
important  and  the  insignificant,  and  when  all  the  arguments 
in  our  scientific  investigation  are  exhausted,  Ave  must  not. 
by  the  construction  of  hypothetical  fables,  falsify  many  exist- 
ing truths  by  fictions  of  the  imagination.  In  the  domain  of 
psychology  some  inquirers  search  for  novelty  rather  than  truth, 

"  1 


2  INTRODUCTION. 

and,  with  the  pretence  of  solving  doubts,  entertain  us  with 
hypotheses  which  are  not  only  fanciful  but  absurd.*  It  is 
incumbent  upon  us,  therefore,  as  a  duty  which  we  owe  to 
science,  to  be  most  scrupulous  and  cautious  in  stating  our 
individual  opinions.  Rather  let  us  remain  in  a  condition  of 
uncertainty  than  propound  doctrines  which  not  only  falsify 
existing  truths,  but  even  block  the  way  to  further  research. 

If  we  look  at  the  boundaries  of  our  subject,  on  the  one  side 
we  have  the  domains  of  metaphysics  and  ethics,  whilst  on  the 
other,  that  of  the  human  organism  as  viewed  by  the  physiolo- 
gist. We  must  endeavour  to  confine  ourselves  more  particu- 
larly to  our  own  portion  of  the  study  of  philosophy,  and  with 
regard  to  the  special  requirements  of  the  physician,  abstract 
from  the  study  of  a  rational  or  empirical  psychology,  only  so 
much  as  is  essential  to  our  purpose.  In  speculative  psychology 
little  or  no  account  is  taken  of  the  relations  of  the  mind  and 
body ;  the  mind  is  regarded  as  a  conscious  being  that  perceives, 
thinks,  imagines,  remembers,  feels,  and  wills ;  and  in  regard  to 
the  infinite  variety  of  relations  that  exists  between  the  mind 
and  the  varied  functions  of  the  brain,  no  attempt  is  made  to 
reduce  them  under  general  laws  of  cause  and  effect.  The 
attempt  to  reduce  them  under  such  laws  brings  us  to  an 
empirical  psychology,  or  method  of  thought  resembling  the 
natural  sciences,  and  of  which  psychology  and  physiology 
form,  of  course,  the  component  parts. 

The  position  of  our  own  particular  sciences  M'ould  be  as 
follows : — 

(1)  Physiology. 

(a)  Descriptive. 
(h)  Experimental, 
(c)   Speculative. 

(2)  Psychology. 

(a)  Descriptive. 

(Ij)  Experimental. 

(c)   Specvilative. 

*  Those  hypotheses  which  make  the  results  of  physiology  involve  sub- 
jective data,  and  thereby  raise  metaphysical  questions  as  to  the  substantive 
or  dynamic  nature  of  mind,  must  be  carefully  distinguished  from  what  we 
can  with  fairness  accept  as  postulates  pertaining  to  the  departments  of 
physiology  and  psychology. 


PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGY  AND  STUDY  OF  MIND.  3 

The  relation  of  physiological  psychology  to  the  general  study 
of  mind  is  shown  in  the  following  diagram  by  Baldwin  * : — 

Psychology 


Empirical  (Inductive)  Rational  (Deductive) 


Descriptive  (Analytic)  Experimental 

I  I 


Internal  External     External  Internal 


Cause  to  effect 


Cause  to  effect 


Hypnotism 
Dreams 
Insanity 
Physiological  Mental  pathology. 

I 


Neuro-psychology     Psycho-physics    Psychometry. 

In  our  account  of  the  relation  of  psychology  to  physiology 
we  are  absolutely  unable  to  avoid  some  metaphysical  questions ; 
for,  any  discussion  upon  the  nature  of  the  mind  involves  a 
rational  or  deductive  etement,  as  much  as  does  also  any  dis- 
cussion upon  the  laltimate  nature  of  the  physical  elements 
of  the  brain.  The  attempt  to  analyse  physiological  data  has 
resulted  hitherto  in  vague  conceptions  as  to  inter-atomic  motions, 
and  we  are  taught  to  imagine  oscillatory  motion  of  the  atoms  of 
the  substances  that  combine. f  kSimilarly,  the  attempt  to  analyse 
psychological  data  has  involved  vague  conceptions  as  to  inter- 
psychical  motions,  and  we  are  taught  to  imagine  that  ideas  derive 
their  component  parts  from  this  or  that  structural  equivalent. 
How  far  these  hypotheses  are  supported  we  shall  make  it  our 
particular  object  to  inquire,  and  in  our  employment  of  the 
term  "  conception  "  (as  applied  to  such  hypotheses)  we  do  not 
mean  thereby  that  we  are  able  to  form  a  definite  picture  of 
what  takes  place.  We  use  the  term  in  its  widest  sense,  and 
failure  to  conceive  many  of  the  accepted  hypotheses,  must  be 
taken  as  failure  to  conceive  how  the  requirements  of  one  series 
of  events  are  met  by  the  events  of  the  other  series. 

In    the    study    of  medicine   there    is    a   preponderance    of 

*  Baldwin,  "  Handbook  of  Psychology,"  p.  31. 
t  Gower,  "Dynamics  of  Life,'  p.  10. 


4  INTRODUCTION. 

the  somatic  element,  and  little  or  no  regard  is  paid  to  the 
psychical  element.  According  to  Hartmann  the  reason  of  this 
neglect  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact,  that  philosophers  by  profession 
are  not  necessarily^  phj^siologists,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that 
physiologists  are  seldom  enough  of  philosophers  to  handle  their 
subject  successfully.  In  the  following  pages  everything  that 
can  tend  to  effect  this  union  of  characters  for  medical  purposes 
is  part  of  our  object.  Later  we  shall  see  that  there  are  two 
ways  of  treating  the  subject  of  our  investigation — 1st,  The 
analji^ical,  A\diich  induces  the  particular  from  the  unity  of  the 
scientific  idea.  2ndly,  The  synthetical,  which  takes  particulars 
as  the  starting  point,  and  aims  at  reaching  scientific  iinity. 
The  question  may  be  asked  :  Is  there  a  science  of  psycho- 
logy ?  Our  reply  must  depend  upon  the  meaning  in  its 
intension  of  the  word  psychology.  If  it  implies  a  science  which 
deals  with  mental  phenomena  as  thej^  exist,  implying  also  that 
the  Inental  phenomena  have  physical  correlatives,  but,  at  the 
same  time,  taking  no  account  of  their  possible  explanation,  then 
our  answer  would  be  in  the  affirmative,  and  our  position  would 
be  as  secure  as  that  of  any  other  science.  Should,  however, 
we  restrict  our  meaning  so  as  to  regard  the  mind  as  absolute, 
then  we  pass  from  the  region  of  science  and  implj^  the  existence 
of  an  entity  about  which  we  can  only  speculate.  Unfortunately, 
the  boundaries  of  mental  physiology  extend  into  two  spheres. 
In  the  one  we  have  conflicting  philosophical  doctrines,  many  of 
^^'hich,  however,  may,  with  advantage,  be  consigned  to  oblivion  ; 
whilst,  in  the  other  we  have  that  which  is  empirical,  and  even 
more  full  of  conflicting  and  often  superfluous  opinions.  In  the 
former  department  the  knowledge  and  examination  of  some  of 
the  philosophical  doctrines  are,  to  a  great  extent,  indispensable 
to  us  ;  whilst  in  the  latter  our  knowledge  is  so  incomplete  that, 
in  order  to  attain  to  some  degree  of  precision  and  clearness, 
we  cannot  consider  a  knowledge  of  previous  opinions  super- 
fluous. If  we  regard  our  science,  however,  as  an  empirical  one. 
we  may  with  great  advantage  be  allowed  to  be  ignorant  of  what 
is  useless;  and  we  do  not  feel  bound  to  transmit  all  that  is 
believed  to  have  been  known. 

Every  system  of  philosophy  is  subject  to  modifications,  and, 
moreover,  within  limits,  will  eternally   be  so.     To    recognise, 


IS  MIND  KELATIVE  OR  ABSOLUTE?  5 

and  to  be  conscious  of  these  limits,  is  another  important  part  of 
our  task.  By  the  frank  recognition  of  what  cannot  be  known, 
much  time  is  spared,  and  much  error  avoided,  and  it  is  only 
when  we  are  sufficiently  clear  about  the  impossibility  of  ex- 
plaining many  things  that  we  shall  be  able  to  avoid  vain 
attempts  to  estimate  or  elucidate  phenomena,  the  explanation 
of  which  is  unknowable  for  us,  and  hopelessly  beyond  our 
power. 

In  order  that  we  may  have  a  firm  foundation  and  a  definite 
terminology,  we  must  take  every  step  with  security,  and  in  so 
doing  we  may  be  able  to  make  some  advance  in  our  knowledge 
of  the  physiology  of  mental  operations.  We  shall,  therefore, 
after  making  an  attempt  to  determine  the  facts  and  notions 
from  which  we  have  to  proceed,  begin  with  the  most  simple 
operations  and  gradually  advance  to  the  more  complex. 

Are  we  to  regard  the  term  "  mind  "  as  relative  or  absolute  ? 
If  we  are  to  regard  it  as  relative  in  meaning,  it  would  denote  an 
object  \vhich  cannot  be  thought  of  without  reference  to  some 
other  object,  or  as  part  of  a  larger  whole — i.e.,  just  as  the  term 
"father"  cannot  be  thought  of  but  in  relation  to  "child."  If 
this  be  our  position,  the  terin  mind  cannot  be  thought  of  apart 
from  body,  and  we  are  compelled  to  view  "  mind  "  as  relative, 
and  "body"  as  its  correlative.  Such  a  distinction  is  no  doubt 
convenient  from  a  logical  point  of  view,  but  from  a  scientific 
point  of  view  it  is  somewhat  different — i.e.,  the  terms  tree,  sun, 
earth  may  be  used  as  absolute  terms  in  logic  (i.e.,  having  no 
apparent  relation  to  anything  else),  but  in  science  it  would  be  im- 
possible to  prove  their  absolute  independence.  From  a  scientific 
standpoint,  therefore,  we  are  not  justified  in  regarding  mind  as 
absolute,  but,  as  with  eveiy  other  phenomenon  of  nature, 
relative. 

If  we  accept  the  term  "  mind "  as  relative,  however,  we  do 
not  thereby  extend  its  connotation  so  far  as  to  imply  a  causal 
relation,  or  even  a  possible  explanation  of  its  correlation.  In 
fact,  we  must  define  the  term  "  mind"  as  relative  only  so  far  as 
we  appreciate  it  in  its  relation  to  the  body,  without  in  any  way 
implying  an  explanation  of  the  nature  of  the  relation.  As  the 
naturalist  knows  and  applies  electro-magnetism  in  its  relations, 
without  comprehending  its  essence;  as  the  astronomer  calculates 


6  INTRODUCTION. 

the  movements  of  the  planets,  without  knowing  their  absolute 
relativity:  so  we  can  duly  appreciate  spirit  and  matter  in  their 
relations  to  each  other  as  body  and  mind,  without  being  able 
to  explain  their  actual  nature  or  their  deepest  relations. 

Let  us  now,  therefore,  understand  what  is  meant  by  mental 
physiology.  As  defined  by  Hack  Tuke,*  mental  physiology  is 
one  division  of  the  great  department  of  physiology.  It  seeks  to 
discover  the  bodily  organisation  with  which  mental  operations 
are  connected.  Seeing  that  the  brain  is  admitted  to  be  the 
organ  of  mind,  it  endeavours  to  trace  their  correlations  in 
detail.  Unconscious  no  less  than  conscious  mind  falls  within 
its  range.  The  student  of  mental  physiology  makes  the  func- 
tions of  the  nervous  system  his  especial  object  of  study, 
employing  for  this  end  all  the  objects  within  his  reach.  He 
endeavours  to  discover  the  laws  by  which  mental  operations  are 
governed,  and  to  classify  their  phenomena ;  but  he  is  not  con- 
cerned with  speculative  metaph^^sics  in  the  usual  sense  of  the 
term.  Mental  physiology,  however,  embraces  such  modern  psy- 
chological methods  of  research,  as  are  instituted  to  determine 
the  relation  between  the  action  of  external  stimuli  on  the 
sensory  end  organs,  and  the  resulting  sensation  or  motion, 
as  well  as  the  reaction  time  of  mental  phenomena  generally. 
Ladd  defines  the  expression  "physiological  psychology"  as 
the  science  of  the  phenomena  of  human  consciousness  in  their 
relations  to  the  structure  and  the  functions  of  a  nervous  system. 
Carpenter,  in  his  "  Mental  Phj^siology,"  has  gone  a  step  further, 
and,  b}^  the  consideration  of  mental  pathology,  has  attempted 
to  throw  additional  light  upon  the  subject. 

The  term  "mental  pathology"  requires  some  explana- 
tion. Putting  aside  for  the  moment  the  question  of  dependence 
of  the  mind  upon  the  brain,  we  are  compelled  to  admit  that, 
just  as  we  are  ignorant  as  to  the  manner  in  which  physical 
states  cause  mental  states,  so  are  we  absolutely  without  any 
knowledge  as  to  the  methods  hj  which  morbid  physical  factors 
give  rise  to  morbid  psj^chical  events.  By  this  we  mean,  that 
any  complete  explanation  of  the  ultimate  causal  connection 
bet-ween  the  morbid  material  factors  and  the  morbid  mental 
manifestations    is  impossible   for  us.      Therefore,  we  must  of 

"  Dictionary  of  Psychological  Medicine,"  p.  804. 


DEFINITION  OF  MENTAL  PATHOLOGY.  7 

necessity  view  the  patholog}"  of  a  mental  state  from  a  psy- 
chical, as  well  as  from  a  physical,  standpoint — i.e.,  until  we 
can  associate  the  simplest  mental  fact  with  its  corresponding 
phj^sical  fact,  we  cannot  hope  to  solve  in  physical  terms  the 
most  simple  morbid  train  of  thought  as  seen  in  the  insane. 
Mental  pathology  must,  accordingly,  be  viewed  froili  two  sides 
— namelj",  its  ps^^chological,  and  its  physiological  side ;  and  our 
hope  is  that  we  may  bring  the  two  series  of  phenomena,  as  it 
were,  "face  to  face,"  without  in  any  way  rendering  our  position 
insecure  by  unnecessary  hypotheses  as  to  ultimate  cause  and 
effect. 

The  student  will  now  recognise  ho\\'  limited  must  be  our 
explanation  of  mental  and  physiological  facts,  and  that  no 
amount  of  accurac}'  in  detail,  or  any  mere  enumeration  of  a 
series  of  phenomena,  will  explain  the  nature  of  another  series. 
In  pursuing  these  inquiries,  much  difficulty  will  be  experienced 
in  our  efforts  to  "  unlearn  the  errors  of  the  crowd,  and  the  pre- 
tended wisdom  of  the  schools."  Scientific  statements,  with  the 
sanction  of  scholastic  authority,  will  prove  more  dangerous  to 
us  than  controversial  discussions  on  points  purely  speculative, 
and  in  this  relation  we  must  appreciate  that — until  the  proximal 
causal  connection  between  the  world  of  immaterial  and  material 
things  is  explained — when  we  depart  from  the  consideration  of 
the  facts  contained  within  each,  and  attempt  to  speculate  upon 
their  nature  and  cause,  we  wander  at  once  from  the  path  of 
scientific  inquiry'  into  that  of  conjecture,  and  find  ourselves 
contemplating  problems,  the  truths  of  which  are  far  beyond  our 
reach.  The  psychologist  and  physiologist,  each  from  his  o^^'n 
point  of  view,  may  equally  be  justified  in  saying  such  specula- 
tions ought  to  be  entirely  banished  from  their  practical  investiga- 
tions, as  not  only  useless  and  improbable,  but  as  beyond  the 
reach  of  their  faculties,  and,  therefore,  contrar}'^  to  the  first- 
principles  of  scientific  investigation.  Our  own  object,  I  appre- 
hend, should  be  simply  to  investigate  the  facts  in  regard  to 
both  mind  and  brain,  and  not  so  to  misconceive  the  first  prin- 
ciples of  scientific  inquiry  as  to  attempt  to  construct  a 
philosophy  of  cause  and  effect  by  unsound  reasoning  and 
logical   absurdities. 

Of  all  the  imj)ortant  principles  which  are  commonly  called 


8  INTRODUCTION. 

first  truths,  the  most  important  to  iis  is  to  be  found  in  the  ansM^er 
to  the  question — "What  is  life?"  A  rigid  definition  of  life  is 
impossible.  We  can  only  view  it  on  the  physical  side  as  being 
simply  a  tendency  exhibited  by  certain  forms  of  matter,  under 
certain  conditions,  to  pass  through  a  series  of  changes  in  a 
more  or  less  definite  and  determinate  sequence.  All  definitions 
of  the  phenomenon  of  life  are  objectionable,  and  really  mean 
nothing,  inasmuch  as  they  are  merely  enumerations  of  the 
phenomena  observed,  which  indicate  the  existence  of  that 
called  life.  Were  we  in  a  position  to  answer  this  question 
satisfactorily,  we  might  then  ask.  What  is  mind  ?  and  how  can 
we  explain  it  ?  Our  answer  is,  and  must  ever  be.  We  don't 
know.  And  we  never  can  know.  In  the  history  of  psychology 
many  attempts  have  been  made  to  solve  this  problem.  One 
source  of  fallacy  has  arisen,  not  infrec|uently  in  the  actual 
reasonings  of  so-called  materialists  and  spiritualists,  whereby, 
in  disproving  a  doctrine,  they  have  fallen  into  the  sophism  of 
assuming  the  opposite  doctrine  to  be  true,  thus  making  the 
truthfulness  of  that  doctrine  dependent  upon  the  unsoundness 
of  that  which  is  opposed  to  it. 

In  the  light  of  existing  knowledge,  therefoi'e,  we  are 
compelled  to  approach  the  subject  by  two  roads.  Physiologists 
and  psychologists  must  perforce  study  their  respective  sub- 
jects, to  a  certain  extent,  apart  and  in  their  entireties.  The 
fundamental  disparity  of  physical  and  psychical  activities 
renders  the  explanation  of  the  one  impossible  from  the  study  of 
the  other ;  and,  moreover,  at  the  very  outset,  we  must  inllj 
recognise,  that  in  naming  the  nervous  accompaniments,  or 
physical  conditions  of  mental  phenomena,  we  do  not  fully  account 
for  them,  no  matter  how  faithfully  detailed  the  description  of 
such  accompaniments  may  be.  Such  mere  enumerations  do 
not  in  the  least  degree  aid  us  in  the  solution  of  their  causal 
connections.  This  does  not,  however,  interfere  with  the  pri- 
mary conception  that  there  is  concomitance  and  co-variation 
of  physical  and  psychical  processes.  Hitherto,  the  attempts 
to  prove  causal  relations  between  psychical  events  and  phj'sical 
processes  have  proved  useless.  The  two  are  plainly  connected 
in  time,  but  our  recognition  that  the  two  conditions  have  time 
associations  in  no  way  explains  their  ultimate  or  causal  con- 


DEFINITION  (3F  MENTAL  PATHOLOGY.  9 

nection.  Professor  James  says,*  "  The  ultimate  of  ultimate 
problems,  in  the  study  of  the  relations  of  thought  and  l:)rain, 
is,  to  understand  why  and  how  such  disparate  things  are  con- 
nected at  all.  But  before  that  problem  is  solved,  it  must  at 
least  be  ascertained  and  reduced  to  the  lo\\'est  terms  as  to 
which  mental  fact  and  which  cerebral  fact  are,  so  to  speak,  in 
immediate  juxtaposition.  We  must  find  the  minimal  mental 
fact  whose  being  reposes  directly  on  a  brain  fact ;  and  we 
must  similarly  find  the  minimal  brain-event  which  will  have  a 
mental  counterpart  at  all.  Between  the  mental  and  the 
physical  minima  thus  found  there  will  be  an  immediate  rela- 
tion, the  expression  of  which,  if  we  had  it,  would  be  the 
elementary  psycho-physic  law." 

A  statement  of  all  the  relations  which  exist  between  mental 
phenomena  and  the  changes  with  respect  to  chemical  constitu- 
tion, structural  form,  and  physiological  function,  which  take 
place  in  the  molecules  of  the  cerebral  areas,  would  constitute 
the-  foiTndation  for  an  empirical  science  of  the  connection  of 
body  and  mind. 

lyndallf  says,  "There  is  no  fusion  possible  between  the 
two  classes  of  facts."  AVe  can  trace  the  development  of  a 
nervous  system,  and  correlate  with  it  the  parallel  phenomena 
of  sensation  and  thought ;  we  see  with  undoubting  certainty 
that  they  go  hand  in  hand,  but  we  cannot  comprehend  the 
connection  between  them."  Again. |  he  says,  "  The  passage 
from  the  physics  of  the  brain  to  the  corresponding  facts  of 
consciousness  is  unthinkable.  Granted  that  a  definite  thought 
and  a  definite  molecular  action  in  the  brain  occur  simulta- 
neously, we  do  not  possess  the  intellectual  organ,  nor 
apparently  any  rudiment  of  the  organ,  which  would  enable  us 
to  pass,  by  a  process  of  reasoning,  from  one  to  the  other." 
Spencer  §  holds  that  a  unit  of  feeling  has  nothing  in  common 
with  a  unit  of  motion,  and  that  this  becomes  more  than  ever 
manifest  when  we  bring  the  two  into  juxtaposition. 

Let  us  now  glance  at  the  so-called  science  of  physio- 
logical psychology  which  constitutes  a  part  of  our  empirical 

*  •'  Principles  of  Psychology,"'  p.  177. 

T  "  Nature,"'  August  20,  1874,  p.  318. 

X  "  Fragments  of  Science,"'  5th  edit.,  p.  420. 

§  "  Principles  of  Psychology,"  p.  62. 


10  INTRODUCTION. 

psychology.  (1)  There  are,  without  doubt,  certam  psychical 
phenomena  or  processes  that  do  not  occur  independently  of 
certain  material  phenomena  and  processes,  and  which  are  not 
alien  to  the  latter,  but  stand  in  obvious  correlation  to  them, 
and  vice  versa ;  and  (2)  there  are  psychical  processes  for  which 
no  corresponding  physiological  processes  in  the  brain  are  con- 
ceivable, and  we  are  not  j^et  in  a  position  to  assert  that 
material  processes  do  accompany  all  psychical  processes. 
Physiological  psychology  deals  exclusively  with  those  psychical 
phenomena  to  which  concomitant  physiological  processes  in  the 
brain  correspond,  and  is  chiefly  concerned  M'ith  variations 
^^dlich  occur  in  the  quality,  intensity,  combination,  and  time- 
order  of  the  states  of  consciousness,  as  dependent  upon  the 
varying  amounts  and  order  of  different  modes  of  phj^sical 
energy  as  applied  to  the  end  organs  of  sense.*  According  to 
Ladd,  physiological  psychology  is  in  a  fair  way  to  make  out, 
that  all  psychical  activity  has,  as  its  concomitant,  some  mode  of 
physical  action,  and  that  mental  life  more  particularly  coin- 
cides with  the  central  portion  of  the  nervous  series ;  namely, 
the  cerebral  process.  "  Mental  life  is  thus  a  chain  of  events 
parallel  to  another  chain  of  phj^sical  events."  The  question  as 
to  the  mental  dependence  or  causal  connections  of  these  two 
series  of  phenomena  has  not  been  solved  by  scientific  methods. 
We  are  not  in  a  position  to  regard  the  psychical  action  as  the 
result  of  sensory  stimulation  in  the  first  stage,  nor  as  the  result 
of  the  muscular  action  in  the  final  stage. 

Physiologists  look  upon  the  series  of  nervous  processes  as 
complete  and  satisfactory  in  themselves,  having  consciousness 
as  their  accompaniment  or  collateral  result.  Psychologists,  on 
the  other  hand,  uphold  the  view  that  many  psychical  processes 
cannot  be  demonstrated  as  having  any  physical  correlative. 
Spencer  takes  mind  in  the  midst  of  all  its  concrete  relations, 
and  says  that  the  essence  of  mental  life  and  bodily  life  are 
one — namely,  the  adjustment  of  inner  to  outer  relations.  "The 
mind  inhabits  an  environment  which  acts  on  it,  and  on  which 
it  in  turn  reacts."  Physiologists  say,  "  No  psychosis  without 
neurosis  " — and  it  is  to  the  study  of  the  exact  relation  between 
the  dispositions  of  the  architecture  of  the  cerebral  substance^ 
*  Ladd,  "  Physiological  Psychology,"  p.  633. 


DEFINITION  OF  PHYSIOLOGICAL  PSYCHOLOGY.        11 

aided  hy  physiological  experiments  and  pathological  anatomy, 
that  they  hope  to  become  more  closely  acquainted  with  the 
principles  upon  which  this  mechanism  operates — infer  func- 
tion from  structvire,  regarding  the  former  as  the  natural  out- 
come of  the  latter.  In  reply  to  this,  Professor  James  points 
out  that,  no  matter  how  numerous  and  delicately  differentiated 
the  train  of  ideas  may  be,  the  train  of  brain  events  that  runs 
alongside  of  it  must,  in  both  respects,  be  exactly  its  match,  and 
we  must  postulate  a  neural  machinery  that  offers  a  living 
counterpart  for  every  shading,  however  fine,  of  the  history  of 
its  owner's  mind.  Whatever  degree  of  complication  the  latter 
may  reach,  the  complication  of  the  machinery  must  be  quite  as 
extreme,  otherwise  we  should  have  to  admit  that  there  may  be 
mental  events  to  which  no  brain  events  correspond. 

In  accepting  the  theory  of  imiclio-physical  parallelism,  we 
limit  the  parallelism  to  mental  life,  and  the  activities  of  the 
nerve  structure  of  the  organic  world.  We  stop  at  conjectures, 
which  make  mind  co-extensive  with  matter,  or  which  make 
the  parallelism  absolute,  and  assign  a  subjective  side  to 
every  atom  of  cosmic  dust.  We  accept  as  fundamental,  the 
psycho-physical  parallelism,  the  conservation  of  energy,  the 
indispensability  of  introspection,  and  the  utilit}^  of  the  experi- 
mental method.  How  far  Ave  are  warranted  in  assuming-  that 
the  entire  qualitative  content  of  consciousness  is  explicable 
by  the  association  of  sensational  elements  in  conformity  with 
physical  laws,  we  shall  venture  to  inquire.  We  shall  avoid 
following  the  psychology  that  fails  to  recognise  the  limitation 
on  the  study  of  mind  through  matter.  The  application  of  the 
parallelism  beyond  consciousness  belongs  to  metaphysics  and 
epistemology.  We  merely  postulate  the  co-existence  in  time, 
between  the  events,  the  physical  and  mental  series. 

The  tendency  of  many  authors,  who  seek  to  prove  a 
parallelism  in  the  evolution  of  life  and  mind,  is  to  start  the 
parallelism  somewhere  only  when  the  biological  evolution  has 
attained  a  certain  degree  of  comjilexit}- ;  others,  again,  attempt 
to  drop  the  parallelism  AA-hen  a  further  degree  of  complexity 
has  been  attained ;  they  then  assign  to  the  mind  or  bod}' 
powers  which  on  analysis  are  unAA'arrantable.  If  the  paral- 
lelism is  to  be  complete,  the  phenomena  of  human  life  and 


12  INTRODUCTION. 

mind  must  be  traced  as  correlatives  from  the  very  beginning 
and  to  the  very  end.  There  is  no  period  in  the  evolution  of 
the  organism  when  mind  can  be  said  to   appear. 

From  time  to  time,  v^^e  shall  have  occasion  to  criticise  the 
principles  of  physiologists  in  regard  to  the  complexity  of 
neural  action,  and  we  shall  see  that  mere  complexity  of 
arrangement  in  the  refined  mechanism  of  the  brain  may  serve 
to  demonstrate  the  ways  and  means  of  physiological  activities ; 
but  these  principles  afford  us  no  solution  of  any  of  the  sub- 
jective attributes  of  the  mind.  We  grant  the  existence  of 
dynamical  functions,  and  we  are  forced  to  accept  many  of  the 
hypotheses  advanced  to  elucidate  the  occurrence  of  activities 
in  a  rational  and  orderly  sequence ;  but  no  arguments  hitherto 
addiiced  will  allow  us  to  grant  that  consciousness  is  a  mere 
inert  spectator  of  physiological  processes. 

We  shall  have  occasion  to  criticise  the  general  law  that 
"  no  mental  modification  ever  occurs  which  is  not  accompanied 
or  followed  by  a  bodily  change,"  and  we  shall  take  account,  not 
only  of  the  conditions  antecedent  to  mental  states,  but  also 
of  the  resultant  consecjuences  of  such  mental  states — i.e.,  a 
certain  amount  of  brain  physiology  must  be  presupposed  or 
included  in  psychology. 

Physiological  psychology  is  defined  as  "  the  science  which 
investigates  the  correlations  that  exist  between  the  structure 
and  functions  of  the  human  nervous  mechanism  and  the 
phenomena  of  consciousness,  and  which  derives  therefrom 
conclusions  as  to  the  laws  and  nature  of  the  mind."*  We 
do  not,  however,  infer  that  the  science,  as  such,  seeks  as  its 
object  to  form  conclusions  as  to  the  nature  of  one  series  of 
phenomena  from  the  study  of  those  of  the  other — i.e.,  the  study 
of  the  laws  which  govern  matter  and  their  concomitmice  with 
mental  acts,  would  only  form  part  of  the  basis  of  the  study  of 
mind.  Our  task  is  now  one  of  extreme  difficulty.  Let  us 
compare  the  inanimate  cerebral  mass  in  all  its  structural  com- 
plexity, to  the  earth  with  its  geological  strata  and  substrata, 
and  for  illustration  let  us  surround  them  with  the  mind  and 
the  atmosphere  respectively.  Putting  aside  the  cjuestion  of 
their  several  causal  connections  and  mutual  dependence,  we 
*  Ladd,  "  Physiological  Psycliology,"  p.  4. 


DEFINITION  OF  PHYSIOLOGICAL  PSYCHOLOGY.         13 

propose  to  elucidate  the  phenomena  of  the  one  by  the  study  of 
the  other.  Geologists  divide  the  globe  into  a  certain  number 
of  geographical  regions  or  "  zoological  provinces,"  each  of 
which  is  characterised  by  the  occurrence  in  it  of  certain  asso- 
ciated forms  of  animal  life.  In  the  vertical  or  bathymetrical 
distribution  of  animals  we  find  that,  as  a  rule,  each  species  has 
its  own  definite  bathymetrical  zone,  and  it  is  by  generalising 
from  a  large  number  of  such  facts  that  we  are  able  to  lay  do\\'n 
and  name  certain  definite  zones.  In  addition,  geologists  and 
zoologists  have  to  investigate  the  conditions  and  nature  of 
animal  life  during  past  epochs  in  the  history  of  the  world. 
They  are  enabled  to  estimate,  with  a  certain  degree  of  accuracy, 
how  one  animal  differs  from  another,  morphologically  in 
the  fundamental  points  of  its  structure,  and  thereby  infer  a 
physiological  specialisation  of  function  ■  from  the  grade  of  its 
organisation,  or  they  are  able  to  formulate  doctrines  of  evolu- 
tion. Similarly  the  physiologist  maj^  stud}^  the  complex 
surface  of  the  brain,  differentiating  it  into  functional  provinces, 
each  having  its  own  definite  zone,  and  he  may  infer  a  special- 
isation of  function  from  the  distributive  development  of  its 
component  parts.  Further,  on  the  one  hand,  the  geologist 
may  estimate  ■\^'ith  accuracy  the  correlation  of  certain  types 
of  structure  with  certain  climatic  or  atmospheric  phenomena  ; 
whilst  the  physiologist  attributes  functions  to  certain  nervous 
elements  having  mental  phenomena  as  their  correlatives.  Is  it 
possible,  however,  for  the  former  to  fully  estimate  the  laws 
which  govern  the  atmosphere,  solely  from  the  studj^  of  the 
earth's  crust,  and  the  mere  estimation  of  concomitant  atmo- 
spheric conditions  ?  or,  is  it  possible  for  the  latter  to  estimate 
the  nature  of  mind,  and  the  laws  which  govern  it,  solel}^  from 
the  study  of  the  structure  of  the  nervous  mechanism,  and  the 
enumeration  of  collateral  series  of  mental  activities  ?  Until 
we  are  able  to  formulate  one  general  law  as  to  cause  and  effect 
between  material  and  immaterial  phenomena  we  must  of 
necessity  approach  the  subject  from  its  two  totally  different 
aspects,  and  the  closest  attention  to  psjxhical  lairs  (con- 
sidered as  such)  is  as  indispensable  to  our  success  as  the 
minutest  investigation  of  structural  detail.  Any  real  advance 
is  to  be  made  only  b}"  the  study  of  the  laws  of  both  series- 


14  INTRODUCTION. 

of  events.  Physical  analysis  has  taught  tis  nothing  as  yet 
about  subjective  states ;  whilst  subjective  analysis  has  been 
just  as  futile  with  regard  to  objective  states.  Physiological 
psychology  has  as  its  ultimate  task  the  apposition,  and  com- 
parison of  objective  and  subjective  states.  It  seeks  to  discover 
the  laws  which  bind  together  processes,  which  in  their  essence 
have  no  knowable  commiTnity  with  each  other. 

A  material  bond  may  be  conceived  in  connection  with 
matter,  a  non-material  in  connection  with  mind,  but  the  bridge 
between  the  two  must  be  constructed  of  one  or  the  other,  or, 
perchance,  as  suggested  by  one  eminent  writer,  a  substance 
intermediate  between  mind  and  matter,  which  partakes  of  the 
nature  of  both  without  being  exclusively  either.  To  this 
Mercier  aptly  remarks,  "  Imagine  a  thing  which  is  partly  an 
iron  bar  and  partly  a  smell  of  paint  without  being  exclusively 
either  !  "  The  connection  is  no  less  real,  however,  because  it  is 
inexplicable,  and  no  one  doubts  that  causal  connections  do 
exist  although  they  cannot  be  explained.  If  we  look  at  the 
position,  as  viewed  by  Ziehen,  all  psychical  processes  for  which 
there  is  no  conceivable  corresponding  physiological  process  in 
the  brain  are  to  be  ignored.  He  admits,  however,  that  as  a 
consequence,  we  do  not  obtain  sufficient  knowledge  unless,  in 
addition,  we  investigate  certain  psychical  phenomena  as 
purely  psychical,  but  nevertheless  being  always  aware  of  the 
possibility  of  some  concomitant   cerebral  process. 

Empirical  psychology  is,  therefore,  to  be  studied  under  two 
heads.  (1)  Psychical  processes  not  contingent,  or  demonstrably 
dependent,  upon  cerebral  processes,  termed  by  some  trans- 
cendental psychology.  (2)  Psychical  processes  concomitant  Avith, 
or  apparently  dependent  upon,  cerebral  processes,  termed  the 
science  of  physiological  psychology,  metrical  physiological 
psychology,  or  psycho-physics.  Later,  when  we  discuss  mind 
and  nervous  conditions  in  their  several  relationships  to  one 
another,  attention  will  be  given  to  the  various  psychological 
methods  of  research,  and  the  psychical  effects  of  varying  con- 
ditions of  nerve  organs  will  be  dealt  with  in  detail.  Account 
will  also  be  taken  of  the  question,  as  to  whether  the  activity  of 
all  parts  of  the  brain  is  directly  concerned  with  conscious  life, 
or  only  that  of  certain  of  its  structures  ;  or  whether  the  organ 


SPECULATIVE  PSYCHOLOGY.  15 

of  mind  includes  other  centres  as  well  as  brain  centres ;  and  we 
shall  have  recourse  to  the  i*esnlts  obtained  by  artificial  experi- 
mentation, by  which  definite  external  stimuli  have  been 
employed,  the  subjective  effects  of  which  have  been  objective!}' 
noted  and  registered ;  and  to  the  pathological  aspects  of 
cerebral  diseases  having  mental  correlations. 

Before  entering,  however,  upon  the  cpiestions  as  to  the 
interaction  of  mind  and  brain,  let  us  review,  briefly,  some  of 
the  hypotheses  Avhich  have  been  derived  from  speculation  upon 
the  philosophical,  ethical,  and  religious  aspects  of  their  causal 
connections. 

The  spiritual  theor^^  holds,  that  the  mind  is  a  soul  distinct 
in  its  nature  and  mode  of  activity  from  material  things,  and,  in 
accordance  with  the  Cartesian  philosophy,  the  body  and  soul 
cannot  act  upon  each  other  because  of  the  essential  difference 
between  the  two.  By  the  Occasionalists,  body  and  mind  are 
regarded  as  having  no  causal  relations — i.e.,  neither  really 
acts  on  the  other.  An  event  of  a  definite  kind  happens  in 
the  bodily  realm,  a  corresponding  event  of  its  own  definite 
kind  happens  in  the  domain  of  consciousness,  and  vice  versa. 
They  are  connected  causally  through  a  common  ground  by 
God.  A  further  development  is  to  be  found  in  the  theory 
of  p'e-estahlished  harmony,  by  which  God  has  eternally  pre- 
destined the  entire  succession  of  events  in  the  world,  down 
to  every  minutest  detail.  *  Animists  (animo,  I  give  life  to) 
adopt  the  Stahlian  theory  of  the  soul,  and  regard  it  as  the  vital 
principle.  The  term  "  animism "  is  now,  however,  ordinarily 
used  to  express  the  general  doctrine  of  spiritual  agency  in  the 
operations  of  nature,  f  Mercier  ^  regards  the  whole  doctrine  of 
so-called  spiritualism  as  a  survival,  in  slightly  altered  form,  of 
the  old  superstition  of  demoniacal  possession.  Commenting 
upon  such  terms  and  phrases  as  "  psychomotor-centres,"  "  ideo- 
motor  processes,"  "  sensation  changing  into  movement,"  he 
says,  "  Commonest  and  worst  of  all  is  the  prevalent  opinion, 
expressed  or  implied,  that  above  the  material  part  of  the  brain, 
somewhere  in   the  skull  cavity,   there  sits  a  little  deity  who 

*  Ladd,  "  Physiological  Psychology,"  p.  650. 
t  Tuke,  "Dictionary  of  Psych.  Med.,"'  p.  94. 
X  "  Sanity  and  Insanity,''  p.  48. 


16  INTRODUCTION. 

sends  liis  orders  out  this  waj^  and  that,  and  by  some  niysterions 
but  easy  process  produces  all  the  movements  of  the  body.  He 
plays  on  the  centres  of  the  brain  as  a  performer  plays  on  the 
keji'-board  of  the  piano,  and  produces  just  such  combinations 
and  successions  of  movements  as  he  pleases,  imtrammelled  by 
natural  laws.  This  being  is  variously  named,  according  to  the 
predilections  of  the  writer,  some  calling  him  the  Will,  others 
the  Ego,  others  again  Conscious  Personality,  others  the  Soul ; 
while  yet  others  split  him  up  into  several  beings,  and  with  the 
natural  tendenc}^  of  anthropomorphism,  not  only  let  them  make 
common  cause  against  their  unfortunate  servant — the  bod}' — 
but  set  them  fighting  among  themselves." 

The  effort  to  evade  the  question  of  the  freedom  of  the  will 
arises,  in  most  instances,  from  the  absence  of  any  definite 
concept  of  the  nature  of  the  subject  under  debate.  The 
dilemma  is,  to  a  certain  extent,  extra-psj^chological.*  Psycho- 
logy, however,  can  deal  with  the  problem  through  analysis  of 
the  activity  and  selective  character  of  choice.  Were  we  able 
to  eliminate  motivation  from  our  consideration,  then,  also,  might 
we  regard  determination  as  external  and  not  internal.  The 
assumption  that  mechanical  law  or  determination  b}"  extraneous 
influences  is  the  onl}^  conceivable  type  of  orderlj'-  activity  is 
natural ;  the  fact  that,  as  yet,  we  fail  to  conceive  of  any 
universal  law  of  choice,  is  no  argument  that  the  former  ass^imp- 
tion  is  the  only  solution.  We  find  ourselves  at  issue  with  the 
psychologists,  who  regard  ideo-motor  action  as  the  type  of  all 
volition,  and  we  fail  to  reduce  all  choice  to  immediacy  Mathout 
deliberation.  Those  psychologists  who  deny  their  own  agencies 
in  volition  are  fatalists,  and  base  their  conclusions  upon  false 
ideas  of  the  relation  between  mechanical  causation  and  self- 
determined  activity.  The  purpose  of  modern  phj^siological 
psychology  is  to  try  to  demonstrate  the  relation  of  the  mind  to 
the  brain,  and,  at  the  hands  of  some  inquirers,  the  problem  is 
solved  as  physiological  fatalism.  Others  conceive  themselves  as 
mere  spectators  of  effects  determined  by  whatever  their  absolute 
may  chance  to  be.  The  logical  import  of  the  controversies 
would  lead  us  to  conclude  that  self-determination   cannot  be 

*  Prof.  A.T.  Ormoncl;  "Freedom  and  Psycho-Genesis" — "Psycli.  Review," 
May,  1894. 


ASSOCIATIONISTS.  17 

reduced  to  mechanical  laws.  The  various  laws  which  prede- 
termine (through  heredit}'  and  environment)  the  physiological 
and  psychological  individuality  give  no  solution  of  the  self- 
determination  of  choice.* 

The  association  school,  of  Herbart  in  Gernian}^  and  of 
Hume,  Mills,  and  Bain,  in  England,  has  constructed  a 
psj^choiogy  in  which  the  soul  or  e(jo  of  the  individual  is  no 
longer  viewed  as  the  pre-existing  source  of  the  representations, 
but  rather  as  their  last  and  most  complicated  result.  Its 
disciples  endeavour  to  show  how  such  things  as  perceptions, 
emotions,  volitions,  etc.,  may  be  engendered  in  an  individual  by 
the  cohesions,  repulsions,  and  forms  of  succession  of  discrete 
"  ideas "  and  without  the  aid  of  a  soul.  Materialists  seek  to 
reduce  organic  life  to  the  effect  of  mechanical  arrangements, 
and  they  regard  mind  as  an  effluence  from,  or  product  of,  the 
activitj^  of  this  material  substratum.  They  regard  the  constitu- 
tion and  activities  of  molecules,  as  determined  by  the  inter- 
action of  the  ultimate  atoms  which  comprise  them,  under 
the  law  of  the  conservation  and  correlation  of  physical  energy. 
Whenever  a  certain  constitution  and  consequent  modes  of 
activity  are  brought  about  in  the  molecules,  under  this  general 
law,  then  it  is  of  their  own  comprehensible  nature  to  exhibit, 
in  addition  to  the  various  forms  of  motion  known  as  nerve 
commotion,  another  class  of  co-existing  phenomena,  called 
mental  phenomena. f 

Later,  we  shall  see  that  the  arguments  of  even  the  most 
advanced  materialists,  who  regard  thought  as  the  effect,  or 
result  of  cerebral  movement,  are  insufficient  to  afford  the 
slightest  explanation  of  any  subjective  mental  state.  "  The 
whole  circle  of  consciousness  is,"  says  Baldwin,  "  an  added 
fact  to  that  of  movement."  Manj^  of  the  materialists  ridicule 
the  idea  of  an  immaterial  mind  acting  upon  a  material  bod}- ; 
but  t\\Qy  do  not  hesitate  to  affirm  that  a  material  body  can 
act  on  an  immaterial  mind. 

If  we  look  more  closely  at  the  physical  laws  of  "  correlation 
of  energy "  we  at  once  see  that  they  afford  us  no  help  in  the 

*  See  Baldwin,  "  Handbook  of  Psycliologj"-,"  vol.  ii.  pp.  352—376 ;  Hodgson, 
"Free  Will :  an  Analysis  " — "  Mind,"  April,  1891. 
t  Ladd,  "Physiological  Psychology,"  p.  654. 

.    2 


18  INTRODUCTION. 

solution  of  the  causal  relations  of  mind  and  matter ;  for  we 
must  classify  all  forms  of  physical  energy  according  to  their 
quality,  nature,  degree,  and  amount  of  their  motion;  and  we  are 
imable  to  demonstrate  or  define  states  of  consciousness  in  the 
same  manner  as  modes  or  amounts  of  motion,  and,  in  conse- 
quence, we  cannot  attempt  a  strict  mathematical  correlation 
between  physical  motion  and  such  states  of  consciousness.  In 
the  endeavour  to  bridge  the  gap  between  the  molecitlar  energy 
of  organic  material  and  that  of  the  mode  of  activity  of  mind, 
the  various  mathematical  formulge,  under  the  laws  of  conserva- 
tion and  correlation  of  energy,  have  been  unwarrantably  extended 
in  their  application.  Further,  as  Ladd  puts  it,  "  Psychology 
teaches  that  the  world  of  mental  objects — ^the  only  world  of 
immediate  experiences — is  built  up  by  the  synthetic  activity  of 
mind  ;  it  calls  upon  the  physicist  to  remember  that  he  has  no 
other  way  of  reaching  these  atoms  and  of  discovering  the  laws 
of  their  relations  except  by  the  path  of  mental  activity  ;  and  it 
reminds  him  that  this  activity  cannot  escape  the  control  of 
mental  law." 

In  addition  to  the  spiritualistic  theory  that  so-called  inani- 
mate objects  are  vitalised  by  a  principle  which  involves  purpose 
or  end,  and  the  materialistic  view  of  mind  as  the  result  of  an 
activity  of  complex  physical  forces,  we  have  combinations 
which  aim  at  giving  equal  substantive  reality  and  power, 
both  to  the  spiritual  and  to  the  material. 

In  the  theory  of  dualism  we  find  a  combination  of  the  two 
substances,  which  are  viewed  as  existing  side  by  side,  but  as 
exerting  no  influence  the  one  on  the  other,  the  appearance  of 
interaction  being  due  to  Divine  arrangement.  The  molecules  of 
the  brain  act,  dynamically,  according  to  their  own  constitution 
and  modes  of  arrangement.  The  mind,  on  the  other  hand,  as  a 
real  entity  of  another  order,  has  the  various  states  of  con- 
sciousness as  its  acts ;  and,  according  to  the  more  recent 
doctrines  of  dualism,  the  two  series  of  phenomena  are  cor- 
related. The  nature  of  the  correlation  is  unknown,  but  it 
is  assumed  that  the  mind  and  brain  act  in  view  of  each  other: 
the  action  of  the  one  accounting  for  the  action  of  the  other  in 
some  unexplainable  and  unknowable  way.  There  are  three  forms 
of  dualism — viz.,  (1)  The  metaphysical,  which  takes  account  of 


MONISM.  19 

mind  and  matter  ;  (2)  The  philosophical,  which  takes  accoiTnt  of 
the  body  and  the  soul ;  and  (3)  The  ethical,  which  concerns 
itself  with  good  and  evil. 

The  desire  to  connect  the  two  metaphysically  has  given  rise 
to  the  doctrine  of  monism,  according  to  wdiich,  one  reality 
has  two  aspects — i.e.,  material  phenomena  and  mental  phe- 
nomena are  related  as  two  attributes  of  the  same  substance. 
This  implies  the  existence  of  a  substance  composed  of  two 
utterly  incomparable  series  of  phenomena,  and  to  regard  this 
substance  in  the  terms  of  either  series  must  result  necessarily 
in  arguments  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  spiritualist  or  the 
materialist.  Wundt  recognises  three  types  of  theory :  Material- 
ism, Spiritualism,  and  Animism,  the  former  two  each  having 
a  dualistic  as  well  as  a  monistic  form.  Bain,  on  the  other 
hand,  forms  two  main  groups — viz.,  Those  which  adopt  two 
substances,  and  those  which  assume  but  one. 

Let  us  now  ventiire  to  look  at  the  subject  for  oui-selves  and 
ask  ourselves,  Is  there  any  test  whereby  we  can  distinguish 
between  a  physical  or  physiological  and  an  intelligent  act? 
Many  hold  the  view  that  the  pursuance  of  future  ends  and  the 
choice  of  means  for  their  attainment  are  the  mark  and  criterion 
of  the  presence  of  mentality,  and  that  no  actions  but  such  as 
are  done  for  an  end  and  show  a  choice  of  means  can  be  called 
intelligent.  Professor  James  says :  "  If  Ave  find  ourselves 
unable  to  banish  the  impression  that  there  is  a  realm  of 
final  piirposes,  that  we  exist  for  something,  we  place  intelli- 
gence at  the  heart  of  it  and  have  a  religion.  If,  on  the 
contrary,  in  surveying  its  irremediable  flux,*  we  can  think 
of  the  present  only  as  so  much  mere  mechanical  sprouting 
from  the  past,  occurring  with  no  reference  to  the  future,  Ave 
are  atheists  and  materialists."  The  same  author  regards  con- 
sciousness  as  having  a  causal  efficacy,  and  as  being  at  all  times 
primarily  a  selecting  agency.  "  Every  actually  existing  con- 
sciousness seems  to  be  a  Jighter  for  ends,  of  Avhich  many,  but  for 
its  presence,  Avould  not  be  ends  at  all."  In  fact,  consciousness 
directs  its  OAvn  machinery.  "  The  spiritualist  may  believe  in  the 
soul  if  he  Avill,  the  pessimist  may  say  that  Nature,  in  her 
unfathomable  designs,  has  mixed  us  of  clay  and  flame,  of 
*  "  Irremediable  flux  "  is  essentially  ijessimistic. 


20  INTRODUCTION. 

brain  and  mind,  that  the  two  things  hang  indubitably  together 
and  determine  each  other's  being,  but  how  or  why,  no  mortal 
Tonaj  ever  know."  Undoubtedly,  the  nutrition  of  the  tissues, 
the  circulation  of  the  blood,  and  the  secretion  of  different  kinds 
of  fluids  are  dependent,  to  a  great  extent,  upon  the  states  of 
the  mind ;  and,  later,  when  we  come  to  study  the  infl.uence 
of  the  mind  upon  the  body,  we  shall  find  that,  if,  with  sluggish 
and  abnormal  digestion,  we  have  mental  depression,  it  is  equally 
true  that  an  attack  of  melancholia  will  retard  and  pervert  th& 
processes  of  digestion;  and,  similarl}^,  emotional  conditions, 
stress  or  strain,  may  impair  the  cerebral  mechanism  and  its 
functions. 

In  opposition  to  these  more  or  less  spiritualistic  views  we 
have  the  authority  of  Professor  Huxley,  who  ^  says  that  in 
animals,  their  volition,  if  the}^  have  any,  is  an  emotion  indica- 
tive of  phj^sical  changes,  and  not  a  cause  of  such  changes.  We 
are,  therefore,  regarded  as  conscious  automcda.  "  Our  mental 
conditions  are  simply  the  symbols  in  consciousness  of  the 
changes  which  take  place  automatically  in  the  organism.  In 
men,  as  in  brutes,  there  is  no  proof  that  any  state  of  conscious- 
ness is  the  cause  of  change  in  the  motion  of  the  matter  of  the 
organism."  We  can  also  add,  it  is  not  possible  to  form  any 
conception  as  to  how  any  state  of  consciousness  can  affect  the 
cerebral  molecules,  and,  moreover,  we  never  shall  be  able  to 
surmount  or  explain  this  difficulty  ;  but  our  inability  to  explain 
such  action  does  not  negative  its  possibility.  The  view,  hoM'- 
ever,  that  the  feeling  we  call  volition  is  not  the  cause  of  a 
voluntary  act,  but  the  symbol  of  that  state  of  the  brain  which 
is  the  immediate  cause  of  that  act,  is  open  to  any  number  of 
arguments.  Professor  Clifford  states,  dogmatically,  that  the 
only  thing  which  influences  matter  is  the  position  or  motion 
of  surrounding  matter,  and  "  if  anyone  says  the  will  influences 
matter,  the  statement  is  nonsense."  "  Were  this  the  case," 
remarks  Professor  James,  "  the  mind's  history  would  run  along- 
side the  body  history  of  each  man,  and  each  point  in  the  one 
would  correspond  to,  but  not  react  upon,  a  point  in  the  other," 
and  we  agree  with  hin;  that,  "  in  the  present  state  of  psy- 
chology^ to  urge  the  automaton  theory  upon  us  on  purely 
d  iriiori  or   (/wafi-metaphj^sical  grounds  is  an    unwarrantable 


MATERIAL  MONADISM.  21 

impertinence."  Spiritualists  and  materialists  are  free  to  argne 
from  their  respective  standpoints ;  while  we,  as  unbiased  specta- 
tors, are  also  free  to  state  that  we  can  as  readily  imagine  an 
immaterial  psychical  state  influencing  a  material  bodily  state, 
as  we  can  a  bodily  state  affecting  a  mental  state ;  and  this 
although  the  two  series  of  activities  have  no  communit}^  with 
f^ach  other. 

The  material  monad  theory,  or  the  theory  of  ''  poly- 
zoism''  or  "'multiple  monadism,"  as  upheld  by  Leibnitz,  Herbart, 
and  Lotze,  is  as  follows : — "  Every  brain-cell  has  its  own 
individual  consciousness,  which  no  other  cell  knows  anything 
about,  all  individual  consciousness  being  '  ejective '  to  each 
other.  There  is,  however,  among  the  cells  one  central  or 
pontifical  one  to  which  our  consciousness  is  attached.  But 
the  events  of  all  the  other  cells  physically  influence  this  arch- 
cell;  and  through  producing  their  joint  effects  on  it,  these  other 
cells  may  be  said  to  '  combine.'  The  arch-cell  is,  in  fact,  one 
of  those  'external  media,'  without  which  we  saw  that  no  fusion 
or  integration  of  a  number  of  things  can  occur.  The  physical 
modifications  of  the  arch-cell  thus  form  a  sequence  of  results,  in 
the  production  whereof  every  other  cell  has  a  share,  so  that,  as 
one  might  say,  every  other  cell  is  represented  therein.  And, 
similarly,  the  conscious  correlates  to  these  phj'sical  modifica- 
tions form  a  sequence  of  thoughts  or  feelings,  each  one  of  which 
is,  as  to  its  substantive  being,  an  integral  and  uncompounded 
psychic  thing,  but  each  one  of  which  ma}"  (in  the  exercise  of 
the  cognitive  function)  be  aware  of  things — many  and  compli- 
cated— in  proportion  to  the  number  of  other  cells  that  have 
helped  to  modify  the  central  cell."  * 

We  shall  have  occasion  to  discuss  such  theories  from  the 
point  of  view  of  localisation  of  mental  function,  and  we  shall 
see  that  we  have  no  anatomical  or  physiological  data  for  their 
support.  We  have  not,  as  yet,  been  able  to  attach  such 
anatomical  or  functional  pre-eminence  to  any  one  cell  or  group 
of  cells  in  the  brain.  We  do  not  know  the  brain  laws  which 
determine  an  immediate  correspondence  between  matter  and 
mind  ;  nor  do  we  know  the  psychic  laws  which  determine  a 
correspondence  between  mind  and  matter  :  we  can  only  seek  to 

*  James,  "  Principles  of  Psychology,''  p.  179. 


22  INTEODUCTION. 

determine  the  laws  wliicii  mutually  or  individuall}'  regulate  the 
two  totally  different  series  of  phenomena,  and  thus,  by  bringing 
them  into  apposition,  endeavour  to  establish  a  psycho-phj^sical 
law  which  shall  embrace  the  requirements  of  both  series  of 
events.  Manjr  of  the  existing  psycho-physical  formulae  are 
the  results  of  unsafe  hypotheses  within  the  domains  of  ps}^- 
chology  and  physiology  respectively. 

The  student  will  find  that  the  blind  ends  of  physiology  and 
psj^chology  are  covered  respectively  by  anverifiable  hypotheses, 
and  that  it  is  with  the  comparison  of  these  blind  ends  that  he 
has  to  do  in  estimating  the  ultimate  nature  and  correlation  of 
bodily  and  menta    events. 

Our  ideas  of  the  brain,  and  of  its  relation  to  the  mind,  are 
derived  mainly  from  some  showy  results  of  modern  science ; 
but  the  modern  scientist  too  often  forgets  that  processes  are 
no  explanation  of  results.  The  theorists  wdio  evolve  man  from 
an  ape  see  no  likelihood  that  he  will  ever  become  an  angel. 
Under  the  dogma  of  their  one  great  law  they  settle  the  histor}' 
of  the  past,  and  negative  the  possibilities  of  the  future.  Mate- 
rialists sa}^  that  the  mind  is  derived  from,  or  correlated  to, 
atomic  movement,  and  in  order  to  prove  a  causal  nexus  they 
bring  the  analogy  of  the  cosmical  mechanism  to  bear  upon 
the  cerebral  atoms.  They  seek  to  prove  the  existence  of  a 
mind  correlated  to  the  infinitesimally- minute  counterpart 
of  the  cosmos ;  but  there  they  end.  They  do  not  coun- 
tenance any  speculation  as  to  the  existence  of  a  universal 
mind  correlated  to  the  infinite  system  from  which  the}^  draw 
their  analogy. 

That  our  minds  have  a  physical  basis,  without  which  their 
phenomena  w^ould  not  exist  for  us,  is  as  tr^ie  as  the  statement 
that  life  itself  has  a  physical  basis,  without  \\'hich  it  would 
not  exist  for  us.  Beyond  this  we  cannot  go,  and  the  state- 
ment that  mind  depends  upon  the  body  in  no  "s^'ay  implies  an 
explanation  of  the  causal  connection  between  the  two  states — 
i.e.,  to  state  that  one  condition  depends  upon  another  is  not  to 
explain  hoiv  it  depends.  The  doctrines  of  concomitance,  i:iaral- 
lelism,  and  siinultaneity  furnish  us  with  an  explicandum  and  not 
an  explica,tio.  Since  an  expliccdio  is  impossible,  we  must  devote 
ourselves   with  an   equal   amount  of  attention  to  the  stud}^  of 


MATERIAL  MON.UJISM.  23 

the  heterogeneous  states  of  mind  and  matter ;  and,  in  our 
endeavour  to  bring  them  into  apposition,  Ave  must  not  venture 
upon  any  such  explicoAio. 

Finally,  it  is  happily  obvious  that  our  knowledge  of  the 
brain  and  its  structures  is  gradually  becoming  more  extensive. 
The  anatomico-physiological  school  is  striving  to  provide  us 
with  data,  vsiih.  the  aid  of  which  it  is  hoped  we  may  be  able 
to  correlate  mental  facts.  The  explanation  of  the  absolute 
reality  of  physical  and  psychical  acts  must  remain  outside 
physiological  and  psychological  theories.  The  phj^siologist 
seeks  to  demonstrate  the  paths  of  conduction  and  dissemination 
of  phj^sical  forces.*  The  psychologist  seeks  to  demonstrate  the 
method  by  which  we  think  ;  whilst,  lastlj^,  the  physiological 
psychologist  seeks  to  establish  some  relationship  between  the 
two  processes,  without  in  any  way  attempting  to  throw  light 
upon  their  ultimate  nature  or  causal  origin. 

*  See  Batty  Take,  "  On  the  Insanity  of  Over-exertion. ' 


24 


CHAPTER   I. 


Anatomy  of  Cobtex. 


Arrangement  of  Cortical  Structures  —  The  Xerve-Cell  —  Processes  of 
Nerve-Cells  —  Nerve-Fibres  —  The  Relation  between  Cells — The 
Neuroglia,  or  Connective  Tissue  Basis  Cell  Elements — Caudate 
Fibre-Cells — Stellate  Fibre-Cells — Protoplasmic  Glia  Cells. 

Physiology  of  Neeve-celi/. 

Nutritive  Function — Transmission  of  Nerve  Impulses — Excitability  and 
Conductivity — The  Functions  of  Nerves — Negative  Variation. 

ANATOMY  OF  CORTEX. 

Before  examining  w^liether  the  areas  of  the  cerebral  cortex 
are  allied  Avith  particular  functions  of  the  mind,  it  may  be 
well  for  us  to  examine,  somewhat  carefully,  the  physical  side, 
so  that  we  may  build  o^ir  conceptions  upon  the  basis  of  facts 
known  to  us.  If  we  are  to  regard  the  mind  as  having  its  seat 
in  the  brain,  we  must  study  the  material  elements  of  which 
that  seat  is  composed. 

Starting  with  the  assumption,  justified  by  scientific  observa- 
tion, that  the  mind,  as  perceptive,  has  its  seat  within  the 
nervous  system,  and  that  of  this  system  the  structural  elements 
of  the  cerebral  cortex  have  the  greatest  claims  to  being  con- 
sidered as  immediately  concerned  with  the  occurrence  of 
mental  phenomena,  it  will  be  advisable  to  give  some  account 
of  what  is  known  as  to  the  microscopic  and  chemical  nature 
of  these  brain-elements.  To  enter  into  a  description  of  the 
entire  encephalon,  with  its  membranes,  vessels,  tracts,  and 
subordinate  regions,  would  obviously  be  out  of  place  here. 
Neither  can  we  deal  thoroughly  with  the  anatomy  of  the 
convolutions,    our    knowledge    of    which   has    been    so    much 


ARRANGEMENT  OF  CORTICAL  STRUCTURES.  25 

advanced  by  the  labours  of  Gratiolet,  Ecker,  Turner,  Broca, 
Bevan  Lewis,  Ramon  y  Cajal,  de  Vaillet,  de  Mosso,  Golgi,  and 
others.  Comparative  investigations,  in  reference  to  the  struc- 
tural differences  of  the  various  regions  of  the  cortex,  have 
proved  of  great  importance.  The  progression  in  complexity 
of  structure,  as  we  ascend  the  scale  of  animal  organism,  is 
significant,  and  the  comparison  of  the  structure  and  functions 
of  the  brain  in  different  animals  leads  us  to  fairly  definite 
conclusions  concerning  the  human  brain.  We  are  almost 
compelled  to  believe  that  differentiation  of  cerebral  function 
implies  likewise  a  structiiral  differentiation  ;  but,  as  we  shall 
see  later,  we  do  not  yet  understand  the  design  of  structural 
differentiation,  as  allied  with  psychical  events.  With  the 
evolution  of  certain  mental  manifestations,  we  look  for  a 
corresponding  advance  in  complexity  of  arrangement  of  the 
material  elements,  "  Thus  it  is,"  says  Bevan  Lewis,  "  we 
expect  the  physiological  areas  ascertained  by  Ferrier  to  exist 
in  the  brain  of  the  monkey  and  other  animals  to  exhibit  a 
structural  differentiation  characteristic  of  those  parts,  and 
hence  helpful  in  the  recognition  of  analogous  regions  in  other 
orders.  If  it  can  be  established  that  areas  whose  functional 
endowments  are  familiar  to  us  present  uniformly  specialisecl 
anatomical  features,  we  may  reasonably  conclude  that  other 
structurally  differentiated  areas,  whose  functions  are  unknown 
to  us  at  present,  nevertheless  have  each  and  all  of  them 
diverse  endowments."  In  urging  the  importance  of  making 
ourselves  acc[uainted  with  the  intimate  structure  of  the  cortex, 
he  pays  this  tribute  to  physiological  experimentation  that  it 
alone  can  lead  to  conclusive  results.  "An  attempt  to  delineate 
the  homologous  areas  of  the  cortex  in  the  different  orders  of 
mammalia  by  simple  inspection  Avould  (on  a  priori  grounds) 
only  lead  to  failure ;  indeed,  errors  have  already  been  fre- 
quently committed  with  respect  thereto. 

Arrangement  of  Cortical  Structures. — To  Eamon  y 

Cajal,  Retzius,  Golgi,  and  Dejerine,  we  are  indebted  for  the 
latest  descriptions  of  the  arrangement  of  cortical  cells.  Cajal 
describes  four  layers  of  cells  in  a  typical  Rolandic  convolution — 
viz. :  (Ij  A  superficial  zone,  containing  a  few  small  fusiform 
cells,   surrounded   by  numeroiis  neuroglia   nuclei ;    their  long 


26  ANATOMY   OF  CORTEX. 

axis  lies  parallel  to  the  plane  of  the  surface,  and  they  give  off 
an  apical  and  a  basal  process,  which  arises  from  the  proto- 
plasmic expansions,  and  not  directly  from  the  body  of  the  cell. 
These  processes  never  descend  into  the  other  layers,  but  run 
horizontally  or  slightly  diagonallv  for  a  considerable  distance, 
and  in  their  course  give  off  collateral  branches,  which  form  a 
rich  terminal  plexus.  Collaterals  are  also  sometimes  given  off 
hj  the  axis-cylinder,  which  breaks  up  into  two  or  three 
branches.  Cajal  also  describes  numerous  polygonal,  triangular, 
and  unipolar  cells  belonging  to  this  layer. 

(2)  The  second  zone  contains  a  number  of  small  pyramidal 
cells,  with  apical  processes,  which  end  in  tufts  in  the  super- 
ficial layer.  Collaterals  are  given  off  from  these  apical 
processes,  and  also  from  the  axis-cylinder  process,  just  as  in 
the  superficial  layer.  The  lateral  expansions  end  without 
anastomosing  with  similar  expansions  of  other  cells.  The 
"  broad  stripe "  of  Baillarger  corresponds  to  this  plexus. 

(3)  The  third  zone,  or  the  zone  of  large  pyramidal  cells, 
resembles  the  second  zone,  except  in  the  size  of  the  pyramids, 
which  are  known  as  "  giant-cells."  These  giant  cells  are  found 
chiefly  near  the  vertex,  and  the  plexus  formed  by  the  collaterals 
of  their  axis-cylinder  processes  corresponds  to  the  "  thin 
stripe  "  of  Baillarger. 

(4)  The  fourth  zone,  or  the  zone  of  poltiyonal  cells,  con- 
tains cells  which  are  egg-shaped,  spindle-shaped,  triangular,  or 
polygonal.  The  apical  processes  of  these  cells  do  not  reach 
the  superficial  zone,  and  the  collaterals  of  the  axis-cjdinder 
process  either  end  in  terminal  ramifications,  or  form  a  plexus 
round  some  of  the  nerve-fibres  of  the  Mdiite  medullary  sub- 
stance. In  the  last  three  zones,  according  to  Golgi,  there  are 
also  cells  with  a  short  axis-cylinder,  and  spindle-shajDed  cells, 
which  send  processes  to  the  superficial  (Marinotti)  and  second 
zone  (Cajal). 

Bevan  Lcm^s  has  devoted  much  attention  to  the  study  of 
cortical  lamination,  and  also  to  the  local  deviations  in  the 
general  arrangements  of  cortical  structures.  He  found  that 
the  distinctness  of  lamination  not  only  varies  -with  the  local 
peculiarities  of  structure,  but  also  with  morbid  states  of  the 
cortex,  and  with  the  full  or  empty  state   of  its  vessels.     The 


ARRANGEMENT  OF   CORTICAL  STRUCTURES.  27 


h       a 


0  ---5 


G— 


2'?.^L 


y.^\.. 


4th  L 


Fig.  1. 


Diagrammatic  View  of  Cekkbral  Cortex. 

a,  caudate  neuroglia  fibre-cell ;  b,  tangential  fibre-system  ;  c,  protoplasmic  glia  cell ;  D,  bloo.l- 
\-essel  and  perivascular  space  ;  e,  cells  of  ambiguous  layer  ;  /,  plexus  of  nerve-fibres  and 
collaterals;  G,  terminal  arborisation  of  dendron  of  pyramidal  cell;  H,  long  nerve-hbre 
ascending  from  white  substance  to  branch  and  end  freely  in  lacunar  and  molecu.ar 
layers;  J,  pyramidal  cell  with  neuron  and  dendrons;  K,  fusiform  nerve-cell  of  poly- 
morphic layer,  with  ascending  axis-cylinder ;  L.  neuron  from  pyramidal  cell  givmg  oft 
collaterals:  M,  neuron  from  cell  of  ambiguous  layer;  o.  transitional  form  between 
caudate  and  stellate  fibre-cell. 


28  ANATOMY  OF  COllTEX. 

eight  laminar  types  of  cortex,  described  hj  Bevan  Lewis  as 
occurring  in  mammals,  are  characterised  by  abrupt  transitions 
from  one  type  to  the  other ;  whereas,  in  higher  mammals, 
and  especially  in  man,  there  are  no  abrupt  transitional 
regions.  In  the  latter,  the  passage  from  one  form  to  another 
is  gradual,  and,  according  to  Bevan  Lewis,  this  gradual  pas- 
sage is  a  distinctive  element  in  the  evolution  of  the  higher 
brains. 

The  Nerve-Cell. — Much  of  our  knowledge  of  the  nerve- 
cell — its  structure,  functions,  and  relation  to  other  nerve-cells — 
has  been  obtained  by  Marchi's  application  of  the  Wallerian 
methods,  and  the  method  of  staining  i7itra  vitam  by  methyl 
blue  (Ehrlich).  Golgi's  method  of  staining  with  nitrate  of 
silver,  after  treatment  with  chromic  acid  and  its  salts,  has  also 
yielded  most  important  results.  Our  knowledge  of  the  paths 
taken  by  action  currents  is  mainly  attributed  to  the  Gotch 
and  Horsley's  physiological  methods  of  investigation  by  the 
galvanometer  and  electrometer. 

The  term  "  nerve-cell "  is  now  commonly  used  to  denote 
not  only  the  body  of  the  cell,  or  the  part  immediately  inclosing 
the  nucleus,  but  all  the  processes  of  the  cell.  The  adoption  of 
the  term  •''  neuron,"  in  Waldeyer's  sense,  as  denoting  the  whole 
nerve-cell  and  its  processes,  is  liable  to  cause  confusion,  and  is 
acknowledged  to  be  undesirable. 

The  significance  of  the  relative  variations  in  size  of  dif- 
ferent nerve-cells  has  given  rise  to  a  considerable  amount  of 
discussion,  more  especially  by  Meynert,  Bevan  Lewis,  Ramon 
y  Cajal,  and  Hughlings-Jackson.  Meynert  believes  that  the 
relative  size  of  the  so-called  "  giant-cells  "  may  be  attributed 
to  the  greater  depth  of  the  convolutions  where  they  are  to  be 
found ;  "  the  apex  processes  of  these  cells,  therefore,  having 
to  traverse  a  greater  distance  in  their  low-lying  groups  ere 
they  reach  the  outer  layer  of  the  cortex."  To  this  assertion, 
and  to  the  explanation  that  the  grouping  of  these  cells  is  due 
to  their  being  pressed  together  by  the  bundles  of  nerve-fibres 
passing  upwards  from  the  medulla  of  the  gyrus,  Bevan  Lewis 
takes  exception,  and  finds  a  more  probable  explanation  in 
the  age  and  multiplicity  of  the  surrounding  connections  of 
the  nerve-cell. 


THE  XEPtVE-CELL.  29 

"  If  we  carefully  note  a  section  of  fresh  brain,  we  find  that  although 
the  majority  of  the  pyramidal  cells  steadily  enlarge  at  greater  depths,, 
the  ganglionic  cell  clusters,  but  a  very  short  remove  from  the  largest 
pyramidal  cells,  represent  an  enormous  leap  in  dimensions."  .  .  .  "This  we 
believe  to  be  the  case  ;  we  find  as  a  constant  accompaniment  of  increas- 
ing bulk,  much  complex  relationships  with  surrounding  cell-districts 
— in  other  words,  the  larger  the  cell  the  greater  the  nwinher  of  its  branches. 
But  the  older  the  nerve-cell,  the  longer  time  has  it  had  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  organised  relationships  around  ;  and  hence  it  follows  that 
the  older  cell  is  also  the  larger  element:'* 

To  another  factor — -namely  the  medullciAed  fibre  (axis-cylinder 
process) — considerable  importance  is  also  attached  : — 

"The  medullated  fibre,  which  arises  from  the  basal  extremity  of  the- 
great  motor  cells,  traverses  uninterruptedly  an  enormous  distance  to 
reach  the  respective  cell  groups,  which  represent  in  the  spinal  cord  the 
musculature  of  the  limbs.  The  distance  traversed  is  very  unequal 
between  the  lumbar  and  cervical  groups :  the  cortical  centres  represent- 
ing the  lower  extremities  having  not  only  a  greater  distance  through 
which  to  discharge  their  energy,  but  a  far  more  massive  musculature  to 
call  into  activity,  than  is  the  case  with  the  arm  centres  of  the  cortex. 
Again,  the  cortical  centres  for  the  upper  extremities  not  only  act 
through  a  greater  I'ange,  but  they  innervate  larger  groups  of  muscles 
than  do  the  centres  for  the  head  and  neck — the  muscles  of  ai'ticulation, 
deglutition,  etc.  It  would,  therefore,  be  natural  to  presume  that  the 
cortical  cell  groups  representing  these  respective  regions  would  differ 
considerably  in  the  size  of  their  individual  elements.  The  histology  of 
the  motor  area  fully  warrants  us  in  stating  this  to  be  the  case ;  the 
smallest  cells  being  found  at  the  lower  end  of  the  central  gyri,  and 
Broca's  convolution,  and  thence  increasing  rapidly  in  size  upwards 
towards  the  centres  for  the  musculature  of  the  limbs."  * 

The  stndy  of  the  comparative  size  of  the  nerve- cells  would, 
therefore,  seem  to  yield  the  law  that  "  tJbe  [ireater  musculature  is 
■presided  over  hij  the  groups  oflartjest  cells,"  and  this  conclusion  is 
in  accordance  with  the  suggestions  of  Hughlings-Jackson  and 
others.  Bevan  Lewis  believes  that  the  relative  dimensions 
of  the  cells  are  dependent  on  (1)  range  of  discharging 
distance  ;  (2)  size  of  musculature  innervated  ;  (3)  age  of  nerve- 
cell  ;  (4)  resulting  multiplicity  of  cell  connections. 

Undoubtedly  the  size  of  the  nerve-cell  often  bears  a  distinct 
relation  to  the  length  of  the  processes  which  leave  it,  and  an 
examination  of  the  bulbar-spinal  cells  groups,  and  the  larger 

*  Bevan  Lewis,  "  Mental  Diseases,"  p.  107. 


30  ANATOMY  OF  COETEX. 

projection-cells  associated  with  the  part  of  the  cerebral  cortex, 
from  which  the  fibres  of  the  pyramidal  tract  originate,  leads 
to  the  same  conclusion.  The  same  law  also  holds  good  for  the 
ganglion-cells  of  the  retina.  Professor  Schafer,  however, 
believes  that  this  is  not  an  invariable  rule,  and  he  doubts 
whether  it  will  apply  to  the  visceral  and  vascular  nerves.  If 
we  look  at  the  dorso-mesial  group  of  cells  (Clarke's  column)  in 
the  spinal  cord  and  compare  the  individual  cells  with  those  of 
the  anterior  horn,  we  see  that  there  is  a  great  resemblance  in 
form  but  not  in  size  :  the  diameters  of  the  former  varying  from 
40  to  90  fjb,  whilst  in  the  latter  the  motor  cells  measure  from 
67  to  135  /i.  In  the  lower  part  of  the  dorsal  region,  Clarke's 
column  is  best  developed,  and  the  cells  have  a  relatively  larger 
size  than  elsewhere.  This  region  is  also  characterised  by  a 
comparatively  smaller  development  of  the  cells  of  the  anterior 
cornu.  If  we  accept  Gaskell's  view,  that  the  number  and  size 
of  cells  in  Clarke's  column  in  any  particular  region  appear  to 
vary  as  the  number  of  leucenteric  fibres  derived  from  that 
region,  and  if,  as  the  result  of  Gaskell's  researches,  we  believe 
that  this  column  is  connected  with  the  visceral  nerves,  are  we 
not  also  free  to  assume  that  the  relative  size  of  the  cells  falls 
under  the  general  law?  In  a  similar  way,  in  the  medulla 
oblongata  the  cells  of  Clarke's  column,  which  retain  the  same 
characters  as  in  the  cord,  swell  out  into  the  nucleus  of  the 
vagus,  the  great  leucenteric  nerve  of  the  thoracic  viscera. 

The  relative  size  of  the  nucleus  of  the  nerve-cell  is  regarded 
as  being  of  peculiar  significance,  and  here,  again,  we  cannot 
do  better  than  quote  from  Bevan  Lewis,  "who  says  : — 

"  When,  however,  we  consider  the  assumed  sensory  element  of  the 
cortex — the  minute  angular  and  granule  cells — we  must  not  lose  sight 
of  a  remarkable  distinction  between  them  and  the  assumed  motor  unit, 
and  that  is,  the  great  proportionate  preponderance  of  the  nucleus  to  the 
cell  in  the  former.  That  the  nucleus  does  exert  some  mysterious 
influence  over  the  nutritive  and  functional  activity  of  the  cell  has  been 
long  surmised ;  and  the  results  of  our  histological  inquiry  indicate  that 
nuclear  degeneration  within  the  nerve-cell  is  peculiarly  associated  with 
certain  states  of  mental  and  motorial  instability.  We  have  long  been 
accustomed  to  regard  it  as  related  more  definitely  to  the  fi;nctional 
activity  of  the  cell,  and  less  directly  related  to  the  nutritive  activity  of 
the  cell.  In  other  woi'ds,  the  cell  is  subject  to  a  constant  supply  of 
nutritive  plasma,  it  gradually  assumes  a  state  of  nutritive  instability, 


PROCESSES  OF  NERVE-CELLS.  31 

and  will  necessarily  discharge  its  accumulated  energy  in  accordance 
with  the  simple  law  of  nutritive  rhythm,  the  resulting  stable  equili- 
brium is  succeeded  by  a  measurable  period  ere  the  potential  energising 
of  the  cell  has  once  more  brought  it  up  to  its  former  state  of  instability. 
Were  this  all  that  "occurs,  the  process  of  storage  and  liberation  of 
energy  would  be  a  simpler  rhythmic  process  than  the  more  compounded 
rhythm  which  actually  pertains  to  mental  operations. 

If,  hoAvever,  we  regard  the  nucleus  as  affecting  the  functional 
activity  of  the  cell,  as,  in  fact,  restraining  or  inhibiting  its  discharge,  as 
a  kind  of  iynperium  in  imperio  exercising  a  controlling  influence  upon  the 
perturbations  which  reach  the  cell  from  sensory  surfaces ;  then  the 
presence  of  a  healthy  nucleus  would  become  an  all-important  feature  in 
the  cell  life — a  feature  of  the  utmost  significance  to  us  in  our  patho- 
logical inquiries.  The  view  we  have  here  taken  of  the  significance  of 
the  nucleus  would  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  when,  from  its  degenera- 
tion or  morbid  state,  it  fails  to  inhibit  the  cell,  these  nerve-elements 
would  be  subject  to  a  rapid  running  down  on  trivial  excitation,  and  in 
servile  obedience  to  the  law  of  nutritional  rhythm ;  in  fact,  we  should 
here  find  an  explanation  of  morbid  instability,  such  as,  e.g.,  in  motor 
realms  results  in  convulsive  states,  and  in  the  substrata  of  mental 
operations  in  varied  psychical  states  and  reductions  of  consciousness. 

It  is  these  considerations  which  induce  us  to  regard  the  dispropor- 
tionately larger  nucleus  of  these  smaller  angular  elements  of  the  second 
layer  of  the  cortex  as  being  of  some  significance.  Subject,  as  such 
minute  cells  are,  to  a  rapid  accumulation  of  energy,  we  might  presume 
that  some  restraint  might  be  established  to  prevent  their  reckless 
liberation  of  energy,  and  hence  we  believe  such  restraining  capacity 
to  be  afforded  by  the  vei'y  large  nucleus.  In  the  next  place,  we  have 
every  reason  for  believing  that  this  superficial  belt  of  angular  cells  is 
in  direct  organic  connection  with  the  subjacent  cells  of  large  size,  and 
that  their  morbid  instability  would,  therefore,  affect  these  larger 
units,  which,  from  the  small  size  of  their  nucleus,  would  be  more 
subject  to  the  law  of  nutritional  rhythm  in  their  discharge  of  energy. 
As  indicated  by  Dr.  Ross,  and  also  in  the  preceding  note  by  Dr. 
IIughlings-.Jackson,  the  large  cell  would  present  a  far  smaller  area  in 
contact  with  the  nutrient  material  than  the  same  amount  of  protoplasm 
broken  up  into  numerous  minute  elements ;  and  hence,  such  large 
cells  would  labour  under  nutritive  disadvantages,  would  be  reservoirs 
for  the  slow  accumulation  and  storage  of  energy,  which,  when  liberated, 
would  again  resvilt  in  a  tardy  reinstatement  of  nutritive  instability." 

Processes  of  Nerve-Cells. — Every  nerve-cell  lias  one 
or  more  processes.  These  processes  are  of  two  kinds,  termed 
''neurons'^  and  "  dendrons ." '""  '"Neuron"  is  used  to  signify 
those  processes  which  first    show  themselves  in  the  course  of 

*  Schafer,  "Brain,"  1893,  p.  136. 


32  ANATOMY  OF  CORTEX. 

development  of  the  nerve-cell,  and  whicli  hitherto  have  usualh^ 
been  styled  as  the  axis-cjdinder  or  nerve-fibre  processes.  The 
term  "  dendron "  is  applied  to  the  protoplasmic  processes  of 
Deiters,  which  are  regarded  as  not  being  so  essential,  since 
many  cells  are  entirel)^  destitute  of  them.  The  term  "  neuro- 
dendron "  is  used  for  combined  processes,  snch  as  occur  in  the 
motor  nerve-cells  of  arthropods.  The  classification  of  nerve- 
cells,  according  to  the  number  of  their  processes,  is  regarded 
as  unsatisfactory ;  the  terms  uni-polar,  bi-polar,  and  multi- 
polar not  distinguishing  between  the  kinds  of  processes.  All 
processes  of  nerve-cells  are  ultimately  dendritic,  and,  almost 
without  exception,  the  neuron,  or  nerve-fibre  process,  although 
it  may  have  a  course  of  several  feet  without  giving  off  a  branch, 
finally  ends  in  a  terminal  arborisation.  Schafer  gives  examples 
of  this  fact  in  the  arborisation  of  the  nerve  ending  in  muscles, 
and  in  the  arborisation  of  nerve-fibrils  in  sensory  structures, 
su.ch  as  the  cornea  of  the  eye,  and  the  epidermis  of  the  skin. 
He  also  adds  that  even  where  a  nerve-fibre  apparently  ends  in 
a  simple  extremity  it  can  generally  be  noticed,  as  in  the 
corpuscles  of  Pacini,  and  in  the  tactile  corpuscles  of  Meissner, 
that  the  actual  ending  of  the  essential  part  of  the  nerve-fibre  is 
really  arborescent.  There  are  some  nerve-cells  which  have 
no  dendrons,  and  others  which  have  many  dendrons ;  all, 
however,  possess  at  least  one  neuron.  A  primar}^  distinction 
is  therefore  made  between  dendric  and  adend^ric  cells  ;  and, 
according  to  the  number  of  neurons,  the  cells  are  classified  into 
those  which  are  mononeuric  and  those  which  are  i?olyneuric 
(dineuric,  trineuric,  etc.),  according  as  we  find  one,  two,  or 
more  neurons  or  axis-cylinder  processes  emanating  from  the 
cell-body  or  from  any  of  the  dendrons.  As  examples  of  the 
mononeuric  class,  Schafer  takes  the  cells  of  the  anterior  horn 
of  the  spinal  cord,  many  of  the  cells  of  the  cerebral  cortex,  and 
the  large  cells  of  Purkinje  of  the  cerebellum;  whilst,  as  instances 
of  the  polyneuric  class,  he  quotes,  on  the  authority  of  Eamon 
y  Cajal,  the  superficial  cells  of  the  cerebral  cortex,  and  he  also 
refers  to  his  own  observations  on  the  nerve-cells  of  the  neuro- 
muscular sheet  of  the  Aurelia.  This  classification  of  nerve- 
cells,  therefore,  is  based  upon  the  kinds  of  processes  which  they 
possess,  and,  according  to  the  number  of  neurons,  the  number 


NERVE-FIBRES. 


33 


of  dendrons  being  considered  as  of  minor  importance.  For  the 
cell  with  a  long  axis-cylinder  process  the  term  projection-cell 
(Fig.  2)  is  used,  to  distinguish  it  from  the  intermedAanj  cell 
with  its  relatively  short  axis-cylinder  process. 


Fig.  % 

PKOJECTION-CliLL  OF  CEREBRAL  CORTEX  (DIAGRAMMATIC). 

dr,  dendrons ;  n,  neuron  ;  coll.,  collaterals. 

(Slightli/  hiodified  froin  Sclilifer.) 

Golgi,  Avho  was  the  first  to  describe  the  relative  size  of  the 
neurons,  regarded  those  cells  with  comparatively  long  neurons 
as  being  concerned  with  the  giving  out  of  efferent  impressions  ; 
those  with  relatively  short  and  soon-branching  processes  as  being- 
sensor}^  or  receptive  in  function.  Schiifer  employs  the  term 
"  intermediary  cell  "  to  imply  that,  the  cell  in  question  offers  an 
intermediary  link  between  centripetal  impressions,  which  may 
be  brought  to  a  nerve-centre  by  the  neuron  of  a  sensory  pro- 
jection-cell, and  centrifugal  impressions  u'hich  pass  awa}'  from 
the    nerve-centre   by    the    neurons    of    motor    projection-cells. 


34  ANATOMY  OF  COKTEX. 

Ramon  y  Cajal  lias  given  the  term  "  collaterals  "  to  the  fine 
branches  which  are  now  demonstrated  as  coming  from  the 
neuron.  The  difference  in  appearance  between  the  two  kinds 
of  processes,  when  prepared  by  the  Golgi  method  of  staining, 
is  readily  detected  by  an  experienced  observer.     The  dendrons 


Fig.  3. 

Cell  of  Ieregulab  Pyramidal  Type. 

d,  dendrons  terminating  in  feathery  arborisations  ;  n,  neuron  ;  coll.,  collateral. 

(After  Berkley.) 

usually  have  a  rough  outline,  while  the  neurons  are  generally 
smooth.  The  neurons  remain  comparatively  unchanged  in 
diameter  along  their  course,  whereas  the  dendrons  branch 
repeatedly,  and  hence  gradually  diminish  in  size  (Fig.  3). 

Nerve-Fibres. — Nerve-fibres  represent  to  us  a  conducting 
apparatus,  and  they  form  a  means  of  connection  between  the 
central  nervous  organs  and  the  peripheral  end  organs.  Of 
nerve-fibres  we  have  two  kinds :  (1)  non-^nedullated  nerve-fibres, 
and  (2)  onedullated.  Of  the  non-medullated  form,  the  simplest 
is  that  of  the  'primitive  nerve-fibril,  which  is  very  delicate,  and 
is  often  found  exhibiting  small  varicose  swellings  in  its  course. 
These  fibrils  form  by  the  splitting  up  of  the  axis-cylinder  of 
the  nerve-fibre  near  its  termination,  as  seen  in  the  terminations 
of  the  olfactory  fibres,  in  the  optic  nerve-layer  in  the  retina,  in 
the  corneal  nerves,  and  in  the  terminations  in  non-striped 
muscle.  Similar  fibres  are  also  to  be  found  in  the  finely  divided 
processes  of  nerve-cells   in  the    grey   matter  of  the  brain  and 


NERVE-FIBEES.  35 

spinal  cord.  A  second  variety  is  to  be  seen  in  the  axial- 
cylinder  process  of  nerve-cells,  in  which  primitive  fibrils  are 
held  together  in  bundles  by  a  slightly  granular  cement,  which 
gives  them  a  very  delicate  longitudinal  striation  and  finely 
granular  appearance.  These  are  termed  nalied,  or  simple 
axial  cylinders.  Remak  has  described  a  third  variety  in  the  pale 
non-medullated  fibres  which  are  found  in  abundance  in  the 
sympathetic  nervous  system.  They  consist  of  an  axial  cylinder 
which  is  inclosed  by  a  delicate,  structureless,  and  elastic  sheath, 
corresponding  to  the  sheath  of  Schwann.  Ranvier,  however, 
denies  the  presence  of  this  sheath,  and  believes  that  the  nuclei 
are  merely  applied  to  the  surface,  or  slightly  embedded  in  the 
superficial  parts  of  the  fibre,  and  that  they  belong  in  reality  to 
the  fibre  itself.  These  differ  from  medullated  fibres,  inasmuch 
as  they  branch  and  form  an  anastomosing  network.  When 
acted  upon  by  silver  nitrate  they  never  show  any  crosses. 

Medullated  fibres  occur,  also,  in  several  forms.  In  the  white 
and  the  grey  matter  of  the  brain  and  spinal  cord  we  meet  with 
axis-cylinders,  or  nerve-fibrils,  covered  only  by  a  medullary 
sheath  or  white  substance  of  tSchwann.  These  are  also  called 
varicose  fibres,  from  the  fact  that  after  death  they  often  present 
varicose  swellings  due  to  the  accumulation  of  fluid  between  the 
medulla  of  myelin  and  the  axis-cylinder.  They  are  medullated 
nerve-fibres  without  any  neurilemma,  and  they  have  nodes  of 
Ranvier.  The  great  mass  of  the  cerebro-spinal  nerves,  how- 
ever, is  largely  constituted  of  medullated  fibres  having  the  sheath 
of  Schwann.  These  fibres  are  highly  refractive,  homogeneous, 
and  exhibit  a  double  contour,  their  margins  being  dark  and 
well  defined  if  acted  upon  by  reagents.  Each  fibre  consists  of 
(1)  Schwann's  sheath  (neurilemma  or  primitive  sheath),  which  is 
thin,  clear,  and  has  nuclei  in  it ;  (2)  inedullary  sheath,  or  white 
substance  of  Schwann,  Avhich  siTrrounds  the  axis-cylinder  and 
has  been  compared  to  an  insulating  medium  round  an  electric 
wire.  This  substance  is  cpiite  homogeneous,  glistening,  and 
refractive.  It  is  of  fluid  consistence,  and  this  fluid  can  be 
squeezed  out  of  the  cu-t  ends  of  the  fibres  in  spherical  drops. 
After  death  this  substance  shrinks  slightly  from  the  sheath  and 
breaks  up  into  droplets,  not  due  to  coagiilation,  but,  according 
to  Toldt,  to  a  process  like  emulsiflcation,  the   drops  pressing 


36  ANATOMY  OF  CORTEX. 

against  each  other.  It  contains  a  large  amount  of  lecithin  and 
^  cerebrin,  which  swell  up  to  form  myelin-like  forms  in  warm 
water.*  It  also  contains  fatty  matter,  is  blackened  by  osmic  acid, 
^     and  rendered  transparent  by  chloroform,  ether,  and  benzine. 

The  axis-cylioider,  which  lies  in  the  centre  of  the  nerve  and 
is  essential  to  it,  is  usnally  cylindrical  and  composed  of  fibrils 
united  by  a  cement  of  semi-fluid  consistence.  KupjBer  de- 
scribes a  fluid — "  neuro-plasma  " — which  lies  between  the  fibres. 
According  to  other  observers,  however,  the  whole  cylinder  is 
inclosed  in  an  elastic  sheath,  peculiar  to  itself  and  composed  of 
neuro-keratin.  f  To  this  sheath  Klihne  has  given  the  term 
axi-lemma.  There  are,  in  addition,  certain  structural  modifi- 
cations which  require  notice.  The  nodes  or  constrictions  of 
Ranvier  occur  at  regular  intervals  along  a  nerve-fibre.  At 
these  points  of  consti"iction  the  white  substance  of  Schwann  is 
interrupted,  so  that  the  sheath  lies  upon  the  axis-cylinder. 
The  presence  of  one  or  more  nuclei  in  each  inter-annular  or 
inter-nodal  segment  has  led  to  the  belief  that  the  whole 
'  segment  is  equivalent  to  one  cell.  These  nodes  are  regarded 
■  as  being  concerned  with  the  diffusion  of  plasma  through  the 
outer  sheath  into  the  axis-cylinder,  and  the  giving  off  of  the 
decomposition  products.  Each  segment  is  looked  upon  as 
being  built  up  of  a  series  of  conical  sections,  each  of  which 
is  bevelled  at  its  ends.  These  bevels  are  arranged  one  over  the 
other  in  an  imbricate  manner,  showing  slight  intervals  between. 
The  oblique  lines  running  across  the  white  substance  are 
termed  the  incisures  of  Schmidt  or  Lantermann.  In  addition 
to  the  nucleated  nerve-corpuscles,  which  are  found  at  intervals 
under  the  neurilemma,  other  nerve-corpuscles  or  "  demilunes " 
have  been  described  as  quite  distinct.  These  latter  are  stained 
yellow  by  safronin,  while  the  ordinary  nerve-corpuscles  are 
stained  by  methj^anilin.^  Ewald  and  Klihne  state  that  the 
axis- cylinder,  as  well  as  the  white  substance  of  Schwann,  are 
covered  with  an  excessively  delicate  sheath  of  neuro-heratin, 
and  the  two  sheaths  are  connected  by  numerous  transverse  and 
oblique  fibrils  which  permeate  the  white  substance. 

The  nature  of  the  fibrillated  appearance  of  the  axis-cylinder, 

*  Landois  and  Stirling,  3rd  edit.,  p.  528. 
t  Ibid.,  p.  527.  t  Ibid.,  p.  518. 


NERVE-FIBRES.  37 

as  seen  both  in  nenrons  and  clenclrons,  is  still  a  matter  of 
conjecture.  Max  Schultze  regards  the  axis-cylinder  as  con- 
sisting of  two  substances — viz.,  a  bundle  of  fine  fibrils  (ultimate 
fibrillte)  which  serve  as  conductors,  embedded  in  a  clear  sub- 
stance like  protoplasm  ;  and  his  observations  upon  the  structure 
of  the  non-medullated  fibres  of  the  olfactor}^  nerve,  and  of  the 
axis-cylinder  of  the  ordinary  medullated  fibres,  go  to  prove  an 
anatomical  discontinuity  of  the  fibrils.  Schiifer  argues  that  this 
is  further  borne  out  when  we  trace  the  ramification  of  the  nerve- 
fibre  at  its  peripheral  extremity;  as,  for  example,  in  the  cornea, 
and  even  in  the  nerve-endings  of  the  motor  nerves  upon  the  so- 
called  end  plates,  where  there  is  to  be  seen  a  complete  separa- 
tion of  the  fibrils  which  have  composed  the  axis-cylinder,  and 
which  end  here  in  the  ultimate  branchings  of  the  axis-cylinder. 
The  occurrence  of  varicosities  upon  the  nerve-fibrils  is 
regarded  as  an  additional  proof  that  they  are  excessively 
fine-walled  tubules  filled  with  fluid.  The  opposing  views  of 
Heitzmann,  Leydig,  Fromann,  and  Nansen,  are,  that  the 
nerve-fibrillse  of  the  axis-cylinder  are  nothing  but  a  repetition 
of  the  reticulum  of  fibrils,  as  seen  in  the  protoplasm  of  all  nerve- 
cells;  the  reticulum  haviiag,  in  this  case,  been  drawn  out  to 
such  an  extent  that  its  meshes  have  become  extremely 
elongated,  and  its  fibrils,  to  all  appearance,  parallel  and  dis- 
tinct.* Nansen  believes  that  the  apparent  fibrils  are  really 
the  optical  longitudinal  sections  of  sheaths  or  septa  of  spongio- 
plasm,  which  subdivide  the  fibre  into  tubes  filled  with  hyalo- 
plasm, which  forms  the  true  conducting  material  of  the  nerve- 
fibre.  Engelmann  f  agrees  that  the  fibrils  appear  to  be  distinct, 
and  are  never  seen  to  anastomose  or  form  a  plexus  of  fibrils. 
He  does  not  see,  however,  how  these  subdivisions  of  the  axis- 
cylinder  can  fulfil  any  separate  function  as  the  conductors  of 
nervous  impulses,  on  account  of  the  closeness  of  their  contact, 
and  the  smallness  of  their  number,  as  compared  Avith  that  of 
the  fibrils  into  which  the  fibre  breaks  up  at  its  peripheral 
termination.  ^  From  the  experiments  of  Engelmann,  by  treat- 
ing the  axis-cylinders  with  nitrate  of  silver,  the  question  as  to 

*  Schafer,  op.  cit.,  p.  144. 

t  "  Pfliiger's  Archiv.,"  xxii.  p.  26. 

:j:  Ladd,  "Physiolog.  Psych.,"  p.  40. 


38  AXATOMY  OF  CORTEX. 

the  continuit}'  of  the  axis-cylinder  through  the  annular  con- 
strictions is  by  no  means  settled.  The  fact  that  the  axis- 
cylinders,  as  a  rule,  when  treated  in  this  Avay,  were  broken  off 
at  the  annular  constrictions  does  not  disprove  their  discon- 
tinuity, and  possibly  there  may  be  exceedingly  minute  hour- 
glass constrictions  at  these  nodes.  These  fibres  are  regarded 
as  composed  of  a  number  of  annular  segments  cemented 
together — each  separate  fibril  placed  exactly  end  to  end  with 
its  fellow  in  the  adjoining  segments — and  possibly  such  an 
arrangement  Avould  accord  with  the  theor}^  which  regards  the 
segments  as  elongated  and  developed  nerve-cells.  Bevan  Lewis 
regards  the  question  of  the  homogeneity  or,  so  to  speak,  of  the 
fibrillated  constitution  of  the  axis-cylinder  as  of  fundamental 
importance,  and  if  we  are  to  look  upon  such  fibrils  as  isolated 
tracts  of  conduction  throughout  their  length,  the  nerve-fibre 
n/  and  the  cell  itself  have  a  far  different  significance.*  He  points 
out  that  visible  continuity  of  the  fibrillse  is  not  essential.  More 
or  less  fusion  may  occur  throughout  the  length  of  the  fibre ; 
and  the  splitting  up  into  fibrillse  may  only  be  observed  at  the 
centric  and  peripheric  terminations  as  an  indication  of  the 
fibrillar  constitution  of  the  axis-cylinder  and  its  lines  of 
molecular  disturbances.  The  significance  of  Fromami's  lines  is 
unknown.  These  lines  are  to  be  seen  as  transverse  markings 
when  the  axis-cylinder  is  treated  with  nitrate  of  silver.  The 
silver  solution  seems  to  penetrate  at  the  nodes,  where  it  stains 
the  cement  substance  and  also  part  of  the  axis-cylinder,  giving 
the  characteristic  striation. 

The    Relation  between    Cells. — The  relation   which 

nerve-cells  bear  to  one  another  is  important  though  still  some- 
A^'hat  doubtful.  Of  late,  however,  much  valuable  work  has  been 
done  in  this  direction,  and  much  evidence  has  been  accumu- 
lated to  show  that — (1)  there  never  is  direct  union  of  nerve-cells 
b}^  distinct  and  comparatively  coarse  fibres ;  (2)  there  is  no 
union  of  nerve-cells  by  means  of  the  ramifications  of  the  fine 
dendrons,  which  formerl}^  were  supposed  to  pervade  the  whole 
grey  matter  of  the  nervous  system  as  a  fine  fibrillar  net-A^'^ork ; 
(3)  every  nerve-cell,  with  all  its  processes,  is  a  distinct  and 
isolated  anatomical  unit.f  Schafer  ^believes  that,  with  great 
*  Op.  cit.,  p.  92.  t  Schafer,  op.  cit.,  p.  147. 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN  CELLS.  39 

probability,  the  only  connection  of  one  nerve-cell  with  another 
is  a  physiological  one,  and  that  it  takes  place  by  the  adjunction 
of  the  arborised  process  or  processes  of  one  nerve-cell,  either 
with  the  cell-body  of  another  cell,  as  in  the  cerebellar  cortex,  or 
by  the  adjunction  and  interlacement  of  the  arborised  processes 
of  one  nerve-cell  with  similar  arborised  processes  of  other  cells, 
as  in  the  olfactory  glomeruli.  In  fact,  ^ve  may  regard  the  basis 
of  the  grey  matter  of  the  nervous  system — the  granular-looking 
substance  in  which  the  nerve-cells  are  embedded — as  an  ex-  \ 
tremely  fine  interlacement  of  ramified  processes,  not  only  of  the  ^ 
nerve-cells  which  actually  lie  in  that  particular  grey  matter, 
but  also  of  nerve-cells  Avhich  lie  in  other  parts  of  the  nerve- 
centres,  or  even  in  the  peripheral  parts  of  the  nervous  system, 
and  which,  on  arriving  at  the  grey  matter,  break  up  into  a  fine 
arborescence  of  nerve-fibrils.  *  The  iieuroglia  or  connective 
basis  is,  according  to  Bevan  Lewis,  composed  of  a  structureless 
or  finely  molecular  hasis-suhstance,  and  connective  cell  and  fibre 
nettcorhs,  which  act  as  a  supporting  and  protective  material, 
and  differ  in  special  qualities  in  different  regions.  In  the  spinal 
cord  the  binding  material  is  in  the  form  of  large-sized  nucleated 
cells,  with  numerous  lengthened  ramifying  processes,  together 
with  a  plexus  of  fine  fibrils ;  whilst  a  structureless  or  very 
finely  granular  material  is  found  here  but  sparingly.  Nearer 
the  periphery  of  the  cord  this  connective  sheath  becomes  more 
fibrillar.  In  the  grey  matter  of  the  cord,  and  in  the  grey 
matter  of  the  cortex,  the  molecular  basis  preponderates  over 
the  fibrillar  elements  of  the  neuroglia ;  whilst  in  the  medulla 
of  the  brain  the  amount  of  connective-fibre  element  exceeds 
that  of  the  molecular  element.  In  affirming  that  this  basis- 
substance  (Punhtsubsianz,  of  Leydig),  is  finely  molecular  and 
structureless,  Bevan  Lewis  hardly,  perhaps,  pays  sufficient 
triljute  to  the  numerous  observations  which  have  accumulated 
since  the  employment  of  the  methods  of  Ehrlich  and  Golgi. 
By  these  methods  the  so-called  PuuJdsubstanz  is  shown  to  be 
made  up  of  the  ramifications  of  fibres  derived  from  the  neuro- 
dendrons of  the  large  motor  nerve-cells.  The  Punktsubstanz 
is  now  generally  regarded  as  being  made  up  of  the  ramified 
processes  and  their  somewhat  varicose  ends.     These  processes 

*  Op.  cit.,  p.  148 


40  ANATOMY  OF  CORTEX. 

/    are  part  of  the  nerve-cells   of  tlie  central  ganglia,  and  also  of 
the  nerve-cells  at  the  periphery.     The  observations  of  Retzius, 

\  liohde,*  and  Biedermannt  also  support  this  view. 

The  cell-elements  of  the  neuroglia  are  of  two  kinds,  and 
these  differ  from  one  another  in  regard  to  size  and  connections. 
The  smaller  of  the  two  kinds  of  cell  vary  from  ^\jb  to  9/^  in 
diameter.  Their  nucleus  is  spheroidal  and  relatively  large,  and 
it  is  surrounded  by  an  extremely  delicate  protoplasmic  invest- 
ment. According  to  Bevan  Lewis,  these  cells  are  to  be  found 
in  three  situations  :  (1)  irregularly  in  the  neuroglia  framework  ; 
(2)  in  regular  series  round  the  nerve-cells  •  and  (3)  in  more  or 
less  regular  succession  along  the  course  of  the  blood-vessels 
(capillary  and  arteriole).  The  larger  cells  are  usually  XZfx  in 
diameter,  and  have  a  relatively  larger  amount  of  protoplasm  as 
compared  with  the  size  of  the  nucleus.  These  cells  are  also  fre- 
cpently  flask-like  in  appearance,  and  may  contain  several  nuclei. 
Their  processes  are  numerous,  extremely  fine  and  radiating.  The 
want  of  affinity  of  these  elements  for  the  staining  agent  (anilin) 
has  led  to  the  conclusion  that  they  are  non-nervous  in  character. 
By  the  employment  of  a  modification  of  Golgi's  method  of 
staining,  Andriezen  has  demonstrated  two  great  morphological 
groups  of  neuroglia  elements,  which  he  has  termed  (a)  neuroglia 
fibre-cells,  and  (6)  protoplasmic  neurogiia-cells.  Of  the  neu- 
roglia fibre-cell  he  describes  two  species.  One  species  is 
situated  in  the  first  layer  of  the  cortex,  and  sends  its  streaming 
fibres  down  into  the  third  layer  :  these  are  the  caudate  fibre- 
cells  (Fig.  4).  The  other  species  is  situated  in  the  medullary 
substance  or  white  matter,  and  has  radiating  fibres  passing  in 
all  directions  :  these  are  the  stellate  fibre-cells. 

The  caudate  fihre-ceUs  form  a  distinct  feature  in  the  first 
laj^er  of  the  grey  matter.  The  bodies  of  the  cells  are  embedded 
in  the  grey  substance,  and  their  apices  are  rounded  and  pointing 
downwards,  thus  giving  rise  to  "  tail-like  tufts "  of  smooth 
fibres,  which  pass  into  the  deeper  layers  of  the  cortex.  From 
the  wider  ends  of  the  bodies  there  arises  a  system  of  radiating 
tangential    fibres.      Andriezen  describes  the    individual    fibres 

*  "  Histologische  Untersuchungen    iiber  das   Nervensystem  der  Poly- 
chaten,"  Breslau,  1887. 

t  "Jenaische  Zeitschr.  f.  Naturwissensch.,"  1891. 


THE  RELATION  BETWEEN   CELLS. 


41 


as  extremely  long,  smooth  contoiTi'ed,  and  of  uniform  calibre 
throughout;  as  being  of  remarkably  iTuiform  thickness  one  with 
another,  nnbranched,  slightly  Avavy  in  their  course  (which  is,  on 
the  whole,  almost  rectilinear  J,  and  as  exhibiting  here  and  there 
small  sharp  curves  and  small  angular  bends,  while  sharp  trans- 
verse fractures  are  not  infrequent.  These  fibres  formed  a  line 
cortical  fretwork,  and  none  of  them  could  be  demonstrated  as 
forming  an  anastomosis,  nor  did  they  appear  to  have  any  special 
vascular  connections. 

The    stellate  jil/re-cells   have    small    and   indistinct    bodies, 
mainly  constituted  by  the  enormous  number  of  fibres  which 


i^n. 


2''^L 


Fig.  4. 

Thkee  Neurowlia  Fibre-Cells. 

fl,  caudate  cell ;  h  and  c,  transitional  forms  between  caudate  and  stellate  fibre-t'ells  ; 
\st  I.,  first  layer ;  2nd  I.,  second  layer  of  cortex. 

(After  Amlrie-en.) 

meet  and  intercross  them.  Many  of  the  neuroglia  fibres  pass 
through  the  cell-body.  According  to  Andriezen  these  are 
remarkably  like  the  fibres  of  the  caudate  fibre-cells  in  calibre 
and  contour,  and  exhibit  the  same  peculiar  sharp  curves  and 
angular  bends  in  a  course  otherwise  straight,  and  also  the  same 
transverse  fractures.  They  stain  of  the  same  colour,  never 
branch  or  anastomose,  are  of  considerable  length,  and  do  not 
exhibit  the  special  vascular  attachments  which  the  protoplasmic 
glia-cell   exhibits. 


42  ANATOMY  OF  CORTEX. 

The  protoplasmic  cell  (Fig.  5)  is  said  b}^  Andriezen  to  occur 
abundantly  throughout  the  grey  matter  of  the  cortex,  and  but 
rarely  in  the  medullary  substance.  It  is  of  mesoblastic  origin, 
and  exercises  a  lymphatic  function.  Its  processes  are  stellate  or 
dendritic  in  arrangement,  and  the  Ijniiph-spaces  which  surround 
its  coarse,  shaggy  processes,  are  in  direct  communication  with 
the  perivascular  lymphatics.  Bevan  Lewis  regards  these  large 
protoplasmic  cells  as  forming  the  actual  extremities  of  the 
lymphatic  system,  and  he  maintains  that  their  thick  processes 
end  in  the  perivascular  or  hyaline  sheath,  whilst  the  finer  reti- 
culated processes  extend  through  the  neuroglia  network. 


.Fig.  5. 

Pkotoplasmic  Glia-cell  from  the  Human  Brain  (1st  Layer  of  Cortkx],  showing 

One  Expanded  Disc-like  Attachment  to  a  Vessel. 

{After  Andriezen.) 

These  protoplasmic  giia-elements  are  regarded  by  Andriezen 
as  being  the  elements  which  exhibit  a  morbid  hypertrophy  in 
pathological  conditions  (alcoholism,  general  paralysis).  The}' 
also  show  further  morbid  activities,  in  the  last  stage  of  which 
their  protoplasm  deposits  numerous  organised  fibrillge,  in  the 
act  of  doing  which  the  protoplasm  proper  is  used  up.  A  scanty 
remnant  may  persist,  ghost-like,  to  mark  the  position  of  what 
was  once  a  protoplasmic  cell-body.*  These  protoplasmic  cells 
are  now  regarded  as  lymph-secreting  cells.  Andriezen  believes 
that  the  cell  absorbs  or  takes  up  lymph  from  the  brain-tissue 
which  it  permeates,  and  that  it  discharges  it,  through  its  peri- 
dendritic  canaliculi,  into  the  perivascular  lymph  spaces. 

*  Andriezen,  "  British  Medical  Journal,"  July,  1893. 


PHYSIOLOGY  OF  THE  NERVE-CELL.  43 

Other  small  glia-cells,  sometimes  mistaken  for  leucocytes, 
with  sharply-defined  nuclei  and  a  small  quantity  of  protoplasm, 
have  been  described  as  surrounding  the  larger  nerve-cells  as 
they  lie  in  their  pericellular  sacs.  Their  function,  however,  is 
unknown.* 

Bevan  Lewis  regards  the  protoplasmic  cells  as  comprising 
the  distal  extension  of  a  lymphatic  system,  and  he  has  clear h^ 
pointed  out  that  arrest  to  the  escape  of  perivascular  lymph  from 
the  cortex  is  immediately  followed  by  a  morbid  development 
and  by  a  hypertrophic  condition  of  these  "  spider  cells,"  The 
question  of  the  significance  and  nature  of  these  cells  in  morbid 
conditions  has  been  freel}^  discussed  of  late.  Bevan  Lewis 
attributes  to  them  an  active  and  aggressive  pai't  in  the  pro- 
duction of  disease,  and  thereby  somewhat  enlarges  the  notion  of 
their  function  as  "  scavengers  "  to  remove  waste  products.  The 
more  generally  accepted  opinion,  however,  is  that  their  role  is 
probably  a  secondary  one,  and  that  they  remove  rubbish  instead 
of  producing  it.f 

PHYSIOLOGY  OF  THE  NERVE-CELL. 

Nutritive  Function. — The  nerve-cell's  most  important 
function  is  that  of  nutrition,  and  the  presence  of  a  nucleus 
seems  to  be  essential  to  this.  When  a  nerve-fibre — i.e.,  a  process 
of  a  nerve-cell — is  cut — no  matter  whether,  in  its  normal  state, 
it  conducts  impulses  to  or  from  the  cell — the  part  which  is  cut 
off"  from  the  parent  cell  must  die.  This  nutritive  function  of 
the  nerve-cell  has  been  insisted  upon  by  Nansen4  who  believes 
that  the  cell-body  has  no  other  function  than  that  of  effecting 
the  nutrition  of  the  whole  cell,  and  more  particularly  that  of 
the  axis-cylinder  process. 

Schiifer  points  out  that  although  the  nutritive  function  may 
be  the  one  essential  function  of  the  nucleated  body  of  the  nerve- 
cell,  there  are  many  cases  in  which  the  body  of  the  cell  also 
serves  for  the  transmission  of  nevve-imiyulses.  As  examples,  he 
gives  the  bi-polar  cells,  through  which  impulses  must  of  neces- 

*  Andriezen,  "Brain,"  1894,  p.  664. 

t  Carter,  "Brain,"  1893,  p.  399. 

%  "  Histological  Elements  of  the  Central  Nervous  System,"  Bergen,  1887. 


44  PHYSIOLOGY  OF  THE  NERVE-CELL. 

sity  pass;  and  the  motor  projection-cells  of  the  spinal  cord  and 
bulb,  in  which  instances  nerve-impulses  are  probably  communi- 
cated to  the  body  of  the  cell  from  the  interlacement  of  nerve- 
fibres,  derived  from  other  cells,  which  enfold  the  body  of  the 
motor  cell. 

Whether  nerve-impulses  reall}^  traverse  the  cell  body  is  still 
open  to  discussion.  Schafer  believes  that  in  some  instances 
nerve-impulses  can  be  transmitted  along  nerve-fibres  without 
traversing  a  nerve-cell  at  all,  and  he  even  goes  a  step  further, 
with  the  conception  that  sensory-impulses  may  become  con- 
verted into  motor-impulses  within  the  PmiMsuhstanz  without 
necessarily  traversing  the  motor  nerve-cells  at  all;  the  latter  being 
only  connected  with  the  Punktsubstanz  by  dendritic  collaterals, 
which  pass  ofi"  from  their  large  neuro-dendritic  processes.  Our 
knowledge  of  the  modes  of  neural  motion — i.e.,  the  methods 
of  propagation  of  nerve-impulses — is  absolutely  untrustworthy, 
and  we  have  yet  to  solve  this  problem.  Hence  we  readily  see 
that  before  an  attempt  is  made  to  find  the  solution  of  psy- 
chical phenomena  in  terms  of  neural  molecular  motion,  we 
must  arrive  at  some  more  definite  conclusions  as  to  the  nature 
and  workings  of  the  material  structure. 

Excitability  and   Conductivity.— The  two  forms  of 

molecular  motion  which  characterise  both  nerve-fibres  and 
nerve-cells  may  be  called  excitability  and  conductivity.  The 
former  is  looked  upon  as  the  motion  originally  set  up  in  the 
nervous  elements,  and  corresponds  to  the  excitation  of  a 
stimulus  ;  the  latter  represents  the  propagation  or  conduction 
of  this  initial  excitation  along  tracts  to  other  regions. 

The  external  and  internal  stimuli,  and  their  relation  to 
excitation,  will  be  dealt  with  later.  Here,  however,  Ave 
must  ask  the  question.  Do  nerve-cells  act  as  generators  of 
nerve-impulses  r  It  is  almost  universally  held  that  they  do,  in 
which  case  such  commotions  are  regarded  as  being  essentially 
automatic.  Let  us  take,  as  an  example  of  automatic  action, 
the  action  of  the  respiratory  centre,  and  let  its  endeavour  to 
eliminate  from  it  all  sources  of  stimulation  from  without.  In 
order  to  do  this  we  must  exclude  the  chemical  stimulation 
which  results  from  varying  conditions  of  the  blood :  we  must 
also  cut  off  the  possibility  of  stimuli  reaching  the  centre  from 


EXCITABILITY  AND  CONDUCTIVITY.  45 

the  peripheiy,  or  from  any  other  regions  whatever.  AVhen  we 
have  direct  proof  that  nerve-impulses  are  generated  in  the 
nerve-cell  under  such  circumstances,  then  only  shall  Ave  be 
able  to  say  that  such  impulses  arise  automaticall}^  The  end 
organs  of  sense  are  excited  specifically  by  their  appropriate 
stimuli ;  the  afferent  nerves  have  their  specific  function  of 
conduction  from  these  end  organs  of  sense;  the  efferent  nerves 
have  their  "specific  function  of  conduction  from  the  central 
organs,  and  we  are  not  in  a  position  to  say  that  nerve-cells 
ever  do  give  rise,  without  some  mode  of  stimulation,  to 
automatic  action.  We  have  already  seen  that  nerve-impulses 
ma}'  be  transmitted  Avithout  passing  through  the  nerve-cell  at 
all ;  and,  further,  the  power  possessed  by  the  bod}^  of  the 
cell  of  transmitting  impulses,  when  stimulated,  is  not  unique 
in  it,  but  is  equally  shared  by  its  processes  under  preciselj^  the 
same  conditions.  "  It  is,"  says  Schafer,  "  a  function  which  is 
not  special  either  to  the  cell  body,  or  to  the  processes,  but 
is  common  to  both."* 

When  a  stimulus  is  transmitted  by  a  ganglion-cell,  so  as  to 
impart  motion,  such  action  is  termed  reflex,  and  the  ganglion-- 
cell  is  said  to  possess  reflex  function.  This  form  of  action  is 
the  simplest  nervous  process  with  which  Ave  shall  have  to  deal. 
Stimulation  and  reaction  are  the  main  conditions  of  nerve  life, 
and  they  are  essentials  of  nervous  function.  Throughout  the 
AA'hole  of  animal  life  Ave  see  this  function  exhibited  in  its 
innumerable  modes  and  degrees.  The  mere  recognition,  hoAA'- 
ever,  of  this  fundamental  property,  as  pertaining  to  all  life, 
does  not  iniplj-  any  explanation  of  the  phenomena  in  terms 
either  physical  or  psychical.  The  phenomenon  is  essentialh' 
the  same  in  its  rudimentary  form  in  the  amoeb£e  as  in  its  more 
complex  developments  through  the  paths  of  conduction  in  man ; 
and  Ave  must  ncA^er  lose  sight  of  this  fact,  that  no  matter  hoAv 
clear  our  knoAvledge  may  become  of  the  excitations  of  stimuli, 
of  the  methods  and  directions  of  their  conduction,  and  of  their 
numerous  expressions  as  forms  of  motion,  Ave  are  in  realit}^  no 
nearer  the  solution  of  the  all-important  problem — the  ultimate 

*  Eckliard  made  a  distinction  between  the  automatic-tonic  and  automatic- 
rhythmic  functions  of  the  ganglion-cells,  according  as  the  movements  over 
which  the  cells  exercised  control  occurred  at  irregular  or  regular  intervals. 


46  PHYSIOLOGY  OF  THE  NERVE-CELL. 

conditions  of  vital  reaction.  On  the  physical  side  we  imagine 
that  within  the  nerve-cell  afferent  impulses  become  modified 
as  to  niimber  and  character  by  profotind  molecular  changes,  so 
that  they  become  transformed  into  efferent  impulses  of  another 
kind.  In  reality,  however,  we  do  not  know  how  the  effects  of 
stimuli  are  conveyed  to  the  ganglion-cell ;  we  do  not  know 
what  becomes  of  the  excitations  within  the  ganglion-cell ;  nor 
do  we  know  how  the  modified  afferent  impulses  are  propagated 
to  their  destinations.  When  we  come  to  consider  the  phe- 
nomena of  mind,  and  discuss  the  various  physiological  theories 
which  have  been  advanced  to  explain  those  phenomena,  we 
shall  see  that  the  endeavour  to  find  a  complete  expression  for 
all  mental  acts  in  physical  terms  is,  to  say  the  least,  premature, 
and  scarcely  warrantable  in  our  present  state  of  knowledge. 

This  leads  us  to  the  question,  Has  the  nervous  process  of  a 
simple  reflex  action  a  concomitant  psychical  process  which 
corresponds' to  it?  When  we  consider  the  plantar  reflex,  which 
is  manifested  even  thoxigh  psychical  life  is  supposed  to  be  non- 
existent, we  are  able  to  answer  in  the  negative.  The  essential 
anatomical  elements  involved  by  the  processes  of  reflex  action 
are  known  to  us,  but  the  nature  of  the  psychical  process,  or  the 
extent  of  its  concomitance  with  the  physical  process,  is  un- 
known. Ziehen  says  our  consciousness,  which  is  alone  able  to 
decide  the  question,  negatives  the  idea  of  such  a  correspondence. 
If  our  foot  is  but  pricked  unawares,  it  is  only  after  the  move- 
ment has  been  executed  that  we  become  aware  of  what  has  taken 
place  by  a  resultant  sensation — the  sensation  of  motion. 

The  fitness  of  reflex  action  has  been  given  as  an  argument 
to  support  the  theory  that  there  is  a  psychical  concomitance 
with  the  physical  process.  In  every  reflex  act  we  are  forced 
to  believe  that  the  physical  process  is  not  confined  to  a 
single  afferent  or  efferent  nerve  or  ganglion-cell.  On  the 
contrary,  many  are  affected ;  and  if  we  are  to  explain  the 
correspondence  of  a  psychical  event,  we  must  establish  a  corre- 
spondence not  of  one  psj'^chical  event  with  one  physical  process, 
but  with  many  physical  processes.  These  physical  processes 
may  lead  to  one  result — namely,  the  motor  effect — and  in  the 
lower  forms  of  reflex  action  the  result  tends  to  remain  the  same, 
no  matter  how  the  sensible  stimulus  may  change  ;  but  the  con- 


REFLEX  ACTION.  47 

sdousness  of  the  excitation,  or  of  its  resulting  effect  (motion), 
mvist  of  necessity  be,  not  the  correspondence  with  one  physical 
process,  but  with  many.  The  lower  forms  of  motor  reaction  do  not 
seem  to  depend  entirely  upon  the  character  of  the  stimuli. 
There  is,  however,  a  general  fitness  in  their  reaction,  and  it  is 
upon  this  fitness  or  unfitness  of  our  reflex  mechanism  that  our 
survival,  as  physical  organisms,  in  great  part,  depends.  The 
argument  that  this  fitness  implies  a  psychical  correlate — i.e., 
that  lower  reflex  acts  which  are  fitting  demonstrate  their 
psychical  nature — is  of  great  importance  as  bearing  upon  the 
evolution  of  the  mind  in  animals  and  man.  Nerve-cells  are 
believed  to  have  the  power  of  diminishing  or  intensifying 
the  nerve-energy  entering  them.  Thus  the  sensory  stimulus 
may  become  more  complicated  in  its  course  of  transmission. 
In  the  higher  form  of  reflex  action — in  which  co-ordination  is 
evidenced — the  concomitance  of  a  psychical  process  has  been 
assumed.  The  nature  of  this  complicated  motor  reaction  has 
given  rise  to  much  discussion  and  difference  of  opinion.  Ziehen 
believes  we  have  no  ground  whatever  for  assuming  that 
these  higher  or  more  complicated  reflex  acts  are  accompanied 
by  psychical  processes.  Those  motor  reactions,  hoAvever,  which 
are  not  the  invariable  result  of  a  definite  stimulus,  but  are  the 
modified  result  of  new  intercurrent  stimuli,  may  be  called 
(lutomatic  acts  or  reactions,  using  the  term  automatic  in  its  more 
restricted  sense,  and  not  including  the  so-called  automatic 
rhythmical  movements  which  are  the  result  of  internal  stimuli. 
The  instance  given  us  of  the  pianist  who  executes  an  often- 
practised  piece  of  music  while  his  thoughts  are  wandering 
elsewhere,  is  of  great  significance,  and  the  explanation  is, 
that  the  visual  image  of  the  notes  and  the  sensations  of 
toiTch,  imparted  by  contact  with  the  keys,  act  without  interrup- 
tion upon  the  execution  of  the  movements  of  the  fingers.  In 
an  example  of  this  kind  the  transmissions  of  the  excitations 
may  be  explained  as  occurring  along  the  lines  of  least  resist- 
ance— along  fixed  paths,  or  so-called  paths  of  conduction. 

Further,  we  may  conceive  the  occurrence  of  structural  modifi- 
cations in  these  paths  of  conduction  with  the  constant  execution 
of  definite  functions ;  but  how  are  we  to  explain  a  still  higher 
form  of  reaction,  in  which  an  individual  is  able  to  extemporise 


48  PHYSIOLOGY  OF  THE  NERVE-CELL. 

and  construct  new  combinations  whilst  liis  mind  is  engaged 
elsewhere,  or,  at  the  most,  is  only  dimly  conscious  of  the  working 
of  his  reflex  mechanism  ?  Such  instances  are  not  uncommon, 
and  the  musician  may  possess  a  reflex  mechanism  of  such 
exquisite  sensibility  that  its  constructive  effects  ma}^  be  wrought 
without  any  obvious  psychical  correlate.  An  analysis  of  this 
phenomenon,  however,  is  permissible,  and  we  shall  see  that, 
in  realitj",  this  constructive  power  is  an  advanced  develop- 
ment of  the  general  fitness  of  reflex  action  j^^^is  intercurrent 
stimuli.  As  in  the  former  instance,  the  pianist's  fingers,  in 
spite  of  his  absence  of  mind,  glide  over  the  notes  in  proper 
succession,  and  his  movements  tend  to  act  in  lines  of  least 
resistance.  No  effort  of  memory  is  involved  in  a  psychical 
sense.  Oo-ordinative  actions,  which  have  been  acqiiired  for- 
merly, now  succeed  each  other  in  a  relatively  new  order  or 
sequence.  Experience  has  taught  the  fingers  how  to  avoid 
consecutive  fifths  and  octaves.  Relative  progressions  and  in- 
tervals are  treated  with  an  equal  amount  of  accuracy.  The 
hands  approximate  to,  and  diverge  from,  each  other,  and  so 
accurate  is  their  judgment  of  distance,  that,  taking  their  clue 
from  one  another,  the  fingers  fall  upon  their  proper  notes 
without  arousing  the  consciousness. 

To  the  5"0ung  musician,  such  a  mechanism  is  almost  incom- 
prehensible, and  were  he  to  attempt  to  illustrate  this  by  his  own 
efforts,  he  would  find,  firstly,  a  failure  in  his  co-ordinative  move- 
ments— his  fingers  would  be  slow  to  adapt  themselves  to  the 
necessary  intervals,  through  insufficient  practice  or  ineptitude  ; 
secondly,  sensations  of  resistance  would  be  experienced,  with  an 
immediate  stimulation  or  arousal  of  consciousness ;  and,  thirdly, 
the  results  of  long  training  in  resolving  discords,  in  weaving  suc- 
cessions of  notes  or  chords  into  rhythmical  form  would  be  want- 
ing. Such  considerations  as  these  lead  us  to  agree  with  Ziehen, 
that  intercurrent  stimuli  may  so  modify  and,  so  to  speak,  im- 
prove upon  the  fitness  of  our  reflex  acts,  that  some  of  the  highest 
and  most  complicated  of  our  actions  may  be  termed  automatic, 
inasmuch  as  they  may  be  performed  ^^ithout  the  concomitance  of 
conscious  phenomena.  The  "  response  movements"  of  Goltz  also 
bear  out  the  same  view,  in  that  they  are  adapted  to  a  definite 
purpose,  and  are  able  to  overcome  opposing  obstacles.     Ziehen 


FUNCTIONS  OF  NERVES.  49 

claims  that  the  first  automatic  movements  to  be  met  with  in 
the  animal  series  have  been  developed  from  reflex  action 
through  the  agency  of  "natural  selection."  He  believes 
that  originally  the  amphibians  which  regularly  avoided  an 
obstacle  suddenly  placed  in  their  way,  thereby  modifying  their 
locomotor  course,  were  just  as  numerous  as  those  which  did 
not.  In  the  struggle  for  existence,  however,  the  former  had 
a  decided  advantage,  for  mechanisms  situated  below  the  cortex 
relieved  the  cerebrum  of  work,  and  other  deeper  nervous 
centres  fittingly  performed  its  functions.  This  fitting  pecu- 
liarity was  inherited,  and  constantly  bred  bj^  transmission, 
while  those  animals  which  were  less  favourably  constituted 
gradually  died  out. 

The  Functions  of  Nerves.— Our  knowledge  of  the 
functions  of  nerves  is  no  more  advanced  than  that  of  nerve- 
cells.  The  various  functions  of  nerve-fibres  have  been  classified 
more  or  less  according  to  the  different  effects  produced  by  the 
conduction  of  nervous  impulses  along  them.  Thus  we  have 
the  follo^^'ing  classes  : — (a)  nerves  of  motion  controlling  the 
muscular  apparatus,  whether  of  smooth  or  of  striated  muscular 
fibres  ;  (/>)  nerves  of  inhibition ;  (c)  nerves  of  secretion  ;  (c/) 
trophic  nerves,  or  nerves  which  have  a  direct  influeaice  upon 
nutrition  ;  (e)  centripetal  nerves  that  have  no  sensory  functions ; 
and  (/)  sensory  nerves,  or  those  the  excitation  of  which  may 
result  in  conscious  sensation.*  With  results  so  different  as 
those  seen  in  the  above  classes,  we  natiirally  ask  ourselves 
whether  those  differences  are  due  to  variations  in  the  modes  of 
transmission  of  the  impulse,  or  is  the  cause  to  be  sought  in  the 
origin  of  the  nerve-commotion  ?  For  the  present  we  are  quite 
unable  to  satisfy  ourselves  in  this  respect,  since  our  knowledge  of 
the  nature  of  the  impulse  transmitted  has  been  shown  to  be  so 
extremely  limited.  Ladd  says,  "  Just  as  the  same  electric  current 
may  pass  along  the  same  kind  of  wire,  and  write  a  message,  or 
ring  a  bell,  or  move  the  legs  of  a  frog ;  just  so,  the  irritation  of 
certain  fibres  of  the  pneumogastric  nerve  results  in  controlling 
the  motion  of  the  heart ;  the  irritation  of  other  nerves  seems  to 
have   no  immediate  metabolic  effect  in  directing  the  secretory 

*  Hermann,  '•  Hanb.  d.  Physiol."  II.,  i.,  p,  200  ff. 


50  PHYSIOLOGY  OF  THE  NEEVE-CELL. 

processes  ;  that  of  still  others  profoundly  modifies  the  nutrition 
of  the  portions  of  the  body  to  which  they  are  distributed." 

A  more  convenient  classification  of  the  nerve  function  of 
conduction  is  that  of  afferent  and  efferent,  according  as  the 
nerves  in  question  serve  as  conductors  of  nerve-impulses 
inv^^ard  toward,  or  outward  from  the  nerve-centres.  Some 
writers  have  supported  the  view  that  afferent  and  efferent 
nerves  have  the  same  specific  mode  of  neural  action  ;  whilst 
others  believe  that  their  respective  molecular  processes  are 
essentially  different.  Our  knowledge  as  yet,  however,  will 
not  warrant  us  in  giving  credence  to  either  of  these  views. 
We  assume  that  impulses  are  propagated  somehow  along  a 
nerve-fibre :  we  assume  that  such  impulses  may  undergo 
variations,  or  even  in  the  case  of  sensory  nerves  be  transmitted 
backwards  ;  and  we  deem  it  possible  that  the  transmission  of 
impulses  is  attended  with  chemical  change  :  but  beyond  this  we 
■  must  confess  to  being  in  a  state  of  complete  ignorance. 

The  nature  of  a  nerve-hnpulse  is  assumed  to  be  that  of  waves 
of  molecular  vibration  or  of  chemical  action,  or  of  the  two  in 
combination.  Schafer  holds,  that  there  is  absolutely  no  evi- 
dence of  the  first  supposition,  although  the  fact  still  remains 
that  there  is  some  evidence  of  chemical  action.  Upon  the 
views  of  d'Arsonval — that  the  electrical  phenomena  of  active 
muscle  and  nerve  are  produced  by  variations  of  surface-tension 
passing  in  a  wave-like  manner  along  the  fibres — Schafer  con- 
jectures that  such  waves  of  pressure,  or  surface-tension  change, 
might  possibly  originate  in  consequence  of  the  rhj^thmical 
contraction  of  the  nerve-cell,  or  of  any  of  its  processes. 

In  illustration  of  this  view  Schafer  says, 

"When  a  fibre  of  the  pyramidal  tract  is  excited,  the  nerve- 
impulses  which  are  generated  in  that  fibre,  and  which  are  pro- 
bably of  the  same  rate  as  the  excitation,  pass  down  to  the  grey 
matter  of  the  spinal  cord,  and  are  there  converted  into  nerve- 
impulses,  which  may  have  a  very  much  less  frequent  rhythm. 
This  can  only,  so  far  as  appears,  take  place  at  the  adjunction  of  the 
terminations  of  the  pyramidal-tract  fibres  with  the  motor  nerve-cells  : 
and  it  would  appear  that  the  motor  nerve-cell  is  stimulated  by  the 
nerve-impulses  which  are  conveyed  along  the  fibre  of  the  pyramidal 
tract,  but  that  it  resj)onds  to  that  action  with  a  very  much  slower 
rhythm  than  that  of  the  assumed  excitation  :  for  the  excitation  may 
be  as  rapid  as  100  per  second,  or  more ;  but  provided  it  is  not  too 


FUNCTIONS  OF  NERVES.  51 

intense,  the  impulses  which  pass  along  the  motor  fibres  are  only  at  the 
rate,  as  shown  by  the  response  of  the  muscle,  of  about  10  per  second. 
The  same  thing  is  seen  when  the  muscles  are  made  to  contract  by  a 
reflex  excitation  of  the  skin.  Such  an  excitation  may  be  very  rapid  or 
it  may  even  be  continuous.  This  rapid  or  continuous  excitation  of  the 
skin  produces  in  the  sensory  fibre  nerve-impulses,  which  may  be 
assumed  to  be  at  least  as  rapid  as  the  excitation  itself,  and  these  are 
■conveyed  to  the  grey  matter  of  the  lower  nerve-centres,  and  are 
converted  into  nerve-impulses  of  a  relatively  slow  rhythm,  as  shown  by 
the  rhythm  of  the  reflex  muscular  response.  This  transformation  may 
be  assumed  to  occur  either  in  the  motor  projection-cell,  or  in  an  inter- 
mediary cell,  if  any  such  intervene  between  the  afferent  fibre  and  the 
motor-cell,  and  the  slow  rhythm  of  the  epileptiform  convulsions  which 
follow  strong  electrical  excitation  of  the  cerebral  cortex,  and  which 
certainly  originate  in  the  cells  of  the  cortex,  furnishes  another  well- 
marked  instance  of  rhythmic  production  of  nerve-impulses  by  nerve- 
<3ells." 

When  we  considered  the  anatomy  of  the  nerve-cell  and  the 
ramification  of  its  processes  we  said,  that  there  was  no  direct 
continuity  between  the  nerve-cells,  except  through  the  con- 
tiguity of  those  ramified  processes.  Schiifer  has  shown  that, 
as  a  consequence,  there  is  always  a  partial  block  to  the  passage 
of  nerve-impulses  at  the  conjunction  of  one  cell  with  another, 
and  he  regards  the  period  of  time  lost  at  this  junction  as 
representing  the  period  of  latent  excitation  of  the  nerve-cell. 
For  an  account  of  what  probably  happens  at  this  point  we 
cannot  do  better  than  again  quote  his  own  words  : — 

"  The  nerve-fibre  to  which  the  excitation  is  applied  carries  nerve- 
impulses,  which  become  spread  out  in  the  fine  arborescence,  which 
forms  the  termination  of  that  fibre  and  which  enwraps  the  motor-cell. 
From  this  cell  nerve-impulses  start  which  are  not  necessarily  of  the 
same  rate  as  those  which  have  reached  the  terminal  arborescence  just 
mentioned,  and  these  new  nervous  impulses  pass  down  towards  the 
muscle  and  cause  its  contraction.  It  is  clear  that  a  change  occurs  at 
the  adjimction  of  the  arborescence  within  the  cell-body.  A  change  in 
rhythm  certainly  occm-s,*  and  this  renders  it  extremely  probable  that 
the  nerve-impulses  which  are  passing  off  from  the  spinal  cord  are 
entu-ely  new  impulses.  If  so,  we  may  look  upon  this  cell  as  having 
been  freshly  stimulated  by  the  impulses  which  have  passed  along  the 
fibre  of  the  pyramidal  tract.  We  may  briefly  consider  in  what  manner 
it  can  be  thus  stimulated.  Since  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  fibrils 
of  the  arborescence  anywhere  touch  the  cell-body  or  its  processes,  we 
must  assume  that  a   space   intervenes  everywhere  between  the  two, 

*  '•Journal  of  Physiology,"  1886,  vol.  vii. 


52  PHYSIOLOGY  OF  THE  NEKVE-CELL. 

very  narrow  indeed,  but  still  a  space  which  cannot  readily,  if  at  all,  be 
traversed  by  nerve-impulses.  It  is  possible  to  suppose  that  the  nerve- 
impulses  reach  the  pericellular  arborescence,  and  produce  by  mere 
induction  new  nervous  impulses  within  the  cell  around  which  they  play. 
But  we  have  no  evidence  that  such  nerve-induction  is  possible.  It  is 
also  open  to  us  to  suppose  that  the  electrical  change  (action  current), 
which  accompanies  the  passage  of  the  nerve-impulses  to  the  arbores- 
cence, may  itself  be  the  excitant  of  the  nerve-cell,  and  that  the  nerve- 
cell  may  respond  to  this  excitation  by  a  rhythmic  chemical  action, 
possibly  molecular  vibration,  or  perhaps  a  combination  of  two  of  these. 
At  all  events,  it  is  probable  that  a  new  process  is  started  within  the 
nerve-cell.  This  does  not  necessarily  follow  from  the  fact  that  there  is 
time  lost  at  the  adjunction,  for  a  partial  block  to  the  passage  of  nerve- 
impulses  and  a  resultant  loss  of  time  may  be  produced  merely  by 
mechanical  means;  but  the  change  of  rhythm  renders  it  extremely 
probable." 

The  function  of  conductivity  of  nervous  iinindses  varies  con- 
siderably under  certain  modifying  conditions.  The  velocity  of 
transmission  of  an  impulse  along  a  human  motor-nerve  is 
estimated  by  Helmholtz  and  Baxt  to  be  100  to  120  feet  per 
second.  In  visceral  nerves  it  is  somewhat  less  (26  feet, 
Chauveau).  Both  elevation  and  lowering  of  the  temperature 
lessen  it.  Anelectrotonus  also  diminishes,  while  cathelectro- 
tonus  increases  it.     (Rutherford  and  Wundt). 

Negative  variation  in  nerve  is  readily  observed  if  a  nerve 
be  placed  with  its  transverse  section  on  one  non-polarisable  elec- 
trode, and  its  longitudinal  surface  on  the  other ;  then,  b}^  stimu- 
lating it  electrically,  chemically,  or  mechanically,  the  nerve- 
current  is  found  to  be  diminished  (du  Bois-Reymond).  Accord- 
ing to  Bernstein,  this  negative  variation  is  propagated  towards 
both  ends  of  a  nerve,  and  is  composed  of  very  rapid,  successive, 
periodic  interruptions  of  the  original  current.  The  amount  of 
the  negative  variation  depends  upon  the  extent  of  the  primary 
deflection,  the  degree  of  nervous  excitability,  and  on  the  strength 
of  the  stimulus  employed.*  Head  found  that  it  increased  with 
the  duration  and  strength  of  the  stimulation,  and  with  the 
drying  of  the  nerve.  The  velocity  with  which  negative  varia- 
tion is  propagated,  as  estimated  by  means  of  the  differential 
rheotome,  is  a  subject  of  great  interest,  but  its  further  con- 
sideration must  be  for  the  present  deferred. 

*  Landois  and  Stirling,  j).  559. 


INTERCELLULAR  CONNECTIONS.  53 

Do  nerve-impulses  pass  backwards?  It  has  been  demon- 
strated by  Gotcli  and  Horsley*  that  impulses  do  pass  down 
afferent  or  sensory  paths,  but  no  matter  how  strong  the 
stimulus  emplo3^ed,  they  do  not  pass  up  the  efferent  or  motor- 
paths.  Schafer  offers  an  explanation  of  this  in  the  anatomical 
arrangement  of  the  terminations  of  the  pyramidal  tract  fibres 
around  the  motor-cells,  as  compared  with  the  mode  of  central 
termination  of  the  sensory  fibres  within  the  grey  matter.  Such 
an  arrangement,  he  conceives,  may  allow  of  the  excitation  of  new 
nerve-impulses  within  the  body  of  the  motor-cell  by  an  electrical 
discharge  from  the  fine  brush  of  pericellular  fibrils  which 
envelopes  the  body  of  the  motor-cell;  whilst  the  electrical  change 
which  accompanies  nerve-impulses  up  the  motor-fibre,  when  this 
is  artificially  stimulated,  may  be  so  diffused  throughout  the 
cell-body  of  the  motor-cell,  as  to  fail  to  stimulate  and  set  up 
nerve-impiilses  in  the  pericellular  ramification  of  fibrils,  Avhich 
represents  the  ending  of  the  fibre  of  the  pyramidal  tract. 

The  most  important  fact  which  has  been  pointed  out  of  late, 
is  that  cells  and  fibres  may  functionate  by  contact  only.  The 
observations  of  Golgi,  Ramon  y  Cajal,  and  Kolliker  seem  to 
demonstrate  that  direct  continuity  of  structure  is  not  essential 
for  the  propagation  of  motor,  sensory,  and  reflex  excitations. 
Kolliker  t  has  demonstrated  the  truth  of  this  in  the  cases  of 
sensory  root-fibres,  which  end  free  in  the  grey  matter  of  the 
cord  and  medulla,  the  terminations  of  lateral  branches  of  the 
nerve-processes  of  many  of  the  cells  of  the  grey  matter,  and 
also  the  terminations  of  the  longitudinal  fibres  and  collaterals 
of  the  anterior  and  lateral  pyramidal  tracts  in  the  grey  matter 
of  the  anterior  horns. 

Intercellular  Connections. — Ramon  y  Cajal  |  holds  the 
view,  that  not  only  may  the  protoplasmic  prolongations  of  the 
nerve-cells  possess  nutritive  functions,  but,  also,  they  may, 
as  well  as  the  body  of  the  cell  itself,  serve  as  conductors  of 
nervous  currents  between  neighbouring  cells  and  elements  at  a 
distance.  From  the  minute  study  of  the  histological  appear- 
ances of  the  connections  of  the  olfactory  nerve-fibres,  and  those 

*  "Phil.  Trans.,"'  1891,  vol.  182,  B. 

t  "  Anat.  Anzeiger,"  1891. 

t  "Crooniaii  Lecture,"  Roy.  Soc,  March  8,  1894. 


54  PHYSIOLOGY  OF  THE  NERVE-CELL. 

of  the  visual  fibres  and  of  the  retinal  cells,  he  drew  the  conclu- 
sion, that  not  only  do  the  protoplasmic  expansions  act  as  con- 
ductors, but  also  that  the  nervous  current  is  inward  toward 
the  cell  in  these  expansions,  and  outwards  from  the  cell  in  the 
axis-cjdinder.  The  nerve-cell  has,  in  the  dendritic  expansion 
and  the  cell-body,  an  apparatus  for  the  reception  of  cvirrents,  an 
apparatus  for  transmission  in  the  prolongation  of  the  axis- 
cylinder,  and  an  apparatus  for  repartition  or  distribution  in  the 
terminal  nervous  ramifications.  From  an  analysis  of  the 
quantitative  and  qualitative  difference  which  cerebral  action 
presents  among  different  animals  and  in  the  same  animal 
species,  Cajal  regards  the  morphology  of  the  pja-amidal  cell  as 
but  one  of  the  anatomical  conditions  of  thought.  But  he  does 
not  believe  that  this  special  morphology  will  ever  siiffice  to 
explain  the  enormous  differences  which  exist,  from  a  functional 
point  of  view,  between  the  pyramidal  cell  of  a  rabbit  and  that  of 
a  man,  any  more  than  between  the  pyramidal  cell  of  the  cerebral 
cortex  and  the  stellate-cells  of  the  cord  or  the  great  sympathetic. 
From  the  fact  that  the  nerve-elements  lose  their  power  of 
proliferating  after  the  embr^^onic  period,  an  increase  in  the 
number  of  cells  is  not  to  be  looked  for  as  an  essential  feature 
in  the  improvement  of  organisation  of  the  brain.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  probable  that,  in  those  regions  which  are 
most  exercised,  mental  activity  involves  a  greater  develop- 
ment of  the  protoplasmic  apparatus,  and  of  the  system  of 
collateral  nervous  paths.  It  is  in  this  way,  says  Ramon  y 
Cajal,  that  associations  already  in  existence  between  certain 
groups  of  cells  would  be  notably  reinforced  by  means  of  the 
multiplication  of  the  minute  terminal  branches  of  the  proto- 
plasmic expansions,  and  of  the  collateral  nervous  paths. 
Further,  absolutelj^  new  intercellulai'  connections  might  be 
established  by  the  formation  of  new  collateral  connections  and 
protoplasmic  expansions.  The  anatomico-physiological  hypo- 
thesis, which  bases  intellect  upon  the  richness  of  the  cellular 
association,  is  open  to  an  objection,  which,  however,  this 
author  fully  recognises.  How  can  the  volume  of  the  brain 
be  maintained  unaltered  if  there  be  a  multiplication,  and  even  a 
new  formation  of  the  terminal  branches  of  the  protoplasmic 
appendices,  and  of  the  collateral  nervous  connection  ?     In  reply 


INTERCELLULAK   CONXECTIOXS.  55 

to  this  objection,  he  states  there  is  nothing-  to  prevent  our  sup- 
posing either  a  correlative  diminution  of  the  cell  bodies,  or  a 
proportional  shrinking  of  those  parts  of  the  brain  \\diose  functions 
are  not  directly  related  to  the  exercise  of  the  intelligence.  We 
may  thus  explain  family  talent  by  supposing  an  hereditary 
transmission  to  the  immediate  or,  by  atavism,  to  the  more  dis- 
tant descendants  of  this  superior  organisation  of  the  connections 
of  the  pj'ramidal  cells.  In  the  case  of  those  men  in  whom 
talent  is  coincident  with  a  brain  of  small  size,  the  nerve-cells 
\\'ould  be  less  numerous,  or,  perhaps,  simply  smaller;  whereas,  on 
the  other  hand,  they  would  present  a  very  complicated  system 
of  protoplasmic  nervous  associations.  The  excessively  large 
brain,  on  the  other  hand,  so  often  associated  with  defective 
intelligence,  or  even  with  imbecility,  would  contain  a  greater 
number  of  cells,  but  the  connections  between  them  would  be 
verj*  imperfect.  As  compared  ^^•ith  the  theory  of  networks,  Cajal 
believes  that  the  theory  of  the  free  branching  of  cellular  expan- 
sions, capable  of  growth,  is  not  only  more  probable  but  also 
more  encouraging.  "A  continuous  network,"  he  says,  "pre- 
established — a  sort  of  fixed  telegraphic  grillwork  into  which  it 
Avould  not  be  possible  to  introduce  either  new  stations  or  new 
lines — it  is  a  thing  so  rigid,  so  immutable,  so  unmodifiable,  that 
it  does  violence  to  the  feeling  which  we  all  have,  that  the  orgfan 
of  thought  is,  within  certain  limits,  plastic  and  susceptible  of 
being  improved,  especially  during  the  period  of  its  development, 
by  well-directed  '  mental  gymnastics.' "  His  comparison  of  the 
cerebral  cortex  to  a  garden  containing  innumerable  trees  (the 
pyramidal  cells),  ^\hich.in  response  to  intelligent  cultivation,  can 
increase  the  number  of  their  branches,  strike  their  roots  over  a 
Avider  area,  and  produce  ever  more  varied  and  more  exquisite 
flowers  and  fruits,  is  open  to  criticism ;  and  we  shall  see  that 
mere  quantitative  variations  in  cerebral  structures  are  not,  in 
reality,  sufficient  to  explain  cpialitative  variations  in  mental 
events. 


56 


CHAPTEE   II. 


Chemical  Pkopeeties  of  Nerve-substance. 

Specific  Gravity — Percentage  of  Water — Albumin — Potash  Albumin^ — 
Nuclein — Neuro-Keratin — Cholesterin — Cerebrin  (Homocerebrin 
Encephalin) — Lecithin — Protagon. 

Vascular  Supply  of  the  Brain. 

Basal  Arterial  System — Anterior  Cerebral  Arteries — Middle  Cerebral 
Arteries — Posterior  Cerebral  Arteries — Arterioles  of  the  Cortex. 

Lymphatic  System  of  the  Brain. 

Ptegulation  of  Cerebral  Pressure  —  Lymph-Cisterns  —  Perivascular 
Channels  —  Cerebro-Spinal  Fluid  —  Pacchionian  Granulations  — 
Subarachnoid  Space — Venous  Circulation — Quantitative  Rela- 
tions between  Blood  and  Cerebro-Spinal  Fluid. 

Brain-Movements. 

Pulsatile  —  Respiratory  —  Vascular  —  Nutrition  of  Nerve-elements  — 
Functional  Hypersemias — Vaso-motor  Centres — Influence  of  the 
Sympathetic. 


CIIExMICAL    PROPERTIES    OF    NERVE-SUBSTANCE. 

When  we  begin  to  study  the  chemical  and  mechanical  pro- 
perties of  nervous  substance  we  find  that  the  facts  with 
which  we  have  to  deal  are  comparatively  few  in  number,  and 
their  import  uncertain.  This  is  not  to  be  wondered  at 
when  we  remember  that  the  nervous  tissues  are  formed  by 
highly  complex  and  unstable  compounds.  Attempts  have  been 
made  to  estimate  the  chemical  nature  of  the  white  and  the 
grey  nervous  matter  respectively,  and  they  have  been  found  to 


SPECIFIC  GRAVITY.  57 

differ  not  only  in  chemical  constitution  but  also  in  specific 
gravity.  It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  it  is  difficiilt 
to  make  an  absolute  distinction  between  the  white  and  the  grey 
substance,  and  more  especially  is  this  the  case  in  investigations 
where  facts  can  be  obtained  only  by  an  examination  of  the 
entire  masses  of  the  brain.  Meynert  recommends  his  method 
of  dissecting  out  the  brain-trunk  and  cerebellum  from  the 
hemispheres  as  peculiarly  adapted  to  such  investigations, 
but  no  one  seems  to  have  adopted  his  suggestions,  and 
our  knowledge  on  this  head  is  exceedingly  fragmentar}^. 
Danilewski  attempted  to  estimate  the  elements  of  the  grey  and 
the  ^vhite  substance  by  means  of  a  comparison  of  the  differences 
in  their  specific  r/ravity.  He  found  that  the  sp.  gr.  of  the 
grey  substance  varied  between  1"029  and  1*038,  and  that  of 
the  white  substance  between  1'039  and  1"043.  In  man,  he 
fovmd  the  relative  proportions  of  both  substances  to  be  37 '7  to 
39  per  cent,  of  grey  substance,  and  61  to  62*3  per  cent,  of  white 
substance ;  while  in  the  dog,  the  grey  and  the  white  substance 
were  present  in  equal  proportions.  Bastian,  W.  Krause,  and 
L.  Fischer  estimated  the  mean  sp.  gr.  of  the  grey  matter  at 
about  1-031,  of  the  white  at  1-036— 1-040.  *  The  explanation 
of  this  difference  in  weight  is  attributed  to  the  relative  amount 
of  water  and  of  solids  which  they  contain.  Gamgee  f  has  given 
a  tabular  statement  of  Weisbach's  investigations  as  to  the 
amount  of  water  entering  into  the  composition  of  the  different 
parts  of  the  central  nervous  system.  From  this  table  the  largest 
percentage  of  water  is  found  in  the  grey  substance  of  the  brain 
(83  per  cent,  approximately).  The  cerebellum  comes  next  with 
about  78-5  per  cent. ;  then  the  medulla  oblongata,  74-5 ;  pons 
Varolii,  73-5 ;  and  the  white  substance  of  the  brain  about 
70  per  cent.  The  cortex  contains  86  per  cent. ;  the  medullary 
substance  of  the  hemisphere  70  per  cent. ;  the  oblongata  74  per 
cent. ;  sympathetic  64  per  cent.  Bernhardt  found  a  smaller 
proportion  of  water  in  the  cervical  region  of  the  cord  (73-05 
per  cent.)  than  in  the  lumbar  (7604).  Another  fact  ascer- 
tained from  the  results  of  Weisbach's  observations  is,  that  in 
man  between  the  age  of  twenty  and  thirty  there  is  a  relatively 

*  Lacld,  "  Physiol.  Psych.,"  p.  -22. 

t  "Physiological  Chemistry  of  the  Animal  Body,"  i.  p.  445,  London,  1880. 


58        CHEMICAL  PEOPERTIES  OF  NERVE-SUBSTANCE. 

higher  percentage  of  Avater  than  between  the  age  of  thirty  to 
fifty ;  and,  further,  that  between  the  age  of  seventy  and  ninety- 
fonr  there  is  a  higher  percentage  than  at  either  of  the  former 
ages. 

Observations  are  niucli  wanted  npon  these  points,  and  it  is 
of  importance  to  us  to  know  under  what  conditions  we  are  to 
expect  an  increase  in  the  watery  constituents,  both  in  tlie 
normal  and  the  morbid  brain.  At  the  present  time  our  know- 
ledge of  the  relative  proportions  of  such  an  increase  in  general 
paralysis  of  the  insane,  and  other  progressive  brain  diseases,  is, 
so  far  as  I  am  aware,  absolutely  nil.  Meynert  regards  the 
preponderance  of  grey  substance  in  animals  compared  with 
the  grey  substance  in  man,  as  dependent  upon  the  excess  of 
amorphous  connective  tissue  in  the  former.  In  man  this  sub- 
stance is  regarded  as  albuminous  in  character ;  hence  Boll 
considers  it  allied  to  connective  tissue,  which,  he  claims,  con- 
tains remnants  of  albumin  derived  from  formative  cells,  and 
only  differing  from  other  connective  tissue  in  the  possession  of 
a  greater  quantity  of  albumin.  Albumin  is  found  both  in  the 
axis-cylinder  and  in  the  substance  of  the  ganglionic  cells. 
Some  of  this  proteid  substance  was  formerly  regarded  as  mj'osin, 
and  presented  characters  not  unlike  those  of  this  compound.  We 
now  know,  however,  from  the  experiments  of  Petrowsky,  that 
this  substance  is  insoluble  in  a  10  per  cent,  solution  of  sodium 
chloride.  The  dilute  solution  of  this  salt  extracts  a  proteid 
from  nervous  matter,  which  is,  however,  precipitated  by  the 
addition  of  much  water,  and  by  a  concentrated  solution  of  the 
salt.  Potash  albumin  and  a  r/lobidin-lihe  substance  are  also 
present.*  Both  Klihne  and  Ewald  found,  that  if  grey  nervous 
matter  was  subjected  to  ai'tificial  digestion,  by  trypsin — the  pan- 
creas ferment — two  substances  remained  midigested,  nuclein 
and  neuro-heratin.  The  latter  being  obtained  b}"  treating  the 
residue  with  caustic  potash. 

The  occurrence  of  nuclein  in  the  grey  matter  is  said  to 
imply  the  presence  of  phosphorus  in  the  ganglion-cells  and 
axis-cylinders.  But  whether  this  substance  (nuclein)  is  actually 
present  in  the  brain  at  all  is  a  matter  of  doubt.  Von  Jaksch 
and  Drechsel  believe  that  it  does  occur,  but  its  existence  has 
*  Landois  and  Stirling,  p.  531. 


NUCLEIN  AND  NEURO-KERATIN.  59 

been  denied  hj  Worm-Miiller  and  Gamgee.  The  formula  of 
this  substance  is  given  as  OggH^gN^PgOgo-  Jaksch  found  an 
excess  of  nuclein  in  the  grey  substance  as  compared  with  the 
white.  He  did  not,  however,  thoroughl)'  isolate  the  grey  sub- 
stance. Geoghegan  also  found  it  in  the  proportion  of  1'4  to 
every  1,000  parts  of  the  entire  cerebral  mass.  From  the 
experiments  of  Meyer  and  Cornwinder — who  proved  that  in 
plants  the  quantity  of  phosphorus  increased  in  direct  pro- 
portion to  the  quantity  of  nitrogen ;  and  the  researches  of 
Bischoff,  who  found  phosphoric  acid  in  a  definite  proportion 
to  the  quantit}^  of  nitrogen  in  the  urine  of  starving  animals, 
whereas,  the  quantity  of  phosphorus  taken  in  was  greater  than 
that  in  the  excretions  if  the  animal  was  properly  fed — A^oigt 
infers  that  the  albuminates  and  phosphates  unite,  so  that  the 
fundamental  connective  tissue,  as  well  as  the  nerve-cells  in  the 
grey  substance  of  the  brain,  must  be  classified  with  those 
substances  which  contain  phosphorus.  In  the  chemical  com- 
position of  the  brain  the  element  of  phosphorus  of  the  gre}' 
substance  constitutes  an  important  factor.  Meynert,  relying 
upon  the  observations  of  Schlossberger,  Bibra,  Pollak,  and 
Jaksch,  estimates  that  a  fresh  brain  contains  0'49  per  cent,  of 
phosphoric  acid  in  its  grey  substance,  and  0'89  per  cent,  in  its 
white  substance.  He  says  ^^'e  are  not  warranted,  however,  in 
concluding  that  the  nervous  sj^stem  contains  an  absolutely 
larger  quantitj^  of  phosphorus.  The  quantity  of  phosphorus  in 
the  nervous  system  cannot  be  gauged  hj  the  amount  of  phos- 
phorus in  the  excretions ;  for,  as  Voigt  has  determined,  the 
entire  nervous  system  of  man  contains  but  12  grains  of  phos- 
phoric acid  as  compared  with  130  grains  in  the  muscles,  and 
1"800  grains  in  the  bones;  and,  besides,  we  know,  ever  since 
Chossat's  starvation  experiments  were  published,  that  during 
starvation  the  nervous  system  sho^^'s  no  appreciable  loss  of 
weight. 

Neuro-heratin  occurs  in  the  corneous  sheath  of  nerve-fibres. 
It  is  also  found  in  the  grey  matter  of  the  nerve-centres,  and  in 
the  retinal  epithelial  cells  and  pigment  cells  of  the  choroid  ; 
but  not  in  the  non-medullated  nerve-fibres.  It  is  a  bodj^ 
containing  much  sulphur,  and  is  closely  allied  to  keratin.  It 
is    soluble    onlv    in    a    hot    concentrated    solution    of    caustic 


60        CHEMICAL  PEOPEHTIES  OF  NERVE-SUBSTANCE. 

potash  and  sulphuric  acid,  and  amounts  to  but  15  or  20 
per  cent,  of  the  dried  residue  of  the  alcohohc  or  ethereal 
extract  of  the  brain.  If  the  fatty  matters  of  the 
medullary  sheath  are  extracted  with  boiling  alcohol  and 
ether,  this  highly  refractile  substance  is  left  as  an  irregular 
network. 

Cholesterin  (CggH^^O  +  H2O)  is  regarded  as  a  monad  alcohol 
which  occurs  in  a  free  state,  especially  in  white  nervous  sub- 
stance. It  is  non-nitrogenous,  taking  the  form  of  fine  needles 
or  rhombic  tables  when  separated  from  its  solution  in  ether  or 
alcohol.  Hoppe-Seyler  says  that  this  body  is  probably  merely 
suspended,  and  not  dissolved,  in  protoplasm ;  that  it  is  common 
to  all  living  vegetable  and  animal  cells,  taking  no  important 
part,  however,  in  the  development  of  the  cells.  It  is  uncertain 
whether  it  is,  as  maintained  by  Hoppe-Seyler,  a  prodvict  of 
decomposition  resulting  from  the  organic  changes  during 
cell  life.  Petrowski  states  that  lecithin  and  cholesterin 
originate  from  the  cells  of  the  grey  substance  and  not 
from  the  white  substance  mixed  with  it.  According  to 
Drechsel,  the  terms  lecithin,  cholesterin,  and  cerehrin  designate 
mixtures  only;  of  which  lecithin  applies  to  the  phosphorised 
substance  which  has  been  dissolved  by  ether  and  alcohol ; 
cholesterin  to  the  ethereal  extract  which  remains  after 
removing  the  lecithin;  and  cerebrin  to  the  substances  which 
form  crystals  in  hot  alcohol,  but  are  insoluble  in  cold  alcohol 
(y.  Meynert). 

Cerehrin  (CggogH^^^yNg^g.  Parous)  is  a  white  powder  com- 
posed of  spherical  granules  soluble  in  hot  alcohol  and  ether, 
but  insoluble  in  cold  water.  It  is  prepared  by  rubbing  vip  the 
brain  into  a  thin  fluid  with  baryta  water.  The  separated 
coagulum  is  then  separated  with  boiling  alcohol  (Miiller). 
Parous  gave  the  name  of  homocerehrin  to  a  substance  which 
he  separated  from  cerebrin,  this  substance  being  slightly 
more  soluble  in  alcohol  than  cerebrin.  He  also  found  a 
"  clyster-like"  body,  soluble  in  hot  water,  which  he  named 
encephalin. 

Lecithin  (C^^Hg^NPOg.  Diakanow)  occurs  as  a  phosphorised 
organic  compound  in  the  matter  of  the  brain,  and  from  its 
decomposition    products    we    obtain    glycero-phosphoric    acid 


PROTAGOX.  61 

and  oleophosphoric  acid.  Lecithin  is  a  salt  of  the  base 
neurin*  Gamgee  believes  that  lecithin  is  only  one  of 
a  group  of  bodies  which  possess  a  higher  percentage  of 
phosphorus  than  protagon.  It  is  soluble  in  water  and 
alcohol,  and  has  been  formed  synthetically  from  glycol  and 
trimethylamin. 

ProtoAion  (CijgH.,^^X^Oo,P)  is  regarded  liy  its  discoverer, 
Liebreich,  to  be  the  chief  constituent  of  the  brain.  It  con- 
tains N  and  P,  and  resembles  cerebrin.  This  substance  is 
considered  by  some  observers  to  be  the  only  well-established 
phosphorised  proximate  principle  of  the  brain.  Ladd  believes 
it  to  be  the  best  representative  that  chemistry  can  as  yet 
present,  of  a  scientific  result  upon  which  to  base  any  attempt 
to  point  out  definite  relations  between  psychical  activities 
and  the  chemical  constitution  of  those  complex  phosphorised 
bodies  which  exist  in  the  central  nervous  mechanism,  and  he 
regards  it  as  highly  probable  that  protagon  is  not  a  com- 
pound or  mixture  of  cerebrin  and  lecithin.  The  contro- 
versy as  to  whether  protagon  is  a  definite  ultimate  chemical 
principle,  or  a  mixture  of  lecithin  and  cerebrin,  has  attracted 
a  considerable  amount  of  attention.  The  former  view  has 
been  upheld  by  Kiihne.  Blankendorf,  and  Gamgee,  vrhilst 
Diakanow,  Hoppe-Seyler.  and  Thudicum  have  advocated  the 
latter. 

From  a  physiological  and  psychological  point  of  view  con- 
siderable importance  is  attached  to  the  discovery  of  the  com- 
position of  these  highly  complex  phosphorised  substances. 
More  recently  Drechsel  has  discredited  the  view  that  pro- 
tagon is  merely  a  mixture,  by  pointing  out  that  the  atomic 
weights  of  lecithin  and  cerebrin  do  not  suffice  to  make  a 
mixture  of  the  nature  of  protagon,  and  that  a  third  substance 
would  have  to  be  shown  to  exist  containing  more  nitrogen  and 
less  carbon.  The  power  the  medullary  substance  of  the  brain 
possesses  of  reducing  osmic  acid,  and  turning  a  black  colour, 
is  regarded  by  Meynert  as  an  additional  reason  for  the  exist- 
ence of  a  body  like  protagon.  He  recognises,  however,  that 
these  peculiar  c[ualities  are  common,  also,  to  the  myelin  forms  of 
protagon  resulting  from  prolonged    contact  of  protagon  with 

*  Landois  and  Stirling,  p.  331. 


62        CHEMICAL  PROPERTIES  OF  NERVE-SUBSTAJS"CE. 

water.  Diakanow  contended,  althongh  apparently  withovit 
proof,  that  protagon  contained  no  phosphorus  at  all.  Blank en- 
dorf,  Gamgee,  and  Drechsel  found  that  the  percentage  of 
phosphorus  was  constant  in  protagon,  although  it  had  been 
re-crystallised  four  or  five  times.  The  hygroscopical  characters 
of  lecithin  and  cerebrin  have  led  Meynert  to  believe,  that  though 
lecithin  and  cerebrin  (the  latter  a  substance  without  phos- 
phorus) exhibit  the  starch-like  properties  and  myelin-like  forms, 
there  is  not  sufficient  ground  to  doubt  the  formation  of  these 
substances  from  the  protagon  of  the  brain,  but  that  their 
marked  hygroscopical  properties  stand  in  broad  contrast  to 
the  lack  of  such  qualities  in  protagon.  "  If  protagon  were 
.a  mixture  of  cerebrin  and  lecithin  it  would  be  difficult  to  con- 
ceive how  a  non-hygroscopical  body  could  result  froin  the 
union  of  two  hygroscopical  bodies.  It  would  be  more  natural 
to  suppose  that  the  hygroscopical  properties  were  the  result 
of  the  more  elaborate  methods  by  which  cerebrin  and 
lecithin  are  recognised  as  secondary  brain  constituents,  while 
protagon,  a  primary  brain  substance,  is  obtained  in  advance 
of  these." 

From  these  brief  considerations  the  student  must  not  for 
one  moment  imagine  that  he  possesses  anything  like  an 
adeqtiate  knowledge  of  the  chemical  constitution  of  nervous 
■substance.  Thudicum*  states,  that  a  quantitative  analysis  of 
the  brain  involves  at  least  three  hundred  quantitative  deter- 
minations of  definite  bodies  or  compounds.  Each  of  the  four 
divisions  of  the  brain,  and  each  of  the  two  varieties  of  tissue— 
the  white  and  the  grey — would  thus  require  at  least  about  fifty 
quantations  for  chemical  characterisation.  Our  account  must 
necessarily  be  limited,  and  we  are  compelled  to  refer  the 
student  to  the  comprehensive  article  by  Thudicum,  in  "  Tuke's 
Dictionary,"  for  details  of  the  group  of  inorganic  principles 
which  have  been  isolated  from  the  brain  ;  and  Ave  hope,  with 
this  author,  that  more  attention  may  be  given  to  this  subject 
by  those  who  make  psychological  medicine  their  especial 
,stndy. 

*  "  Tuke's  Diet.  Psych.  Med.,"  vol.  i.  p.  152. 


VASCULAE  SUPPLY  OF  THE  BRAIN.        63 


VASCULAR  SUPPLY  OF  THE  BRAIN. 

Our  knowledge  in  reference  to  the  vascular  supply  of  the 
brain  has  been  rendered  more  accurate  owing  to  the  inde- 
pendent laboiTrs  of  Heubner  and  Duret.  The  entire  arterial 
supply  of  the  brain  has  been  divided  into  two  systenis^ — viz.,  a 
hasal  and  a  cortical  arterial  system.  Here,  we  shall  have  to 
deal  more  particularly  with  the  latter,  for  a  full  description  of 
the  source  and  mode  of  arrangement  of  the  basal  system  would 
be  beyond  our  object. 

From  the  hasal  arterial  sj/stem,  as  represented  by  the  circle 
of  Willis,  numerous  small  branches  pass  off  nearly  at  right 
angles,  and  enter  the  ganglia  near  the  base  of  the  brain.  These 
are  called  "  terminal"  or  "  end  "  arteries,  because  they  do  not 
anastomose  with  one  another ;  nor  do  they  anastomose  with  the 
vessels  of  the  cortical  arterial  system.  The  anterior  cerebral  and 
the  middle  cerebral  are  the  main  arteries  of  the  forebrain.  The 
former  supplies  the  superior  frontal  and  anterior  two-thirds  of 
the  middle  frontal  convolutions,  and  the  upper  extremity  of  the 
ascending  frontal.  It  has  four  cortical  branches.  The  first 
supplies  the  two  internal  orbital  convolutions  ;  the  second  is 
distributed,  to  the  anterior  extremity  of  the  marginal  convolu- 
tions, to  the  superior,  and  to  the  anterior  portion  of  the  middle 
frontal  convolutions  on  the  outer  surface ;  the  third  passes  to 
the  inner  surface  of  the  hemisphere  as  far  as  the  calloso- 
marginal  fissure  ;  whilst  the  foui'th  goes  to  the  quadrate  lobule, 
and  also  gives  off  a  branch  to  the  corpus  callosum.  On  the 
median  surface,  the  corpus  callosum,  and  the  entire  region 
from  the  frontal  apex  to  the  sulcus  occipitalis,  receive  their 
blood-supply  from  the  anterior,  median,  and  posterior  internal 
branches  of  the  anterior  cerebral  arteries.  The  oniddle  cerebral. 
in  addition  to  the  numerous  small  vessels  which  pass  through 
the  foramina  of  the  anterior  perforated  sjoace  to  the  corpus 
striatum,  the  two  grey  nuclei  and  lenticular  nucleus,  and  to 
the  posterior  part  of  the  nucleus  caudatus,  gives  off  from  its 
main  trunk,  as  it  reaches  the  island  of  Reil,  several  branches. 
These  branches,  as  given  by  Charcot,  are  as  follows  : — (1)  the 


64        VASCULAR  SUPPLY  OF  THE  BRAIN. 

external  frontal,  supplying  the  inferior  frontal  convolution ; 
(2)  the  ascending  frontal  to  the  region  of  the  anterior 
cerebral  convolution ;  (3)  the  ascending  parietal  to  the 
posterior  central  convolution  and  the  superior  parietal  lobule ; 
(4)  the  parietal  to  the  parietal  convolutions ;  and  (5)  temporal 
arteries,  which  ramifjr  over  the  first  and  second  temporal 
convolutions. 

The  2^osterior  cerehral  artery  gives  off  numerous  branches 
in  the  posterior  perforated  spot,  and  others  as  it  passes 
round  the  crus,  both  of  which  sets  pass  into  the  thalami 
optici,  crura  cerebri,  and  corpora  quadrigemina.  It  has  three 
cortical  branches,  one  to  the  anterior  part  of  the  imcinate 
gyrus  and  its  immediate  vicinity ;  one  to  the  posterior  part  of 
the  uncinate  gyrus,  and  the  lower  part  of  the  temporo- 
sphenoidal  lobe ;  and  a  third  to  the  occipital  lobe  on  its  outer 
and  inner  surfaces.*  From  the  distribution  of  the  anterior, 
middle,  and  posterior  cerebral  arteries,  we  see  that  they 
determine  the  blood-supply  to  certain  regions.  Each  main 
artery  gives  off  secondary  and  tertiar}^  branches.  These 
tertiary  branches,  in  their  turn,  give  off  numerous  fine  fila- 
ments, which,  according  to  Duret,  do  not  anastomose  with  one 
another,  although  a  communication  may  take  place,  to  a  certain 
extent,  between  the  branches  of  contigiTOus  areas.  Opinions 
differ  considerably  upon  this  question  of  anastomosis  between 
the  vessels  of  the  cortical  system.  Heubner,  basing  his  opinion 
upon  the  result  of  his  injections,  believes  that  there  is  a  free 
anastomosis  between  the  main  vessels  and  also  between  the 
secondary  branches  of  the  vessels  of  the  cortex,  the  anas- 
tomosis being  effected  through  vessels  not  less  than  a 
millimetre  in  diameter.  He  does  not  believe  that  col- 
lateral compensation  is  effected  solely  through  the  circle  of 
Willis.  In  consequence  of  this  view,  objection  is  taken  to 
the  statement  that  an  artery  supplies  any  definite  region  or 
convolution. 

In  support  of  Heubner's  view,  we  have  the  fact,  admitted 
by  Charcot,  that  in  certain  cases  of  arterial  obstruction  by 
embolism  or  thrombosis,  there  is  an   exemption  from  softening, 

*  H.  Diiret,  "  Archives  de  Physiol.,"  1874,  and  Heubner,  "  Centralblatt 
fiir  die  Med.  Wissensch.,"  1872. 


ARTERIOLES  OF  THE  CORTEX.  65 

which    would    point    to    the    establishment    of    a    collateral 
circulation. 

Duret  contends  that  such  anastomoses  are  absent  or 
extremely  rare,  and  he  maintains  that  it  is  only  through  the 
terminal  filaments  of  the  branchlets  that  communications  occur. 
Such  communications,  however,  he  believes,  may  vary  in 
number  in  different  individuals.  Cohnheim  also  maintains  that 
there  are  no  anastomoses  between  the  larger  branches  of  trunk 
arteries,  but  that  all  the  cerebral  arteries  more  or  less 
resemble  true  terminal  or  end  arteries,  in  that  the^^  onlj- 
communicate  with  other  vessels  through  their  ultimate  capil- 
lary loops.  Meynert  believes  that  the  arteries  supply  definite 
nutritive  areas,  and  that  the  influence  of  the  derivative  net- 
work is  not  as  powerful  as  Heubner  would  have  it ;  further, 
he  regards,  as  of  great  importance  in  cerebral  pathology,  the 
fact  that,  as  there  is  no  derivative  network  beyond  the  circle  of 
Willis,  these  arteries,  because  of  their  shortness,  are  under  the 
more  immediate  influence  of  cardiac  action,  and  are  therefore 
more  liable  to  rupture  than  the  cortical  arteries. 

Arterioles  of  the  Cortex. — In  his  monograph  on  the 
structure  of  the  cerebral  cortex  (1868)  Meynert  showed  that 
the  cortex  was  supplied  with  a  large  number  of  arterioles 
from  the  broad  expansion  of  pia.  All  these  arterioles  were 
about  the  same  size,  and  entered  adjacent  portions  of  brain 
tissue.  Each  one.  moreover,  represented,  to  a  certain  degree,  an 
independent  circulatory  area.  His  observations  led  him  to  the 
belief  that  in  a  mass  of  tissues,  supplied  by  a  smaller  number 
of  larger  arterial  branches,  it  would  be  quite  impossible  for 
differences  of  arterial  blood-supply  to  exist  simultaneously  in 
adjacent  portions  of  that  tissue.  From  this  he  inferred  that  \ 
partial  functional  hyperemia  of  separate  cortical  areas  was  > 
readily  permissible,  and  that  the  so-called  cortical  centres 
could  be  functionally  hyperasmic  at  a  time  when  the  other 
cortical  centres  wei'e  functionally  at  rest.  The  blood-supply 
to^ie  brain^jvould  in  this  way  be  determined  by  the  functional 
hypersemia  of  the  areas  which  A^-^ere  in  a  state  of  activity.  In 
the  pia  mater  we  have,  then,  main  arteries  with  their  branches, 
branchlets,  and  fine  filaments.  From  the  branchlets  and 
filaments  a  great  number  of  minute  arterial  twigs  pass  at  right 


66 


VASCULAE  SUPPLY   OF  THE  BEAIN. 


angles  into  the  cortex.  These  are  commonly  known  as  nutrient 
arteries :  they  are  very  slender,  and  vary  in  length.  The 
longer  twigs  pass  through  the  grey  matter  into  the  white 
substance,  where  they  approach  the  terminal  twigs  of  the 
basal  arterial  system,  but  with  which,  however,  they  are  said 
to  have  no  communication.  In  their  course  they  give  ofi 
numerous  fine  offsets,  which  communicate  with  the  capillary 
network  of  the  shorter  ultimate  arterial  twigs.  These  latter 
usually  terminate  in  a  capillary  network  within  the  grey 
matter  itself.     In  cases  of  embolism  or  thrombosis,  therefore, 


Fig.  6. 

Injected  Cerebellum  of  Cat,  showing  Cortical  Arrangement  of  Blood-Vessels. 

A,  inner  granule  layer ;  B,  layer  of  corpuscles  of  Purkinje ;  C,  external  layer ; 
D,  vessels  of  pia  mater. 


not  only  does  the  grey  matter  of  the  cortex  suffer,  but  also  the 
subjacent  white  matter,  the  amount  of  destruction,  of  course, 
depending  upon  the  size  of  the  vessel  obstructed,  and  the  amount 
of  communication  existing  between  it  and  its  neighbours. 

Meynert  states  that  the  larger  branches  of  the  arteries,  on 
the  surface  of  the  brain,  do  not  lie  within  the  pia,  but  in  the 
subarachnoidal  spaces ;  the  smaller  branches  only  entering  the 
pia.  The  general  relations  between  the  blood-vessels  of  the 
brain  and  the  membranes  is,  as  we  shall  see,  a  question  of 
importance,  as  bearing  upon  the  mechanism  of  nutrition. 
Before  entering,   however,  upon  this  question,  we  must  con- 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  CEREBRAL  ARTERIES.  67 

sider  some  other  anatomical  and  physiological  conditions, 
which  have  a  direct  bearing  upon  the  quantity  and  quality 
of  the  cerebral  blood-siipply. 

^.... _.- -..A 


Fig.  7. 

Short  Nutriejjt  Artery  of  Cortex  Cerebri,  showing  Capillary  Network. 
A,  pia  mater;  B,  white  matter. 

Structure  of  the  Cerebral  Arteries.— The  cerebral 
arteries  have  less  muscular  element  than  those  of  the  body 
generally.  In  the  larger  arteries  the  tunica  adventitia  is 
directly  continuous  with  the  pia  mater ;  whilst,  in  the  smaller 
vessels,  this  sheath  becomes  an  extremely  fine  membranous 
investment,  either  structureless  or  faintly  striated,  and  with 
nucleated  connective-tissue  corpuscles  upon  it.  The  nuclei 
of  these  corpuscles  proliferate  readily.  In  some  conditions 
ampullar  dilatations  are  prone  to  occur.  These  dilatations  are 
regarded  by  Bevan  Lewis  as  being  due  to  separation  of  the 
adventitial  sheath  from  the  tunica  media,  and  a  space  between 
the  two  coats  is  to  be  seen  at  all  times  in  the  angle  formed  by 
the  bifurcation  of  the  vessel. 

The  vessels  of  the  cortex  lie  in  channels — the  perivascular 
channels  of  His — which  are  continuous  with  the  epicerebral 
space.  Numerous  delicate  fibrillar  processes,  w^hich  arise  from 
the  stellate  cells  of  the  cortex,  traverse  this  perivascular  space, 


68        VASCULAE  SUPPLY  OF  THE  BRAIN. 

and  form  connections  with  the  arterial  sheath  (Be\''an  Lewis). 
The  capillaries  of  the  cortex  are  of  extremelj'^  fine  calibre  (not 
over  4yu,  in  diameter,  and  of  less  calibre  than  the  red  blood- 
corpuscles).  Be  van  Lewis  says,  however,  that  we  must  allow 
for  possible  shrinking  of  the  vessel  by  emptying  its  channel, 
as  well  as  for  the  constricting  effects  of  reagents,  and  that  we 
can  scarcely  conclude  that  even  these  minute  ramifications  do  not 
permit  the  passage  of  the  red  corpuscle.  The  same  author  makes 
the  following  observations  tipon  the  structure  of  the  capillaries  : — 

"  The  only  constituents  of  the  arterial  tunics,  which  enter  into  the 
structure  of  the  capillary,  are  the  endothelial  layer  or  intima  and  the 
adventitial  investment.    In  fact,  the  transition  from  the  smallest  artery 


Fig.  8. 

Blood-Vkssel  of  the  Human  Brain,  showin«  seveeal  Neuroglia  Fibre-Cells 

SURROUNDING  IT  AND  FORMING  A   FeLT-WOEK  (PERIVASCULAR  SYSTEM). 

a.  An  encircling  cell ;  p,  perpendicular  neuroglia  fibre  entering  the  sheath  at  right  angles 
from  a  distant  (extrinsic)  cell  (Golgi's  method). — [Andriezen.) 

into  the  larger  capillary  is  indicated  by  the  disappearance  of  the 
muscular  fibre-cell,  and  the  continuation  of  the  channel  as  an  apparently 
homogeneous  tubular  membrane,  with  oval  nuclei  along  its  course,  and 
here  and  there  nucleated  connective  cells  as  the  sole  representative  of 
the  adventitial  sheath.  The  intima,  which  is  a  direct  continuation  of 
the  endothelial  lining  of  the  arteries,  and  by  many  believed  to  be  the 
only   constituent   of    the   capillary,  resembles   that  lining   in    every 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  CEREBRAL  ARTERIES. 


69 


particular,  save  the  number  and  form  of  its  squamous  cells.  These  are 
not  only  fewer,  being  often  reduced  to  two  in  a  transverse  view  of  the 
vessel  or  its  lumen ;  but  instead  of  being  polygonal,  are  more  often 
elongated   into  fusiform   plates. 

"  In  the  smaller  capillaries  the  delicacy  of  the  structure  is  such  that 
it  is  at  first  often  overlooked  until  its  course  is  noticed,  mapped  out 
by  short,  narrow,  spindle-shaped  nuclei,  arranged  alternately  at  regular 
distances  on  the  opposite  sides  of  the  vessel.  In  the  same  direction 
also  will  be  found  rounded  nuclei,  staining  readily  with   aniline  blue- 


FiG.  9. 

Structure  of  Large  Vessel,  showing  Perivascular  Felt-avork  of  Neuroglia  Fibres. 

Dense  on  the  right  side,  less  dense  on  the  left  side  o,  where  it  is  distinctly  separated  from 
the  blood-vessel  by  a  space;  (S,  extrinsic  cells  (Human  Brain,  Golgi's  Method). — 
[Andriezen,  "  Internat.  Monatsch.  fiir  Auat.  u.  Phys.,"  1893,  Bd.  x..  Heft,  ii.) 


black,  sometimes  aggregated  into  groups  or  arranged  in  linear  series 
at  very  ii-regular  intervals  along  the  vessel.  These  are  the  derivatives 
of  the  adventitial  sheath,  and  are,  therefore,  always  external  to,  and 
placed  upon,  the  fusiform  nuclei.  They  are  often  the  best  guide  to 
the  direction  of  the  capillary  loops  around  the  nerve-cell." 


70  THE  LYMPHATIC  SYSTEM  OF  THE  BRAIN. 

THE  LYMPHATIC  SYSTEM. 

To  the  study  of  the  Ijmiphatic  system  of  the  brain  consider- 
able importance  is  attached,  and  our  knowledge  upon  this 
difficult  subject  may  be  attributed  chiefly  to  the  labours  of 
Obersteiner,  Key,  Retzius,  Schwalbe,  Meynert,  and  Bevan 
Lewis.  Obersteiner  was  the  first  to  define  the  nature  and  con- 
nections of  the  lymph-channels  in  the  brain;  whilst  Bevan 
Lewis  is  to  be  credited  with  having  given  us  the  latest  and  most 
advanced  details  as  to  the  relationship  of  the  cortical  nerve- 
cells  to  these  lymph-channels,  both  in  health  and  disease.  It  will 
simplif}^  the  subject,  if  we  diverge  for  a  moment  to  consider  the 
relationship  of  the  cranium,  with  its  rigid  Avails,  to  the  brain. 

Regulation  of  Pressure  of  Cerebral  Fluid. — Meynert 

believes  that  the  skull  regulates  the  pressure  of  the  fluid  within 
its  cavity,  and  hence  becomes  an  important  factor  in  the  nutri- 
tion of  the  brain.  He  states  that  if  the  brain  were  surrounded 
merely  by  rigid  cranial  walls,  a  partial  change  in  the  distribution 
of  arterial  blood  would  be  conceivable.  A  functional  increase, 
however,  would  be  possible  only  upon  one  of  two  conditions — 
viz.,  a  corresponding  collateral  arterial  diminution,  or  a 
transfer  of  venous  blood  in  the  direction  of  the  sinuses.  For 
the  first  condition,  he  thought  it  would  be  difficult  to  explain 
an  appropriate  mechanism.  A  venous  transfer  would  be 
altogether  too  slow,  and  there  could  not  be  any  continuous 
action,  for  the  repulsion  of  the  venous  current,  dependent  upon 
the  respiratory  movements,  would  give  rise  to  a  frequently 
interrupted  flow  of  venous  blood  in  the  brain.  The  cranial 
cavity  is  not  entirely  filled  by  the  brain  ;  it  includes,  in  addi- 
tion, a  number  of  spaces  filled  with  lymphatic  fluid.  The  dura 
mater  is  separated  from  the  arachnoid  b}^  a  comparatively  small 
space,  which  is  lined  b}^  endothelium.  This  space  communi- 
cates with  the  lymphatic  glands  of  the  neck,  and  with  the  sub- 
dural spaces  which  do  not  immediately  surround  the  nerve- 
roots,  but  do  so  in  common  with  the  arachnoid,  and  are  con- 
nected with  the  hanphatic  spaces  of  peripheral  nerves.*  As  an 
example,  we  have  the  communication  between  the  auditory 
labyrinth  and  the  subdural  space  through  the  spaces  which 
*  Meynert,  "  Psj'chiatry,'"  p.  218. 


LYMPH-CISTERNS.  71 

surround  the  auditory  nerve.  In  the  tissue  of  the  dura  itself 
thei*e  are  also  lymph-spaces  which  are  connected  with  the 
subdural  space. 

Lymph-Cisterns. — The  explanation  of  the  formation  of 
the  so-called  "  cisterns '"  is  to  be  found  in  the  relationship  of 
the  arachnoid  membrane  to  the  pia.  They  are  connected  by 
means  of  a  network  of  threads  and  trabeculee  of  connective 
tissue,  and  at  the  base  of  the  brain  by  means  of  perforated 
membranes.  At  the  summit  of  the  convolutions  the  threads 
of  this  network  are  narrower  than  over  the  sulci ;  whilst,  at  the 
base  of  the  brain  where  the  subarachnoidal  spaces  are  dilated, 
there  may  be  no  trabeculas.  Meynert  enumerates  the  following- 
cisterns  which  belong  to  the  surface  of  the  cortex  : — 

"  The  space  of  the  fossa  Sylvii,  wliich  is  merely  spanned  by  the 
arachnoid,  and  a  space  which  separates  it  from  the  dorsal  surface  of  the 
corpus  callosum,  which  space  extends  on  the  basilar  surface  as  far  as 
the  linea  terminalis  (of  the  central  grey  substance)  situated  beneath  the 
corpus  callosum.  Farther  back  on  the  basilar  surface  we  come  upon 
the  cy sterna  chiasmatis  and  the  cy sterna  interci-uralis,  the  latter  dividing 
again  into  a  superficial  and  a  deep  reservoir.  From  the  cysterna 
intercruralis  and  to  the  outer  side  wide  subarachnoidal  spaces  extend 
across  the  crus  cerebri  to  the  corpora  quadrigemina — i.e.,  from  the 
basilar  surface  to  the  dorsal  surface  of  the  trunk,  the  cysterna  ambietis. 
Short  trabeculse  unite  the  subarachnoidal  space  just  over  the  corpora 
quadrigemina  to  the  surface  of  the  latter.  The  most  extensive  sub- 
arachnoidal space  on  the  dorsal  side  is  the  cysterna  magna  cerebello- 
medularis,  extending  from  the  dorsal  surface  of  the  oblongata  to  the 
cerebellum,  on  the  superior  surface  of  which  exactly  the  same  relations 
obtain  as  over  the  convolutions  of  the  cerebrum. 

"  Behind  the  corpora  quadrigemina,  the  arachnoid  of  the  cystenia 
ambiens  ascends  to  the  upper  wall  of  the  cysterna  corporis  callosi.  The 
flexion  of  the  cerebellum  over  the  oblongata  produces,  furthermore,  a 
fold  in  the  pia  on  its  way  from  the  cerebellum  to  the  oblongata,  the 
two  laminae  of  this  fold  giving  rise  to  the  tela  choroidea  of  the  fourth 
ventricle.  The  foramen  Magendie  leads  through  the  pia  from  this 
ventricle  into  the  subarachnoidal  space  of  the  spinal  canal.  In  regard  to 
the  third  ventricle,  it  is  to  be  remarked  that  its  membranous  tela  does 
not  correspond  to  the  superior  wall  of  the  primary  cerebral  vesicle, 
but  that  the  only  vestiges  of  this  which  remain  are  the  epithelial  cells 
of  the  plexus  choroideus,  at  the  lateral  margin, and  on  the  inferior 
surface  of  the  velum." 

In  the  brain-cortex    all    the    vessels    are    inclosed   within 
channels,  known   as  the  iierivascular  channels  of  His.     These 


72  THE  LYMPHATIC  SYSTEM  OF  THE  BKAIN. 

channels  are  noticeable  in  hardened  sections,  and  most  markedly 
so  in  cases  of  atrophy  of  the  cortex.  Bevan  Lewis  differs  from 
several  authors  in  that  he  believes  they  are  not  the  lymph- 
channels  proper,  but  simply  channels  in  the  brain-substance, 
without  an  endothelial  lining,  and  having  free  communication 
with  the  epicerebral  space.  He  says  these  channels  appear  to 
be  equivalent  to  an  involution  of  the  naJced  surface  of  the 
brain,  and  yet  the  epithelial  elements  of  the  epicerebral  surface 
are  not  continuous  along  this  tubular  canal.  Their  appearance 
of  being  lined  by  endothelial  cells  is  said  to  be  due  to  the 
adventitial  sheath  of  the  blood-vessels,  which  becomes  "  closely 
appressed  "  to  its  limiting  channel.  The  nerve-cell  has  around 
it  a  somewhat  similar  space,  which  Bevan  Lewis  has  termed 
the  pericellular  sac,  and  he  regards  these  as  genuine  sacs,  and 
not  mere  artificial  gaps  in  the  brain-substance.*  The  peri- 
vascular channels  and  pericellular  sacs  communicate  with  the 
perivascular  lymph-spaces  of  the  adventitia.  The  study  of  the 
lymph  connective  system  is  of  great  importance  in  cerebral 
pathology;  but  it  is  yet  to  be  shown  how  the  individual 
elements  of  this  system  undergo  morbid  changes  and  cause 
alterations  in  the  movements  of  the  lymph.  Bevan  Lewis  has 
summarised  his  account  as  follows : — 

"The  lymphatic  system  of  the  brain  consists  of — 

"  (1)  A  distensible  lymphatic  sheath,  loosely  applied  around  the 
arterioles  and  venules,  containing  numerous  nucleated  cells  in  its 
texture — the  adventitial  lymph-sheath — the  whole  being  included  within  a 
non-distensible  channel  of  the  brain-substance,  devoid  of  endothelial 
lining — \hQ  perivascular  channel  of  His. 

"  (2)  A  continuation  of  the  cellular  elements  of  this  sheath,  loosely 
applied  to  the  arterio-capillary  plexuses,  still  contained  Avithin  a  peri- 
vascular channel,  which  now  exhibit  along  the  capillary  loop  sac-like 
dilatations — the  pericellular  sacs,  within  which  the  nerve-cell  lies, 
surrounded  by  plasma. 

"  (3)  A  system  of  plasmatic  cells  with  numerous  prolongations,  which 
are  always  in  intimate  connection  with  the  adventitial  lymph-sheath, 
and  which  drain  the  areas  between  the  vascular  branches — termed  the 
lymph  connective  elements. 

"Finally,  if  we  take  a  comprehensive  view  of  the  whole  system, 
the  channelled  vascular  tracts,  the  saccular  arapullse  along  the  capillary 
tube,  the  canaliculai'-like  formation  of  the  lymph-connective  elements,  all 

*  Bevan  Lewis,  "  Mental  Diseases,"  p.  823. 


PACCHIONIAN  GRANULATIONS.  73 

embedded  in  a  homogeneous  matrix  of  neuroglia,  we  cannot  but  be 
struck  by  the  sponge-like  arrangement  of  the  cortex,  and  the  facilities 
so  offered  for  the  free  circulation  of  plasma  throughout  its  most 
intimate  regions." 

Cerebro-Spinal  Fluid. — The  cerebro-spinal  fluid  in  the 
brain  is  secreted  by  the  epithelium  of  the  choroid  plexuses  in 
the  lateral,  the  third,  and  the  fourth  ventricles,  and,  possibly, 
from  the  general  epithelial  linings  of  these  cavities.  The  fluid 
is  transparent,  and  has  a  specific  gravity  of  about  1010.  The 
view  that  the  lymph-cisterns  act  as  a  water  cushion  to  minimise 
the  shock  to  the  brain  and  to  compensate  variations  in  blood- 
pressure,  is  supported  by  the  fact  that,  in  cases  of  spina  bifida,  the 
cerebro-spinal  fluid  can  be  readily  driven  from  the  spinal  canal 
into  the  cranial  cavity  by  pressure  on  the  tumour,  so  that  it 
may  be  assumed  that  a  passage  may  be  as  readily  effected  in 
the  reverse  direction  (Bruce).*  Before  entering  upon  a  descrip- 
tion of  the  various  brain-movements,  it  would,  perhaps,  be  well 
to  consider  briefly  some  points  in  regard  to  the  Pacchionian 
granulations. 

Pacchionian  Granulations. — Meynert  looks  upon  these 

bodies  as  prolongations  of  the  subarachnoidal  spaces.  They 
occur  in  the  course  of  all  sinuses,  but  more  particularly  along- 
side of  the  sinus  longitudinalis.  The  cerebro-spinal  fluid  is 
removed  from  the  subarachnoidal  space  by  several  channels. 
Much  of  it  passes  into  the  corresponding  space  round  the 
spinal  cord,  and  escapes  outwards  along  the  subarachnoidal 
sheath  of  the  spinal  nerves.  The  remainder  passes  along  the 
corresponding  sheaths  of  the  cranial  nerves,  or  is  excreted  by 
the  Pacchionian  bodies  into  the  superior  longitudinal  sinus  in 
the  dura  mater  (Bruce). 

The  suharacJmoidal  space  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  true  serous 
cavity,  or  lymph-space.  Langer  describes  the  sinuses,  and  the 
veins  adjacent  to  them,  as  situated  in  the  substance  of  the 
dura,  and  arranged  in  such  a  manner  that  the  veins  of  the 
antei'ior  portions  of  the  hemispheres  meet  with  the  veins  of 
the  posterior  lobes  in  the  walls  of  the  sinus  longitudinalis,  as 
though  the  former  (veins)  stood  in  the  relation  of  vasa  vasorwn 
to  the  latter. 

*  "  Tuke's  Diet.  Psych.  Med.,"'  p.  172. 


y 


74  THE  LYMPHATIC  SYSTEM  OF  THE  BRAIN. 

Meynert  lias  shown  that  a  definite  brain-pressure  forces  the 
serous  fluid  from  the  subarachnoidal  space  into  the  subdural 
spaces,  whence,  by  a  process  of  filtration,  it  empties  into  the 
veins  and  sinuses. 

"The  posterior  cerebral  veins  take  a  similar  longitudinal  course 
forward,  between  the  layers  of  the  dura,  so  that  the  cerebral  veins 
empty  into  the  sinus  for  a  distance  of  only  2  cm.,  and  about  below  the 
middle  of  the  parietal  vertex.  The  Pacchionian  formations  push 
forward  into  the  cerebral  veins  as  diverticula  of  the  subarachnoidal 
spaces.  The  veins  lie  intradural,  and  the  subarachnoidal  spaces  are 
shut  off  from  the  subdural  space. 

"The  subarachnoidal  spaces  communicate,  moreover,  with  the  lymph- 
channels  of  the  peripheral  nerves,  which  encircle  the  roots,  as  does  the 
dura  also.  From  these  subarachnoidal  spaces  we  can  throw  injecting 
iiuid  into  the  lymph-space  surrounding  the  optic  nerve,  into  the  peri- 
lymphatic space  of  the  labyrinth,  and  the  lymphatic  vessels  of  the  nasal 
mucous  membranes." 

The  venous  circulation  within  the  cranium  presents 
several  peculiar  features.  The  blood  flows  along  the  longi- 
tudinal sinus  towards  the  occiput,  and  hence  its  course  is 
opposed  in  direction  to  the  blood  issuing  from  the  cortical 
veins,  which  open  into  the  sinus  in  a  forward  direction.  Hence 
the  fact,  that  the  blood  which  enters  the  brain  by  ascending 
arteries  reaches  the  sinuses  by  ascending  veins,  is  made  use  of 
to  explain  the  occurrence  of  thrombosis  in  these  vessels — the 
explanation  being,  that  here  gravitatioi;  is  opposed  to  the  flow 
of  blood.  In  this  way,  morbid  processes  affecting  the  scalp — 
such  as  erysipelas,  caries,  or  carbuncle — may  readily  affect  intra- 
cranial structures  by  means  of  the  communication  with  intra- 
cranial veins — e.f/.,  those  of  the  nose,  the  facial  through  the 
ophthalmic,  the  mastoid  veins,  and  the  veins  of  the  diplooe. 
Cerebral  anaemia  is  sometimes  produced,  owing  to  hydrostatic 
causes — e.r/.,  if  a  person  who  has  been  in  bed  for  a  long  time 
and  whose  blood  is  small  in  amount,  be  suddenly  raised  into 
the  erect  position.  Such  a  condition  is  also  not  infrequently  at- 
tended by  loss  of  consciousness.  Liebermeister  regards  the  thy- 
roid gland  as  a  collateral  blood-reservoir,  which  empties  its  blood 
towards  the  head  during  such  changes  of  the  position  of  the  body. 

Quantitative  Relation  between  Blood  and  Cerebro- 
spinal Fluid. — There   is  an  intimate  relation   bet^^•een   the 


BRAIN-MOVEMENTS.  75 

amounts  of  cerebro-spinal  fluid  and  blood  within  the  cranial 
cavit}-.  When  more  blood  passes  in,  some  cerebro-spinal  fluid 
passes  out,  and  rice  versa.  Formerly  it  was  taught  that,  as  the 
skull  is  a  rigid  box,  and  as  the  brain-substance  and  its  fluids  are 
practically  incompressible,  no  variation  in  the  amount  of  blood  in 
the  brain  could  be  possible.  This,  however,  is  now  proved  to  be 
erroneous.  The  average  quantity  of  cerebro-spinal  fluid  within 
the  cranium  is  about  two  ounces,  and  if  it  be  suddenly  with- 
drawn, epilepsy  or  convulsions  may  be  produced  ;  or,  if  it  be 
rapidly  increased  in  amount,  coma  may  result.  This  fluid  has 
also  important  mechanical  functions,  protecting  delicate  parts 
of  the  brain  from  injury,  and  by  distributing  vibratory 
impulses  it  insulates  the  nerve-roots.  The  presence  of  the 
cerebro-spinal  fluid  is,  as  pointed  out  b}'  Donders,  of  great 
importance  in  regulating  the  pressure  uniformly  when  brain- 
movements  occur,  so  that  every  s3'stolic  and  expiratory  dilata- 
tion of  the  blood-vessels  is  concentrated  upon  those  parts  of  the 
cerebral  membrane  which  do  not  offer  any  resistance.  These 
movements  almost  disappear  when  the  fluid  is  abstracted. 

The  forece  (jlandulares,  according  to  Langer  and  Trollard, 
are  venous,  cavernous  spaces  produced  by  the  wearing  away  of 
the  vitrea,  and  are  to  be  found  in  drunkards,  in  the  senile,  and 
in  the  subjects  of  heart  disease.  They  are  not,  says  Meynert, 
direct  impressions  of  the  Pacchionian  dilatations  of  the  sub- 
arachnoidal spaces.  Meyer  regarded  their  life  as  compensatory, 
inasmuch  as  they  dilate  with  ana?mia  and  collapse  when  there  is 
a  full  current  of  blood  within  the  brain.  The  increase  and 
diminution  of  the  amount  of  blood  and  cerebro-spinal  fluid 
within  the  cranial  cavity,  is  a  question  of  gi'eat  importance  as 
bearing  upon  the  nutrition  of  the  brain  ;  and  it  is  b}^  means  of 
the  orderly  working  of  this  mechanism  that  waste  products  are 
transferred  from  the  circulation  to  the  lymph-vessels. 


BRAIN-MOVEMENTS. 

The  movements  of  the  brain  are  of  three  different  kinds  : — 
(a)  iiiulsaiile  movements  communicated  from  the  pulsations 
of  the    large    basal    cerebral    vessels ;    (Jj)  respiratory    move- 


76  BRAIN-MOVEMENTS. 

ments,  so  that  the  brain  rises  during  respiration  and  falls 
during  inspiration ;  and  (c)  vascular  elevation  and  depres- 
sions which  alternate,  and  are  due  to  periodic  dilatation 
and  contraction  of  the  blood-vessels.  This  last  is  a  peri- 
staltic arterial  movement,  regulated  by  the  vaso-motor  centre, 
and  occurring  from  two  to  six  times  per  minute  (Meynert). 
These  movements  have  been  investigated  chiefly  over  the 
fontanelles  of  children,  and  where  the  membranes  have  been 
exposed  by  trephining.  Burckhardt's  observations  were  made 
upon  four  patients  with  defective  skulls.  The  peristaltic  move- 
ments of  the  arteries  dependent  upon  the  vaso-motor  centre  are 
believed  by  Hering  and  others  to  be  the  result  of  the  respira- 
tion of  the  vaso-motor  centre  itself.  These  movements  are 
common  to  blood-vessels  everywhere  throughout  the  body,  but, 
according  to  Hering,  the  stimuli  causing  such  contractions  do 
not  always  accumulate  sufficiently  to  exert  an  influence  with 
every  respiratory  act ;  in  which  case  the  rhythm  of  the  move- 
ment is  altered  by  other  influences  acting  upon  the  vaso-motor 
centre  by  stimulation  of  the  sensory  nerves.  In  the  case  of  the 
brain,  which  is  surrounded  by  rigid  cranial  walls,  and  by  the 
arachnoidal  spaces,  and  from  the  fact  that  it  is  placed  under 
considerable  pressure,  Meynert  believes  a  modification  of  this 
general  vascular  movement  is  effected.  The  vascular  wave, 
according  to  Mosso,  is  independent  of  the  pulse  and  respiratory 
waves;  but  it  may  exert  an  influence  upon  the  respiratory  and 
pulse  waves.  The  advance  of  the  peristaltic  wave  within  the  rigid 
cranial  walls  aids  in  the  establishment  of  currents  of  brain  fluid, 
whereby  metabolic  waste  products  are  carried  off"  through  the 
lymphatic  fluids.  The  brain  and  the  fluid  surrounding  it  are 
subjected  to  a  certain  mean  pressure,  which  depends  upon  the 
blood-pressure  within  the  vascular  system.  Naunyn  and 
Schreiber  showed  that  cerebral  pressure  must  be  slightly  less 
than  the  pressure  within  the  carotid  before  the  symptoms 
proper  to  pressure  on  the  brain  occur.  The  vascular  wave 
causes  a  hemispherical  protrusion  of  the  cerebral  mass,  followed 
by  a  bowl-shaped  contraction.  The  height  and  length  of  this 
wave  are  not  equal.  The  wave  flattens  in  a  cool  bath,  and  it  is 
raised  in  a  warm  bath.  It  is  most  distinct  and  regular  during 
sleep ;  during  the  hours  of  waking  its  regularity  is  interfered 


PULSATORY  MOVEMENTS.  77 

with.  Moderatel}'  waniT  baths  of  77-79°  Fahr.  lessen  the 
number  of  waves,  but  make  each  wave  longer ;  warm  baths 
increase  the  number  and  shorten  the  single  waves  (Meynert). 
In  one  of  Burckhardt's  patients  a  sudden  fright,  followed  b}"  an 
unexpected  noise,  caused  a  rapid  rise  in  the  curve,  followed  by 
a  fall.  Whilst  another  patient  was  plaj'ing  at  chess  low  but 
long  extended  waves.  Avith  a  few  larger  perturbations,  were 
noted.  He  also  found  that  while  doing  arithmetical  work 
elevations  were  noticeable  at  the  beginning  and  at  the  end, 
whilst  in  between  depressions  were  more  frequent.  Meynert 
concludes,  that  all  stimuli  acting  upon  the  sensorium  create 
vascular  movements,  and  disturb  the  periodic  changes  in  the 
condition  of  the  vessels ;  and  that,  of  the  psychical  influences 
which  may  cause  elevation,  the  emotions  act  more  readil}-,  and 
bring  about  a  greater  change  than  purely  intellectual  processes. 

Great  variations  of  brain-pressure  are  almost  constantly 
attended  by  sj'-mptoms  of  disturbances  of  the  nutrition  of  the 
brain.  If  the  pressure  is  moderate  the  symptoms  may  remain 
latent,  or  only  show  themselves  as  headaclie,  vertigo^  weakness, 
or  disturbance  of  the  sensor}-  functions.  During  sleep  the\<^ 
circulation  of  the  lymphatic  fluid  in  the  brain  effects  the 
removal  of  the  waste  products,  and  this,  to  a  great  extent, 
is  dependent  upon  the  vascular  movements  of  the  brain. 
Burckhardt  regards  the  influence  of  this  vascular  wave  as  far  more 
powerful  than  that  of  the  respiratory  wave  :  the  irregularities 
of  vascular  wave-movements,  which  occur  when  the  individual 
is  awake,  indicate  that  in  certain  parts  of  the  brain  there  is  an 
independence  of  action,  just  as  we  know  to  be  the  case  in  reflex  ^ 
arterial  constrictions  on  the  surface  of  the  body. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  so-called  ^^  indm,tor[i  movements  "  of 
the  brain.  From  the  circle  of  Willis  the  arteries  ascend  and 
their  currents  are  directed  upwards,  as  is  also  the  case  with  the 
venous  currents.  The  arteries  at  the  base  are  the  first  to  en- 
large with  the  blood-flow  ;  then  the  wave  passes  into  all  the 
branches  of  the  vessels.  The  brain,  however,  is  only  able  to 
enlarge  concentrically  toward  the  ventricles,  on  account  of  the 
resistance  offered  by  the  roof  of  the  skull  to  the  swelling  of  the 
convolutions.  This  concentric  swelling  of  the  brain  is  almost 
constant,  and  the  pressure  is  neutralised  in  the  ventricles  in 


78  BRAIN-MOVEMENTS. 

part  by  the  circumstance,  that,  with  the  increased  pressure 
arising  from  the  flow  of  blood  through  the  shorter  arteries  of 
supply  to  the  basal  portion  of  the  ventricles,  there  is  first  an 
equivalent  displacement  of  the  cerebro-spinal  fluid  within  the 
ventricles ;  then,  when  the  engorgement  of  the  walls  of  the 
ventricles  diminishes,  the  blood-supply  through  the  longer 
arteries  to  the  cortex  is  forced  by  the  cranial  walls  downwards 
toward  the  dorsal  aspect  of  the  ventricles.  In  this  way  less 
active  movement  of  the  cerebro-spinal  fluid  is  brought  about 
than  if  the  basal  and  dorsal  aspects  of  the  ventricles  were  engorged 
simultaneously.  The  cerebro-spinal  fluid  finds  its  way  through 
the  foramen  of  Magendie,  and  to  all  the  cisterns  in  general,  so 
that  the  concentric  pressure  influences  not  only  the  contents 
of  the  ventricles,  but  also  all  the  lymph-spaces.  Meynert  also 
points  out  that  the  engorged  parenchymatous  arteries  effect  the 
exudation  of  lymphatic  fluid  from  those  perivascular  spaces 
which  lie  between  the  blood-vessels  and  the  adventitia,  so  that 
the  systolic  pressure  is  still  further  neutralised.  Coincidental 
with  the  basilar  constriction  the  upper  parts  of  the  brain  are 
pressed  against  the  cranial  roof,  and  with  the  increased  pressure 
within  these  parts  resistance  is  offered  to  the  advance  of  basilar 
cerebral  fluid.  In  addition  to  the  escape  of  fluid  through  the 
foramen  of  Magendie,  during  the  first  phase  of  the  vascular 
systole,  a  certain  amount  flows  into  the  veins  of  the  choroid 
plexus.  With  the  systole  of  the  superior  cerebral  arteries,  we 
have  the  simultaneous  occurrence  of  the  basal  diastole ;  but  the 
displaced  cerebral  fluid  does  not  now  return  to  the  ventricle. 
In  consequence  of  the  swelling  of  the  basal  portion,  the  diastole 
pushes  the  fluid  past  the  upper  cerebral  parts  (which  have  been 
removed  to  a  distance  from  the  skull  by  the  arterial  systole) 
into  the  Pacchionian  bodies  and  the  sinuses,  and  then  into  the 
basilar  nerve-sheaths  and  into  the  cervical  glands.  The  return 
of  the  ventricular  fluid  is  still  further  prevented  by  the  increase 
of  ventricular  fluid  secreted  by  the  choroid  arteries  during 
their  diastolic  dilatation.  Quinke  injected  cinnabar  into  the 
spinal  subarachnoidal  spaces,  and  found  that  the  greater  portion 
penetrated  as  far  as  the  Pacchionian  glands,  the  dura,  the 
sheaths  of  the  cerebral  nerves,  and  to  the  cervical  glands,  but 
not  to  the  ventricles,  or  perivascular  spaces  between  the  pia  and 


NUTEITION  OF  NERVE-ELEMENTS.  79 

media  of  the  arteries.  The  explanation  of  this,  as  offered  by 
Burckhardt  is,  that,  if  an  artery,  lying  in  the  midst  of  a  peri- 
vascular space  which  communicates  with  the  subarachnoidal 
spaces,  contracts,  lymphatic  fluid  will  pass  from  the  parenchyma 
into  the  perivascular  space  (in  a  direction  opposed  to  the  course 
of  the  injection  from  the  cerebral  surface  into  the  perivascular 
space),  because  the  passage  to  the  subarachnoidal  spaces  on  the 
convexity  of  the  brain  is  now  unobstructed  ;  but  if  this  artery 
in  the  perivascular  space  be  dilated,  it  obstructs  this  passage  by 
filling  out  the  above  space,  and  no  cinnabar  will  be  allowed  to 
enter  the  subarachnoidal  spaces.  During  this  stage  the  lymph- 
current  is  impelled  toward  the  veins,  as  by  the  pulse  wave,  which, 
with  less  success  during  cardiac  systole,  enables  parenchyma- 
tous lymph-fluid  to  be  absorbed  by  the  veins,  and,  during  cardiac 
diastole,  opens  up  the  passage  into  the  subarachnoidal  spaces. 

The  act  of  inspiration  causes  a  fall,  whilst  that  of  expiration 
causes  an  elevation  of  the  pulse-wave.  This  influence  is  most 
noticeable  during  forced  efforts  of  expiration,  and  depends  upon 
variations  in  the  venous  pressure.  This  venous  pressure  acts 
retrogressively  upon  the  cerebral  venous  sinuses.  Starting 
from  the  torcular,  the  stasis  occurs  first  in  the  longitudinal 
sinus,  and  the  comparatively  short  sinus  rectus  ;  hence  the  veins 
of  the  cortex  are  sooner  affected  than  the  longer  veins  of  the 
choroidal  plexus.  As  the  result  of  this  venous  pressure,  con- 
centric swelling  of  the  hemispheres  occurs,  although  less 
frequently  than  was  the  case  with  the  pulse-wave ;  the  venous 
pressure  also  acts  from  the  vertex  downward,  instead  of  from 
the  base  upward,  as  does  the  pulse-wave.  From  these  brief 
considerations  of  the  arterial  supply,  the  movements  of  the 
brain  during  systole  and  diastole,  and  the  movements  of  the 
cerebro-spinal  fluid,  we  can  gain  some  idea  as  to  the  mechanism 
of  nutrition  of  the  brain ;  but  as  yet  we  know  little  or  nothing 
of  the  modes  of  nutrition  of  the  individual  nervous  elements,  and 
it  is  to  this  part  of  our  subject  that  we  must  now  pay  attention. 

Nutrition  of  Nerve-Elements.— The  fact  that,  when 
motor  or  sensory  nerves  are  cut,  they  begin  to  die  at  their 
central  or  peripheral  ends  respectively,  suggests  to  us  the 
presence  of  some  mode  of  nutrition  other  than  that  dependent 
upon  the  plasma  of  the  blood.     This  other  condition  is  found  in 


)C 


80  BRAIN-MOVEMENTS. 

tlie  influence  of  stimulation  and  conduction.     The  non-medul- 
lated  tissue  of  the  axis-cylinder  exercises  a  strong  attraction  for 
nutritive  plasma,  but  this  is   rendered  more   eflective  by  the 
mediation  of  stimulation.     During  the  processes  of  stimulation 
and  conduction  the  axis-cylinder  is  better  able  to  attract  nutri- 
tion from  the  plasma,   and  to   increase  the   chemical  changes 
involved  b}'  the   intensity  of  the  nerve-current.     The  sheath  of 
the  axis-cylinder,  consisting,  as  it  does,  of  horny  and  glutinous 
substances,  has  been  compared  by  Meynert  to  a  sieve,  which 
allows  the  nutritive  plasma,  as  much  of  it  at  least  as  is  attracted 
from  the  white  substance,  to  fall  upon  the  axis-cylinder,  not 
with  the  intensity  of  a  full  current,  but  with  the  more  delicate 
force   of  rain  ;    and   we  must    regard  the  partial   endosmotic 
permeability    of  the    neuro-keratin    sheath    as    an    apparatus 
regulating  the  physiological  needs  of  the  axis-cylinder.    Rumpf 
has  shown  that  the  nutrition  of  the  axis-cylinder  depends  in 
part  upon  stimuli,  and  therefore  upon  the  axis-cylinder's  connec- 
tions with  a  peripheral  sense  organ  and  a  central  organ.     In  the 
brain  there  is  a  larger  proportion  of  water  than  in  nerve-fibres 
generally,  and  possibl}^  this  fact  has  some  relation  to  the  lessened 
tension  (through  absence  of  the  sheath  of  Schwann),  and  conse- 
quent greater  exudation  of  plasma.   Owing  to  the  denser  supply 
of  blood-vessels  to  the  cortex  there  is  also  a  relatively  larger 
supplj^  of  plasma  to  the  axis-cylinder.     In  the  grey  substance 
generall}^,  there  is  a  larger  percentage  of  water  than  in  the  white, 
and  the  nutrition  of  the  former  is  almost  entirely  dependent  upon 
its  blood-supply ;  thus,  in  this  way,  it  differs  somewhat  from  the 
indirect  and  independent  mode  of  nutrition  of  the  axis-cylinder. 
The  nerve-cell  is  also  surrounded  by  a  perforated  keratin- 
sheath  which  regulates  its  supply  of  nutritive  plasma.     In  the 
grey  substance  of  the  cortex  there  is  less  danger  of  suffering 
from  anaemia  than  elsewhere.     This  is  to  be  accounted  for  by 
the  independence  of  the  ganglion-cells  and  the  axis-cylinder, 
which,  under  the  influence  of  attraction,  stimulation,  and  con- 
duction, are  rendered,  to  a  certain  extent,  safe  from  vascular 
disturbances.     The  nutritive  function   of  the  nucleus  over  the 
albuminoid  substance,  is  insisted  upon  by  Meynert,  who  also 
infers  a  direct  relation  between  albuminoid  substances  and  the 
percentage  of  phosphorus.     The  influence  of  the  nucleus  upon 


YASO-MOTOR  CENTRE.  81 

the  nutrition  of  the  cell  has  already  been  alluded  to  ;  and  as 
nuclein  contains  a  relatively  large  proportion  of  phosphorus, 
its  influence  by  some  is  regarded  as  of  importance,  especially  in 
the  regeneration  of  tissues  in  pathological  processes. 

In  order  that  we  may  be  better  able  to  understand  the 
mechanism  of  the  so-called  '•functional  hypenemias "  of  the 
brain,  we  must  return  to  the  consideration  of  some  "^  anatomical 
and  physiological  condition  of  the  cerebral  mechanism,  upon  the 
efficiency  of  which  the  nutritive  processes  of  the  brain  in  great 
part  depend. 

The  vaso-motor  centre  is  looked  upon  as  the  chief  y 
centre  which  supplies  all  the  non-striped  muscles  of  the  arterial 
system  with  motor  nerves,  termed  "  vaso-motor,"  "  vaso-con- 
strictor,"  and  "  vaso-hj^ertonic  "  nerves.  Under  ordinary  con- 
ditions this  vaso-motor  centre  is  in  a  condition  of  moderate 
rhythmical  tonic  activity.  When  this  area  is  stimulated  there 
occurs  a  general  increase  of  arterial  blood-pressure  through 
contraction  of  all  the  arteries.  Paralysis,  on  the  other  hand, 
causes  a  fall  of  blood-pressure  through  relaxation  and  dilatation 
of  all  the  blood-vessels.  This  centre  can  be  excited  directl}'  or  >^ 
reflexh*.  It  shares  also,  with  some  other  centres  in  the  medulla 
oblongata,  the  functions  of  dominating  or  controlling  similar 
centres  placed  elsewhere.  The  assumption  that  there  is  a 
continuous,  regulating,  and  inhibitor}^  action  of  this  centre 
upon  the  heart  through  the  fibres  of  the  vagus,  is,  according  to 
Bernstein,  not,  in  reality,  sufficient,  for  there  is  a  reflex  condition 
effected  through  the  abdominal  and  cervical  sjanpathetic.  All 
the  three  cervical  sympathetic  ganglia,  in  some  degree,  supply  C 
vaso-motor  power  to  the  spinal  cord  and  brain.  The  superior 
cervical  ganglion,  by  its  connection  with  the  lenticular  ganglion, 
has  power  over  the  movements  of  the  iris ;  by  its  association 
with  other  cranial  nerves  it  takes  part  in  the  secretion  of  saliva, 
tears,  nasal,  and  pharyngeal  mucus ;  it  supplies  vaso-motor 
fibres  to  the  external  carotid  and  its  branches ;  it  also  sends 
branches  to  the  internal  carotid  which  it  follows  within  the 
skull,  innervating  the  dura  mater,  the  vessels  of  the  anterior 
and  middle  brain,  both  basal  ganglia  and  cortex,  the  latter 
through  the  vessels  of  the  pia  mater.  It  is  not  yet  definitely 
known  whether  this  superior  cervical  ganglion  is  the  only  vaso- 

'  6 


82  BEAIN-MOVEMENTS. 

motor  centre  for  these  portions  of  the  brain,  or  only  the 
chief  one.  When  there  is  ablation  of  this  ganglion,  vaso- 
motor influence  may  gradually  be  supplied  by  nerves  from 
the  cervical  plexus,  by  fibres  from  the  pons,  medulla  oblongata, 
and  upper  part  of  the  cord.  The  middle  cervical  ganglion 
supplies  vaso-motors  to  the  thyroid  gland,  and  to  the  larynx 
and  part  of  the  trachea.  The  inferior  ganglion  supplies 
vaso-motors  to  the  vertebral  and  basilar  arteries  and  their 
branches.* 

It  has  not  yet  been  proved  how  far  we  may  regard  the 
cortex  as  possessing  vaso-motor  centres.  With  arterial  systole 
we  have  vaso-constrictor  influence,  and  with  the  arterial 
diastole  we  have  vaso-dilator  influence  at  work  ;  but,  as  pointed 
out  by  Meynert,  mental  processes  are  not  interrupted  by 
arterial  systole ;  therefore  they  must,  to  a  certain  degree,  be 
independent  of  functional  hyperaemia.  Meynert  thinks  that 
this  independence  of  mental  acts  may  possibly  be  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  cortex  itself  acts  as  a  vaso-motor  centre  in  its 
relations  to  subcortical  centres;  and,  arguing  from  the  evidence 
of  the  influence  of  cerebral  activity  over  the  vaso-motor  centre, 
he  concludes  that  the  vaso-motor  nerves  of  the  cortex  do  not 
reach  the  blood-vessels  at  once,  but  that  they  are  interrupted 
in  the  subcortical  vaso-motor  centre ;  and  that  these  sub- 
cortical centres  must  be  constantly  in  a  state  of  activity  for  the 
vascular  innervation  of  the  cortex. 

Every  sympathetic  ganglion  is  a  vaso-motor  centre,  possess- 
ing some  independence  of  action,  biit  more  or  less  controlled 
by  a  higher  ganglion  of  this  extensive  system.  The  vaso- 
motor nerves  of  the  cranium  come  from  the  cervical  sympa- 
thetic ganglia,  and  are  arranged  in  two  plexuses  in  the  vessels 
of  the  brain — one  in  the  external  tunic,  and  one  in  the  middle 
tunic  of  the  artery.  The  veins,  possessing  less  muscular  tissue, 
receive  fewer  nerve-filaments.  Whether  the  nerve-filaments 
terminate  outside  the  muscular  elements,  as  maintained  by 
Krause,  or  penetrate  into  the  interior  of  the  smooth  fibres,  as 
believed  by  Henocque  and  Arnold,  is  a  problem  which  we  are 
not  prepared  to  solve.  The  terminal  fibres  of  these  small 
plexuses  of  the   arteries   end  by  punctiform   swellings  in  the 

*  'Long  Fox,  "  Influence  of  the  Sympathetic  on  Disease,"  p.  13. 


VASO-MOTOR  CENTRE.  83 

nucleus,  or  in  the  fibre ;  or  extend  along  the  interstices  of  the 
fibre  cells.  In  the  veins  their  terminations  are  similar ;  and  in 
the  capillaries  the  fibrils  probably  end  in  the  nuclei  of  their 
walls.  8ome  ganglion-cells  are  interposed  in  a  bundle  of 
sympathetic  nerve-fibres ;  others  have  prolongations  of  their 
siibstance  on  the  axis-cylinder  of  the  nerve-fibre.  A  partial 
.independence  of  these  sympathetic  ganglia  is  manifested  in 
various  phenomena — viz.,  (a)  nutrition  may  be  carried  on  in  spite 
of  destruction  of  the  cerebro-spinal  centres,  supporting  the 
view  of  Goltz,  that  local  centres  are  able  to  maintain  the  tone 
of  arteries  within  their  own  immediate  vicinity ;  Qi)  reflex 
irritation  of  vaso-motor  nerves  may  be  limited  to  the  par- 
ticular tissue  supplied,  as  seen  in  the  continuance  of  the 
heart's  action  after  its  separation  from  the  body ;  .  (c)  vaso- 
motor neuroses  of  the  extremities ;  automatic  and  reflex 
co-ordinate  movements  and  secretions  are  known  to  occur 
apart  from  the  influence  of  the  cerebro-spinal  centi"es  ;  (d)  the 
stimulus  of  the  blood  itself  acts  reflexly  upon  vascular  tone, 
and  the  phenomena  of  blushing,  and  local  hypersemias  further 
indicate  the  partial  independence.  When  we  consider  the 
partial  independence  in  the  action  of  this  complicated  sym- 
pathetic system,  and  the  dependence  of  action  brought  about 
by  association  with  the  cerebro-spinal  system,  we  readily 
appreciate  the  dictum  that.  "The  use  of  the  central  cord  of  the 
sympathetic  is  to  make  the  animal  and  the  vegetative  worlds 
known  to  each  other,  so  that  revictualling  should  be  dispro- 
portionate to  waste."*  The  independence  of  the  vaso-motor 
portion  of  the  sympathetic  is  also  shown  in  many  conditions  of 
shock  or  injury  to  this  system.  Woakes  has  pointed  out  the  \\ 
relation  betw^een  injury  of  the  nerves  of  the  brachial  plexus 
and  loss  of  consciousness,  the  resulting  shock  of  the  former  j 
being  propagated  to  the  inferior  cervical  ganglioii,  and  thence 
to  the  vertebral  artery,  and  all  its  branches.  We  can  state,  y 
therefore,  that,  under  certain  conditions,  sympathetic  ganglia 
may  act  as  independent  centres  for  reflex  acts.  The  import- 
ance of  this  fact,  in  the  production  of  variations  in  the 
vaso-motor  conditions  in  the  brain,  cannot  be   over-estimated, 

*  Fox,  op.  cit.  p.  43. 


84  BRAIN-MOVEMENTS. 

especially  when  we  seek  to  understand  the  etiology  of  brain 
disorders.* 

It  is  not  part  of  our  object,  however,  to  enter  upon  the 
numerous  questions  of  innervation  of  the  vessels,  and  space 
will  not  permit  us  to  consider  all  the  conditions  under  which 
contractions,  dilatations,  and  reflex  vaso-motor  effects  occur. 
The  statement,  that  the  mutual  interaction  of  vaso-dilator  and 
vaso-constrictor  nerv-es,  j:>Z'm.s  the  factor  of  cerebral  inhibition, 
are  the  main  elements  in  the  regailation  vaso-motor  tone  in  the 
brain,  must  suffice  for  the  present.  At  the  same  time,  bearing 
in  mind  that  the  local  circulation  is  regulated  mainly  by  the 
motor  nerves,  which  issue  from  the  ganglia  of  the  sympathetic, 
and  extend  along  the  arteries  throughout  their  entire  course. 
This  vascular  tone  is  altered  by  pathological  changes  in  the 
vessels  themselves,  as  in  atheroma,  fatty,  calcareous,  and 
amyloid  degenerations,  senility,  syphilis,  alcoholism,  etc.,  and 
it  is  of  importance  that  we  should  take  accoimt  of  the  action 
of  the  sympathetic  system  as  a  causal  factor  of  pathological 
conditions,  which  are  known  to  exist  with  various  morbid 
mental  states. 

Althann,t  more  than  twenty  years  ago,  pointed  out  that 
fulness  of  cerebral  vessels  was  no  measure  of  the  good  or  bad 
blood-supply  of  the  nervous  elements ;  but  that  oxygen  was 
more  readily  brought  to,  and  carbonic  acid  more  readil}^ 
removed  from,  these  elements  under  such  conditions.  He 
regarded  this  as  depending  upon  (a)  the  chemical  constitution 
of  the  blood,  and  (Ji)  the  quantity  of  blood  that  passes  through 
the  capillaries  in  a  given  time.     For  an  even  and  satisfactor}- 

*  Long  Fox  believes  that  in  those  forms  of  hysteria  that  depend  upon 
definite  uterine  or  ovarian  lesion,  the  deep-seated  sense  of  pelvic  uneasiness, 
nearly  similar  in  position  and  sometimes  equalling  in  intensity  the  sacro- 
coccygeal pain  attending  piles,  the  paresis  of  intestine  evinced  by  meteor- 
ismus,  the  increased  flow  of  limi^id  urine,  the  vomiting,  the  hiccough,  the 
frequent  diarrhoia,  the  palpitation,  the  faintness,  the  sighing  respiration,  the 
globus,  the  difficulty  in  deglutition,  the  blushing,  the  dilated  pupil,  the  tears, 
the  tinnitus,  the  excitation  of  the  emotional  area,  the  occasional  epilepsy, 
melancholia,  mania,  to  which  such  patients  are  liable,  are  all  examples  of 
afferent  irritation  carried  to  the  solar  plexus,  and  thence,  from  ganglion  to 
ganglion  of  the  sympathetic  chain,  to  the  three  cervical  ganglia ;  thence  to 
the  eye,  the  cerebral  vessels,  and  the  medulla  oblongata. 

t  Geigel,  "  Virchow's  Archiv,,"  vol.  cxix.,  p.  93. 


VASO-MOTOll  CENTRE.  85 

flow  of  arterial  blood  through  the  capillaries  Geigel  employed 
the  term  ''eudia3morrhysis,"  whilst  too  little  blood  (true  anaemia 
cerebri)  and  too  much  blood  (true  hypersemia  cerebri)  were 
termed  "  adiaemorrhysis "  and  ''hyperdisemorrhysis"  respec- 
tively. The  same  author  stated  that  the  velocity  of  the  circu- 
lation of  the  blood  in  the  capillaries  of  the  brain  is  directly 
proportional  to  the  arterial  pi'essure,  and  inversely  proportional 
to  the  resistance  ;  and  that  the  resistance  depends  directly 
upon  the  amount  of  intra-cranial  pressure  ;  therefore  (as  Fick 
has  shown  that  the  intra-cranial  pressure  is  equal  to  the  intra- 
arterial pressure,  less  the  resistance  which  the  tension  of  the 
arterial  walls  oppose  to  it),  (1)  if  the  contraction  force  of  the 
arterial  wall  gets  less,  intra-cranial  pressure  will  increase  and 
the  velocity  will  become  less — i.e.,  dilatation  of  an  artery  causes  \/^ 
anaemia,  and  not  hypersemia ;  (2)  contraction  of  the  arteries  of 
the  b)rain  will  increase  the  velocity  of  the  blood-flow  through 
its  capillaries.  Again,  suppose  the  heart  acts  more  powerfully, 
raising  intra-arterial  pressure,  while,  at  the  same  time,  the 
arterial  walls  increase  their  contraction,  intra-cranial  pressure 
will  be  the  same,  or  e'l'eater  or  less,  according  as  the  arterial 
contraction  ecjuals,  or  is  less  or  greater  than  the  rise  of,  intra- 
arterial pressure.  Hence,  with  increased  contraction  of  ai'torial 
walls,  intra-cranial  pressure  decreases  and  capillaries  widen. 
On  the  other  hand,  with  diminished  contraction  of  arterial 
walls  intra-cranial  pressure  is  raised,  the  capillaries  are  com- 
pressed, and  the  amount  of  blood  circulating  through  them  is 
diminished.* 

Geigel  believes  that  the  symptoms  of  cerebral  pressure  are 
really  due  to  the  interference  with  the  circulation  which  the 
pressure  produces,  and  are  not  the  direct  result  of  the  pressure 
on  the  cerebral  substance  ;  and  in  support  of  this  he  points 
out  that,  provided  the  cerebral  circulation  is  not  interfered 
with,  the  brain-sxibstance  Avill  withstand  a  pressure  of  two 
atmospheres  and  more  without  harm.  The  symptoms  of  high 
intra-arterial  pressure  and  of  ana3mia  are  very  similar,  because 
the  supply  of  oxygen  and  the  removal  of  carbonic  acid  are 
equally  interfered  with  in  the  two  conditions.  Geigel  regards 
the  effects  of  embolism  or  rupture  of  a  vessel  as  somewhat 
*  Haig,  "  Brain,"'  ]).  315. 


86  BRAIN-MOVEMENTS. 

similar ;  embolism  or  rupture  of  one  intra-cranial  artery  pro- 
ducing temporary  diminution  of  circulation  in  all  the  other 
intra-cranial  vessels,  and  the  apoplectic  shock  of  embolism  is 
thus  due  to  diminution  of  blood-supply.     . 

Lewy*  believes  that  this  argument  holds  good  only  under 
certain  pathological  conditions,  but  denies  that  it  does  so  for 
physiological  conditions.  His  views  are  :  (1)  that  an  intra- 
cranial artery  cannot  expand  M^ithout  taking  space  from  other 
vessels,  the  space  thus  taken  being  so  small,  that  in  physiolo- 
gical conditions  it  affects  the  cerebro-spinal  fluid,  but  not  the 
capillary  circulation  at  all ;  (2)  that  when  an  artery  enlarges, 
the  blood  meets  with  less  resistance  in  passing  through  it ; 
and  possibly  the  lessened  resistance  in  the  artery  more  than 
compensates  for  an}^  slight  increase  of  resistance  in  the  capil- 
laries due  to  the  expansion  of  the  artery ;  (3)  that,  conversely, 
contraction  of  an  artery  may  inci"ease  the  resistance  more 
than  the  corresponding  relaxation  of  capillaries  diminishes  it ; 
(4)  that,  when  the  arteries  all  enlarge  together,  the  lymph  gets 
out  of  the  way,  and  the  capillaries  are  so  numerous  that  they 
will  bear  a  large  amount  of  compression  before  they  are  so  far 
closed  as  to  hinder  the  circulation ;  and  under  these  conditions 
narrowing  an  artery  diminishes  the  blood-stream,  and  widen- 
ing an  artery  increases  it,  so  that  arterial  hypersemia  is  possible. 
But  beyond  a  certain  point  this  does  not  hold,  for  if  we  imagine 
the  arteries  to  enlarge  so  much  that  the  veins  are  pressed  flat, 
absolute  stasis  will  result ;  if  the  arteries  now  begin  to  contract, 
passage  of  blood  will  begin  again  and  increase,  and  thus  a 
narrowing  of  the  arteries  produces  hypergemia  ;  (5)  if,  however, 
part  of  the  intra-cranial  space  is  taken  up  by  a  tumour,  or, 
again,  if  a  large  number  of  capillaries  have  been  destroyed  by 
injury  or  inflammation,  then  a  smaller  amount  of  arterial  eii- 
largement  may  seriousl}^  interfere  with  the  capillary  circulation. 

Grasheyt  has  shown  that  stasis  in  the  veins  maybe  due  not 
only  to  the  enlargement  of  the  arteries,  but  also  to  a  rise  of 
inti-a-arterial  pressure.  When  this  pressure  rises  beyond  a 
certain  height  the  central  veins  begin  to  vibrate,  and  then  the 

*  "  Virchow's  Archiv.,"  vol.  cxxii.  p.  146. 

t  "  Experimentelle  Beitrage  zur  Lehre  vou  der  Blut-Circulation  in  der 
Schadel  undRuckgratshohle."    J.  F.  Lehmann,  Miinchen,  1892. 


VASO-MOTOR  CENTRE.  87 

amount  of  blood  streaming  through  is  decidedly  reduced.  At 
this  point  it  is  possible  that  the  symptoms  of  pathological  brain- 
pressure  begin. 

Grashey  believes  that  true  hypereemia  cerebri  is  not  pro- 
portional to  arterial  contraction,  for,  if  the  spastic  contraction 
of  arteries  is  very  great,  the  blood-stream  may  be  stopped  alto- 
gether, and  contraction  or  dilatation  of  arteries  must  influence 
intra-arterial  pressure.  Contraction  of  an  artery  diminishes, 
whilst  dilatation  increases,  the  pressure  in  it;  therefore,  dilata- 
tion of  an  intra-cranial  artery  increases  the  pressure  on  the 
veins  and  does  harm.  For  the  proper  nutrition  of  the  brain,  a 
diminution  of  the  amount  of  blood  passing  through  the  cerebral 
veins  is  unfavourable.  When  the  veins  and  capillaries  become 
overfilled  with  blood,  the  blood,  as  a  result,  is  only  able  to 
move  slowly.  Grashey  also  believes  that  stasis  in  the  veins 
adds  to  the  intra-cranial  pressure  by  causing  an  increase  in  the 
amount  of  cerebro-spinal  fluid. 

These  effects  of  a  dilatation  of  a  cerebral  artery  are  observed 
in  the  case  of  local  dilatations  only. 

The  points  of  importance  in  the  observations  of  these  authors 
are : — (1)  That  proper  nutrition  of  the  nervous  tissues  depends 
more  upon  freedom  of  circulation  than   upon  the   quantity  of 
lilood ;  and  (2)  that  nutrition  is  carried  on  imperfectly  if  there    \ 
is  venous  or  capillary  stasis  through  high  intra-cranial  pressure.  / 

Burckhardt's  experiments  go  to  prove,  that  the  activity  of 
the  hemispheres  modify  the  influence  of  the  vaso-motor  centre 
upon  peristaltic  vascular  movements ;  and  that  in  sleep,  when 
this  activity  is  lowest,  the  vascular  movements  are  most  regular. 
Meynert  refers  the  vaso-motor  centres,  which  govern  cortical 
influence,  to  the  grey  substance  of  the  anterior  division  of  the 
l)rain-trunk.  in  which  are  situated,  also,  the  other  motor 
tracts,  subject  to  centrifugally  transmitted  cortical  innervation. 
Further,  if  the  cortex  be  excited  in  its  capacity  as  a  vaso-motor 
centre,  the  influence  of  the  arterial  systole  upon  the  vaso-motor 
centre  will  be  augmented,  thus  causing  active  anaemia  of  the 
brain,  which,  as  a  rule,  remains  entirely  independent  of  the 
ansemia  of  the  rest  of  the  body.  But  since  a  functionally 
active  cortex  cannot  impede  the  development  of  functional 
hypergemia,  we  must  assume  that  the  physiological  excitation 


88  BEAIN-MOVEMENTS. 

of  the  cortex  increases,  in  a  centrifugal  direction,  the  arterial 
diastole  which  forms  part  of  a  peristaltic  movement.  Meynert 
also  believes,  that  deficient  or  diminished  cortical  activity, 
as  seen  in  various  psychical  conditions,  is  attended  by  an 
increase  of  excitation  of  the  vaso-motor  nerves  connected  with 
this  part  of  the  cortex,  and  thereby  affects  the  blood-supply  as 
well  as  the  chemical  changes  in  the  brain,  and  that  increase  in 
functional  activity  of  the  cortex  is  attended  by  diminution  of 
cortical  vaso-motor  influences.  Whence,  he  says,  it  follows 
that  a  cortical  process  of  association  by  inhibiting  vascular 
innervation  will  result  in  immediate  functional  hypersemia. 
He  seeks  to  explain,  that  the  cortex  in  a  state  of  func- 
tional activity  imparts  an  impulse  inwards  (centrifugally) 
to  the  vaso-motor  centre,  and,  that  in  some  way  or  another, 
this  impulse  is  transmitted  in  a  centripetal  direction  from  the 
subcortical  centre  reacting  upon  the  vascular  system.  The 
view,  that  hypereemia  of  the  superior  surface  of  the  brain 
occurs  in  direct  relation  to  psychical  activity,  is  supported  by 
the  observations  of  Mosso,  Batty  Tuke*  and  Gibson,  who  have 
each  made  observations  upon  this  point.  Batty  Tuke,  however, 
regards  it  still  as  an  open  question,  as  to  whether  this  functional 
hypergemia  is  produced  by  reflex  inhibition  of  the  vaso-con- 
strictor  centre  by  direct  action  of  vaso-dilator  fibres,  or  by  a 
combination  of  the  action  of  the  two  systems. 

From  these  considerations,  as  to  the  complex  conditions 
of  nutritive  supply,  we  are  now  in  a  position  to  appreciate  how 
essential  to  mental  life  is  the  proper  working  of  the  mechanism 
whereby  nutrition  of  the  nervous  elements  is  effected.  It  need, 
therefore,  scarcely  be  urged  that,  if  our  object  be  to  understand 
how  morbid  psychical  manifestations  may  arise  through  defect 
of,  or  interference  with,  the  effective  working  of  the  cerebral 
mechanism,  the  study  of  the  varying  conditions  of  nutrition  of 
the  brain  is  of  primary  importance  to  us,  and  the  importance 
of  it  to  us  can  scarcely  be  over  estimated. 

*  "  On  the  Insanity  of  Over-exertion  of  the  Brain,"  p.  18. 


89 


CHAPTEE   III. 

Scheme  of  the  Central  Nervous  System. 

Sensory  Paths — Cerebral  Localisation  for  Touch — Course  of  Sensory 
Fibres — Special  Senses:  Sight,  Hearing,  Smell,  Taste — Motor 
Nerves  :  Cerebral  Localisation — Projection  Systems  :  Association 
Fibres,  Fimbriae  Proprise — Value  of  our  Knowledge  of  Cerebral 
Localisation  :  Phrenology,  Experimental  Research,  Compara- 
tive Anatomy,  Morbid  Anatomy — Sensori-Motor  Areas  and  their 
Relations  to  Mental  Faculties :  Views  of  Hitzig,  Ferrier,  Munk, 
Waller,  etc. — Conclusions. 

SCHEME  OF  THE  CENTRAL  NERVOUS  SYSTEM. 

Hitherto  we  have  considered  certain  nervous  elements,  as  far 
as  possible,  according  to  their  individual  anatomical  and 
physiological  peculiarities.  It  is  now  our  task  to  obtain  a 
general  view  of  the  chief  arrangements  of  these  individual  parts 
in  the  complicated  structure  of  the  brain.  A  description  of  the 
manner  in  which  the  elements  are  combined  is  obviously  indis- 
pensable to  us.  For  convenience  we  shall  consider  the  general 
scheme  of  the  central  nervous  system  in  its  triple  form,  both 
anatomically  and  physiologically. 

We  shall,  therefore,  so  far  as  may  be  essential  to  our  pur- 
pose, attempt  to  comprehend  the  coinplicated  system  of  afferent, 
associative,  and  eiferent  nerve-tracts  as  a  systematic  whole,  and 
it  is  obvious  that  the  consideration  of  every  psychical  process 
deemed  to  have  a  demonstrable  physiological  correlative 
involves,  at  least,  the  study  of  some  part  or  other  of  this 
system. 

It  is  known  to  every  student  that  the  grey  matter  of  the 
cerebrum  is  placed  external  to,  and  spread  as  a  thin  coating 
over,  the  white  matter  of  the  centrum  ovale.  The  folding  of 
this  grey  matter  into  gyri  or  convolutions,  and  their  anatomical 


90  SCHEME  OF  THE  CENTRAL  NERVOUS  SYSTEM. 

lines  of  demarcation,  by  means  of  fissures  or  sulci,  are  facts  also 
equally  M^ell  known.  JSTor  do  we  need  to  enter  upon  a  descrip- 
tion of  the  arrangement  of  the  masses  of  grey  matter  at  the 
base  of  the  brain,  which  form  the  corpus  striatum  (the  caudate 
and  lenticular  nuclei),  the  optic  thalamus,  the  corpora  quadri- 
gemina,  and  the  red  nucleus  and  locus  niger  within  the 
tegmentum  of  the  crura  cerebri.  The  formation  of  the 
central  grey  tube  as  a  continuation  of  the  grey  matter  of  the 
cord  through  the  medulla,  pons,  round  the  iter,  and  ending  at 
the  tuber  cinereum,  is  a  stiidy  of  great  complexity;  and  the 
variety  of  ways  in  which  these  various  parts  are  connected  with 
each  other,  by  transverse  fibres  stretching  between  the  two  sides 
of  the  brain,  or  by  longitudinal  fibres  extending  from  the 
hinder  and  lower  to  the  fore  parts  of  the  brain,  is  worthy  of 
careful  consideration. 

The  cortex  cerebri,  as  we  have  already  seen,  contains  in  its 
structures  the  elements  which  are  regarded  as  being  most 
closety  associated  with  psychical  action.  To  it,  all  the  fibres 
coming  from  sensory  organs,  proceed,  and  the}"  convey  the 
effects  of  peripheral  or  external  stimulation  to  the  region,  or 
regions,  where  psychical  perception  of  external  agents  is 
supposed  to  take  place. 

Our  knowledge  of  these  sensory  paths  is,  as  yet,  unsatis- 
factory and  wanting  in  precision.  Sensory  impulses  enter 
the  spinal  cord  by  the  posterior  nerve-roots,  and  may  pass, 
if  to  the  cerebellum,  through  the  cerebellar  tract  and  pos- 
terior column  to  the  restiform  body,  and  thence  to  the  cere- 
bellum ;  or,  if  to  the  cerebrum  (after  decussating  in  their 
course  in  the  cord),  through  the, posterior  half  of  the  pons,  into 
the  tegmentum  of  the  crus  under  the  corpora  quadrigeminav 
to  enter  part  of  the  posterior  third  of  the  posterior  segment 
of  the  internal  capsule.  The  subsequent  course  of  these  fibres, 
however,  is  somewhat  doubtful ;  some  fibres  enter  the  optic 
thalamus  (Meynert) ;  others  pass  into  the  white  matter  of  the 
cerebrum.  According  to  Meynert,  the  sensory  columns  of  the 
cord  turn  suddenly  back  from  the  posterior  third  of  the  internal 
capsule,  and  are  distributed  to  the  occipital  and  temporo- 
sphenoidal  lobes.  From  the  occurrence  of  impairment  of 
tactile  sensibility,  associated  with  disease  of  the  motor  regions 


CEREBRAL  LOCALISATION   FOR  TOUCH.  91 

of  the  cortex,  Gowers  asserts  that  some  of  these  fibres  go  to 
the  parietal  and  central  regions.  Whether  some  of  the  fibres 
pass  into  the  optic  thalamus,  or  whether  they  have  no  connec- 
tion with  it,  but  pass,  as  stated  by  Bevan  Lewis,  uninterrup- 
tedly" between  the  lenticular  nucleus,  thalamus,  and  caudate 
nucleus,  to  their  cortical  termini,  is  not  3'et   clearly  decided. 

Ferrier  found  that,  when  parts  of  the  gyrus  hippocampi 
were  removed,  loss  of  sensation  occurred  on  the  other  side  of 
the  body.  Horsley  and  Schafer  found  similar  results  from 
destruction  of  parts  of  the  gyrus  fornicatus.  Horsley  has 
also  found  that  when  parts  of  these  gyri  were  removed  in 
man,  there  was  slight  loss  of  sensation ;  the  patient  being- 
unable  to  feel  very  slight  touches  of  the  limb,  and  the  point 
localised  as  touched  was  usually  a  segment  higher  up  than  the 
actual  point  touched. 

The  observations  of  Flechsig.  Monakow,  and  Dejeriue  seem 
to  demonstrate  that  the  course  of  the  sensory  paths  (kingesthetic) 
is  up  the  posterior  columns  of  the  cord,  through  the  posterior 
colunni  nuclei,  the  internal  arciform  fibres  ;  thence,  after  decus- 
sation, by  the  inter-olivary  tract  and  fillet  of  the  opposite  side 
to  the  posterior  part  of  the  internal  capsule,  and  eventually 
to  terminate  in  the  central  convolutions.  Mott*  has  demon-  "^ 
strated  that  the  so-called  motor  cortex  is  concerned  with  the 
reception  of  afferent  sensory  impulses.  This  view  is  supported 
b}-  the  experiments  of  Hitzig,  Munk,  Luciani  and  Seppili, 
Tripier  and  Moelli.  Horsley  found  undoubted  sensory  defects  <^ 
following  the  removal  of  lai'ge  portions  of  the  Rolandic  area  in 
man.  Allen  Starr  has  endeavoured  to  demonstrate  that  the 
tactile  sense-centres  are  situated  in  the  Rolandic  area,  especially- 
behind  the  fissure  of  Rolando.  Wundt,  Bastian,  and  James 
agree  that  the  central  convolutions  possess  sensory  functions. 
Mott  considers  that  this  view  is  fully  supported  by  the  facts  of 
anatomy,  embrj^ology,  experimental  i^hysiologj^,  pathology,  and 
clinical  observation.  To  account  for  tiie  fact  that  the  motor 
paralysis  is  greater  and  more  permanent  than  the  loss  of  sen- 
sory functions,  Mott  compares  the  expansion  of  the  centrifugal 
and  centripetal  fibres  of  the  internal  capsule  to  two  funnels  ;  the 
fibres  as  they  lie  in  the  capsule  forming  the  tubes,  and  expanding 
*  "British  Medical  Journal,"  Sept.  1893,  p.  685. 


92  SCHEME  OF  THE   CENTRAL  NEEVOUS   SYSTEM. 

above  like  cones,  the  bases  of  each  of  which  are  nearly  coinci- 
dent although  the  tubes  are  not.  He  says  there  is  one  important 
difference,  however ;  the  base  of  the  efferent  cone  is  made  up 
of  axis-cylinder  processes  just  after  leaving  the  cells  from  which 
thej  grow  ;  that  is  (comparing  a  nerve-fibre  to  a  tree),  the  base 
of  the  efferent  cone  consists  of  the  trunks,  from  which  all  the 
branches  and  collaterals  spring.  The  base  of  the  sensory  cone 
in  the  cortex  consists  only  of  the  terminal  twigs  of  the  afferent 
nerve  trunks.  As  the  afferent  fibres  to  the  cortex  form  an 
arborisation  before  terminating  in  the  grey  matter,  it  is  con- 
ceivable that  a  small  portion  of  grey  matter  of  the  area  con- 
nected with  tactile  perceptions  will  suffice  to  restore  function, 
but  removal  of  the  base  of  the  efferent  cone  prevents  a,ny  volun- 
tary motor  impulse  starting. 

So  far,  however,  it  has  been  found  impossible  to  localise  accu- 
rately the  areas  which  represent  the  different  parts  of  the  body. 
On  the  grounds  that  definite  localisation  of  the  centres  of  sight, 
hearing,  smell,  and,  probably,  taste,  as  well  as  the  respective 
motor  centres,  is  possible.  Terrier  assumes  there  must  be  a 
definite  region  for  the  various  forms  of  sensibility  included 
generally  under  the  sense  of  touch,  contact,  pressure,  tempera- 
ture, etc.  He  says,*  that  up  to  the  point  of  radiation  into  the 
cerebral  cortex,  the  sensory  paths  have  been  proved  to  be 
entirely  differentiated  from  the  motor;  and  that  the  two  should 
X^become  jumbled  together  indiscriminately  in  the  cortical  centres 
is  a  hjrpothesis  which,  j^rimci  f tide,  is  extremely  unlikely. 

In  the  spinal  cord  the  sensory  and  motor  nerves  are  distinct 
from  one  another.  In  the  pons  and  crura  cerebri  they  still  remain 
apart.  The  observations  of  Veyssiere,  Charcot,  Reymond,  Rendu 
and  others,  go  to  prove  that  in  the  internal  capsule  the  sensory 
tracts  are  quite  distinct  from  the  motor,  and  may  be  injured  or 
diseased  separately,  causing  hemianaesthesia  on  the  opposite  side 
of  the  body  as  the  result.f  When  the  region  of  the  sensory  paths 
in  the  internal  capsule  is  divided,  volitional  movements  can  be 
effected,  but  there  is  no  corresponding  consciousness  by  means 
of  the  muscular  sense.  Ferrier  asserts,  that  the  same  condition 
which  abolishes  cutaneous  sensibility  also  entirely  annihilates 

*  "  Functions  of  the  Brain,"  2nd  edit.,  p.  323. 
t  FeiTier,  ibid.,  p.  323. 


COURSE   OF  SENSORY  FIBRES.  93 

the  so-called  muscular  sense  ;  and  that  there  is  no  necessary 
relation  between  the  power  of  effecting  movement  and  the  sense 
of  movement  effected — i.e.,  the  paths  of  muscular  sense  are 
quite  distinct  from  the  paths  of  volitional  impulse. 

Flechsig  maintains,  that  the  tracts  forming  the  outer  third 
of  the  foot  of  the  crus  radiate  from  the  internal  capsule  out- 
wards and  downwards  towards  the  hippocampal  region.  Ferrier 
found,  that  destructive  lesions  of  the  hijDpocampal  region 
caused  profound  impairment  or  total  abolition  of  cutaneous, 
muco-cutaneous,  and  muscular  sensibility  ;  and  that  the  degree 
of  duration  of  the  anaesthesia  varied  with  the  completeness  of 
destruction  of  the  region  in  question.  Since,  however,  recovery 
sometimes  takes  place  after  the  removal  of  the  hippocampal 
region  only,  Horsley  and  Schafer  made  additional  experiments, 
and  found  that  destruction  of  the  gyrus  fornicatus  alone  could 
produce  analgesia  and  anaesthesia  of  the  opposite  side  of  the 
body.  The  falciform  lobe  is  now  regarded  as  the  cortical 
centre  of  those  fibres  of  the  internal  capsule,  destruction  of 
which  is  the  cause  of  hemianassthesia  of  organic  origin.* 

The  sense  of  movement  (kinaesthetic  sense)  will  be  con- 
sidered with  more  convenience  when  we  come  to  study  the 
motor  centres;  so  we  leave  this  subject  for  the  present  and  take 
up  briefly  that  of  the  special  senses. 

Sight. — -The  most  important  of  the  special  senses  is  that  of 
sight.  Gratiolet  believed  the  optic  tract  to  be  directl}-  con- 
nected with  every  part  of  the  cerebral  hemisphere,  from  the 
frontal  to  the  occipital  lobe  in  man.  Hamilton  has  demon- 
strated that  its  connections  are  A^ery  numerous  ;  but  the  obser- 
vations of  Gratiolet  have  not  been  confirmed.  Certain  fibres 
are  connected  with  the  basal  ganglia,  whilst  others  are  con- 
nected with  the  cortex.     The  former  probably  arise  from  the 

*  Ferrier  says  : — "  The  symptoms  observed  in  the  animals  operated  on 
prove  that  the  centres  of  mere  touch  proper  are  precisely  the  same  as  those 
of  painful  sensation— whether  from  pressure,  heat,  or  otherwise — the  latter 
being  merely  an  intense  degree  of  the  former."  "  All  the  facts  receive  the 
most  satisfactory-  explanation,  if  we  regard  the  falciform  lobe  as  a  whole, 
and  in  each  and  every  part  the  centre  of  tactile  sensation  for  the  whole  of 
the  opposite  side  of  the  body ;  though  probably  the  various  motor  centres 
are  each  anatomically  related  by  associating  fibres  with  corresponding- 
regions  of  the  falciform  lobe.  The  association  would  form  the  basis  of  a 
musculo-sensory  localisation."—"  Functions  of  the  Brain,"  p.  -344. 


'94  SCHEME  OF  THE  CENTEAL  NERVOUS  SYSTEM. 

corpora  geniculata,  pulvinar,  and  anterior  quadrigemina,  and 
from  the  substance  of  the  thalamus ;  whilst  the  latter  (cor- 
tical fibres)  join  the  former  to  form  the  optic  tract. 

In  the  frontal  region,  the  connection  with  the  cortex  is 
■effected  through  "  Meynert's  commissure  "  (Hamilton).* 

To  attempt  to  elaborate  or  explain  the  relation  of  the  fields 
of  vision  of  the  retina,  tracts,  and  the  cerebral  optic  centre,  is 
obviously  outside  our  object ;  nor  can  we  undertake  to  explain 
some  of  the  eye-symptoms  which  occasionally  occur  in  cerebral 
disease.  Gowers  states  that  affections,  (a)  of  the  optic  nerve 
(between  the  eyeball  and  the  chiasma) — i.e.,  in  the  orbit,  optic 
foramen,  or  within  the  skull — affect  one  eye  only ;  (b)  of  the 
middle  of  the  chiasma,  cause  temporal  hemiopia;  (c)  of  the  optic 
tract  (between  the  chiasma  and  the  occipital  cortex),  cause 
hemiopia,  which  is  always  symmetrical. 

/  The  centre  for  sight  has  been  localised  in  the  angular  gyrus, 
around  the  posterior  end  of  the  parallel  sulcus,  and  in  the  occi- 
Vpital  lobe.  Ferrier,  Horsley,  and  ■  Schafer  have  found  that 
complete  permanent  hemiopia  for  the  opposite  field  of  vision 
is  only  produced  when  both  these  parts  are  removed.  If  one 
occipital  lobe  be  ablated,  there  is  hemiopia  for  the  opposite 
field  of  vision,  but  this  is  of  a  temporary  natiire.  Ferrier  has 
also  found,  that  when  the  angular  gyrus  of  one  side  alone  is 
removed,  complete  blindness  of  the  opposite  eye  is  caused,  from 
which,    however,   the    animal  soon  recovers.      Gowers  regards 

*  According  to  Hamilton,  other  cortical  connections  join  the  tract  as  it 
winds  round  the  cerebral  peduncle.  These  other  connections  comprise — 
(1)  a  large  mass  of  fibres  coming  from  the  motor  areas  of  the  opposite  cere- 
bral hemispheres,  crossing  in  the  corpus  callosum,  entering  the  outer  cap- 
sule, and  joining  the  tract  directly ;  (2)  fibres  uniting  it  to  the  temporo- 
sphenoidal  lobe  of  the  same  side,  especially  the  first  and  second  temporo- 
sphenoidal  convolutions ;  (3)  fibres  to  the  gyrus  hippocampi  of  the  same 
side ;  (4)  a  large  leash  of  fibres  forming  the  "  optic  radiation  "  of  G-ratiolet, 
which  connect  it  directly  with  the  tip  of  the  occipital  lobe.  There  are  pro- 
bably also  indirect  connections  with  the  occipital  region  through  some  of 
the  basal  ganglia.  These  connections  with  the  frontal  and  sphenoidal  lobes 
are  not  admitted  by  some  investigators,  but  all  are  agreed  as  to  its  connec- 
tion with  the  occipital  by  means  of  the  "  optic  radiation."  The  optic  radiation 
gives  fibres  to  the  optic  tract,  to  the  corpus  geniculatum  internum  and 
extemiim,  to  the  pulvinar  and  thalamus,  to  the  posterior  third  of  the  poste- 
rior limb  of  the  inner  capsule  ("  sensitive  band "  of  Meynert)  and  fibres 
which  run  betw-een  the  island  of  Keil  and  the  tip  of  the  occipital  lobe. 


SIGHT.  95 

the  angular  gyrus  as  containing  a  higher  visual  centre,  in 
which  the  half  fields  are  combined,  and  the  whole  opposite 
field  is  represented.  Terrier  believes,  that  each  hemisphere  is 
in  relation  with  the  corresponding  half  of  both  retinae,  and  that 
the  semi-decussation  of  the  optic  tracts  is  maintained  in  the 
cortical  centres  ;  and  in  addition  to  the  representation  of 
the  correlated  halves  of  both  retinae  in  the  corresponding 
occipito-angular  region,  the  angular  gyrus  is  the  region  of 
clear  or  central  vision  of  the  opposite  eye,  and,  perhaps,  to 
some  extent,  also  of  the  eye  on  the  same  side.  Ferrier  says — 
"  Each  occipital  lobe  is  in  relation  with  the  half  of  each  retina 
on  its  own  side,  while  each  angular  gyrus  is  in  relation  with 
the  centre  of  the  opposite  eye,  partly  by  fibres  which  are  sup- 
posed to  cross  in  the  chiasma,  and  partly  by  fibres  which  reach 
it  after  decussation  in  the  low^er  visual  centres — possibly  the 
corpora  quadrigemina.  At  the  same  time,  also,  a  partial  inter- 
mingling in  the  chiasma  of  the  fibres  from  the  centre  of  each 
eye  brings  each  angular  gyrus,  to  some  extent,  also  in  relation 
with  the  eye  on  the  same  side."* 

There  are  some  small  fibres  at  the  posterior  part  of  the 
chiasma  which  run  along  the  mesial  side  of  the  optic  tracts  to 
join  the  internal  geniculate  bodies  of  the  two  sides.  These 
fibres  form  the  inferior  commiss^ire  of  Gudden  ;  but  they  are  not 
supposed  to  have  any  visual  function.  Darkschewitsch  states 
that  this  commissure  unites  each  mesial  geniculate  body  with 
the  lenticular  nucleus  of  the  opposite  side.f 

The  intercentral  connections  of  the  nervous  visual  apparatus 
are  probably  as  follows  :  A  set  of  fibres  passes  from  the  higher 
visual  centre  in  the  occipital  lobe  through  the  corona  radiata 
and  caudal  end  of  the  internal  capsule,  to  the  grey  matter  of 
the  lower  optic  centres,  where  they  end  in  arborisations.  Another 
set  arises  in  the  lower  optic  centres,  and  terminates  by  arbori- 
sation in  the  occipital  cortex.  There  appears  to  be  some  con- 
nection between  the  grey  matter  of  the  bulb  and  cord  and  the 
lower  optic  centres.  There  is  some  direct  connection  (through 
the  tract  of  the  upper  fillet)  between  the  cerebellum  and  the 
fibres  of  the  optic  tract. 

*  "  Functions  of  the  Brain,"  p.  292. 

t  ■'  Quain's  Anatomy,''  vol.  iii.  pt.  I.  p.  118. 


96 


SCHEME  or  THE  CENTRAL  NERVOUS  SUSTEM. 


Munk  *  maintains  that  the  identical  points  of  both  retinae 
do  not  correspond  to  the  same  points  of  the  cerebral  cortex, 
but  that  the  external  half  of  each  retina  is  associated  with  the 
outer  half  of  the  visual  area  of  the  same  side,  and  the  inner  half 


qorj>us  genie,  lat. 


nmleits  oculomotorlm. 


cortex  cerehrl. 


Fig.  10. 

Diagram  of  the  Probable  Course  and  Relations  of  some  of  the  Optic  Fibres. 
{A^ter  Sehafer  and  Thane. ) 

of  each  retina  with  the  inner  half  of  the  corresponding  visual 
area  of  the  opposite  side.  The  relation  of  the  visual  area  of  the 
cerebral  cortex  to  eye-movements  is  not  yet  definitely  settled  ; 
nor  do  we  know  the  exact  connection  between  the  optic  centres 
*  "The  Visual  Area  of  the  Cerebral  Cortex."— " Brain,"  1890,  p.  45. 


SCHEME  OF  THE   CENTRAL  NERVOUS  SYSTEM.        97 

and  the  nuclei  of  the  nerve  to  the  muscles  of  the  globe  of  the 
eye.  It  is  thought  possible  that  this  connection  may  be  partly 
effected  through  the  posterior  commissure  and  posterior  longi- 
tudinal bundle,  and  that  it  is  probablj^  both  crossed  and 
uncrossed.  Munk  found  that  stimulation  of  the  cortex  (in 
dogs)  somewhat  beyond  the  anterior  border  of  the  visual 
area,  or  beyond  the  lateral  border  of  the  visual  area  in  the 
auditory  centre  caused  cessation  of  eye-movements.  When 
these  movements  do  occur  they  are  supposed  to  be  the 
results  of  locally-restricted  stimulations  of  portions  of  the 
visual  area. 

When  there  is  total  extirpation  of  both  visual  areas,  perfect 
blindness  results,  but  eye-movements  may  remain  intact,  except 
those  which  are  entirely  dependent  upon  vision.  Munk  regards 
the  visual  area  as  having  nothing  to  do  with  those  eye-move- 
ments which  are  independent  of  sight ;  neither  do  these  move- 
ments result  from  excitation  of  the  visual  areas,  nor  does  the 
path  of  conduction  from  the  place  of  their  excitation  to  the 
periphery  lead  through  the  visual  centres ;  consequently  the 
eye-movements  which  the  electrical  irritation  of  the  visual  area 
induces,  only  correspond  to  particular  eye-movements  which  are 
the  results  of  visual  perception.  He  further  believes  that,  out- 
side the  visual  area,  and  in  his  "tactile  sphere,"  there  are  two 
spots  on  the  cortex,  the  electrical  stimulation  of  which  causes 
eye-movements ;  and  as  one  or  the  other  spot  is  excited,  so  will 
the  eye-muscles  which  are  set  in  motion  give  rise  to  particular 
movements,  just  as  arm  or  leg  muscles  will  be  brought  into 
action  by  stimulation  of  neighbouring  spots  on  the  motor  areas.* 

*  "  Therefore,"  he  says,  '•  if  an  animal  makes  a  movement  in  consequence 
of  having  seen  anything,  it  must  be  concluded  that  the  excitation  conducted 
through  the  optic  nerve-fibres  to  the  visual  area  is  transferred  by  associated 
fibres  which  connect  these  same  areas  with  the  tactile  areas,  at  one  time  by 
this  set  of  associated  fibres,  at  another  time  by  that — according  to  the  kind 
of  movement  produced ;  and  so  through  certain  association  fibres  the  excita- 
tion reaches  the  spots  C  or  D  if  arm  or  leg-movements  occur,  through  other 
associated  fibres  the  spots  i^''  or  H  if  eye-movements  take  place.  In  analo- 
gous fashion  the  eye-movements  are  obtained  in  our  case  by  excitation  of 
the  visual  area  with  induction  currents,  since  the  excitation  produced  by 
the  electrical  current  spreads  to  the  centres  F  and  H  by  associated  fibres, 
which  run  from  the  visual  areas  to  those  centres,  whether  excitation  is 
originated  by  the  current  in  the  central  elements  of  the  visual  area,  or  in  the 
fibres  themselves  where  they  terminate  in  the  visual  area." 

7 


98  SCHEME  OF  THE  CENTRAL  NERVOUS  SYSTEM. 

Munk  attaches  no  significance  to  the  commissural  fibres 
which  pass  out  of  the  visual  areas  into  the  corpus  callosum. 
He  concludes  that  eye-movements  are  caused  by  the  electrical 
stimulation  extending  to  the  radiating  fibres  of  the  corona 
radiata  which  go  to  the  subcortical  parts  of  the  brain,  and 
that  the  excitation  starts  in  the  central  elements  of  the  visual 
area — i.e.,  in  the  radiating  fibres  where  they  proceed  from  the 
visual  areas.  These  movements  correspond  more  especially  to 
those  eye-movements  which  produce  "  wandering  vision  "  and 
fixation  of  the  eyes  upon  an  object  previously  indistinctly  seen. 
Further,  the  portions  of  both  retinae  of  the  corresponding  side, 
which  are  on  the  same  side  of  the  maculae  lutae,  belong  to  each 
visual  area ;  while  the  upper,  middle,  and  lower  quadrants  of 
those  portions  of  the  retina,  belong  to  the  anterior,  middle,  and 
posterior  zones  of  the  visual  area  respectively.  Munk  also 
upholds  the  view,  that  the  visual  nerve-fibres,  after  their  entry 
into  the  visual  area,  are  connected  directly  and  immediately 
with  the  central  elements  which  serve  for  the  perception  of 
light.* 

Sherrington,!    however,   has    found  that,   in   the   monkey, 
after  a  deep  frontal  section  across  the  hemisphere  and  into  the 

*  The  projection  of  the  retinee  upon  the  visual  areas,  according  to  Munk, 
presents  itself  now  in  its  full  significance  as  the  substratum  for  the  localisa- 
tion of  the  visual  perceptions,  since  the  involuntary  eye-movements,  which 
are  brought  about  through  the  radiating  fibres,  supply  the  necessary  com- 
plement. Successive  and  opposite  positions  of  the  objects  in  Helmholtz's 
visual  fields  are  yielded  by  projections,  the  judgment  being  assisted  by  the 
sensations  which  bring  about  these  involuntary  eye-movements,  upwards, 
downwards,  right  or  left ;  thus  projection  and  eye-movements  together, 
permit  such  rapid  and  certain  cognisance  of  the  visual  field,  as  we  observe 
in  animals,  and  which  would  be  quite  impossible  if  it  were  necessary  to 
deliberate  regarding  every  detail  in  the  visual  field.  The  discovery  of  the 
new  radial  fibres  of  the  visual  area  will  prevent  the  anatomical  investigator 
from  being  able,  without  further  consideration,  to  refer  all  descending 
degenerations  which  result  from  removal  of  that  area  to  the  tracts  which 
conduct  visual  impressions ;  but  there  is,  on  the  other  hand,  now  opened  up 
to  him  the  prospect  of  being  able  to  distinguish  the  two  kinds  of  central 
elements,  and  of  being  able  to  demonstrate  their  morphological  differences — 
a  prospect  which  is  attractive  by  reason  of  the  proved  connection  of  the 
radiating  fibres  with  the  light-perceiving  central  elements,  and  of  the 
associated  fibres  with  the  representative  elements  (Vorstellungselementen). 
"Brain,"  1890,  p.  65. 

I  "Royal  Society  Proceedings,"  vol.  xxxv.  p.  407.  "Journal  of  Physiology," 
vol.  xvii..  No.  1,  1894. 


HEARING.  99 

lateral  v^entricle  (partly  entering  the  internal  capsnle)  so  as  to 
sever  occipital  from  frontal  cortex,  he  could  still  evoke  move- 
ments by  appropriate  excitation  of  all  that  portion  of  the  cortex 
which,  on  excitation,  gives  conjugate  lateral  deviation  of  the 
eyes — i.e.,  from  the  area  discovered  by  Ferrier  in  the  frontal 
region,  and  from  that  discovered  by  Schafer  in  the  occipital 
region.  The  reaction  could  also  be  obtained  by  excitation 
of  (1)  the  corona  radiata  underlying  the  frontal  cortex  after 
complete  ablation  of  the  cortex  itself;  (2)  the  corona  radiata 
running  downwards  and  forwards  from  the  occipital  cortex 
after  free  removal  of  the  latter ;  (o)  the  internal  capsule  itself 
at  two  distinct  places,  one  in  front  of,  the  other  behind,  the 
genu ;  (4)  the  cross-section  of  the  corpus  callosum  about  3 — 5 
millimetres  behind  the  genu  ;  also  at  the  splenium.  Sherring- 
ton concludes  that  the  inhibition,  which  can  be  elicited  by 
experimental  excitation  of  the  grey  cortex  and  of  the  under- 
lying white  matter,  is  fully  and  habitually  exercised  in 
volitional  eye-movements.  He  also  concludes  that  the  action 
may  take  place,  and  probably  does  so  usually,  in  centres  which 
are  subcortical ;  and  that  the  grey  matter  of  the  cortex  is  not 
essential  to  the  phenomenon. 

Hearing. — The  auditory  nerve  is  regarded  not  only  as 
the  nerve  of  hearing,  but  also  as  participating  in  another 
function — viz.,  that  of  helping  to  maintain  the  equilibrium  of 
the  body  through  its  connection  with  the  semicircular  canals. 
The  nerve  arises  by  two  roots :  a  larger  anterior  root,  from 
which  proceeds  the  vestibular  nerve ;  and  a  smaller  posterior 
root,  from  which  the  cochlear  nerve  comes.  Each  root  springs 
from  a  median  and  a  lateral  nucleus.  The  fibres  from  the 
cerebellum  are  regarded  as  being  concerned  with  equilibration. 
The  chief  mass  of  the  posterior  ganglion  fibres  of  the  cochlear 
nerve  cross  and  pass  to  the  corpora  quadrigemina,  the  internal 
geniculate  body,  and  to  the  temporo-sphenoidal  lobe.  The  striae 
acusticas  form  a  second  decussating  projection  system,  and 
according  to  Flechsig,  the  origins  of  both  acoustic  nerves  are 
connected  by  commissures  in  the  brain.  The  physiological 
significance  of  the  exchange  of  fibres  between  the  auditory  and 
the  portio  intermedia  of  the  facial  nerve  is  not  known. 

The  centre  for  hearing  has  been  localised  by  Ferrier  in  the 


100        SCHEME  OF  THE  CENTRAL  NERVOUS  SYSTEM. 

first  temporo-sphenoidal  convolution.  According  to  Munk, 
destruction  of  the  entire  region  causes  deafness  of  the  opposite 
ear,  while  destruction  of  the  middle  shaded  part  alone  causes 
"psychical  deafness '^  (Seelentaubheit).  Bilateral  lesions  of 
the  first  and  second  temporo-sphenoidal  convolutions  in  man 
cause  complete  deafness.  Disease  of  these  convolutions  is 
attended  with  ivord-deafness. 

The  auditory  paths  are  from  the  auditor}^  nuclei  in  the 
medulla  oblongata  through  the  pons,  where  they  perhaps  cross 
into  the  tegmentum,  thence  into  the  sensory  crossway,  and 
onwards  to  the  auditory  centre.*  Gowers  records  two  cases  of 
tumour  of  the  first  temporo-sphenoidal  convolution,  in  which 
there  were  fits  beginning  with  an  auditory  aura  referred  to  the 
opposite  ear.f 

Equally  important  with  these  effects  of  disease  are  the 
sensory  impressions,  or  '' cmrce,"  as  seen  in  epilepsy;  and  just 
as  a  discharging  lesion  of  the  occipital  lobes  may  cause  flashes 
of  light  or  coloured  visual  aurse,  so  sounds  or  noises  may 
arise  through  affection  of  the  first  temporo-sphenoidal  con- 
volution, and  usher  in  an  attack  of  epilepsy.  Mills  ij:  has 
recorded  a  case  of  word-deafness  following  an  apoplectic 
seizure,  and  more  complete  deafness  and  partial  left-sided 
paralysis  following  a  second  apoplexj^  In  this  case  there  were 
lesions  of  the  first  and  second  temporal  convolutions  of  both 
hemispheres. 

The  auditory  centres  are  best  developed  in  the  left  hemi- 
spheres, but  in  order  to  produce  complete  brain-deafness 
destruction  of  both  centres  is  essential.  When  the  posterior 
thirds  of  the  first  and  second  temporal  convolutions  of  the  left 
hemisphere  are  destroyed,  an  almost  complete  word-deafness  is 
produced.  When  a  lesion  is  limited  to  the  centre  for  word- 
hearing,  and  causes  word-deafness,  it  will  also  cause  paraphasia 
and  paralexia.  In  time,  such  a  lesion  will  lead  to  secondarj- 
atrophy  of  the  speech  and  oro-lingual  centres,  and  also  to  affec- 
tions of  the  association  tracts  between  the  sensory  and  motor- 
hearing  speech  centres.     The   field  for  all  auditory  memories 

*  Landois  and  Stirling,  p.  704. 
t  "Take's  Dictionary,"  p.  156. 
+  "Brain,'"  1891,  p.  468. 


SMELL.  101 

seems  to  include  the  posterior  two  thirds  of  the  first  and  second 
temporal  convolutions.  When  there  is  word-deafness  there  is 
not  necessarily,  therefore,  inability  to  recall  words  through 
other  channels  ;  as,  for  instance,  through  their  visual  signs,  in 
which  case  the  meaning  of  the  word  may  be  understood,  although 
the  name  cannot  be  properly  verified  in  consciousness.* 

Smell. — The  olfactory  centre,  as  inferred  from  anatomical 
considerations  and  direct  experimentation,  is  probably  localised 
in  the  anterior  extremity  of  the  temporo-sphenoidal  lobe. 
Ferrier  has  found,  that  destruction  of  this  part  produced  loss 
of  smell  on  the  same  side  in  monkeys.  Hughlings-Jackson, 
and  Beevorf  have  published  a  case  in  which  there  was  a 
growth  in  the  right  hippocampal  lobule,  associated  with  epi- 
leptic fits,  which  were  preceded  by  the  sensation  of  an  un- 
pleasant smell. I  The  olfactory  bulb  and  tract,  in  respect  of 
strxTcture  and  connections,  are  regarded  rather  as  constituent 
parts  of  the  cerebrxim  than  as  a  true  nerve.  The  tract  is  a 
triangular  band  of  white  matter,  inclosing  a  central  grey 
neuroglia  substance.  It  lies  in  the  olfactory  sulcus  parallel 
to  the  longitudinal  median  fissure.  Anteriorly,  it  is  continuous 
with  the  olfactory  bulb,  which  rests  on  the  cribriform  plate 
of  the  ethmoid  bone,  and  receives  the  fibres  of  the  olfactory 
nerves,  which  come  from  the  cells  of  the  olfactory  mucous 
membrane.  Posteriorly,  it  bifurcates  into  two  roots — mesial 
and  lateral — which  diverge  as  they  pass  backwards,  and  in- 
close (1)  a  space  (the  trirjonmn  olfadoriuni),  which  is  known 
as  the  middle  or  grey  root  of  the  tract ;  and  (2)  a  portion  of 
grey  matter  lying  between  the  mesial  root  and  the  peduncle  of 
the  corpus  callosum,  and  continuous  with  the  commencement 
of  the  callosal  gyrus.  §  The  mesial  root,  in  passing  over  the 
trifjonurth  olfactoriwn,  subdivides  it  into  two  parts.  Fibres  pass 
from  this  root  to  the  area  of  Broca,  and  others  pass  directly 
from  the  posterior  end  of  the  tract  into  the  trigonum,  to  join 
the  anterior  commissure,  and  thence  to  the  posterior  part  of  the 
temporal  lobe ;  or,  according  to  Meynert,  they  may  cross  in 
this  commissure  to  the  temporal  lobe  and  hippocampal  region 
of  the  opposite   side.     Fibres   from  the  posterior  end  of  the 

*  Mills,  "Brain,"'  1891,  p.  468.  t  "Brain,"  part  XLVII. 

X  "Tuke's  Dictionary,"  p.  156.  §  Quain,  vol.  iii.  pt.  L  p.  159. 


102        SCHEME  OF  THE   CENTEAL  NERVOUS  SYSTEM. 

olfactory  tract  also  pass  directly  into  the  white  matter  of  the 
frontal  lobe.* 

The  outer  root  consists  of  a  band  of  medullary  fibres,  which 
passes  along  the  outer  part  of  the  anterior  perforated  space,  to 
disappear  about  the  posterior  border  of  the  Sjdvian  fissure.  It 
has  been  traced  by  some  to  the  island  of  Keil,  the  optic  thalamus, 
and  to  a  nucleus  in  the  substance  of  the  temporo-sphenoidal  lobe, 
in  front  of  the  anterior  extremity  of  the  hippocampus. 

Taste. — The  sense  of  taste  is  supposed  to  have  its  centre 
in  close  relation  to  that  of  smell,  and,  according  to  Ferrier,  it  is 
probably  situated  somewhere  about  the  lower  extremities  of  the 
temporo-sphenoidal  lobes.  The  gustatory  path  crosses  in  the 
posterior  part  of  the  posterior  segment  of  the  internal  capsule- 
Gowers  thinks  that  taste-impressions  reach  the  brain  solely  by 
the  roots  of  the  fifth  nerve,  and  not  through  the  giosso-pharyn- 
geal  nerve.  He  admits,  however,  that  the  nerves  of  taste  to  the 
back  part  of  the  tongue  may  be  distributed  with  the  glosso- 
pharyngeal, reaching  them  through  the  otic  ganglion  by  the 
small  superficial  petrosal  and  tympanic  plexus.  The  centres 
which  we  have  considered  occup}^  parts  of  the  non-excitable 
cortex.  This  non-excitable  area  has  been  divided  into  (1)  the 
parts  behind  and  below  the  excitable  cortex,  as  well  as  the 
convolutions  on  the  median  surface  of  the  brain,  except  the 
marginal  gyrus ;  and  (2)  the  frontal  region  anterior  to  the 
excitable  area.  We  shall  return,  however,  to  the  considera- 
tion of  these  later ;  and  for  convenience'  sake  we  shall  now 
look  at  the  construction  of  the  apparatus  by  means  of  the 
working  of  which  mechanical  movements  are  effected. 

Motor  Nerves. — The  course  of  the  fibres  which  convey 
impulses  for  motion  is  as  follows  : — The  pyramidal  tracts  pass 
from  the  motor  areas  of  the  cortex  through  the  "v'^diite  matter  of 
the  cerebrum  to  the  internal  capsule,  where  the  fibres  for  the 
face  and  tongue  occupj^  the  knee  of  the  capsule,  those  for  the 
arm  the  anterior  third  of  the  posterior  segment  or  limb,  whilst 
those  for  the  leg  occupy  the  middle  third.  They  then  pass 
beneath  the  optic  thalamus  to  the  cnxsta  of  the  cerebral 
peduncle,  which  they  enter  and  occupy  its  middle  third ;  the 
fibres  for  the  face  lying  next  to  the  middle  line,  then  the  fibres 
*  Quain,  op.  cit.,  p.  160. 


MOTOR  NERVES.  103 

for  the  arm,  and  external  to  these  the  fibres  for  the  leg.  Their 
subsequent  course  is  to  the  pons  on  the  same  side,  where  the 
fibres  for  the  face  and  tongue  cross  to  the  nuclei  of  the  facial 
and  hypo-glossal  nerves  of  the  opposite  side.  The  fibres  for  the 
arm  and  leg  go  to  the  medulla  oblongata,  where  they  form  the 
anterior  pyramids.  Subsequently,  the  greater  number  cross  at 
the  decussation  of  the  pyramids  to  form  the  crossed  pyramidal 
tracts,  or  lateral  columns  of  the  opposite  side  ;  whilst  a  lesser 
number  continue  on  the  same  side  as  the  direct  pyramidal 
tracts.*  The  question  as  to  whether  there  is  ultimate  crossing 
of  the  latter  set  of  fibres  need  not  detain  us  here.  According 
to  Melius t  and  Sherrington,^  some  fibres  pass  to  the  crossed 
pyramidal  tract  of  same  side.  The  pyramidal  fibres  are  con- 
nected with  multipolar  nerve-cells  of  the  gre}^  matter  of  the 
spinal  cord  at  successively  lower  levels,  and  it  is  from  these 
multipolar  nerve-cells  that  the  anterior  roots  of  the  spinal 
nerves  arise.  A  somewhat  similar  course  is  known  to  exist  for 
some  of  the  motor  cranial  nerves.  After  leaving  the  internal 
capsule  and  the  crusta  they  pass  across  the  middle  line  to  their 
respective  nuclei,  from  which  fibres  proceed  to  the  muscles 
supplied  by  these  nuclei. 

The  excitable  part  of  the  cortex  is,  in  the  monkey,  around 
the  fissure  of  Rolando,  and  includes  the  ascending  frontal  and 
parietal  convolutions  with  the  parietal  lobule,  and  the  posterior 
parts  of  the  three  frontal  convolutions,  as  well  as  the  corres- 
ponding part  of  the  marginal  convolution  on  the  median 
surface  of  the  hemisphere.  The  exact  localisation  of  the 
excitable  areas  of  the  cortex  is  of  importance  not  only  in 
determining  the  seat  of  discharging  lesions,  causing  local 
epileptiform  fits,  but  also  in  determining  the  possible  rela- 
tions which  exist  between  various  psychic  functions  and  their 
expression  in  motion.  In  brief,  stimulation  of  certain  parts  of 
the  excitable  cortex  is  supposed  to  give  rise  to  movements  in 
their  corresponding  muscular  areas.  These  relations  may  be 
tabulated  as  follows  : — 

*  Muratoff,  "  Neiu-ologisches  Centralblatt,"  March,  1892;   also  "Arcliiv. 
f  lir  Anatomie  und  Physiologie,"  1893,  Heft  iii. 
t  "Proc.  Roy.  Soc,"  1894. 
X  "Lancet,"  1894. 


104        SCHEME  OF  THE  CENTEAL  NEEVOUS  SYSTEM. 


In  Monkey. 


A)-ea  stimulated. 
Part  of  marginal  gyrus  opposite  to  the 
ascending  frontal  convolution. 


Next  to  the  preceding  area,  on  the 
outer  surface,  the  upper  ends  of  the 
ascending  frontal  and  parietal  con- 
volutions as  far  out  and  down  as  the 
horizontal  level  of  the  superior  frontal 
sulcus,  and  as  far  forwards  as  the  ver- 
tical limit  of  the  prse-central  sulcus. 


Results  of  stimulation. 
Movements  in  limbs    and    trunk- 
muscles  of  the  opposide  side  of 
the  body  (Horsley  and  Schafer). 


Movements  in  lower  limb  opposite 
side  (Ferrier). 


Below  this  latter  area,  the  ascending 
frontal  and  parietal  convolutions 
down  to  the  genu  or  bend  in  the 
fissure  of  Rolando ;  bounded  below 
by  a  line  drawn  from  the  upper  end 
of  the  pras-central  sulcus  backwards 
through  the  genu  of  the  Eolandic 
fissure  to  the  anterior  end  of  the 
intra-parietal  sulcus,  and  in  front  by 
a  line  drawn  from  the  prae-central 
sulcus  upwards  to  the  middle  line. 

Below  this  latter  area,  a  narrow  strip 
of  cortex. 


Below  this  area,  and  between  the 
Rolandic  lissui-e  and  the  prse-central 
sulcus. 


Round  the  lower  end  of  the  Rolandic 
fissure. 


Between  the  inferior  end  of  the  Rolandic 
fissure  and  the  fissure  of  Sylvius. 


In  front  of  the  latter  area,  and  bounded 
below  by  the  fissure  of  Sylvius,  three 
small  areas  from  behind  forwards. 

Posterior  part  of  third  frontal  convolu- 
tion (left  side). 


Posterior  part  of  three  frontal  convolu- 
tions in  front  of  vertical  limb  of  prae- 
central  sulcus,  and  a  line  drawn 
between  this  and  the  middle  line, 
(a)  in  the  angle  formed  by  the  two 
limbs  of  this  sulcus ;  {b)  between  the 
horizontal  limb  of  this  sulcus  and  the 
middle  line  ;  (c)  below  the  latter  area. 


Movements  in  upper  limb. 


Closure  of  opposite  eye-lids,  and  if 
the  current  is  stronger,  closure  of 
eye-lids  on  same  side  (Horsley 
and  Beevor). 

Elevation  of  the  opposite  angle  of 
the  mouth. 


Retraction  of  the  angle  of  the  op- 
posite side  of  the  mouth. 


Bilateral    movements 
the  mouth. 


of   opening 


Rhythmical  movements  of  mastica- 
tion, SAvallowing,  and  adduction 
of  vocal  cords. 


Aphasia. 


(«)  Synchronous  movements  of 
turning  head  and  eyes  to  op- 
posite side ;  {b)  head  tends  to 
move  without  or  before  the  eyes ; 
(c)  synchronous  movements  of 
the  eyes  occur  before  or  without 
the  head. 


MOTOR  NERVES. 


105 


Reference  to  Fig.  11  will  show,  that  as  we  pass  from  the 
marginal  gyrus  along  the  fissure  of  Rolando,  we  meet  with 
areas  which  represent  a  gradual  increase  in  complexity  of 
function.  No  sharp  line  of  demarcation  is  possible,  however, 
between  these  areas  of  representation.  Horsley  and  Beevor 
have  given  the  name  of  "border  centres"  to  those  places, 
stimulation  of  which  causes  combinations  of  movements.  The 
same  authors  have  found  that  the  different  segments  of  the 
limb  have  areas  of  representation ;  those  for  the  lower  limb 
being  (in  the  monkey)  in  the  following  order  from  before 
backwards — viz.,  hip,  knee,  ankle,  and  hallux  ;  whilst  in  the 
upper  limb  area  they  occur  in  the  order  from  above  downwards 

I     S\0'-  p"  ELBOW       7 
JO^o^imhz ;  7  INDEX     ^ 

-         J~L\Z   'f^'"  OPENING  OF.. 


Fig.  11. 
Diagram  of  Motor  Areas. 
{After  ITorfiley  and  Beevor.) 

— viz.,  shoiilder,  elbow,  wrist,  fingers,  index  finger,  and  thumb, 
the  three  first  being  most  represented  in  front  of  the  fissure 
of  Rolando,  while  the^  three  last  are  behind  it  (Beevor).  We 
have,  therefore,  in  the  cortex  cerebri  some  fairly  definite  areas 
which  are  apparently  directly  concerned  with  the  reception  of 
incoming  stimuli,  and  others  which  are  apparently  concei'ned 
with  outgoing  impulses  or  motor  stimuli.  In  addition  to  these 
areas,  however,  there  are  others,  which,  so  far  as  we  know  at 
present,  are  non-excitable.  Ferrier,  Horsley,  and  Schafer  have 
removed  that  part  of  the  cortex  of  the  frontal  lobe  situated 
anterior  to  the  areas  which  we  have  seen  to  be  excitable,  with 


106        SCHEME  OF  THE  CENTRAL  NERVOUS   SYSTEM. 

the  result,  that  there  were  no  observable  sensory  or  motor 
symptoms ;  moreover,  there  was  little  or  no  change  observable 
in  the  mental  condition.  Ferrier  noted  a  marked  mental 
change  when  the  cortex  was  stripped  from  this  area  on  both 
sides  of  the  brain,  but  Horsley  and  Schafer  found  no  mental 
change  whatsoever.  We  shall  have  occasion  later  to  return  to 
the  question  of  the  functions  of  this  part  of  the  brain,  and  of 
the  possible  relations  it  may  hold  to  the  rest  of  the  cortex,  so 
we  now  pass  to  the  consideration  of  the  arrangement  of  fibres, 
in  the  so-called  "  projection  systems." 

Projection  Systems. — Meynert  has  described  three  such 
systems.  The  first  ijrojection  system  consists  of  fibres  which 
lead  to  and  from  the  cortex  cerebri ;  they  pass  in  a  radiate 
direction  through  the  corona  radiata,  some  traversing  the  basal 
ganglia,  others  forming  connections  with  the  cells  of  the 
central  grey  matter.  In  addition,  there  are  cominis sural  fibres 
of  the  corpus  callosum  and  the  anterior  commissure,  which  are 
supposed  to  connect  the  two  hemispheres ;  and  connecting  or 
associatimj  fibres,  which  connect  different  areas  of  the  same  side 
with  one  another.  Meynert  regards  the  corona  radiata  as 
containing  fibres  from  the  corpus  striatum,  lenticular  nucleus, 
optic  thalamus,  and  corpora  quadrigemina. 

The  second  projection  system  consists  of  fibres  of  great 
variation  in  length,  which  run  in  a  longitudinal  direction 
downwards  to  the  central  grey  tube.  Some  of  the  fibres  end 
in  this  central  grey  matter,  while  others  pass  to  the  level  of  the 
lowest  spinal  nerves.  The  fibres  which  descend  from  the 
caudate  and  lenticular  nuclei  pass  through  the  crusta  of  the 
cerebral  peduncle,  and  enter  the  medulla  or  pons  (Flechsig). 
Those  from  the  thalamus  and  corpora  quadrigemina  pass 
through  the  tegmentum  to  join  others  from  the  crusta  in  the 
spinal  cord.  Wernicke  believes  that  the  caudate  and  lenticular 
nuclei  are  independent,  and  that  the  radiate  fibres  from  the 
corona  radiatoj  do  not  enter  them.  Fibres,  however,  may 
proceed  from  them  to  the  crusta,  to  join  those  fibres  coming 
from  the  thalamus  and  corpora  quadrigemina.  Meynert 
regards  the  latter  set  of  fibres  as  being  reflex  channels,  and 
he  looks  upon  these  regions  of  the  brain  as  centres  for  certain 
extensive  co-ordinated  reflexes. 


PROJECTIOX  SYSTEMS.  107 

The  third  jjrojedion  system  consists  of  the  sensoiy,  and  motoi', 
peripheral  nerves.  In  the  meduliary  centre  we  have,  there- 
fore, three  systems  of  fibres — viz.,  Projection-fibre,  Commis- 
sural-fibre,  and  Association-fibre  systems. 

The  projection  fibres  are  regarded  as  being  direct  pro- 
longations of  the  axis-cylinder  processes  of  cells  of  the  cortex. 
The  commissural  fibres,  which  connect  the  hemispheres, 
include,  as  before  mentioned,  the  transverse  fibres  of  the 
corpus  callosum,  and  the  fibres  of  the  anterior  commissure. 
The  fibres  of  the  corpus  callosum  come  from  the  cells  of  the 
cortex  direct,  or  they  are  collaterals  derived  from  the  projection 
system.  Sherrington  has  demonstrated  that  not  only  does  the 
anterior  portion  of  the  corpus  callosum  contain  fibres  from  the 
frontal  lobes,  the  middle  from  the  middle  lobes,  and  the  pos- 
terior from  the  occipital  lobes,  but  that  there  is  also  a  tendency 
to  scattering  of  fibres,  so  that  not  only  similar  but  also 
dissimilar  parts  of  the  two  hemispheres  are  connected  through 
this  commissure.* 

Hamilton  states  that  some  projection  fibres  also  cross  the 
callosum,  and  then  turn  downwards  in  the  internal  capsule. 
The  anterior  commissure  is  made  up  of  fibres,  which  chiefly 
connect  the  temporal  lobes  of  the  two  hemispheres.  These 
fibres  spread  out  into  a  fan-like  arrangement  in  the  temporal 
lobes.  There  are  also  some  fibres  which  are  thought  to  connect 
the  olfactory  tract  of  one  side  with  the  opposite  hippocampal 
gyrus.f 

The  association  fibres  vary  considerably  in  length.  The 
fihriw  i?rop'ia  (Meynert)  are  short  filjres  which  pass  below 
the  grey  matter  at  the  bottom  of  the  fissures,  and  serve  to 
connect  adjacent  convolutions ;  while  the  long  fibres  run  free  or 
are  grouped  into  bundles  in  one  of  the  following  directions  : — 
(1)  a  superior  bundle  runs  below  the  grey  matter  of  the 
cortex,  serving  to  connect  the  frontal  and  occipital  lobes,  and 
the  frontal  and  external  part  of  the  temporal  lolje  :  (2)  an 
inferior  bundle  runs  a  course  near  the  outer  wall  of  the  posterior 
and  inferior  cornua  of  the  lateral  ventricle,  and  serves  to  con- 
nect the  temporal  and  occipital  lobes :  (3)  an  a.nterior  bundle 

*  "Journal  of  Physiology,"  1890. 

t  "  Archiv.  fiir  Psychatrie,"  1878,  vol.  ix. 


108        SCHEME  OF  THE   CENTRAL  NERVOUS   SYSTEM. 

passes  across  the  bottom  of  the  fissure  of  kSylvius,  and  connects 
the  frontal,  especially  the  third,  with  the  temporal  lobe  and 
the  anterior  part  of  the  limbic  lobe :  (4)  the  cingulum  forms 
the  chief  bundle  of  the  gyrus  fornicatus,  its  fibres  pass  from 
the  anterior  perforated  space  in  front,  above  the  transverse 
fibres  of  the  corpus  callosum,  to  curve  round  the  splenium  of 
the  callosum  behind,  and  to  reach  as  far  as  the  anterior 
extremity  of  the  gyrus  hippocampi.  Some  of  the  fibres 
diverge  into  the  white  matter  of  the  hemispheres,  and, 
according  to  Beevor,*  they  probably  connect  the  hippocampal 
and  callosal  gyri  with  the   cortex  of  the  outer  surface  of  the 


Fig.  12. 

X,  Short  association  fibres  connecting  adjacent  gyri ;  f.l.s. ,  fasciculus  longitudinalis  superior ; 
cL,  cingulum;  c.c,  corpus  eallosum;  f.p.,  fasciculus  perpendicularis; /.i.^.,  fasciculus 
longitudinalis  inferior;  fo.,  fornix  ;  f.i.,  fimbria;  v.d'A.,  bundle  of  Vicq  d'Azyr. 

(After  Meynert.) 

hemispheres :  (5)  a  perpendicular  bundle  runs  in  front  of  the 
occipital  lobe,  and  connects  the  inferior  parietal  lobule  with 
the  fusiform  lobule :  f  (6)  the  fibres  of  the  fimbria  of  the 
fornix  connect  the  hippocampal  region  of  the  limbic  lobe  with 
the  corpus  albicans ;  and,  through  the  bundle  of  Vicq  d'Azyr, 
with  the  thalamus  opticus. 

•  "  Phil.  Trans.,"  1891. 

t  Wernicke,  "  Lehrbuch  tier  Geliirnkrankheiten,"  1881,  vol.  i. 


CEREBRAL  LOCALISATION.  109 

Value  of  our  knowledge  of  Cerebral  Localisation, 

— Hitherto,  the  attempt  to  proceed  beyond  the  objective  evi- 
dences of  the  localisation  of  the  motor  and  sensor}^  functions,  to 
the  localisation  of  the  parts  of  the  brain  subserving  the  sub- 
jective side  of  mental  phenomena  has  been  attended  with  very 
great  difficulty,  and  these  subjective  conditions  still  remain 
upon  a  most  unsatisfactor)'  basis — e.'/.,  in  various  morbid 
mental  conditions,  where  the  state  of  consciousness  is  more  or 
less  altered,  it  is  difficult  to  explain  or  localise  the  seat  of  the 
lesion  when  there  is  no  evidence  of  paralysis  of  the  motor  or 
sensory  functions,  and  vice  versa.  The  nearest  approach  to 
the  connecting-link  between  the  seat  of  intellect  and  the  sensorv 
and  motor  functions  has  been  made  by  the  minute  study  of 
such  conditions  as  aphasia,  and  of  this  relationship  Bastian  has 
formulated  (provisional!}-)  a  general  law  as  a  working  hypo- 
thesis— viz.,  "  The  tendency  to  mental  impairment  with 
aphasia,  and  the  degree  of  such  impairment  will,  other 
things  being  equal,  increase  as  the  lesions  of  the  left  hemi- 
sphere, which  produce  aphasia,  recede  in  site  from  the  third 
frontal  convolution,  and  approach  the  occipital  lobe."  The 
exact  localisation  of  the  excitable  cortex  is  of  the  highest  value  in 
determining  accurately  the  seat  of  discharging  lesions,  causing 
epileptiform  fits,  etc.,  but  no  matter  how  exact  the  study,  or 
how  accurate  the  inferences  drawn  therefrom  may  be,  such  data 
still  leave  us  far  from  the  localisation  of  mental  phenomena. 
Let  us  now  look  more  carefull}^  at  some  of  the  facts  before  us, 
and  let  us  endeavour  to  arrive  at  some  conclusion  as  to  how 
far  we  are  really  able  to  localise  even  the  simplest  mental  state. 

(1)  Phrenolor/ical  mc^jpintj  out  has  proved  of  no  value 
hitherto,  and  we  are  forced  to  acknowledge  that  phrenologists 
have  not  shown  us  anything  that  is  verifiable. 

(2)  ExjJerimental  research  has  done  much  to  determine 
certain  phj^sical  relationships  between  cortical  areas  and 
afferent  and  efferent  impulses. 

(3)  Coinparative  anatomy  has  also  done  much  by  demonstrat- 
ing that  differences  of  brain  structure  coexist  with  differences  of 
mental  faculty  in  races  and  species  of  animals.  Meynert  gives 
three  anatomical  facts  which  render  a  functional  differentiation 
of  the  various  cortical  regions  highly  probable  :  («)  the  develop- 


110        SCHEME  OF  THE   CENTRAL  NERVOUS  SYSTEM. 

ment  of  the  olfactory  lobe  in  different  animals  associated  with 
the  amount  of  use  of  the  olfactory  sense  ;  (&)  the  difference  in 
the  relation  between  the  median  and  the  convex  surfaces  of  the 
cortex  in  animals  with  strongly-developed  olfactory  lobes,  and 
in  man  ■  (c)  in  the  human  brain  the  walls  of  the  Sylvian 
fissure,  are  most  highly  developed.  Man  excels  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  regions  associated  with  speech,  and  in  the  number 
of  convolutions  belonging  to  these  regions,  as  animals  with 
highly-developed  olfactory  lobes  excel  in  regard  to  the  size  of 
these  lobes.  Therefore,  he  believes  that  the  evolution  of  certain 
psychical  functions  goes  hand  in  hand  with  a  proportionate 
development  of  certain  regions  of  the  cortex.  Other  morpho- 
logical points  would  apparently  lead  to  the  same  view — e.g., 
the  quantitative  differences  in  the  brain  trunks  both  in  man 
and  in  animals  dependent  upon  quantitative  variations  in  the 
different  parts  of  the  forebrain,  giving  the  idea  of  a  harmonious 
dependence  between  the  form  of  the  brain-trunk  structure  and 
the  quantitative  development  of  the  forebrain. 

(4)  Morbid  anatomy,  or  the  noting  of  the  effects  of  lesions 
in  different  parts  of  the  brain.  Kirchhoff*  asks  the  question, 
"  To  what  extent  have  focal  diseases  aided  in  our  knowledge  of 
the  location  of  mental  disturbances  ?  "  If  we  take  into  account 
only  the  lesions  which  interrupt  the  various  conduction  systems, 
we  do  not  gain  much  knowledge  as  to  the  centres  which  are 
probably  affected.  Of  the  basal  ganglia,  the  optic  thalamus 
would  appear  to  be  more  closely  connected  with  the  mental 
functions  than  the  corpus  striatum  ;  inasmuch  as  the  former 
alone  undergoes  atrophy  in  congenital  absence  of  the  cerebral 
hemispheres.  Kirchhoff  believes  that  the  disturbance  in  the 
intellectual  development  of  individuals,  in  whom  the  corpus 
.callosum  is  absent,  or  only  very  small,  indicates  that  the  higher 
mental  processes  are  not  dependent  upon  the  frontal  brain  alone, 
for  in  these  cases  the  occipital  lobes  are  mainly  atrophied.  In 
some  idiots,  also,  who  have  imperfect  development  of  the  brain 
as  a  whole,  it  is  impossible  to  localise  satisfactorily.  Nor  does 
he  admit  of  any  further  conclusion  being  drawn  from  the  study 
of  irregular  development  in  the  cortical  layers,  unless  the  area 
so  affected  is  circumscribed.  "  For  example,"  he  says,  "  in  a 
*  "  Handbook  of  Insanity,"  p.  9. 


LOCALISATION  OF  THE  MENTAL  FACULTIES.        Ill 

few  idiots  the  frontal  lobes  contained  only  very  few  pyramidal 
cells,  which  were  distributed  irregularly,  so  that  it  was  almost 
impossible  to  distingiTish  the  layers."  In  these  cases  the  im- 
perfect mental  development  may  be  attributed  to  the  imperfect 
development  of  the  frontal  cortex. 

Localisation   of    the   Mental   Faculties.  —  In   the  "^ 

attempt  to  localise  activities  of  the  mind,  some  assert,  that  each 
of  the  ultimate  microscopic  elements  of  the  grey  substance 
(ganglion-cell)  represents  a  distinct  psychical  element  (sensa- 
tion) ;  others  regard  the  brain  as  acting  in  its  entirety,  or  at 
least  through  large  areas. 

Before  granting  that  the  mind  has  its  seat  in  the  brain  at 
all,  let  us  look  at  some  of  the  reasons  which  have  led  to  this 
conclusion. 

(1)  The  brain  («)  is  an  indispensable  medium  between  certain 
changes  in.  the  peripheral  parts  of  the  body  and  corresponding  changes 
in  the  states  of  consciousness ;  (b)  it  serves  as  a  basis  for  the  execution 
of  the  ideas  and  volitions  of  the  mind.  If  nothing  takes  place  here, 
nothing  at  the  periphery  of  the  body  will  come  from  the  volitions ;  if 
anything  wrong  takes  place  here,  all  that  goes  on  at  the  periphery  will 
be  wrong,  and  the  mind  will  not  get  its  volition  executed,  (c)  The 
brain  seems  to  serve  as  the  special  physical  basis  of  the  ideas  and 
volitions  of  motion  themselves.  After  experience  in  moving  a  particular 
member  of  the  body  has  once  been  gained,  that  member  may  be  lost ; 
and  yet,  if  the  proper  areas  of  the  brain  remain  unimpaired,  the  ideas, 
feelings,  and  volitions  connected  with  the  movement  of  the  lost  member 
will  still  arise  in  the  mind.  The  man  whose  leg  or  arm  has  been 
amputated  can  still  feel  it,  can  form  the  image  of  how  it  should  be 
moved  to  be  in  this  position  or  in  that,  and  even  will  to  have  it  moved. 
The  leg  is  not,  then,  the  organ  of  these  ideas,  feelings,  and  volitions 
(Ladd). 

(2)  If  the  cerebral  hemispheres  of  animals  are  removed  various 
effects  are  produced.  Ferrier  says  there  is  little  difference  from  the 
normal  mental  condition.  Vulpian*  found,  that  not  only  may  a  fish  be 
urged  to  move  by  bringing  an  object  before  its  eyes,  but  it  would  also 
avoid  obstacles  as  if  still  possessed  of  a  sense  of  vision.     Steinerf  said 

^y  that  the  only  difference  was  a  greater  tendency  to  impulsiveness,  and  V 
less  caution  in  those  which  had  been  operated  upon ;  further,  not  only 
do  they  see  their  food,  but  discriminate  between  the  different  kinds 
of  food. 

*  ''  Systeme  Nerveux,"  p.  669. 

t  "Die  Functionen  des  Centralnervensystems,  Zweite  Abtheilung,"  Die 
tHsche,  1888. 


y 


112        SCHEME  OF  THE  CENTEAL  NERVOUS  SYSTEM. 

It  is  often  difficult,  so  far  as  their  movements  and  response  to  peri- 
pheral stimuU  are  concerned,  to  distinguish  between  a  normal  and  a 
brainless  frog.  Terrier  believes  that,  if  the  observations  of  Goltz  and 
Steiner  are  correct,  the  principal  points  of  distinction  between  the 
brainless  and  the  normal  frog— namely,  the  absence  of  spontaneity  and 
the  power  to  feed  itself,  which  are  said  especially  to  characterise  the 
former — are  no  longer  capable  of  being  upheld,  and  that  the  brainless 
frog  behaves  precisely  like  the  brainless  fish. 

Longet  believed  that  the  removal  of  the  cerebral  hemispheres  anni- 
hilated only  perception  proper,  as  distinct  from  crude  or  brute  sensation, 
which  had  its  centre  in  the  mesencephahc  ganglia.*  Ferrier  says  that, 
if  the  results  obtained  by  Schrader  are  correct,  we  must  clas^  birds 
with  fishes  and  frogs,  which  retain  their  sense  of  sight  and  guide  their 
movements  accordingly,  even  when  the  cerebral  hemispheres  are 
removed. 

In  animals  generally,  there  are  great  variations,  according  to  their 
lowness  in  the  scale.  Adaptive  reactions  appear  to  be  better  organised 
in  the  mesencephalic  and  spinal  centres  in  fishes,  frogs,  and  pigeons 
than  in  the  lower  mammals,  and  least  of  all  in  monkeys  and  man. 

Can  we  infer,  from  the  adaptive  actions  of  the  lower  centres,  that 
there  is  intelligence  at  the  root  of  those  actions  ?  Ferrier  believes  that 
facts  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  between  the  simplest  reflex  action  and 
the  highest  act  of  intelligence  there  is  no  essential  difference,  the  one 
passes  by  insensible  gradations  into  the  other.  He  says  we  can  infer 
only ;  we  can  prove  nothing.  We  can  say  that  the  activity  of  the  lower 
centres  does  not  affect  the  consciousness — as  in  lesion  of  the  internal 
capsule,  when  the  sensory  tracts  are  cut  off  from  their  cortical  connec- 
tions. The  individual  has  absolutely  no  consciousness  of  impressions 
made  upon  his  organs  of  sense,  so  that  we  may  conclude  that,  in  man  at 
least,  states  of  consciousness  are  indissolubly  connected  with  the  activity 
of  the  cerebral  hemispheres. 

Further,  says  Ferrier,  "  one  may  remove,  anteriorly  or  posteriorly, 
from  above,  or  from  the  side,  a  considerable  portion  of  the  cerebral 
lobes  without  destroying  their  functions.  Even  a  small  portion  of 
these  lobes,  therefore,  suffices  for  the  exercise  of  their  functions.  In 
proportion  to  the  extent  of  the  removal,  all  the  functions  become 
impaired  and  gradually  fail;  and  beyond  certain  limits  they  are 
altogether  annihilated.  The  cerebral  lobes,  therefore,  co-operate  as  a 
whole  in  the  full  and  complete  exercise  of  their  functions.  Finally, 
when  one  form  of  perception  is  lost,  all  are  lost;  when  one  faculty 
disappears,  all  disappear.  There  are,  therefore,  no  special  seats,  either 
of  special  faculties  or  special  perceptions.  The  faculty  of  perceiving, 
judging,  and  wihing  one  thing  resides  in  the  same  region  as  that  of 
perceiving,  judging,  and  willing  another;  consequently,  this  faculty, 
essentially  one,  resides  essentially  in  one  organ." 

*  Flourens,  "  Systeme  Nerveux,"  1842. 


LOCALISATION  OF  THE  MENTAL  FACULTIES.         113 

Certain  areas  of  the  cerebral  cortex  do  appear  to  be  con- 
cerned with  the  execution  of  certain  functions  of  the  mind. 
We  cannot  regard  the  mind,  in  its  special  relation  to  the  brain, 
as  limited  to  any  point  or  small  area  of  the  cerebral  cortex. 
Nearly  all  observers  are  agreed  that  considerable  parts  of  the 
cortex  can  be  destroyed  Avithout  impairment  of  any  of  the 
special  functions  or  faculties  of  mind.  In  fact,  there  is  nothing 
to  indicate  that  the  mind  depends  upon  cerebral  activities 
concentrated  in  any  one  minute  circumscribed  spot.  Goltz,* 
jMunk.  and  Flourens  agree  in  thinking  that  the  most  important 
cerebral  functions,  from  which  we  conclude  mental  functions, 
cannot  depend  on  definite  sections  of  the  cerebrum. 

If  we  accept  the  doctrines  of  the  more  recent  English 
school — that  individual  sensations  or  ideas  exist  only  as  mem- 
bers of  a  connected,  conscious  series,  and  that  consciousness, 
therefore,  can  never  be  conceived  as  a  mere  sum  or  mere 
product ;  t  and  if  we  believe  with  Hume  that  consciousness  is 
a  mere  succession  of  ideas  without  inner  bond  or  connection,  or 
that  it  is  the  series  of  our  actual  sensations  (John  Stuart  Mill), 
it  may  be  thought  possible  that  there  are  individual  nervous 
elements  which  possess  isolated  and  distinct  forms  of  con- 
sciousness. 

From  pathological  conditions  we  do  not  appear  to  obtain 
evidences  which  may  be  termed  conclusive ;  nor  do  such 
evi devices  prove  to  \is  that  consciousness  is  confined  to  an)^ 
supreme  part  of  the  cerebral  cortex.  Glowers i:  says.  "  With 
the  much  disputed  c{uestion  of  the  relation  of  mind  to  brain, 
the  physician  has  nothing  to  do.  It  is  enough  for  him  to 
recognise  that  mental  manifestations  and  cerebral  activity 
invariably  coincide,  and  that  the  character  of  cerebral  pro- 
cesses in  some  way  determines  mental  states.  In  the  study 
of  diseases  of  the  brain  we  are  concerned  only  with  cerebral 
processes.  Unfortiniately,  however,  the  chief  terms  available 
are  those  of  psychology,  and  we  are  obliged,  therefore,  to  speak 
of  mental  processes  when  all  that  we  need  speak  of,  and  are, 
indeed,  justified  in  speaking  of,  are  cerebral  processes.     How- 

*  "  Pfliiger's  Archh'.,"  xxvi.  p.  35. 

t  Hoffding,  "Den  engelske  Filosofi  i  vor  Tid,"  Copenhagen,  1874. 

X  "  Diseases  of  the  Nervous  System,"  p.  98. 


Ill-        SCHEME  OF  THE  CENTRAL  NERVOUS   SYSTEM. 

ever  undesirable  sucli  a  confusion  may  be,  it  is  practically 
unavoidable.*  What  are  the  cerebral  processes  which  in- 
variably coincide  with  mental  manifestations  ?  Can  we  imagine 
any  one  cerebral  jDrocess,  or  set  of  processes,  which  coincide 
with  any  one  mental  state  or  group  of  mental  states  ?  Until 
we  are  in  a  position  to  answer  these  questions,  it  is  obvious  that 
we  are,  in  reality,  not  in  a  position  to  speak  of  mental  processes 
solely  as  cerebral  processes.  Nor  do  we  know  where  to  look 
for  the  junction  of  these  cerebral  processes  with  their  "  coinci- 
dental "  mental  processes. 

The  pathological  data  with  which  we  are  furnished,  are, 
however,  by  no  means  to  be  ignored.  Cases  in  which  there 
has  been  complete  destruction  of  one  cerebral  hemisphere, 
without  mental  disturbance,  have  suggested  the  possibility 
of  vicarious  activity  of  the  other  half  of  the  brain,  provided 
that  both  halves  possess  originally  the  capacity  for  exercis- 
ing the  same  function.  KirchhofF  regards  this  question  of 
the  co-ordinate  value  of  the  hemisphere  as  of  the  highest 
importance  in  the  examination  of  the  site  of  individual  func- 
tions. Similai-ly,  in  aphasic  conditions,  the  consideration 
of  the  physiological  variations  in  the  course  of  speech 
conception,  is  of  manifest  importance.  Further,  although 
(as  we  shall  see  presently)  we  are  not  in  a  position  to  say 
that  conscious  movements  originate  in  the  motor  centres  ; 
these  centres,  nevertheless,  constitute  stations,  or  connecting- 
links,  for  the  transmission  of  such  processes ;  hence,  with 
disease  or  destruction  of  these  areas,  there  is  a  tendency  to 
restriction  of  the  objective  manifestations  of  consciousness. 
In  the  same  way,  affections  of  the  so-called  sensory  areas  may 
restrict  or  modify  the  amount  or  quality  of  sensory  representa- 
tions in  consciousness.  In  fact,  although  we  cannot  bring 
pathological  processes  into  direct  apposition  to  morbid  mental 
processes,  we  can  conceive,  on  a  lower  platform,  various  con- 
ditions of  disease  which  lead,  in  an  unknown  way,  to  restric- 
tions and  variations  in  the  phenomena  contained  in  that  highest 
of  all  platforms — the  seat  of  human  consciousness. 

Speaking  of  the  difficulties  of  nerve-conduction  through  the 

*  The  facts  with  which  the  alienist  has  to  deal  are  in  the  main  psychic 
facts. 


LOCALISATION  OF    THE  MENTAL  FACULTIES.         115 

network  of  fibres  in  the  grey  substances,  Meynert  points  out, 
that  we  may  infer  that  this  enlarged  surface  will  be  able  to  per- 
form a  number  of  totally  independent  functions  ;  that  a  sensory 
perception,  for  instance,  need  not  give  rise  immediately  to  a 
motor  act.  Everj^  spinal  <^.ord  segment  embraces  the  whole  of  V 
the  grey  siibstance,  whereas  sections  through  the  cortex  contain 
but  a  small  portion  of  the  cortical  grey.  This  distribution  of 
grey  substance  will  naturally  prevent  the  entire  cortex  from 
acting  to  one  single  end,  while  it  favours  the  isolated  action  of 
various  cortical  regions.  Irradiation  of  functions  is  facilitated  / 
in  the  grey  substance  of  the  spinal  cord,  and  rendered  difficult 
in  that  of  the  cortex.  Further,  purely  morphological  data 
and  a  single  pathological  anatomical  fact  will  enable  us  to 
determine  which  regions  of  the  cortex,  in  the  probable  division 
of  labour,  take  upon  themselves  centrifugal  functions  in  the 
sense  applied  in  Bell's  law.  The  expression  "  irradiation  of 
functions'^  at  once  suggests  a  clue  to  our  actual  pathological  posi- 
tion, and  we  are  forced  to  confess,  that  pathology,  so  far,  has  truly 
served  to  demonstrate  the  implication  by  disease  of  the  sites 
concerned  with  the  irradiation  of  functions,  and  not  of  the 
actual  ultimate  site  of  consciousness.  Our  position,  therefore, 
is  only  a  step  higher  in  the  confirmation  of  Bell's  law,  of  the 
conduction  of  nerve-force  in  a  centripetal  direction  through  the 
posterior,  and  in  a  centrifugal  direction  through  the  anterior 
spinal  roots. 

In  our  attempt  to  find  the  site  Avhich  is  concerned  directly 
with  consciousness,  we  have  explored  various  sensory  and 
motor  regions  from  an  objective  and  phj^siological  point  of 
view.  Before  leaving  these  regions,  however,  let  us  really 
make  sure  that  we  are  justified  in  concluding  that  conscious- 
ness is  not  ultimately  determined  in  this  sensory  or  motor 
platform — i.e..  can  we  find  any  reason  which  would  justify 
the  belief  that  any  subjective  condition  or  state  of  conscious- 
ness may  arise  directly  from  the  objective  functioning  of  the 
so-called  areas  of  sensation  and  motion  without  the  aid  or 
collaboration  of  other  still  higher  centres?  First  of  all,  let  us 
try  to  answer  the  question.  Are  the  so-called  "  motor  centres  " 
and  "'  sensory  centres  "  really  the  centres  for  pure  motor  and 
.sensory   events  ?    or,   as   put   by  Waller,    "  Have    we    reached 


116        SCHEME  OF  THE  CENTRAL  NERVOUS  SYSTEM. 

any  true  dead  end  to  knowledge  in  the  conclusion  that  the 
cerebral  cortex  contains  '  sensorj^  centres  '  and  '  motor  centres,' 
and,  if  so,  what  signification  do  we  attach  to  these  final 
terms?"* 

On  the  question  as  to  whether  excitation-effects  are  caused 
by  direct  actioii  upon  particular  centres  in  which  the  voluntary 
motor  impulse  arises,  or  whether  they  are  attributable  to  an 
excitation  of  subjacent  fibres,  or  whether  any  third  possibility 
exists?  Hitzigt  says, 

v/  "  Even  if  we  assume  as  proved  that  the  movements  in  question  are 

hberated  by  the  ganglionic  substance — and  it  is  not  proved — this  would 
not  be  enough  to  prove  that  with  these  movements  which  are  Hberated 
by  the  internal  event,  that  precise  portion  of  the  cortex  furnishes  the 
substratum  of  the  first  outward  step  in  the  series  beginning  with  the 
origination  of  a  sense-impression,  and  finding  a  temporary  end  in  the 
expression  of  will  evidenced  as  muscular  movement. 

"  It  is,  on  the  other  hand,  far  from  inconceivable — and  the  notion  is 
favoured  by  our  knowledge  of  the  anastomotic  structure  of  these  parts 
— that  that  portion  of  the  brain  which  includes  the  birthplace  of  a  will 
to  move  is  of  another,  or  perhaps  of  a  more  com]3lex  nature,  and  that 
the  parts  which  we  have  called  centres  only  constitute  agencies,  ex- 
changes, in  which  an  arrangement  of  muscular  movements  occurs, 
similar  to  that  effected  through  the  grey  matter  of  the  spinal  cord  and 
basal  ganglia,  but  more  purposeful." 

From  experiments  made  upon  two  dogs,  from  wdiich  por- 
tions of  the  motor  areas  were  removed,  Hitzig  concluded  that 
the  animals  in  question,  after  the  operation,  had  only  an  im- 
perfect knowledge  of  the  state  of  the  affected  limb,  and  that 
they  had  lost  the  power  of  forming  complete  representations 
of  it. 

"  Still,"  he  says,  "  it  is  clear  that  very  exact  representations  of  the 
state  of  muscle  must  be  produced — as  we  learn  from  these  very  images 
of  movement — and  it  is  equally  clear  that  these  images  are  attributable 
chiefly  to  the  perception  of  the  muscular  stage  and  only  in  minor 
degree  to  joints,  skin,  etc.,  this  we  learn  from  the  well-known  illusions 
of  movements  occurring  in  the  paralysis  of  the  ocular  muscles. 

"If,  nevertheless,  our  representations  of  the  muscular  state  of  our 
own  body  do  not  overstep  the  threshold  of  distinct  consciousness,  and 
thus  enable  us  to  see  into  the  true  nature  of  the  process,  we  must 
attribute  this  failure  to  a  very  general  law.    We  are  able  to  distinguish 

*  "Brain,"  1892,  p.  .333. 
t  "Brain,"  1892,  p.  135. 


> 


LOCALISATION  OF  THE  MENTAL  FACULTIES.         117 

the  state  of  particular  organs  only  in  so  far  as  is  necessary  and 
suflficient  for  their  use  in  the  uninterrupted  maintenance  of  their 
functions. 

"  But  within  such  limits  the  apprehension  of  these  mainly  uncon- 
scious representations  of  each  particular  phase  of  movement,  constitutes 
one  of  the  necessary  conditions  of  a  normal  progress  of  its  succeeding 
phase ;  subsequently  (considering  apparent  muscular  repose  as  a  phase 
of  movement),  one  must  recognise  that  muscular  states  in  general  are 
among  the  various  causes  that  guide  the  organism  in  its  voluntary 
movements,  and  that  regulate  these  movements.  Let  us  assume  an 
entire  absence  of  all  other  sensory  stimuli  and  perceptions,  so  that  we 
have  to  do  with  a  simple  motor  machine  of  such  a  kind,  set  in  motion 
by  the  muscular  impulse,  we  may  then  very  well  imagine  it  as  sufficient 
for  the  execution  of  purposive  movements. 

"  AVe  have  recognised  in  the  above-described  portions  of  the  cortex 
an  organ,  the  function  of  which  coincides  with  that  aspect  of  the 
psychical  phenomenon  that  we  have  been  considering,  and  I  do  not  see 
the  necessity  for  admitting  that  will,  as  such,  involves  a  specific  and 
motor  organ." 

Munk  *  says,  "Just  as  the  cortex  of  the  occipital  lobes  stands  in 
relation  to  vision,  and  that  of  the  temporal  lobes  to  hearing,  so  the 
cortex  of  the  parietal  area  stands  in  relation  to  common  sensation 
(Gefiihlsinn) ;  in  this,  as  in  the  other  cases,  we  have  the  locus  where 
perception  is  consummated,  and  where  representations — the  inemory  ^^ 
images  of  perceptions — have  their  seat.  Let  it  be  clearly  understood, 
however,  that  it  is  not  sensation  of  the  skin  only  that  is  here  in  (juestion, 
but  sensation  in  its  broadest  sense — the  sensation  of  the  Avhole  body." 
Further,  he  asks,  "  What  are  the  organs,  of  M'hich  the  modifications 
can  reach  consciousness  as  neural  sensations  ?  These  organs  are  :  the 
subcortical  ganglia  or  centres  in  brain  and  cord,  that  invoke  movements. 
As  in  the  infancy  of  the  animal,  the  representations  of  movement  are 
developed  from  its  first  purely  reflex  movenients  ;  as  in  the  adult 
animal,  the  representations  of  movements  of  a  part  of  the  body  can 
still  arise  in  its  sensory  area,  even  if  {e.ff.,  in  locomotion)  this  sensory 
area  is  not  actually  participating  in  the  accomplishment  of  such  movt^- 
ments  ;  as,  finally,  the  representations  of  movement  lost  in  consequence 
of  cortical  extirpation  in  a  given  part  of  the  sensory  area,  may  be 
formed  out  of  the  reflex  and  automatic  movements  of  the  affected  part, 
it  cannot  but  be  that  fibres  ascend  to  the  cerebral  cortex  from  sub- 
cortical motor  centres  or  ganglia,  as  well  as  from  the  skin  and  from  the 
muscles — the  fibres  that  subserve  cortical  perception  of  these  sub- 
cortical centres. 

"  Our  neural  sensations  are  indeed,  for  the  present,  to  be  distinguished 
from  what  has  hitherto  very  generally  received  the  name  of  neural 
sensation  (Innervationsgefiihl) — from  the  'perception  of  the  intensity 
of   voluntary  effort   in  connection   Avith  voluntary  movement,'    'will,' 

*  Du  Bois-Reymond,  "  Arcliiv., '  1878,  p.  162. 


118        SCHEME  OF  THE  CENTEAL  NERVOUS   SYSTEM. 

'  voluntary  movement/  with  seat  and  origin  in  the  cerebral  cortex, 
are  indeed  very  convenient,  and  may,  therefore,  also  be,  valid  expres- 
sions, but  they  are  destitute  of  a  phenomenal  physiological  substratum. 
All  we  know  of  the  cerebral  cortex  is,  that  it  is  the  place  of  perceptions 
and  the  seat  of  representations.  Beyond  this,  it  is  merely  admissible 
to  assume,  as  has  been  assumed  by  Meynert  on  somewhat  different 
data,  and  by  Wernicke,  that  representations  of  movement  are  the 
causes  of  so-called  voluntary  movements ;  that  with  the  production  of 
such  a  representation  to  a  given  degree  (and,  indeed,  with  a  production 
via  sensation,  not  via  its  ordinary  constituent  sensations)  eo  ipso  the 
corresponding  movement  is  elicited ;  and  that  the  greater  its  forma- 
tive representation  the  greater  the  resultant  movement.  The  *  percep- 
tion of  voluntary  effort,  in  connection  with  voluntary  movement,'  might, 
indeed,  be  the  attribute  of  a  representation  of  movement ;  a  true 
perception  might  still  obtain  only  indirectly,  quite  independently  of  the 
'  will,'  and  the  percept  Avould  then  be  nothing  but  the  neural  sensation 
in  the  sense  just  set  forth." 

Waller  adopts  the  view  that  every  centre  must  be  sensori- 
motor, and  in  the  two  difTerent  components  of  the  double  term 
he  does  not  recognise  any  phenomenal  division  of  the  central 
process  into  sensory  and  motor.     He  says, 

"Between  centripetal  and  centrifugal  impulses  I  see  a  single 
psychical  process,  one  and  indivisible ;  to  call  it  sensory  or  to  call  it 
motor,  or  even  to  call  it  sensori-motor,  are,  to  my  thinking,  imperfectly 
and  improperly  to  designate  it  by  more  or  less  subjective  terms,  with 
more  or  less  obstructive  connotations.  All  that  I  can  recognise  in  the 
notion  of  a  centre  is  an  organ  of  elaboration  receiving  and  giving  out 
impulses.  By  the  term  motor  I  denote  that  it  emits  but  fail  to  denote 
that  it  receives ;  by  the  term  sensory  I  denote  that  it  receives  (and 
imply  that  it  feels)  and  fail  to  denote  that  it  emits  impulses ;  by  the 
term  sensori-motor  I  denote  reception,  '  feeling,'  and  emission.  All 
these  meanings  when  closely  analysed  are  illegitimate,  and  convey  too 
little  or  too  much.  Experimentally  I  may  not  predicate  'feeling 'of 
any  centre,  biit  only  of  the  hypothetical  ego,  I  may  only  infer  from 
visible  movements  that  other  animals  '  feel,'  and  that  sensations  similar 
to  my  own  are  associated  with  the  activity  of  certain  centres. 

"  I  picture  a  wave  of  change  passing  through  a  cell,  but  do  not  know 
at  what  transverse  section  of  the  wave  to  label  it  'motor'  or  'sensory.' 
The  property  of  cortical  grey  matter  is  senso-motivity  ;  the  most  typica 
so-called  motor  cortex  is  senso-motor ;  the  most  typical  so-called  sensory 
cortex  is  senso-motor. 

"  A  central  process  is  not  sensory  or  motor,  but  senso-motor  (in  a 
guarded  sense),  and  a  centre  is  an  '  organ  of  return  of  action.' 

"  By  those  who  make  a  distinction  and  contrast  between  a  motor  and 
sensory  process,  the  motor  idea  is  a  mental  picture  of  movements  about 


COXCLUSIONS.  119 

to  be  made,  the  kinaesthetic  idea  is  a  mental  picture  of  movements  just 
made.  The  motor  idea  is  considered  as  an  antecedent  to  motion,  the 
sensory  idea  as  its  consequent. 

"  It  is  not  possible  to  distinguish  a  '  kinsesthetic '  image  of  past 
movements  from  a  '  motor '  image  of  impending  movements.  The 
two  words  denote  one  thing.  Nevertheless,  we  can  and  do  recogTiise  in 
the  use  of  the  word  senso-motor,  which  connotes  the  notion  that  the 
centripetal  generates  the  centrifugal  phenomenon,  the  principle  that 
phenomena  have  generators  and  consequent  antecedents;  we  are 
reminded  by  the  word  that  a  centre  is  an  organ  of  return  of  action  and 
that  the  type  of  all  motor  action  is  a  reflex  act.  This  principle  is 
recognised  by  all  leading  workers  and  thinkers — by  Hitzig,  in  his  con- 
ception that  the  motor  area  of  the  cortex  is  a  '  muscular  sense '  area : 
by  Munk,  in  his  conception  that  it  is  the  motor  '  Fiihlsphare ' ;  by 
Bastian,  in  his  conceiJtion  that  it  is  the  centre  of  '  kinsesthetic '  impres- 
sions. These  three  concex)tions  are  but  one  and  the  same  conception^ 
which  I  most  explicitly  and  unreservedly  accept  as  a  fundamental 
article  of  thought." 

Waller  points  out  that  his  remarks  do  not  directly  involve 
any  question  of  actual  localisation.  Its  main  arguments  are 
equally  applicable,  whether  senso-motility  be  the  property  of 
the  entire  cortex  or  of  only  its  Rolandic  area,  whether  we  admit 
motor  and  sensory  centres  as  taught  by  Hitzig  and  by  Ferrier, 
or  the  cortical  map  of  Munk,  or  indifference  of  function  in  the 
unrestricted  sense  of  Flourens,  or  in  the  restricted  sense  of 
Goltz. 

In  whatever  light  Waller  looks  upon  this  question,  his  remarks — 
"  Thought  of  movement  is  memory  of  movement,  or,  more  generally, 
the  thought  is  the  remembered.  An  impulse,  an  intention,  a  resolu- 
tion ;  a  prayer  is  a  more  and  more  concentrated  act  of  attention,  of 
memory,  of  thought.  An  identical  neural  process  is  the  essential 
phenomenon  wrapped  up  and  presented  in  these  very  different  words : 
will,  attention,  memory,  belief,  thought '' — would  appear  to  infer  such 
functional  attributes  to  the  Eolandic  area  of  the  cerebral  cortex— z.e., 
to  a  region  essentially  sensori-motor  in  function.  He  also  disagrees 
with  the  exclusion  of  the  motor  zone  from  the  sphere  of  consciousness, 
as  enunciated  by  James,  Bastian,  Ferrier,  Gotch,  and  Horsley.  To 
James's  comparison  of  the  motor  area  to  the  mouth  of  a  funnel  (through 
which  pour  outgoing  impulses,  caused  by  incoming  impulses)  he  also 
takes  exception,  at  least,  in  so  far  as  the  theory  holds  that  the  functions 
of  the  structures  at  the  mouth  of  this  funnel  may  be  only  those  of 
consciousness  of  the  kinsesthetic  ideas  and  sensations,  and  that  this 
consciousness  accompanies  the  rise  in  activity  of  them  rather  than 
its  discharge.  To  James's  hypothesis  that  these  paths  all  run  one 
Avay — that    is,   from    "  sensory  "  cells  into   "  motor "  cells,   and  from 


120        SCHEME  OF  THE  CENTRAL  NERVOUS   SYSTEM. 

motor  cells  into  muscles,  without  ever  taking  the  reverse  direction — 
he  agrees ;  whilst  with  the  statement,  "  All  cells  are  '  motor ; '  we 
simply  call  those  of  the  Rolandic  region — those  nearest  the  mouth  of 
the  funnel — the  motor  cells  par  excellence,'''  he  agrees,  "most  unre- 
servedly." Further,  he  says,  "  Any  motor  or  discharging  centre  must 
also  be  a  '  sensory '  or  receiving  centre ;  it  must  be  excited  as  well 
as  excite.  Any  '  sensory '  centre  must  also  be  motor,  directl}'-  or 
indirectly ;  else  we  could  have  no  objective  tokens  of  sensation ;  every 
centre,  whether  called  motor  or  sensory,  is  terminus  ad  quern  as  well  as 
terminus  a  quo." 

Let  us  add  to  these  views  those  of  Meynert — ^viz.,  "  Actual  sensation  is 
developed  by  the  evolution  of  equally  unknown  external  forces,  which 
we  must  suppose  differ  very  materially  from  one  another.  Nerves 
and  nerve-cells  possess  no  motor  power.  Indeed,  there  is  nothing  more 
certain  about  the  functions  of  the  cerebral  organism,  than  that  the 
centripetal  sensory  nerves  are  the  keys  which  wind  up  the  mechanism 
connected  with  the  muscles,  and  excite  the  latter  to  action. 

"A  varying  functional  energy  of  brain-cells,  according  to  the  special 
organ  of  sense  with  which  they  may  be  connected,  is  quite  indemon- 
strable, since  we  are  acquainted  with  the  physiological  conditions 
favourable  to  the  action  of  external  forces,  and  can  prove  easily  enough 
that  it  devolves  upon  the  terminal  organs  of  the  nerves  to  meet  these 
conditions. 

"  Specific  energies,  therefore,  depend  altogether  upon  the  peculiari- 
ties of  the  end  organs,  and  sensitiveness  is  the  only  specific  property  of 
brain-cells^ 

Conclusions. — What  are  v\'e  to  iearn  from  these  con- 
troversies ?  Are  we,  after  all,  any  the  better  able  to  come  to 
any  conclusion  as  to  whether  consciousnes;:;  exists,  as  such,  in  the 
areas  we  have  considered?  or  is  some  higher  area  essential  to  the 
psychical  events  ?  If  we  look  upon  the  so-called  sensory  and 
motor  areas  as  containing  the  structures  which  have  sensitive- 
ness (by  this  we  do  not  imply  any  psychical  correlate  or  state 
of  consciousness)  and  the  power  of  furthering,  or  even  adapting, 
forces  in  a  determinate  direction ;  and,  if  we  regard  this 
physical  apparatus  more  as  a  further  advancement  in  com- 
plexity of  the  fundamental  reflex  power,  it  is  obvious  that  the 
areas  of  such  activities  are  only  in  a  degree  more  closely 
approximated  to  the  actual  site  of  consciousness  than  other 
centres  on  a  lower  level  in  the  cerebro-spinal  system.  I^rom 
experimental  investigations  upon  animals,  it  may  be  gathered 
that  extirpation  of  a  certain  region,  or  regions,  is  followed  by 
total  loss  of  sensori-motor  functions,  as  viewed  objectively,  but 


CONCLUSIONS.  121 

this  is  no  guarantee  that  subjective  psychical  conditions  are  not 
still  present.  On  the  other  hand,  just  as  we  may  have  compli- 
cated adaptive  movements  of  exceeding  fitness  performed  by  the 
animal  whose  cerebrum  has  been  destroyed,  so  we  may  have 
complicated  mechanical,  and  even,  apparentl}^  intellectual  per- 
formances brought  about  on  a  higher  level  without  the  slight- 
est evidence  of  any  conscious  psychical  correlate.  By  this  is 
meant,  that  fitness  of  reaction  is  no  sure  evidence  of  immediate 
conscious  guidance.  The  functions  of  the  so-called  sensori-motor 
areas,  therefore,  can  furnish  us  with  no  more  proofs  of  their 
being  ultimately  concerned  with  consciousness,  than  can  the 
activities  of  lower  centres  \\diicli  possess  the  same  fundamental 
properties,  although  developed  in  a  lesser  degree. 

The  theory  of  reflex  action,  as  first  applied  to  explain  cere- 
bral processes  by  Laycock,  has  been  very  generally  accepted. 
He  did  not,  however,  attempt  to  explain  why  some  of  the  most 
complicated  cortical  processes  were  attended  by  consciousness 
and  others  not.  He  viewed  the  objective  and  subjective 
phenomena  as  correlated  in  some,  but  he  did  not  seek  to 
establish  a  direct  or  local  correlation  of  the  phenomena  in  a 
definite  area,  nor  did  he  seek  to  explain  either  phenomenon  in 
the  terms  of  the  other.  The  well-known  views  of  Hughlings- 
Jackson,  that  the  sensori-motor  apparatus  of  the  cortex  is 
re-represented  in  other  centres  higher  in  the  scale  than  the 
physiological  sensory  and  motor  areas  in  the  cortex,  find  the 
most  favour  with  those  who  have  obtained  an  intelligent  grasp 
of  this  subject ;  and,  if  we  accept  his  view,  that  mental  opera- 
tions are  simply  the  subjective  accompaniments  of  sensori-motor 
processes,  we  do  not,  at  the  same  time,  in  any  way  bind  our- 
selves to  the  possibly  erroneous  conception  that  such  subjective 
accompaniments  are  in  immediate  local  juxtaposition  to  the 
physical  sensori-motor  processes.  We  have  an  abundance  of 
examples  of  complex  reactions  with  ^\•hich  no  psychical 
correlate  is  apparent ;  and  it  is  readily  conceivable,  that  just 
as  the  nervous  apparatus  of  lower  centres  is  characterised 
by  its  sensitiveness  and  tendency  to  propagate  its  functions 
in  a  fit  and  appropriate  direction,  so  the  mechanism  of  the 
sensori-motor  regions  is  characterised  by  its  still  more  highly- 
developed  sensitiveness  and  tendency  to  react  to  special  stimuli 


122        SCHEME  OF  THE  CEXTRAL  NERVOUS  SYSTEM. 

conveyed  through  the  medium  of  the  special  senses.  On  this 
assumption,  and  on  this  only,  can  we  seek  an  explanation  of 
many  morbid  objective  manifestations  as  seen  in  the  insane. 
In  the  early  stages  of  the  general  paralytic,  the  occurrence  of 
paralysis  of  his  sensori-motor  apparatus,  as  viewed  by  us 
objectively,  without  implication  of  the  consciousness  or  totality 
of  his  mental  being,  as  viewed  by  him  subjectively;  or  in  the 
acute  maniac,  whose  sensori-motor  apparatiis  furnishes  ns  with 
objective  manifestations  of  its  abnormal  activit}^ ;  or,  again,  in 
the  active  physical  phenomena  of  sleep,  epilepsy,  and  hypnotism : 
all  these  may  be  explained  from  a  sensory-motor  point  of  view, 
and  without  any  obvious  psj^chical  concomitance.  It  is 
characteristic  of  the  himian  consciousness,  that  it  exists  as 
such  over  and  above  all  physical  processes ;  and,  as  yet,  we 
ai'e  far  from  the  possession  of  one  fact,  nay  even  one  valid 
argument,  in  support  of  the  conception,  that  the  mind  has 
its  ultimate  dwelling  place  in  any  one  definite  structure 
contained  within  the  so-called  sensori-motor  regions  of  the 
cerebral  cortex.  "When  we  discuss  the  questions  as  to  whether 
revived  images  are  gathered  together  into  a  special  ideational 
centre,  or  whether  they  are  merely  taken  cognizance  of  by  the 
intelligence  while  remaining  in  their  own  situations,  we  shall 
see  that  the  evidence  stands  in  favour  of  the  latter  view.  Some 
observers  advocate  that  the  intelligence  is  more  especially  con- 
nected with  the  superficial  layers  of  the  cortex ;  but  even  this 
supposition  is  not  supported  by  evidence  which  can  be  regarded 
as  conclusive. 


123 


CHAPTEE    lY. 

Localisation  of  the  Mental  Faculties — {continued). 

Sensory  and  Motoi*  Areas  subserve  Mental  Events — Localisation — 
Diffuse  Localisation  —  Indifferentism  —  The  Frontal  Lobe  — 
Intelligence  not  limited  to  Local  Areas—  Ratiocinative  Theories  : 
Xeural  Inference  Scheme  of  Hughlings-Jackson ;  Meynert's  View 
of  the  Forebrain ;  Wallers  View,  based  upon  Psychological 
Inference  —  Value  of  the  Logical  Mode  of  symbolising  Neural 
Inference — Prse frontal  Lobes :  Experimental  Researches;  Patho- 
logical Evidences — Consciousness  pertaining  to  Lower  Centres — 
Local  Memories — Subjectivity  of  the  Mind — Objective  Contents  ^ 
of  Consciousness — Specific  Functions  of  Xerve-Cells — Wallerian 
Scheme  of  the  Four  R's — Specific  Quantifications  of  Motion — 
Negative  Value  of  Physical  Formulae — The  Doctrine  of  "Invari- 
able Concomitance." 

At  the  close  of  the  preceding  chapter  ^^■e  stated  that  the  per- 
ception of  different  sensations  was  not  proved  to  be  consummated 
within  definite  pai'ts  of  the  so-called  sensori-motor  areas.  We 
mentioned,  for  the  pur^DOses  of  the  student,  the  hypothesis  of 
Hiighlings-Jackson,  and  others,  that  in  addition  to  the  regions 
which  have  been  defined  as  sensory  and  motor,  there  may  be 
other  and  higher  motor  as  well  as  sensory  centres,  within 
which  all  the  motor  and  sensory  functions  are  again  repre- 
sented, and  which  form  the  substrata  of  the  higher  mental 
functions.  This  hypothesis,  according  to  Ferrier,  receives  no 
confirmation  from  the  facts  of  experiment ;  nor  does  he  regard 
it  as  at  all  necessary  to  explain  the  facts  of  normal  or  abnormal 
mentation.  "We  have  in  the  sensory  and  motor  centres  of  the 
cortex  the  substrata  of  the  respective  forms  of  sensory  per- 
ception and  ideation,  and  of  the  individual  acts  of  volition, 
simple  and  compoimd,  as  well  as  of  the  feelings  associated  with. 


124        LOCALISATION  OF  THE  MENTAL  FACULTIES. 

their  activity.  It  seems  more  reasonable  to  suppose  that  there 
may  be  higher  and  lower  degrees  of  complexity  or  evolution  in 
the  same  centres,  than  to  assume  the  separate  existence  of  more 
highly  evolved  centres,  for  which  no  evidence  is  obtained  by 
the  results   of  experimental  research."* 

Of  this  latter  view  no  criticism  is  necessary,  for  it  has  not 
//  yet  been  proved  that  a  centre  for  sensation  and  another  for 
onotion  exists  in  the  cortex ;  and  even  though  such  centres  did 
exist,  we  are  very  far  from  forming  any  conception  as  to  the 
actual  substrata  of  the  respective  forms  of  sensory  perception  a/iid 
ideation,  and  of  the  individual  acts  of  volition.  We  are,  to  a 
limited  extent,  cognisant  of  the  physical  conformation  of  the 
brain  structures ;  we  know  that  there  are  paths  of  conduction 
for  stimuli  of  various  kinds,  and  we  know  that  stimuli  do  pass 
along  those  paths  and  may  be  reflected  in  their  course  by 
structural  realities,  but  beyond  this  we  can  conceive  no  inti- 
mate or  ultimate  substratum  which  directly  serves  conscious- 
ness. In  fact,  when  we  speak  of  the  substrata  of  perception, 
ideation,  and  volition,  as  applied  to  the  cerebral  cortex,  we  can 
only  realise,  that  we  have  advanced  one  step  onward  in  our 
search  for  the  structures'  which  are  immediatel}^  concerned  with 
modes  of  consciousness,  and  that  we  are  still  on  a  level  which 
offers  little  or  no  clue  to  the  whereabouts  of  what  we  seek. 
The  words  of  Herbert  Spencerf — viz.,  "Whoever  calmly 
considers  the  question  cannot  long  resist  the  conviction  that 
different  parts  of  the  cerebrum  must,  in  some  ujay  or  other, 
subserve  different  kinds  of  mental  action  " — contain  the  pith 
of  our  knowledge  of  the  whole  question.  The  different  j)arts 
of  the  cerebrum,  as  M^ell  as  the  whole  physical  organism,  do 
subserve  different  kinds  of  mental  action,  but  they  only  sub- 
serve, and  we  cannot  as  yet  determine  A^daere  or  how  the 
different  kinds  of  mental  action  are  ultimately  served.  Our 
position,  in  regard  to  the  areas  sve  have  already  investigated, 
therefore,  is  this,  they,  vii  some  way  or  other,  subserve  the  different 
hinds  of  mental  action.  Further,  Herbert  Spencer  says,  "  Local- 
isation of  function  is  the  law  of  all  organisation  whatever; 
and  it  would   be    marvellous   were  there   here    an    exception. 

*  Ferrier,  "  Cerebral  Localisation,"  2nd  edit.  -p.  460. 
t  "  Princii)les  of  Psychology,"  1870. 


CONSCIOUSNESS  SUBSERVED.  125 

Either  there  is  .  some  arrangement,  some  organisation  in  tlie 
cerebrum,  or  there  is  none.  If  there  is  no  organisation  the 
cerebrum  is  a  chaotic  mass  of  fibres,  incapable  of  performing 
any  orderly  action.  If  there  is  some  organisation  it  must  con- 
sist in  that  same  '  physiological  division  of  labour,'  in  which 
all  organisation  consists ;  and  there  is  no  division  of  labour, 
physiological  or  other,  but  what  involves  the  concentration  of 
special  kinds  of  activity  in  special  places."  An  analysis  of  this 
statement  in  no  way  invalidates,  or  tends  to  check,  the  coiirse  of 
our  thoughts.  It  involves  both  physical  and  mental  activities. 
Of  the  attempts  to  localise  physiological  activities  we  have  only 
to  mention  those  of  Ferrier,  Schafer,  Horsley.  Beevor,  Charcot, 
Dejerine,  Goltz,  Wundt,  Munk,  Hitzig,  Schiff,  Bastian,  Hubnoff, 
Heidenheim,  and  others  ;  and  from  the  results  of  their  laboiirs 
we  cannot  but  recognise  the  law  of  the  tendency  to  local 
differentiation  of  physical  activities.  When,  however,  Ave  pass 
from  the  objective  manifestations  of  these  activities,  and  en- 
deavour to  sujDerimpose  upon  them  various  psychical  states,  AA'e 
almost  immediately  get  beyond  our  depth,  and  flounder  amidst 
all  sorts  of  conjectures  and  hypotheses.  These  hypotheses  may 
be  ranged  under  two  classes — viz.,  (1)  those  which  favour  the 
view  of  localisation ;  and  (2)  those  which  support  the  idea  of 
diffusion  of  function  ("diffuse  localisation,"  or  "  indifferentism"). 
But,  the  student  will  ask,  Ai"e  we  not  still  upon  too  low  a  plat- 
form of  our  organisation  to  entertain,  for  the  present,  such 
questions  ?  We  are  on  the  platform  of  the  so-called  sensory 
and  motor  centres;  we  are  dealing  with  the  physical  substratum 
(so  far  as  we  know  it)  of  the  special  senses ;  and  we  are  sur- 
veying the  site  which  we  have  already  granted,  ''  in  some  way 
or  other,  subserves  "  consciousness. 

What  we  have  now  to  decide  is,  do  the  elements  of  these 
physical  substrata  directly  and  within  their  oaa'u  domain  serve 
consciousness  AA'ith  the  phenomena  of  sensation  ?  or  do  they  sul)- 
serve  it  by  a  furtherance  or  propagation  of  their  physical  con- 
ditions to  other  regions  where  their  activities  are  ultimately 
correlated  with  consciousness  ?  Herbert  Spencer  advocates, 
that  a  perception  can  have,  in  a  nerve-centre,  no  definite  local- 
isation, but  only  a  diffuse  localisation.  No  one  excited  fibre  or 
cell  produces  consciousness  of  an  external  object:  the  conscious- 


126        LOCALISATION  OF  THE  MENTAL  FACULTIES. 

ness  of  such  external  object  implies  excitement  of  a  plexus  of 
fibres  and  cells.*  Wundt  objects  to  the  view  that  sensations 
take  place  in  the  separate  areas  which  are  now  regarded  as 
sensory  centres,  inasmuch  as  such  a  belief  would  countenance 
the  old  phrenological  faculty  scheme.  His  doctrine  of  a  frontal 
organ  of  apperception  might  appear  to  receive  ample  confirma- 
tion from  the  experiments  of  Terrier,  and  from  the  reasonings 
of  Hughlings-Jackson.  Let  us,  therefore,  go  elsewhere  in  our 
search  for  some  more  highly  evolved  substratum,  than  that  of 
the  chaotic  mass  of  tracts  and  junctions  contained  within,  what 
we  term,  the  sensory  and  motor  areas. 

The  exclusion  of  the  motor  zone  from  the  sphere  of  con- 
sciousness— enunciated  by  James,  and  approved  of  by  Bastian, 
Ferrier,  Gotch,  and  Horsley — has  been  objected  to  by  Waller. 
The  supposition  that  consciousness  accompanies  the  rise  rather 
than  the  discharge  of  activity  in  these  regions  in  no  way 
implies  that  the  sphere  of  consciousness  exists  actually  in 
them.  The  consciousness  accompanying  their  activities  is  to 
be  regarded  as  a  collateral  manifestation  of  the  activities  pro- 
pagated in  some  unknown  way  from  these  regions  to  other 
regions  which  are  more  directly  concerned  with  the  phenomena 
of  consciousness.  That  is  to  say,  we  have  not,  as  yet,  arrived  at 
the  conclusion  that  there  exists  a  more  highly  evolved  centre, 
with  the  activities  of  which  the  respective  forms  of  sensory 
perception  and  ideation,  the  individual  acts  of  volition,  simple 
and  compound,  and  the  feelings,  are  more  directly  associated. 
It  does,  indeed,  seem  reasonable  to  assume  that  there  may  be 
higher  and  lower  degrees  of  complexity  of  evolution  in  the 
nervous  structures  ;  but  we  have,  as  yet,  no  conclusive  proofs, 
either  that  the  various  degrees  of  evolution  occur  in  the  same 
centres,  or  that  there  exist  separate  or  more  highly-evolved 
centres  for  the  phj^sical  correlates  of  mentation. 

The  frontal  lobe  contains  a  non-excitable  area  of  cortex, 
which  is  situated  in  front  of  the  area  for  the  representation  of 
the  head  and  eyes,  and,  in  the  monkey,  is  bounded  posteriorly 
by  a  vertical  line  drawn  through  the  anterior  end  of  the 
horizontal  limb  of  the  praecentral  sulcus,  from  the  median  line 
down  to  a  point  a  few  millimetres  in  front  of  the  anterior  end 
*  "Principles  of  Psych.,"'  2nd  edit.  1870,  p.  562. 


THE  FRONTAL  LOBE.  127 

of  the  fissure  of  Sylvius.*  This  part  of  the  brain  is  considered 
by  most  investigators  to  be  the  seat  of  the  highest  mental  pro- 
cesses. Meynert  believes  that  within  the  forehrain  sensitiveness 
is  converted  into  actual  sensation. 

"The  relation  of  the  forebrain  to  the  other  parts  of  oereliral 
mechanism  is  easily  understood.  To  this  end  we  may  recah  the 
structure  of  the  retina,  which  constitutes  a  hollow  into  which  the 
visual  rays  from  the  external  world  are,  as  it  were,  entrapped.  And, 
in  the  same  way,  we  may  look  upon  each  half  of  the  cortex  of  the 
forebrain  as  a  concave  organ,  duplicated  in  parts,  enveloping  all  the 
nerve-tracts,  which  conduct  to  it  the  impressions  from  the  outer  world. 
In  this  organ  these  impressions  are  converted  into  the  phenomena  of 
sensation.  In  assimilating  totally  unknown  j)hysical  impulses,  the 
cerebral  cortex — a  complicated  protoplasmic  structure — resembles  the 
protoplasm  of  the  primitive  amoeba,  which  can  transform  itself  into 
a  hollow  mass,  and  can  thus  encircle  any  body  which  it  wishes  to 
assimilate.  Just  as  the  mollusea  possess  tentacles,  which  they  pro- 
trude toward  the  outer  world,  and  claws,  by  means  of  which  they  take 
possession  of  their  booty,  so  this  complicated  protoplasmic  organism — 
the  prosencephalic  cortex — possesses  centripetally-conducting  pi'ocesses 
— the  sensory  fibres  of  the  nervous  system — which  we  may  consider  its 
tentacles,  and  motor  fibres,  which  are  its  claws.  The  remainder  of  the 
body,  with  its  sensitive  surfaces,  its  muscles,  and  the  skeleton  to  which 
these  muscles  are  attached,  serves  to  sustain  these  tentacles  and  claws, 
which  enable  the  forebrain  to  receive  the  images  of  the  external  world, 
and  to  react  upon  the  latter." 

Mnnk  regards  the  entire  frontal  lobe  as  a  sensory  sphere ; 
and  others  have  pronounced  the  frontal  region  to  be  the 
exclusive  seat  of  intelligence.  Meynert  corroborates  the  view 
of  Munk,  and  adds,  that  consciousness,  and  intelligence  also, 
which  are  evolved  in  the  forebrain,  depend  upon  a  mechanism, 
the  minute  details  of  \\'hich,  if  understood,  would  enable  us  to 
restrict  intelligence  to  the  forebrain. 

From  the  experimental  investigations  of  physiologists,  we 
are  led  to  believe  that  when  the  forebrain  is  extirpated,  there 
is  serious  impairment  of  the  intelligence  of  the  animal.  Goltz, 
in  particular,  has  demonstrated  that  the  loss  of  only  a  fe^' 
grammes  of  substance  of  the  frontal  lobes  of  dogs  was  suffi- 
cient to  produce  what  he  regarded  as  a  state  of  idiocy. 
Meynert  holds,  that  the  conclusions  of  experimental  physiology 
strengthen  the  opinion  that  intelligence  is  not  limited  to  defi- 
*  Beevor,  "Tuke's  Diet.,"  p.  156. 


128        LOCALISATION  OF  TPIE  MENTAL  FACULTIES. 

iiite  cortical  areas,  but  that,  being  based  upon  perceptions, 
including  the  sensations  of  innervation,  it  results  from  the 
activity  of  the  entire  forehrain. 

The  belief  that  the  exercise  of  intellectual  activity  by  every 
part  of  the  cortex  depends  upon  the  uniform  structure  of  all 
parts  of  the  forebrain,  which  makes  of  each  part  a  centre  for 
inductive  processes,  and  supplies  to  each  part  nerve-elements 
capable  of  perceiving  and  receiving  images,  is  unsupported  by 
experimentation  and  pathology.  All  parts  of  the  forebrain 
are  joined  to  each  other  by  anatomical  association  tracts,  and 
the  connections  of  these  tracts  with  other  functionally-perfect 
association  tracts  in  other  regions  of  the  cortex,  furnished 
some  investigators  with  the  idea  of  the  presence  in  the  brain 
of  an  induction  apparatus  ;  and,  according  to  Meynert,  the 
so-called  logical  sequence  in  the  evolution  of  association,  which 
yields  the  factors  of  intelligence,  is  effected  in  various  wa3's, 
and  to  a  varying  degree  of  perfection,  in  different  brains. 

Let  us  here,  however,  briefly  consider  the  arguments  of 
those  who  have  attempted  to  give  a  rational  view  of  psycho- 
physiology.* 

To  Hughlings-Jacksonf  we  are  indebted  for  the  neural- 
inference  scheme,  as  given  in  his  well-known  "three 
level." 

"  (1)  Evolution  is  a  passage  from  the  most  to  the  least  organised — 
that  is  to  say,  from  the  lowest  well-organised  centres  up  to  the  highest 
least-organised  centres.  Putting  this  otherwise,  the  process  is  from 
centres  comparatively  well  organised  at  birth  up  to  those,  the  highest 
centres,  which  are  continually  organising  through  life.  (2)  Evolution  is 
a  passage  from  the  most  simple  to  the  most  complex ;  again,  from  the 
lowest  to  the  highest  centres.  There  is  no  inconsistency  whatever  in 
speaking  of  centres  being  at  the  same  time  most  complex  and  least 
organised.  Suppose  a  centre  to  consist  of  but  two  sensory  and  two 
motor  elements ;  if  the  sensory  and  motor  elements  be  well  joined,  so 
that  '  currents  flow '  easily  from  the  sensory  into  the  motor  elements, 

*  The  ratiocinationists  (who  deduce  consequences  or  form  inferences 
from  tlie  comparison  of  premises)  follow  more  or  less  in  the  lines  of 
Herbert  Sjjencer,  who  says,  "  Every  ratiocinative  act  is  the  indirect  estab- 
lishment of  a  definite  relation  between  two  things,  by  the  process  of  estab- 
lishing a  definite  relation  between  two  definite  relations." — "  Psychology," 
vol.  ii.  p.  16. 

i'  "  Evolution  and  Dissolution." — "  Lancet,"  1884, 


HIERARCHY  OF  NERVOUS  CENTRES.       129 

then  that  centre,  although  a  very  simple  one,  is  highly  organised.  On 
the  other  hand,  we  can  conceive  a  centre  consisting  of  four  sensory  and 
four  motor  elements,  in  which,  however,  the  junctions  between  the 
sensory  and  the  motor  elements  are  so  imperfect  that  the  nerve-currents 
meet  with  much  resistance.  Here  is  a  centre  twice  as  complex  as  the 
one  previously  spoken  of,  but  of  which  we  may  say  that  it  is  only  half 
so  well  organised.  (3)  Evolution  is  a  passage  from  the  most  automatic 
to  the  most  voluntary.  The  triple  conclusion  come  to  is,  that  the 
highest  centres,  which  are  the  climax  of  nervous  evolution,  and  which 
make  up  the  '  organ  of  mind,'  or  physical  basis  of  consciousness,  are  the 
least  organised,  the  most  complex,  and  the  most  voluntary.  So  much 
for  the  positive  process,  by  which  the  nervous  system  is  '  put  together ' 
— evolution." 

His  scheme  of  the  hierarchij  of  nervous  centres  is  arranged  on 
an  anatomico-physiological  basis — that  is,  especially  as  to  degree 
of  indii'ectness  -with  which  each  represents  the  body,  or  part  of  it. 

"(1)  The  lowest  motor  centres  are  the  anterior  horns  of  the  spinal 
cord,  and  also  the  homologous  nuclei  for  motor  cranial  nerves  higher  up. 
They  extend  from  the  lowest  spinal  anterior  horns  up  to  the  nuclei  for 
the  ocular  muscles.  They  are  at  once  lowest  cerebral  and  lowest 
cerebellar  centres ;  hence  lesion  of  them  cuts  off  the  parts  they  repre- 
sent from  the  whole  central  nervous  system. 

"The  lowest  centres  are  the  most  simple  and  most  organised 
centres :  each  represents  some  limited  region  of  the  body  indirectly, 
but  yet  most  nearly  directly  they  are  representative.  The  middle 
motor  centres  are  the  convolutions  making  up  FeiTier's  motor  region 
and  the  ganglia  of  the  corpus  striatum.  These  are  more  complex  and 
less  organised,  and  represent  wider  regions  of  the  body  doubly  indirectly ; 
they  are  representative.  The  highest  motor  centres  are  convolutions 
in  front  of  the  so-called  motor  region.  I  say  so-called,  as  I  believe,  and 
have  urged  for  many  years,  that  the  whole  anterior  part  of  the  brain  is 
motor,  or  chiefly  motor.*  The  highest  motor  centres  are  the  most 
complex  and  least  organised  centres  :  and  represent  widest  regions 
(movements  of  all  parts  of  the  body),  triply  indirectly;  they  are 
re-re-representative.  That  the  middle  motor  centres  represent  over 
again  what  all  the  lowest  motor  centres  have  represented  will  be 
disputed  by  few.  I  go  further,  and  say  that  the  highest  motor  centres 
(frontal  lobes)  represent  over  again,  in  more  complex  combinations,, 
what  the  middle  motor  centres  represent.  In  recapitulation  there  is 
increasing  complexity,  or  greater  intricacy  of  representation,  so  that 
ultimately  the  highest  motor  centres  represent,  or,  in  other  word?,, 
co-ordinate,  movements  of  all  parts  of  the  body  in  the  most  special  and 
complex  combinations." 

In  regard  to  the  scheme  of  the  sensory  centres  his  conclusions  are— 

*  "Brit.  Med.  Journ.,"  March  6,  1869. 

9 


130        LOCALISATION  OF  THE  MENTAL  FACULTIES. 

(1)  That  the  highest  (chiefly)  sensory  centres,  parts  behind  Ferrier's 
sensory  region,  and  also  the  highest  (chiefly)  motor  centres,  parts  in 
front  of  the  so-called  motor  region,  make  up  the  physical  basis  of  con- 
sciousness ;  and  (2)  that  just  as  consciousness  represents,  or  is,  the 
whole  person  psychical,  so  its  anatomical  basis  (highest  centres)  repre- 
sents the  whole  person  physical,  represents  impressions  and  movements 
of  all  parts  of  his  body ;  in  old-fashioned  language,  the  highest  centres 
are  potentially  the  whole  organism.  States  of  consciousness  attend 
survivals  of  the  fittest  states  of  centres  representing  the  whole  organism 

Meynert  has  endeavoured  to  prove  a  logical  sequence  in  the 
evolution  of  association.  He  follows  most  authors  in  regarding 
the  intensity  of  established  associations,  as  dependent  upon 
their  conscious  and  frequent  re-excitation.  An  accidental  suc- 
cession of  impressions  is  seldom  repeated,  and  relations  thus 
established  vanish  quickly  from  the  brain.  As  soon,  however, 
as  the  "  subjective  bond  of  causality "  represents  an  actual 
union  of  things,  the  re-occurrence  of  external  stimuli  will  estab- 
lish a  permanent  association  within  the  brain. 

The  relation  of  one  mind  to  another,  and  the  effects  of 
the  transmission  of  approved  impressions,  is  of  great  interest. 
Individual  intelligence  may  grow  from  copjang  the  psychical 
associations  in  the  minds  of  others,  but  any  real  development 
■of  intelligence  is  only  to  be  gained  by  the  individual's  own 
association  of  ideas.  According  to  Meynert,  projection  and 
association  are  the  two  forebrain  principles  of  concei'ted  action, 
and  such  action  constitutes  an  induction.  In  this  way  he 
seeks  to  demonstrate,  that  the  widespread  activity  of  the  fore- 
brain  serves  not  only  as  the  recipient,  but  also  as  the  creator 
of  sensations. 

Wundt*  called  an  induction  the  fundamental  logical  func- 
tion; but  Meynert  t  first  tried  to  demonstrate  the  association 
and  induction  mechanism  of  the  forebrain.  He  believed  that 
both  ends  of  the  association  fibres  were  connected  centrally 
with  cortical  cells.  The  projection  bundles,  consisting  chiefly 
of  fibres  of  the  corona-radiata,  spreading  into  the  medullary 
substance  of  the  forebrain,  conduct  to  the  cortex  the  excita- 
tions from  the  external  world,  and  distribute  them  over  its 
different  sensory  spheres.     All  objects  which,  as  soon  as  per- 

*  "  Ueber  Menschen  imd  Thierseele." 
t  "  Leidesdorf  s  Manual,"  1865. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  INFERENCE  SCIIEiME.  181 

ceived,  engage  two  different  sensory  spheres,  niay  appear  to 
prove  the  existence  of  an  induction  mechanism,  present  every- 
where in  the  brain,  and  anatomically  dependent  upon  the  asso- 
ciation and  projection-systems  ;  but,  as  we  shall  see  later,  the 
physical  compounding  of  sensations  is  an  unwarrantable  assiimp- 
tion.  Psychologically,  the  mind  may  receive  an  impression 
and  then  refer  to  the  attributes  of  that  impression,  thus  draw- 
ing upon  the  resources  of  different  sensory  spheres ;  it  does 
not  draw  from  two  sources  at  once. 

Waller*  has  endeavoured  to  demonstrate  the  essential 
similarity  of  neural  processes  concomitant  -with  the  whole  range 
of  subjective  phenomena  from  the  simplest  sensation  to  the 
most  complex  judgment ;  but,  as  his  starting  point  is  -with  the 
ultimate  fact  "  sensation,"  we  do  not  in  reality  gain  any  further 
insight  from  his  conception  of  the  pliysiolofiical  mechanism  of 
ratiocination.  In  analysing  the  factors  of  the  simplest  sensation, 
as  well  as  of  the  most  complicated  judgment,  he  adopts  the 
logical  expressions,  major  premise,  minor  premise,  and  conclusion.^ 

In  this  scheme  it  is  essential  to  avoid  confusion,  b}'  distin- 
guishing between  subjective  sensation  and  activity  within  the 
objective  substratum  of  sensitivity.  Viewing  the  subject  from 
the  centripetal  aspect  of  neural  processes,  he  appropriates  to  the 
three-level  scheme  the  three  terms,  impression,  sensation,  per- 
ception, using  "  impression "  as  the  lowest  level  term,  and 
taking  "  impression  "  to  denote  an  effect  that  does  not  reach 
consciousness  ;  "  sensation  ''  to  denote  a  felt  impression  ;  "  per 
ception  "  to  denote  a  sensation  in  its  felt  consequence. 

The  scheme  is  based  on  the  type  of  the  psychological 
process  of  inference,  and  is  as  follows : — 

The  simplest  present   sensation  o-  is  not  the   concomitant   of  any 

isolate  present  state  of  organ  S,  but  the  resultant  of  a  comparison  based 

S 
upon  state  now  and  state  before  now — i.e.,  of  a  ratio  -,,. 

The  organic  state  now  is  the  sum  of  many  previous  alterations  of 

state ;   many  sensations  o-  the  concomitants  of   many  previous  ratios 

S 

^^-,  may  be  conceived  as  summed  up  in  the  state  of  sensibility  2. 

*  "  Brain,"  1892,  p.  35.5. 

t  Waller  does  not  imply  that  the  syllogistic  terms  of  logicians  correspond 
to  any  physiological  factors  in  a  neural  process.  The  mental  and  physiologi- 
cal states  are  symholised  hy  Greek  and  Roman  letters  respectively. 


132    LOCALISATION  OF  THE  MENTAL  FACULTIES. 

This  state  of  sensibility  2  has  as  its  organic  basis  a  material  state, 

which  (having  regard  to  the  total  2  by  many  elementary  a,  each  con- 

S  S 

comitant  with  a  ratio  ^)  is  properly  represented  as  the  ideal  symbol  ^ . 

b  S' 

Thus  2  the   specific  sensibility,  the   subjective  resultant   of  past 

S 
experience,  is  the  concomitant  of  ~ ,  the  imaginary  organic  sum  of  the 

antecedent  series  of  organic  ratios  '— . 

S 
To  this  resultant  state  (subjectively  2,  objectively  -)  he  applies  the 

term  "  personal  ratio,"  meaning  to  connote  in  this  expression,  that  the 
personal  state  now  is  composed  of  compared  objective  phenomena  and 
not  of  absolute  objective  phenomena. 

This  personal  ratio  he  takes  to  be  the  subjective  attribute  of  the 
organic  major  premise,  each  new  sensificatory  change  of  state  he  regards 
as  a  minor  pre?nise,  and  considers  that  a  conclusion  is  formed  by  the  com- 
pounding of  these  two  premises  ;  this  compounding  or  neural  inference 
may,  he  thinks,  properly  be  represented  symbolically  in  the  form  of  a 
multiplication,  in  which  the  product  represents  the  conclusion,  and  at 
the  same  time  the  new  major  premise  in  relation  to  subsequent  minor 
premises. 

I  X  1=11  or  subjectively.. 

But  here  it  is  necessary  to  justify  the  transition  from  the  use  of  the 
word  "  ratio  "  to  that  of  the  word  "  premise,"  and  the  use  of  a  fractional 
symbol  for  both  words. 

The  terms  of  any  premise  or  proposition  are  the  subject  and  the 
predicate  (joined  by  the  copula) ;  in  a  major  premise  the  subject 
enumerates  and  the  predicate  denominates.     The  major  premise  "  all 

oil      vj")  ATI 

men  are  mortal "  may  be  written  -— ,  in  which  we  enumerate 

all  mortals 

"  all  men  "  as  forming  part  of  "  all  beings  denominated  mortals." 

The  minor  premise  "  Socrates  is  a  man  "  may  be  written  similarly 

' ,  by  which  we  enumerate  Socrates  as  belonging  to  the  denomi- 

men    '    -^  "^    ^ 

nation  men  just  enumerated  in  the  subject  of  the  major  premise.  And 
the  syllogism  may  be  written  : — 

men  Socrates Socrates 


mortals  men  mortals 

major  minor        conclusion. 

It  would  be  absurd  to  say  that  this  or  any  other  mode  of  symbolisa- 
tion  "  explains  "  judgment,  attention,  sensation;  but  it  is  not  too  much 
to  say  that  it  clearly  exhibits  the  possible  factors  of  neural  inference ; 
each  act  of  observation,  each  determination  of  conduct,  is  the  resultant 
of  two  factors :  (1)  the  major  premise  or  central  state,  more  or  less 
attended  to ;  (2)  a  particular  minor  premise  or  group  of  sensificatory 


VALUE  or  THE  EATIOCINATIVE  METHOD.  133 

stimuli,  also  more  or  less  attended  to  (within  the  remaining  sensifica- 
tory  field,  less  or  more  attended  to). 

Value  of  the  Ratiocinative  Method.— The  logical 
mode  of  symbolising  neural  processes  ma.j  serve  a  purpose  ; 
but,  inasmuch  as  the  particular  premises — major  and  minor — 
are  manifestly  mental,  and  only  (at  least  so  far  as  we  can 
imagine  them  to  be)  correlates  of  ultimate  physiological  factors, 
the  whole  scheme  resolves  itself  into  a  disquisition  upon  the 
ordinary  rules  of  the  syllogism,  with,  in  addition,  the  concep- 
tion that  the  physical  organism  in  some  way  or  other  subserves 
the  phenomenon  of  sensation.  We  shall  have  occasion  to  dis- 
cuss at  some  length  the  various  theories  given  to  explain  the 
correlation,  or,  as  materialists  would  say,  the  "evolution"  of  a 
major  or  minor  premise  as  a  sensation  in  consciousness,  and 
we  shall  see  that  the  objects  of  consciousness,  as  viewed 
objectively  by  the  subject,  are  the  data,  or  premises,  upon 
which  our  conclusions  are  formed.  Here  we  anticipate  b}^ 
assu.ming,  that  the  various  presentations  and  representations  in 
consciousness  are  correlative  states  to  physiological  activities. 
Every  presentation  and  representation  is  an  objective  content 
of  consciousness,  and  each  content  in  itself  forms  a  major  or 
minor  premise.  For  an  explanation  of  the  formation  of  that 
major  or  minor  premise,  we  must  have  recourse  to  metaphysics 
or  philosophy.  On  the  psychical  side  we  have  the  contents  of 
consciousness,  which  furnish  us  with  data  from  which  we  infer 
our  conclusions.  On  the  physiological  side  we  have  various 
activities  which  resolve  themselves  into  reflex  acts,  the  results 
of  transmitted  excitations.  It  must  suffice  for  the  present 
to  recognise  that  the  sum  total  of  the  complex  phj^siological 
activities  becomes  manifested  as  an  objective  content  of  con- 
sciousness, and  that  the  e<jo  does  not  view  the  activities  them- 
selves; it  merel}^  views  their  mental  correlates  as  objective  states. 

The  study  of  the  nervous  mechanism  has  disclosed  to  us 
that  just  as  our  bodies  are  associated  with  the  activities  of  the 
cosmical  S3'stem,  so  our  organic  nervous  structures  are  asso- 
ciated with  the  objective  phenomena  of  consciousness.  Further, 
the  details  of  physiology  and  anatomy  A\'oiild  appear  to  point  to 
the  fact  that  some  ultimate  and  intra-bodil}^  activity  is  essential 
to,  and  possibly  conditions  every  diversification  of,  the  sensory 


134         LOCALISATION  OF  THE  MENTAL  FACULTIES. 

and  other  kinds  of  experience.  Be5rond  this  we  cannot  go. 
The  mere  experience  of  sensory  consciousness  in  itself  affords 
lis  no  scope  for  ratiocination.  In  other  words,  we  believe  that 
our  cerebro-spinal  sj^stem  is  capable  of  receiving  and  of  pro- 
pagating specific  agitations,  and  also  of  exerting,  in  some  way 
or  other,  a  determinate  modification  of  activity  in  its  substance ; 
but  we  do  not  in  the  least  degree  understand  the  modus 
operandi  whereby  we  experience  the  current  vicissitudes  of 
consciousness. 

Experimental  Researches.- — We  may  now  return  to 
the  consideration  of  the  iircefrontal  lobes  which  have  been 
regarded  as  especially  the  seat  of  intellectual  operations.  At 
the  International  Congress  of  Experimental  Psychology,  held 
in  London  in  1892,  Schafer  challenged  the  results  of  the  earlier 
experiments  made  upon  monkeys  by  Ferrier.  In  conjunction 
with  Horsley,  Schafer  found,  after  bilateral  removal  of  the  pras- 
frontal  lobes,  that  at  first  the  animals  appeared  apathetic,  but 
that  this  condition  passed  off  after  two  or  three  days.  He  also 
regarded  the  experiments  of  Hitzig  and  Goltz  upon  dogs  as 
doubtful,  inasmuch  as  antiseptics  were  not  used,  and  from  the 
small  size  of  the  prgefrontal  lobes  in  these  animals  and  their 
juxtaposition  to  the  psycho-motor  or  kinsesthetic  area,  the 
symptoms  might  possibly  have  been  due  to  an  extension  of 
the  injury  to  that  region. 

In  order  to  avoid  the  shock,  consequent  upon  a  bilateral 
removal  of  an  extensive  part  of  the  hemispheres,  which  is  apt 
to  be  temporarity  followed  by  a  condition  of  apathy  and 
apparent  idiocy,  whether  the  operations  be  in  the  frontal  or 
other  regions,  Schafer  adopted  a  modification  of  the  mode 
of  operating,  whereby  he  did  not  actually  remove  the  portions 
of  the  brain  but  severed  their  connections  with  the  rest  of  the 
mantle  and  the  brain-stem.  In  several  instances  in  which  he 
thiis  severed  the  preefrontal  lobes  in  monkeys  there  were  no 
appreciable  symptoms.  From  these  experiments  he  could  not 
support  the  view  that  the  prasfrontal  lobes  were  especially  the 
seat  of  intelligent  action. 

Henschen  has  given  an  account  of  a  young  man  who  shot 
himself.  The  ball  entered  the  right  temple  ;  after  perforating 
the  right  frontal  lobe,  it  passed  back  again  to  the  frontal  bone 


PATHOLOGICAL  EVIDEiNCES.  135 

throug-h  the  left  frontal  lobe.  The  man  ^^•as  able  to  get  up 
and  open  the  door  for  the  police.  He  also  walked  downstairs 
and  to  the  hospital.  The  wdiole  day  he  seemed  to  be  conscious, 
and  he  also  spoke  a  little.  At  the  post-mortem  examination 
a  large  part  of  the  nerve-fibres  from  the  frontal  cortex  was 
severed,  and  hgeraorrhage  had  taken  place  in  the  course  of  the 
bullet  wound.  An  even  more  interesting  case  was  admitted 
to  Bethlem  Hospital  three  years  ago.  A  man  who  had  suffered 
from  melancholia,  with  suicidal  tendency,  shot  himself  through 
the  roof  of  the  mouth.  The  ball  passed  through  the  frontal 
region  of  the  brain  and  emerged  at  the  top  of  the  frontal 
bone.  After  the  shock  of  the  injury  had  subsided,  the  mental 
condition  continued  precisely  as  before,  and  there  was  no 
obvious  impairment  of  consciousness.  Nor  did  the  patient  at 
any  time  manifest  any  confusion  of  ideas  or  subjective  change 
within  himself.  Ultimately  he  recovered  completely,  and  still 
possesses  the  right  use  of  all  his  mental  faculties.  These 
cases  would  appear  in  accordance  with  the  conclusion  drawn 
]jy  Schiifer,  to  demonstrate  that  the  frontal  lobe  is  not 
necessary  for  the  higher  psychical  life.  Gowers*  says,  "  It  is 
presumed  that  mental  processes  are  subserved  by  those  parts  of 
the  cortex  that  have  no  kno^^'n  motor  or  sensory  function,  and 
especially  by  the  prgefrontal  lobes.  Many  cases  are  on  record 
in  which  considerable  mental  change  w^as  produced  by  exten- 
sive disease  of  this  part,  especially  great  when  the  disease  was 
bilateral.  Small  lesions,  however,  may  cause  no  symptoms, 
perhaps  becaiise  there  is  considerable  capacity  for  functional 
compensation.  It  ^^•ould  probabty,  however,  be  wrong  to  regard 
mental  processes,  as  excliisively  related  to  the  parts  which  are 
not  known  to  have  other  functions,  since  the  motor  and  sensory 
regions  must  also  subserve  mental  operations." 

Pathological  Evidences. — From  the  numerous  records 
of  injury  and  disease,  implicating  the  prsefrontal  region,  we 
are  almost  bound  to  conclude  that,  inasmuch  as  such  injury 
or  disease  is  not  attended  by  any  definite  impairment  of  sensi- 
bility or  motility,  the  functions  of  this  region  are  not  essential 
to  the  phenomena  of  sensibility  and  motility,  so  far  as  they  are 
evidenced  in  consciousness.  That  is  to  say,  the  functions  of 
*  "Diseases  of  the  Nervous  System,"  p.  25. 


136         LOCALISATION  OF  THE  MENTAL  FACULTIES. 

the  structures  which  subserve  consciousness  may  remain  unim- 
paired, and  consciousness  may  be  subserved,  even  though  the 
structures  which  we  imagine  to  directly  serve  consciousness 
be  in  great  part  destroyed.  Referring  to  many  of  the  recorded 
cases  of  injury,  involving  the  preefrontal  region  of  the  brain, 
Ferrier*  says,  "  I  might  multiply  instances  all  demonstrating 
the  fact,  that  sudden  and  extensive  lacerations  may  be  made  in 
the  preefrontal  region,  and  large  portions  of  the  brain-substance 
may  be  lost,  without  causing  impairment  either  of  sensation  or 
of  motion  ;  and,  indeed,  without  very  evident  disturbance  of 
any  kind,  bodily  or  mental,  especially  if  the  lesion  be  uni- 
lateral." Again,  referring  to  a  number  of  cases  of  softening 
and  abscess  in  this  region,  he  says,  "  In  all  these  cases  there 
was  an  entire  absence  of  sensory  or  motor  paralysis ;  and  in 
many  there  was  nothing  recorded  or  nothing  calling  for  special 
attention  as  regards  the  mental  condition.  In  some  of  them, 
however,  and  in  one  or  two  others  to  be  referred  to,  the 
psychological  condition  seems  to  have  attracted  notice."  As 
we  have  before  observed,  the  removal  of  the  prsefrontal  lobes 
in  monkeys,  followed  by  alteration  in  the  animals'  character 
and  behaviour,  furnishes  us  with  no  definite  proof  that  the 
subjective  conditions  of  consciousness  were  interfered  with  ; 
and  it  is  quite  possible  that  their  consciousness  was  intact 
although  their  objective  expressions  were  at  variance.  Bastianf 
says,  "  In  regard  to  alterations  in  the  mental  condition,  these 
may  be  either  non-appreciable  or  slight  in  cases  of  injury  of,  or 
disease  in,  this  brain  region.  Any  such  symptoms  have  been 
very  frequently  absent  where  there  has  been  damage  to  the 
praefrontal  region  of  the  brain  only  on  one  side ;  whilst,  on 
the  other  hand,  alterations  in  the  mental  condition  have  been 
not  infrequently  noted  when  these  regions  have  been  simulta- 
neously affected  in  both  hemispheres.  It  has  often  been 
difficult  precisely  to  define  the  nature  of  the  change  which 
has  been  brought  about ;  but  a  dull  apathetic  condition  seems 
to  have  been  most  frequently  noticed,  together  with  irrita- 
bility, vacillation,  a  diminished  power  of  attention,  and  a 
lowering  of  the  moral  nature." 

*  "Localisation  of  Cerebral  Disease,"  1878,  p.  33. 
t  "  Paralyses  Cerebral,  Bulbar,  and  Spinal,"  p.  250. 


PATHOLOGICAL  EVIDENCES.  137 

The  following  facts  about  a  patient,  who  was  an  inmate  of 
the  Hospice  de  Menage  (quoted  by  Ferrier),  are  of  interest. 
The  lesion  in  this  case  was  purely  cortical,  atrophic,  and 
dependent  upon  partial  obliteration  of  the  arterial  supply.  It 
occupied  the  first,  second,  and  third  frontal  convolutions,  and 
also  the  internal  aspect  of  both  frontal  lobes.  The  ascending 
frontal,  ascending  parietal,  and  paracentral  convolutions  were 
intact.     The  rest  of  the  brain  was  normal  except  in  the  i-egion  , 

of  the  inferior  parietal  lobule  of  the  right  hemisphere.  During  /  /v<  ,j 
life  his  muscular  powers  and  sensation  were  unimpaired.  He 
was,  however,  in  a  state  of  complete  dementia,  marching  about 
restlessly  the  whole  day,  picking  up  what  came  in  his  way, 
mute,  and  oblivious  of  all  wants  of  nature,  and  requiring  to  be 
tended  like  a  child. 

Unfortunatel}^,  in  this  case,  only  the  macroscopic  changes 
were  described,  and,  as  pointed  out  by  Bastian,  there  might 
have  been  microscopic  changes  in  other  parts  of  the  brain 
similar  to  those  met  with  in  dementia.  This  conclusion  is 
quite  justifiable,  and  the  mental  symptoms  may  have  been 
those  of  an  ordinary  demented  patient,  who  presented,  over 
and  above  what  is  usual,  a  definite  gross  lesion  of  the  frontal 
lobes. 

If  we  ask  ourselves  the  question.  Are  there  any  definite 
signs  by  which  we  can,  \Yith  any  degree  of  certainty,  come  to 
a  positive  diagnosis  that  disease  exists  in  either  pra^frontal 
region  of  the  brain  ?  we  are  forced  to  answer  in  the  negative. 
In  cases  of  external  injury,  disease  in  the  nasal  foss«,  or 
tumours  of  the  orbit,  we  may  be  led  to  infer  that  the  frontal 
region  of  the  brain  has  become  involved ;  but  lesions  originat- 
ing in  the  frontal  lobes  themselves  are  unattended  by  any 
symptoms  which  have  any  localising  value. 

Instances  in  which  the  brain  has  been  extensively  diseased 
without  the  phenomena  of  mind  being  impaired  in  any  sensible 
degree  are  exceedingly  common.  In  such  instances  there  may 
have  been  destruction  of  particular  parts  of  the  brain,  or  the 
cerebral  mass  may  have  been  diseased  or  destroyed  to  a  con- 
siderable extent.  Ferrier  mentioned  the  case  of  a  man  who 
died  of  an  affection  of  the  brain,  and  retained  all  his  faculties 
■entire  till  the  very  moment  of  his  death,  which  was  sudden. 


138         LOCALISATION  OF  THE  MENTAL  FACULTIES. 

On  examining  his  head,  the  whole  of  the  right  hemisphere 
was  found  destroyed  by  suppuration.  Diemerbrock  records  a 
similar  case,  in  which  half  a  pound  of  pus  was  found  in  the 
brain,  without  any  obvious  mental  symptoms  during  life. 
Marshall  has  related  the  remarkable  instance  in  which  a  man 
died  with  a  pound  of  water  in  his  brain,  after  having  been 
long  in  a  state  of  dementia,  but  who,  a  very  short  time  before 
death,  became  perfectly  rational.  In  the  cases  of  idioc}^ 
recorded  as  having  arrest  of  development,  or  atrophy  of  the 
frontal  lobes,  the  condition  has  usually  co-existed  with  similar 
defects  in  other  regions  of  the  brain.  In  general  paralysis 
there  is  no  evidence  that  the  mental  symptoms  can  be  referred 
to  lesions  in  the  frontal  lobe  more  than  to  lesions  in  other  parts 
of  the  brain. 

In  fact,  none  of  the  pathological  changes  hitherto  described 
enable  us  to  understand  the  nature  and  mode  of  development 
of  mental  disorders.  In  other  words,  our  knowledge  of  the 
functions  of  the  human  brain,  and  of  the  localisation  of  cerebral 
disease,  is  not  yet  siifficiently  advanced  to  enable  us  to  deter- 
mine, with  any  degree  of  accuracy,  the  locality  and  nature  ot 
disease  affecting  the  cerebral  hemispheres,  and  still  less  are 
we  enabled  to  localise  the  cerebral  disease,  which  has  morbid 
mental  symptoms  as  its  accompaniments. 

The  attempts  to  follow  up  the  clue  suggested  by  the  localisa- 
tion of  the  speech-centre  in  the  left  hemisphere  have  resulted  in 
the  belief,  that  the  entire  cortex  is  the  site  of  language  con- 
ceptions. Similarly  with  insanit}^,  we  have  to  resort  to  the 
belief  that  the  lesions  are  diffused  over  the  cortex.  In  speech- 
affections  the  mental  disturbance  is  usually  much  more  marked 
with  diffuse  disease  than  with  focal  lesions.  In  insanity  gene- 
rally, speech  affections  are  more  commonly  due  to  diffuse  lesions 
of  the  cortex.  With  our  advance  in  knowledge,  and  improved 
methods  of  examining  the  brain  tissues,  we  shall  probably  find 
that,  in  the  main,  mental  disturbances  are  associated  with 
diffuse  lesions.  Hitherto,  the  clinical  facts  of  irritative  and 
destructive  lesions  of  some  areas  of  the  brain  are  in  accord- 
ance with  the  data  of  experimental  research  ;  but,  as  yet,  such 
data  are  not  sufficient  to  furnish  precise  regional  indications. 
It  must  suffice  for  the  present  to  say  that  we  cannot  diagnose 


PATHOLOGICAL  EVIDENCES.  139 

lesions  of  the  prasfroiital  region  with  anj^  degree  of  certainty 
from  the  symptoms.  The  mental  symptoms  ^^^hich  may  be 
observed  in  connection  with  such  lesions  are  snch  that 
they  cannot  be  distinguished  from  the  general  effects  of 
other  cerebral  diseases,  such  as  embolism,  thrombosis,  abscess, 
or  tumour.  It  is  obvious,  therefore,  that  in  order  to  come  to 
some  decision  upon  the  question  of  localisation  of  mental 
events,  it  is  essential  that  (1)  the  contentions  of  Terrier, 
Charcot,  Nothnagel— that  there  is  no  necessary  connection 
between  cortical  lesions  of  the  motor  zone  and  affections  of 
sensibility — should  harmonise  with  those  of  Exner,  Luciani, 
and  others,  who  believe  that  sensory  and  motor  centres  coincide, 
and  that  cortical  motor  lesions  affect  common  sensibility  as  well 
as  motion;  (2)  the  relations  of  the  sense  of  movement  to  the 
cortical  motor  zone  should  be  decided ;  (3)  the  functions  of  the 
other  parts  of  the  cortex  should  be  more  definitely  known  ;  (4) 
the  conditions  known  as  word-blindness,  word-deafness,  etc., 
should  be  more  closely  investigated.  When  we  have  gained  an 
adequate  knowledge  of  these  physiological  data  we  shall  be  better 
able  to  cope  with  the  questions  of  piental  physiology ;  but,  in 
the  meantime,  we  must  not  assign  causes  where  causes  cannot 
be  shown  to  exist,  or  deduce  extempore  doctrines  from  a  ver}' 
partial  view  of  the  influence  of  cerebral  disease  upon  the 
phenomena  of  the  mind. 

And  so  the  examples  afforded  us  by  cerebral  pathology  do 
not  warrant  those  partial  deductions  which  form  the  basis  of 
an  irrational  materialism.  The  mind  holds  intercourse  with  the 
external  world  through  the  medium  of  the  nervous  mechanism, 
and  any  disease  of  that  mechanism  may  impair  or  suspend  this 
intercoiirse.  We  have  already  mentioned  instances  in  which 
the  brain  has  been  injured  or  diseased  to  an  extraordinary 
extent,  without  any  obvious  impairment  of  the  mental  func- 
tions. Asylum  workers  almost  daily  \Adtness  the  revival  of 
mental  manifestations  which  have  been  obscured  for  a  time.  In 
such  instances  the  mind  may  revive  AA'ith  all  its  old  vigour 
almost  at  the  moment  of  dissolution. 

From  the  above  considerations  it  will  be  readily  under- 
stood that  some  hallucinations  and  mental  changes  cannot  be 
explained  by  physiological  perversion.    In  subsequent  chapters, 


140         LOCALISATION  OF  THE  MENTAL  FACULTIES. 

therefore,  we  shall  simply  assume  that  disease  of  the  cerebrum 
impairs  or  suspends  the  intercourse  of  the  snbstantially  un- 
knowable mind  with  the  external  world. 

Some  writers  maintain,  that  the  prsefrontal  lobes  are  all- 
important  in  regard  to  the  manifestation  of  what  is  known  as 
"  attention,"  and  also  that  they  are  intimately  concerned  with 
emotional  states.  These  views  are  unverified,  and,  as  Bastian 
pointed  out,  it  does  not  require  much  reflection  to  show^  us  that 
an  animal  from  which  the  prsefrontal  lobes  have  been  removed 
may  be  dull  and  apparently  careless  of  what  is  passing  around 
it,  when  the  incitements  and  first  conditions  essential  for  an 
alert  observant  attitude  are  wanting.  Such  an  animal  may 
easily  seem  to  have  undergone  a  very  distinct  mental  alteration. 
Meynert's,  and  Jackson's  view,  that  the  highest  centres  do  pro- 
bably contain  nothing  but  arrangements  for  representing  im- 
pressions and  movements  and  other  arrangements  for  coupling 
the  activity  ofthese  arrangements  together,  is,  on  the  whole,  the 
most  satisfactory.  James's  somewhat  broad  and  vague  concep- 
tion— that  currents  pouring  in  from  the  sense-organs  first  excite 
some  arrangements,  which  in  turn  excite  others,  until  at  last 
a  motor  discharge  downwards  of  some  sort  occursj  and  that 
such  streams  of  innervation  are  accompanied  by  consciousness, 
mainly  of  things  seen  if  the  stream  is  strongest  occipitally, 
of  things  heard  if  it  is  strongest  temporally,  of  things  felt, 
etc.,  if  the  stream  occupies  most  intensely  the  "motor  zone" — 
seems  in  the  right  direction,  but  is  not  sufficient  as  yet  to 
solve  the  mystery  of  the  stability  and  depth  of  the  mind,  as 
evidenced  in  its  mnemonic  and  subjective  powers  of  recall. 

Thus  far  we  have  seen  that  it  is  impossible  to  localise 
mental  events  within  any  definite  areas  in  the  brain.  We 
know  that  the  brain  is  the  organ  or  instrument  through 
which  stimuli  acting  on  the  end  organs  of  sense  ultimately 
reach  the  mind.  Sensations  are  states  of  consciousness ;  and  we 
are  as  far  off"  as  ever  from  the  conception  of  any  brain  activities 
which  could  give  rise  to  them. 

The  question  as  to  wdiether  individual  parts  of  mental  opera- 
tions are  associated  with  definite  parts  of  the  cortex  has,  in  the 
case  of  aphasia  and  allied  conditions,  assumed  fairly  definite 
proportions ;  but,   at  the   best,   we   must  remember,   that  the 


CONSCIOUSNESS  IN  LOWER  CENTRES.  141 

clinical  manifestations  in  these  cases  may  fnrnish  ns  simpl}'  and 
solely  with  evidences  that  the  physical  paths  of  conduction,  or  the 
organic  substrata,  which  in  some  way  or  other  subserve  conscious- 
ness, are  not  performing  their  ph3^sical  functions  satisfactorih'. 
We  have,  on  the  one  hand,  to  deal  A\'ith  mental  activities  of  ex- 
treme complexity,  to  account  for  which  we  can  imagine  no 
specific  functions  in  the  nervous  elements  which  would  serve  as  a 
physical  counterjDart ;  whilst,  on  the  other  hand,  we  have  a  chaotic 
mass  of  tracts,  cells,  and  other  nervous  elements,  which,  when 
viewed  either  singly  or  in  combination,  do  not  suggest  to  our 
minds  any  explanation  of  the  very  simplest  psychical  process. 

Kirchhoff  believes  that  all  internal  processes  constitute 
consciousness,  and  that  there  are  no  individual  modes  of  con- 
sciousness. The  processes  of  consciousness  are  dependent  on 
the  entire  nervous  system,  not  on  the  cerebral  cortex  alone. 
Whilst  recognising  that  mental  phenomena  are  entirely 
dependent  upon  the  phj'sical  organisation  of  the  nervous  ; 
sj'stem,  we  are  at  present  entitled  only  to  saj*,  that  the  cerebral 
cortex  appears  to  have  a  ^lore  direct  and  more  intimate  relation 
with  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  than  is  manifested  by 
other  regions  of  the  cerebro-spinal  system.  But  of  that 
cerebral  cortex,  we  cainiot  point  to  any  one  part  as  containing 
the  absolutely  essential  elements  to  thought  in  its  subjective 
aspects. 

James  asks,  "  Is  the  consciousness  which  accompanies  the 
activity  of  the  cortex  the  only  consciousness  that  man  has  ?  or 
are  his  lower  centres  conscious  as  well  ? "  In  attempting  to 
reply  to  this  question  he  fully  recognises  the  difficulties,  but 
states,  "  The  lo^\'er  centres  themselves  ma}'  conceivably  all  the 
while  have  a  split-off  consciousness  of  their  own,  similarly 
ejective  to  the  cortex  consciousness ;  but  whether  they  have  it 
or  not  can  never  be  known  from  merely  introsj)ective  evidence. 
For  practical  purposes,  nevertheless,  and  limiting  the  meaning 
of  the  word  consciousness  to  the  personal  self  of  the  individual, 
we  can  pretty  confidently  answer  the  question  by  saying  that 
tJie  cortex  is  .the  sole  onjan  of  consciousness  in  ma/n.  If  there  be 
any  consciousness  pertaining  to  the  lower  centres,  it  is  a  con- 
sciousness of  which  the  self  knows  nothing." 

But  the  possibility  of  conscioiisness   pertaining  to   an}^  of 


142         LOCALISATION  OF  THE  MENTAL  FACULTIES. 

the  lower  centres  is  not  to  be  estimated  by  the  complexity  or 
fitness  of  the  reactive  manifestations  as  viewed  objectively, 
otherwise  we  are  free  to  assume  the  existence  of  consciousness 
in  still  lower  centres  of  the  cerebro-spinal  system ;  for,  as  is 
known  to  be  the  case,  such  lower  centres  are  capable  of 
effective  reaction  apart  from  cerebral  influence.  The  facts, 
as  presented  to  us  by  a  study  of  the  evolution  of  the  central 
nervous  system,  would  lead  us  to  the  conception,  that  our 
physical  organism  is  eminently  adapted  to  react  to  stimuli 
derived  from  our  environment ;  and  of  our  physical  organism 
the  central  nervous  system  is  the  more  immediate  means  of 
effecting  such  reaction ;  it  is  through  this  nervous  S3^stem 
that  the  outside  world  is  perceived  subsequently  by  the  mind. 
Beyond  this  we  cannot  go.  A  satisfactory  reply,  as  to  whether 
the  activities  of  the  lower  or  sub-cortical  structures  are  accom- 
panied by  subjective  expressions  in  consciousness,  can  only 
be  given  when  we  have  eliminated  the  cortex  in  its  entirety 
from  its  sub-structures.  The  further  relations  that  conscious- 
ness bears  to  the  evolution  of  the  special  sensory  structures 
will  engage  our  attention  later,  and  we  hope  to  be  able  to 
unravel  some  of  the  numerous  schemes  which,  hitherto,  have 
served  for  theoretic  purposes. 

We  have  in  Hughlings- Jackson's  three-level  scheme  (1)  a? 
level  for  representations,  (2)  a  level  for  re-representations,  and 
(3)  another  for  re-re-representations.  Unfortunately,  we  are 
unable  to  associate  these  psychologically-expressed  events  with 
any  definite  brain-regions  or  structm-es.  Were  the  praBfrontal 
lobes  the  physical  substrata  for  the  reception  of  re-re-repre- 
sentations, these  lobes  would  be  essential  for  the  proper 
correlation  of,  modes  of  matter  to  modes  of  mind.  We  have 
no  proof,  however,  that  any  part  of  the  human  cortex  is 
indispensable  to  the  manifestations  of  subjectivity.  The 
contents  of  consciousness — previously  acquired,  and  serving 
as  the  mental  data  upon  which  the  ego  preserves  its  con- 
tinuity— may  be  rendered  temporarily  inert  by  interference 
with  the  modes  of  matter  concerned  with  local  memories  {e.g., 
word-deafness,  etc.),  but  this  is  all.  No  amount  of  philosophy 
or  argument  will  explain  the  evolution  of  a  subject  from  an 
object.      Neither  will  it  prove  the  nature  of  that  subjetit  by 


DIFFICULTIES  IN  LOCALISATION.  -  143 

the  demonstration   of  the   sources  from  which    it  receives    its 
objective  supplies,  or  data  in  consciousness. 

We  have,  therefore,  ample  experimental  and  pathological 
evidences,  that  the  mind  can  see,  feel,  and  ^-ill.  in  spite  of 
physical  and  structiiral  discontinuities  of  the  brain-cortex. 
Destruction  of  any  brain-areas  is,  so  far  as  our  knowledo-e 
goes  at  present,  not  necessaril}'  attended  by  alteration  in  the 
subjectivity  of  the  mind.  We  maj  destroy,  extirpate,  or  sever 
the  connections  of  any  of  the  cortical  areas,  and  we  can  thereby 
cut  off  present  supplies,  or  even  render  the  results  of  former 
activities  inert  (memory) ;  beyond  this,  however,  we  cannot  go. 

There  is  no  way  of  evading  the  difficult}^  of  adapting  the 
subjectivity  of  the  mind  to  anatomico-phj^siological  data. 
When  we  advance  in  our  knowledge  of  the  data  of  conscious- 
ness (which  are  much  the  same  now  as  they  ever  were),  and  the 
relations  of  the  various  structures  of  the  brain,  we  may  be  able 
to  formulate  some  more  definite  doctrines  as  to  cerebral  localisa- 
tion. In  the  meantime,  however,  we  can  offer  no  ultimate 
solution  of  the  one  great  difficult}'.  If  we  localise  determinate 
activities  ^^■ithin  restricted  areas,  we  become  responsible  for  an 
account  of  some  supreme  site,  where  the  mental  correlates  of 
these  activities  are  viewed  by  the  subject.  Or  if,  on  the  other 
hand,  we  are  indifferentists,  we  find  ourselves  confronted  with 
the  problem,  of  having  to  account  for  the  mode  by  which  the 
subject  obtains  its  view  of  the  objects  correlated  with  physio- 
logical activities  in  widely-apart  localities.  It  is  needless  to 
say,  that  whichever  view  we  take,  our  difficulty  will  be  in 
reaching  the  truth,  so  far  as  the  subjectivity  is  concerned. 

The  answer  of  cerebral  anatoni}^  and  physiology  to  the 
question  of  localisation  of  consciousness  has,  therefore,  been 
of  little  value  hitherto,  and  we  are  as  yet  unable  to  account 
for  the  phenomena  of  mind  hj  the  study  of  material  structures. 
The  mere  fact  that  the  formerly  experienced  contents  of  con- 
sciousness are  rendered  inert  or  incapable  of  being  revived 
(as  in  cases  of  word-blindness  and  word-deafness,  etc.)  j)roves 
nothing,  inasmuch  as  we  are  unable  to  prove,  %\hether  the 
contents  themselves  are  destroj^ed  or  only  rendered  inert 
through  lesions  of  the  tracts,  through  which  their  causal  or 
effectual  activities  have  been  or  should  be  transmitted. 


144         LOCALISATION  OF  THE  MENTAL  FACULTIES. 

Before  leaving  this  subject,  it  is  necessary  that  we  should 
review  some  of  the  more  difficult  problems  which  would  stand 
in  our  way,  even  though  we  were  able  to  localise  a  mental 
state  as  inhabiting  a  definite  or  restricted  area,  or  as  correlated 
to  a  generally-diffused  activity. 

Let  us  take,  for  example,  the  conclusion  of  one  experimental 
investigator,  that  sensitiveness  is  the  only  specific  energy 
comm.on  to  ganglion-cells  ;  and  the  inference  drawn  therefrom, 
that  sensation  is,  in  some  way  or  other,  the  outcome  or  accom- 
paniment of  such  a  specific  energj^.  Mej^nert  and  Munk  both 
believe  that — in  order  to  explain  conscious  movement  (yolitioii) 

/  — it  is  sufficient  to  postulate  sensations  of  innervation.  Munk 
says,  "Intelligence  is  located  everywhere  in  the  cerebral  cortex, 
and  nowhere  in  particular,"  and  Meynert  corroborates  this  view 
by  adding,  that  Memory  is  the  common  property  of  all  cortical 

\     cells  and  fibres  which  are  able  to  receive  and  conduct  external 

V  stimuli  of  all  sorts. 

We  know  that  stimulation  of  the  afferent  nerve-tracts 
between  the  end  organs  of  sense  and  the  brain,  in  some  way  or 
another  gives  rise  to  sensations ;  similarly,  influences  acting 
centrally,  such  as  drugs,  gases,  disease,  or  altered  states  of 
blood-suppl}^,  may  determine  activities  with  which  sensations 
are  correlated  quite  apart  from  the  existence  of  the  end  organs 
of  sense.  So  far  as  we  know,  all  the  modes  of  exciting  the 
specific  energy  of  the  nerve-substance  are  reducible  to  modes  of 
physical  motion  within  that  nerve-substance.  In  dealing  with 
the  activities  of  the  material  structures  of  the  brain,  therefore, 
any  doctrines  we  ma}^  formulate  are,  of  necessitj^,  based  upon 
the  physical  la^^^s  of  gravitation,  cohesion,  chemical  affinity,  etc. 
But  no  matter  how  ingenious  the  arguments,  we  can  neither 
comprehend  nor  even  imagine  how  the  movements  of  atoms  are 
associated  with  the  phenomena  of  consciousness.  It  is  just  as 
impossible  for  us  to  determine  the  relations  in  space  of  the 
mind  to  the  molecules  of  the  brain,  as  it  is  for  us  to  determine 
the  area  or  areas  in  ^Iiich  the  data  of  consciousness  are  pre- 
sented to  the  effo. 

The  weighty  and  philosojDhical  arguments  of  Hughlings- 
Jackson,  that,  from  an  evolutionary  standpoint,  each  and  every 
part  of  the  body  must  be  represented  in  any  one  unit  of  the 


DYNAMICAL  EELATIONS.  145 

cerebral  cortex,  are  well  worth  consideration.  In  accepting 
this  possibility  Ave  cannot,  however,  confine  our  attention  only 
to  that  luiit's  niodtis  operanJi  of  representation.  Such  a  repre- 
sentation on  the  part  of  the  unit  must  also  suggest  to  our 
minds  its  corresponding  representation  in  consciousness. 

The  phenomena,  which  may  be  regarded  as  the  attributes  of 
the  cei'e})ro-spinal  units,  are  embraced  under  Waller's  scheme  of 
the  four  R's — Reflection,  Resistance,  Radiation,  Retention — 
and  Summation.* 

For  present  pui-poses.  we  need  only  concern  ourselves  with  the 
modes  whereby  any  of  the  four  R's  become  correlated  to  sensa- 
tion. The  word  "  motion,"  in  its  broad  sense,  suggests  itself 
to  us  as  the  executive  operation  which  is  correlated  with  the 
ev^ents  of  consciousness.  The  ultimate  activity  of  that  motion, 
so  far  as  Ave  can  understand  it.  is  intra-bodily,  and  seen  in  the 
Avorking  of  the  elements  or  units  of  the  cerebral  cortex.  The 
iniit.  predisposed  by  its  inherent  and  fundamental  capabilities. 
Avould  require  the  motion  to  be  specific  —  i.e.,  the  mere 
dynamical  operation  of  force  irrespective  of  specific  quanti- 
fication is  not  sufficient  to  determine  consciousness.  The 
agitations  set  up  must  be  of  a  certain  fixed  quantity.  The 
rapidities,  sizes,  and  directions  of  the  movements  must  be 
specific,  not  only  for  each  sense,  but  also  for  every  modification 
of  the  activity  each  organ  conditions.  The  vibrations  must  be 
horizontal  in  some  sense-organs,  in  others  perpendicular.  The 
rapidity  of  the  vibrations  A'aries  greatly  cA^en  in  different  fibres 
of  the  same  sense-organ.  No  matter  hoAv  much  Ave  discuss  the 
intra-(juantifications  of  motion,  Ave  are  forced  to   confess  that 

*  (1)  lit'Jlcciion. — It  is  conceivable  that  every  central  element  is  an 
organ  of  return  of  action.  It  is  excitable — exciting.  (2)  Resistance. — 
It  is  conceivable  that  each  central  element  has  a  specific  capacity  for  centri- 
fugal tension  resultant  from  centripetal  impressions.  (3)  Radiation.— 
It  is  conceivable  that  centripetal  imx)ulses  to  a  central  element  radiate  to 
connected  elements.  Infei-ior  im])ressions  influence  superior  centres;  in 
accordance  with  degree  of  resistance  and  strength  of  impulse.  (4)  Reten- 
tinn. — It  is  conceivable  that  after  each  period  of  activity  and  restoration 
there  remains  an  altered  constitution  of  central  elements,  in  which  resist- 
ance to  homogeneous  activity  is  diminished,  to  heterogeneous  activity 
increased.  (5j  .Summation  {and  InltHntion). — It  is  conceivable  that  two 
or  more  impulses  summating  in  centrifugal  tension  or  expression  may  be 
individually  "  friendly"  or  "  unfriendly  "  to  one  another. 

10 


146         LOCALISATION  OF  THE  MENTAL  FACULTIES. 

tliey  are  ineffective  for  the  conditioning  of  human  conscioiisness ; 
in  fact,  such  forms  of  movement  are  antagonistic  to  those  par- 
ticular quantifications  or  specific  movements  ^^ith  which  con- 
sciousness is  correlated. 

The  activity  of  our  sense-organs  is  undoubtedly  determined 
originally  l3y  cosmical  operative  motions  outside  the  body;  but, 
although  these  outer  motions  may  tend  to  influence  our  phy- 
sical organisation,  they  have  to  be  translated,  changed,  or 
modified,  esoneurally,  before  they  can  determine  our  conscious- 
ness. To  quote  from  Cyples,  "  What  man  may  be  said  to  be 
sensorially  in  contact  with  is  his  body ;  not  the  great  physical 
world  intellectually  inferred  as  existing  outside  his  body. 
With  that  larger  sphere  of  the  executive  system  he  has,  in 
fact,  nothing  to  do  sensorially  ;  his  sense-experience  refers  only 
to  a  set  of  dwarfed,  retarded  events,  in  some  way  answerable 
to  the  larger,  swifter  ones.  There  can  be  no  doubt  of  this. 
Light,  sound,  heat,  etc.,  in  our  sensible  experience  of  them,  are 
not  born  forthwith  from  the  agitations  of  the  interstellar  ether 
science  tells  us  of — they  connect  with  the  far  more  modest 
vibrations  of  the  intra-bodily  nervous  substance  as  the  latter 
takes  on  the  former  agitations  at  the  peripheral  limits  of  the 
respective  sense-organs ;  or  rather,  we  should  say,  as  those 
peripherally-taken-on  movements  are  delivered  interiorlj?-  at  what 
may  be  called  the  other  terminals  of  the  nervous  system.  In 
practice,  that  difference — if  there  be  any — cannot  be  reckoned, 
and,  by  an  intellectual  calculation,  the  same  in  kind  as  those 
which  ascertain  the  greater  velocities,  finer  dimensions,  etc.,  of 
the  extra-bodily  cosmical  operations,  it  is  now  estimated  that  the 
transmissions  in  the  nervous  substance  may  be  roughly  set 
down  at  ninety  feet  per  second.  The  enormous  disparity 
between  these  figures  and  those  calculated  for  the  interstellar 
propagations  need  not  be  dwelt  on."  Of  the  numerous  niodes 
of  motion  to  which  science  has  given  the  names  of  gravitation, 
heat,  electricity,  chemical  affinity,  etc.,  the  quantity  of  force 
is  a  fixed  sum,  and  even  though  the  ideal  limits  of  science  M'ere 
reached,  and  the  statical  and  dynamical  relations  supposed  to 
connect  the  cosmical  activities  with  organic  operations  were 
estimated,  we  should  still  be  \\'ithout  the  slightest  explanation 
of  how  the  physical  organisation  inherently  develops  the  specific 


INVARIABLE  CONCOMITANCE.  147 

forms  of  motion  upon  Avhicli  our  consciousness  is  superimposed. 
By  the  study  of  anatomy  and  physiology,  we  gain  our  know- 
ledge of  an  apparatus  wliich  is  possessed  of  certain  statical  and 
dynamical  relations,  and  we  may  further  regard  such  an  a2:)pa- 
i-atus  as  being  necessary  for  specip'c  dynamical  relations  for  the 
occurrence  of  consciousness — that  is  to  say,  we  hare  to  deal 
with  three  factors  of  extreme  difhculty.  Firstly,  Ave  must  com- 
prehend, in  detail,  the  structures  wliich  form  a  basis  for  the 
statical  and  dynamical  activities ;  secondh',  we  must  determine 
the  specific  rapidities,  directions,  etc..  of  motion,  which, 
although  not  immediately  determining  consciousness,  form 
the  functional  activities  of  our  nervous  organism ;  and.  lastly. 
we  must  determine,  over  and  above  mere  statical  relations, 
the  fundamental  and  specific  mode  of  motion,  if  any.  which  is 
directly  associated  with  consciousness. 

The  so-called  materialists  concern  themselves  Axith  the 
structure  and  systematised  movements  of  the  organism,  and 
account  for  the  facts  of  experience  in  consciousness  as  being 
the  results  of  some  specific  and  determinate  relations  ;  while 
the  anti-materialists  uphold  the  view  that  modern  scientists 
assume,  mistakenly,  that  organisation  has  some  magic,  account- 
ing for  the  other  facts  of  experience  besides  the  occurrence  of 
its  own  determinate  movements  and  relations. 

Mercier  has  forcibly  drawn  attention  to  the  fact,  that  any 
attempt  at  a  minute  or  detailed  explanation  of  the  ph}'siological 
■determinate  conditions  of  consciousness  will  only  result  in 
••  nonsense."'  He  says  : — "  A  process  of  change  in  the  nervous 
system  cannot  cause  a  change  of  consciousness  ;  such  an  effect 
is  unthinkable.  Nor  can  a  change  in  consciousness  cause  a 
change  in  the  arrangement  of  the  molecules  of  the  gi'ey  matter  : 
such  an  effect  is  ec|ualh*  unthinkable."'  We  agree  that  such 
<.'ausal  relations  are  unthinkable ;  but  we  do  not.  at  the  samt^, 
time,  go  so  far  as  to  negative  their  possibility  mei'ely  because 
Ave  do  not  imderstand  them. 

The    prediction  of   Ladd.'*  that  some  of  the    most  Avidely 

accepted  of  the  physical  formulae  are  destined  to  be  thoroughly 

shaken  up  in  the   not-far-aAvay  future,  can  ncA^er  be  fulfilled, 

because  (1)  no  physical  formula  is  conceiA'able  ;  (2)  no  data  are 

*  Presidential  Address,  "  Psych.  Rev.,"  a^oI.  i.  p.  2. 


U8         LOCALISATION  OF  THE  MENTAL  FACULTIES. 

afforded  to  us  for  tlie  construction  of  such  a  formula ;  and  (3) 
even  tllO^Tgll  science  shoiild  reach  its  ideal  limits,  and  furnish 
us  with  such  data,  the  construction  of  a  formula  would,  and 
could,  onh^  result,  in  its  conception  Idj  us,  as  a  formula  per- 
taining to  the  domain  of  physics.  Mercier  says,  that  the 
student,  when  he  has  fully  grasped  the  significance  of  the  two 
notions — the  "absolute  separateness  of  mind  and  matter,"  and 
the  "  invariable  concomitance  of  a  mental  change  ^^-ith  a  bodily 
change  " — A^dll  enter  on  the  stud}'  of  psychology  ^^'ith  half  his 
difficulties  already  surmounted.  The  other  half  of  the  student's 
difficulties,  Ave  presume,  will  afterwards  be  found  in  elucidating 
the  facts  upon  which  the  "  invariable  concomitance  '"  theory  is 
founded.  Our  conception  of  the  inter-happenings  of  mental 
and  physical  activities  is  at  present  so  vague  that  our  powers 
must  be  devoted  to  their  consideration,  and  without  taking- 
regard  to  any  conception  which  extends  beyond  our  scope  of 
inquiry.  Science  acknowledges  as  its  most  powerful  helpmate 
the  imagination,  and  we  are  often  forced  to  rest  content  with 
probabilities.  Here,  however,  our  part  is  merely  to  demon- 
strate the  concomitance  of  the  mental  and  the  bodily  events. 


149 


CHAPTEE   V. 

MiNT). 

Scope  and  Methods  of  Study — Total  Resources  at  our  command  for  the 
Study  of  Mind — Sulijective  3Iethods — Subject-Consciousness  and 
Ubject-Consciousness — The  Objective  Method — Logical  Methods 
— Inductive  Method — Deductive  Method — Evolution  Theories — 
Biological — Psychological — Presentationism — Mind-Stuff  Theories 
— Atomistic  Hylozoism — Parallelism — Psychological  Import  of 
the  Theory  of  Self-Compounding  of  Mental  Facts — Unconscious 
Cerebration — Arguments  for  and  against  the  Theory. 

Scope  and  Method  of  Study. — AVe  have  arrived  at  tlie 
simple  conckision,  that  the  outer  ANorlcl  of  objects,  and  the 
j)]iysic'al  executive  nervous  organism,  are  essential  to  the  mani- 
festation of  our  inner  states  of  consciousness.  Hitherto  we 
have  concerned  ourselves  with  the  possibilities  of  a  more  com- 
plete explanation  of  the  A\'orkings  of  that  physical  organism, 
and  we  have  fully  appreciated  the  absolute  dissimilarity  of  the 
phenomena  of  mind  and  matter.  As  Mercier  says,  "  each  is  a 
separate  world — a  universe  by  itself,"  and  we  are  unable  to 
reduce  the  workings  of  the  two  series  to  common  or  convertible 
terms.  Our  attention  will  no\\'  be  given  to  the  study  of  the 
human  mind. 

The  total  resources  at  our  command  for  obtaining  an 
insight  into  the  nature  of  mind  are  as  follows*  : — 

1.  Subjective  observation  and  analysis. 

2.  Artificial  experimentation,  chiefly  by  employing  definite 

external    stimuli,    the    siibjective    effects    of   which    are 
objectively  noted  and  registered. 

*  Coupland,  '^ Take's  Diet,  rsycli.  Med.,'  p.  31. 


150  MIND. 

3.  Pathology,   or    a    study  of  bodily    diseases,  Avitli    their 

mental  correlations. 

4.  The  study  of  the  growth  of  mind  : — 

(a)  By  comparing  mental  development  ^vdth  the  evolu- 
tion of  the  nervous  structures  throughout,  the  animal 
kingdom ; 

(//)  By  study  of  the  manifestations  of  mentality  in  the 
progress  of  mankind  from  a  condition  of  barbarism 
to  present  civilisation ; 

(c)  By  examining  the  development  of  the  individual 
mind  in  the  higher  races  of  to-daj^. 

To  enter  upon  a  question  so  large  as  that  of  the  theory  of 
our  mental  life,  together  A\dth  reference  to  the  ultimate  grounds 
of  knowledge,  would  be  out  of  jolace  here.  We  can  only  take 
account  of  the  various  mental  manifestations,  and  endeavour  to 
describe  or  explain  them  with  a  view  to  the  demonstration  that 
they  are  in  some  way  correlated  to  nervous  processes.*  For 
the  present,  however,  just  as  the  physiologist  is  able  to  take  up 
the  stud}^  of  his  object  matter  in  its  one-sided  plwsical  aspect, 
so  we  propose  briefly  to  glance  at  the  study  of  mind  in  its 
psj'chical  aspect,  not  indeed  as  being  independent  of  a  phj'sical 
basis,  but  as  possessing  properties  which  cannot  be  classed  or 
explained  under  physical  laws. 

The  subjective  methods  of  study  are  open  to  this 
objection,  that,  no  matter  how  much  we  study  ourselves,  the 
knowledge  of  our  o\^'n  individualit}^  M'ill  be  of  little  use  unless 
combined  with  the  knoA^-ledge  of  the  individuality'  of  others. 
Introspection  is  also  necessarily  retrosj)ection,  for  the  mind  can 
only  reflect,  and  cannot  view  its  own  states  at  the  actual  time 
of  their  occurrence ;  or,  as  Comte  puts  it,  "  the  thinking- 
individual  cannot  divide  himself  in  two,  of  which  one  reflects, 
while  the  other  sees  it  reflect."  In  order,  therefore,  to  obtain 
facts    of  any  importance,   sources   of  personal    error   must   be 

*  Although  the  terms  "physical  process,"  "nervous  xjrocess,"  etc.,  are 
employed  throughout,  they  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  explanatory  in 
themselves,  or  as  indicating  a  knoMTi  quantity  or  quality;  they  merely 
imply  the  existence  of  functional  activity  within  the  physical  executive 
mechanism. 


SUBJECTIVE  METHODS  OF  STUDY.  151 

corrected  by  a  comparison  of  the  results  of  self-observation  in 
a  number  of  indi\T[duals.* 

Of  late  years  tlie  terms  ''  suhject-consciousness"  and  "  ohjed- 
consciousness  "  have  crept  into  text-books  npon  insanity,  and  they 
are  accepted  as  being  self-explanatoiy.  They  serve  a  pui-pose, 
inasmuch  as  they  denote,  respectively,  introspection,  the  taking 
cognisance  of  the  mind's  oA\ni  states  subjectivelj' ;  and,  the 
mental  state  which  takes  account  of  objects  external  to  the 
individual.  In  accepting  these  terms,  however,  we  must  not 
overlook  the  fact,  that  our  physical  organism  is  just  as  much 
objective  to  consciousness  as  other  external  facts;  and,  further, 
that  all  the  contents  of  consciousness  are  in  reality  objects 
viewed  subjectively,  so  that  the  contents  of  consciousness  itself 
are  objective  to  the  self  or  eno. 

Another  objection  to  the  introspective  method  of  study,  to 
which  allusion  was  omitted,  is  the  circumstance  that  recent 
psychical  states  may  furnish  us  with  fairh--accurate  data,  but 
that  when  we  attempt  to  deal  with  remote  events,  \\'e  are 
exposed  to  all  the  errors  incident  to  memory.  This,  however, 
need  not  form  a  hopeless  barrier  to  our  gaining  a  fairly- 
accurate  knowledo-e ;  and.  as  before  mentioned,  ^^e  can  render 
this  knowledge  more  accurate  by  a  comparison  of  the  results 
obtained  by  different  individuals  in  order  to  eliminate  the 
personal  error. 

The  objective  method,  whereby  we  study  the  mind 
by  means  of  its  external  effects,  is  indispensable  to  us, 
especially  when  we  are  dealing  with  its  morbid  manifesta- 
tions in  the    insane.      In  pathological  mental  conditions,  the 

*  The  mind,  apart  from  its  physical  correlations,  may  be  said  to  supply  a 
basis  for  many  sciences.f  («)  Psychology,  as  a  whole,  supplies  the  basis  of 
education,  or  the  practical  science  which  aims  at  cultivating  the  miiid  on 
the  side  of  knowing,  feeling,  and  willing  alike.  (//)  In  its  special  branches, 
psychology  supplies  a  basis  to  the  following  practical  sciences  : — Psychology 
of  Knowing. — Logic,  or  the  regulation  of  reasoning  processes,  together  with 
the  allied  arts,  rhetoric,  or  the  art  of  persuasion,  and  that  of  forming 
opinion.  Psychology  of  Feeling. — Esthetics,  or  the  regulation  of  feeling 
according  to  certain  rules  or  principles — to  wit,  the  admirable,  or  beautiful. 
Psychology  of  Willing. — Ethics,  or  the  determination  of  the  ends  of  action 
and  the  regulation  of  conduct  by  principles  of  right  and  -wTong,  together 
with  the  allied  arts  or  sciences  of  politics  and  legislation. 

t  Sully,  "Outlines  of  Psychology'",  p.  15. 


152  MIND. 

psychologist  has  an  opportunity  of  observing  the  phenomena  of 
mind  in  varying  and  unusual  combinations,  and,  as  we  shall  see 
later,  this  helps  us  to  confirm  the  theory  of  evolution  by  exhibit- 
ing the  reverse  order  of  mental  dissolution. 

The  logical  methods  of  studying  psychology  are  also  of 
manifest  importance.  If  we  are  to  argue  correctly,  and  place 
this  science  on  its  right  basis,  we  cannot  afford  to  dispense  with 
logic.  We  must  have  a  science  based  upon  proof  and  evidence, 
and  not  a  science  of  belief.  '•  Logic,"  says  Mill,  "  is,  to  use  the 
words  of  Bacon,  the  ars  artium — the  science  of  science  itself. 
All  science  consists  of  data,  and  conclusions  from  these  data ; 
of  proofs,  and  what  tliej  prove.  Now,  logic  points  out  what 
relations  must  subsist  between  data  and  Avhatever  can  be  con- 
cluded from  them  ;  between  proof  and  anything  which  it  can 
prove."  Xo  doubt  there  are  many  gifted  men  in  our  profession 
who  are  able  to  dispense  with  the  recognised  formuke  of  logical 
and  inductive  science.  They  ma}^  possess  a  natural  aptitude  or 
intuitive  perception  of  the  principles  of  logic,  and  furnish  us 
^Yith  recondite  principles,  or  ready  generalisations,  without  a 
knowledge  of  the  elements  of  the  syllogism.  Unfortunately, 
however,  in  the  study  of  psj^chology,  perhaps  more  than  in  that 
of  any  other  science,  having  to  unravel  the  mysterious  pheno- 
mena of  mind,  and  investigate  the  deviations  from  its  normal 
state,  we  are  peculiarly  exposed  to  many  sources  of  fallacy 
unless  guided  by  the  principles  of  the  inductive  process  of 
reasoning.  A  knowledge  of  principles  and  conclusions  can 
usualh^  only  be  reached  by  a  succession  of  steps,  after  the  result 
of  much  labour  and  long-continued  reasoning ;  and  we  cannot 
hope  to  arrive  per  saUii/m  at  sound  philosophical  doctrines 
except  by  such  logical  and  laborious  methods  of  stud5^  The 
domain  of  mental  physiology  has  been  particularly  seductive 
to  those  who  would  cultivate  it  as  a  science ;  and  the  founda- 
tion of  much  of  the  bad  philosoph}',  with  which  we  are  met  on 
all  sides,  is  due  to  the  illogical  method  of  deducing  general 
principles  from  the  consideration  of  a  few  particulars.  Exner* 
says,  "A  product  cannot  be  thoroughlj^  comprehended  liefore 
its  factors."  Otherwise,  we  are  apt  to  form  hypotheses  which 
are,  of  necessity,  based  upon  premature  and  unsatisfactory  data. 
'■''  "Kritik  der  Hegelschen  Psychologie,"'  Leipzig,  1842. 


LOGICAL  METHODS.  153 

T\\e  g-olden  rules  of  Descartes,  as  set  forth  in  liis  discourse  on 
method,  miglit  with  great  advantage  commend  themsehes  to 
many  of  the  Avorkers  of  the  present  day.*  Our  object,  theiv- 
fore  shoukl  be,  not  to  form  doctrines  based  upon  immature  con- 
siderations, but  to  study  the  workings  of  our  physical  organisui 
down  to  the  minutest  detail,  and.  as  psychologists,  to  investigate 
the  phenomena  of  mind,  and  then,  when  we  have  exhausted  the 
materials  at  our  disposal,  to  see  how  far  the  data  resolve  them- 
selves into  premises  for  a  syllogism.  A  rational  view  is  all- 
important,  and  such  a  view  of  all  the  facts  of  mental  physiology 
will  more  than  confirm  the  words  of  Coupland,  that  "  phj'siol- 
ogists  and  subjectivists  cannot  come  to  terms  by  merely  flinging 
down  their  contributions  side  by  side."  Of  the  logical  methods 
of  studying  psychology  we  have,  (1)  the  inductive  method,  oi" 
analysis,  as  pursued  in  self  observation.  The  obsen'er  starts 
with  a  highly-complex  jDsychical  state  ;  and  (2)  the  dedudive 
method,  or  synthesis,  corresponding  to  the  objective  method, 
in  which,  by  synthesis,  elementary  facts  are  reconstructed  by 
successive  stages. 

The  methods  of  studying  the  mind  by  experimentation  will 
be  discussed  somewhat  in  detail  Avhen  we  consider  the  quanti- 
tative relations  of  ph3^sical  and  pyschical  phenomena,  and  among 
the  problems  we  shall  have  to  determine  are,  (1)  the  limit, 
threshold,  or  liminal  intensity  of  stimulation ;  (2)  the  extent 
of  nervous  agitation,  or  excitation  requisite  for  a  mental  pheno- 
menon ;  (3)  the  duration  of  the  central  nervous  process  implied 
in  mental  phenouiena;  and  (4)  variations  in  the  Cjuantity  of 
nervous  action  and  of  mental  phenomena,  and  the  relation  of 
the  one  to  the  other.  Since  Fechner  first  demonstrated,  with 
a  certain  amount  of  success,  that  some  psycho-physical  relations 

*  (1)  Never  to  accept  anything  as  true,  which  we  do  not  clearly  know 
to  be  so — that  is  to  say,  carefully  to  avoid  haste  or  prejudice,  and  to  com- 
prise nothing  more  in  our  judgments  than  what  presents  itself  so  clearly 
and  distinctly  to  the  mind,  that  we  cannot  have  any  room  to  doubt  it. 
( 2)  To  divide  each  difficulty  we  examine  into  as  many  i^arts  as  possible,  or 
as  may  be  required  for  resolving  it.  (3)  To  conduct  our  thoughts  in  an  orderly 
manner,  commencing  with  the  most  simple  and  easily  known  objects, 
in  order  to  ascend  by  degrees  to  the  knowledge  of  the  most  com^^lex. 
(4)  To  make  in  every  case  enumerations  so  complete  and  reviews  so 
wide  that  we  may  be  sure  of  omitting  nothing-  VeitcKs  Translation, 
Edhihurf/h,  1850. 


154  .  MIND. 

were  capable  of  exact  mathematical  statement,  a  vast  number 
of  important  propositions  liave  accumulated.  Such  experi- 
mentation, as  carried  on  either  in  laboratories  or  in 
asylums,  has  been  rewarded  in  some  instances  by  unlooked- 
for  results.  But,  as  Cotipland  says,  "  an  individualistic  psy- 
chology, aided  by  all  the  resources  of  the  physical  laboratory 
or  clinical  experience,  would  be  but  a  maimed  and  incomplete 
psj^chology." 

The  study  of  mental  life  in  the  lower  animals,  and  the  com- 
parison of  elementary  psychical  phenomena,  must,  of  necessity, 
be  objective ;  but  it  is  none  the  less  valuable,  because  the 
manifestations  of  psychical  action  can  be  studied  by  many,  and 
the  risk  of  errors  in  observation  corrected. 

Evolution. — When  we  face  the  strong  position  held  by 
the  theory  of  biological  evolution,  we  have  a  multitude  of 
evidences  in  its  favour,  so  long  as  we  concentrate  our  argu- 
ments upon  the  problems  which  have  to  do  with  animate 
existence;  but  when  we  proceed  to  include  the  higher  problems 
pertaining  to  thought,  we  encounter,  at  the  very  outset,  an 
almost  insurmountable  difficulty.  If  we  agree  with  Bain,  that 
nothing  is  held  to  be  innate  that  can  be  shown  to  arise  from 
experience  and  education.*  we  must,  of  necessity,  trace  all 
forms  of  thought  to  experience  conditioned  bj^  our  sensori- 
motor nervous  mechanism  ;  and,  as  we  are  led  to  assume  that 
sensation  is  the  starting  point  in  consciousness  of  our  more 
complex  states  of  mind,  a  psycholorjiccd  \heovj  of  evolution 
becomes  responsible  for  a  scientific  account  of  the  genesis  of 
all  the  intellectual  powers.  In  a  theory  of  evolution,  our 
complex  states  of  consciousness  must  be  regarded  merely  as 
developments,  under  natural  law.  from  our  simplest  state. 
Unfortunately,  as  Mill  says,  "  we  have  it  not  in  our  power  to 
ascertain  by  any  direct  process,  what  consciousness  told  us  at 
the  time  when  its  revelations  were  in  their  pristine  purity.  It 
only  offers  itself  to  our  inspection  as  it  exists  now,  when  those 
original  revelations  are  overlaid  and  buried  under  a  mountain- 
ous heap  of  acquired  notions  and  perceptions."  f  A  theory 
of  biological  evolution  would  have  to  start  Avith  the  organism 

*  "Mental  and  Moral  Science,"  B.  2,  C.  6. 

t  Mill,  "Examination  of  Hamilton's  Philosophy,"  p.  171. 


EVOLUTION  OF  MIXD.  155 

and  its  fiinctious.  and  aftenvards  seek  to  demonstrate  the 
development  of  the  higher  mental  functions  from  the  data 
given.  Such  an  attempt  would,  however,  soon  result  in  the 
conviction,  that  states  of  consciousness  must  also  be  accepted 
as  data  given.  The  view  that  the  organism  is  the  product  of 
heredit}'.  under  la^^"s  operating  through  long  ages,  and  that 
mind  is  the  manifestation  of  functions  belonging  to  the  most 
advanced  organism,  would  be  the  imre  theory  of  evolution. 
This  type  Avould  secure  unity,  but  its  support  would  involve  us 
in  greatest  difficulties.*  A  mixed  theorij  would  take  account 
of  the  mind  as  independent  or  superadded  life,  making  sen- 
sation the  origin  of  all  knowledge,  and  subjective  protoplasm 
that  from  which  the  mind,  in  its  higher  manifestations,  is 
gradually  evolved. 

Of  the  biological  theory.  Darwin  and  Wallace  have  been 
the  leading  advocates,  ^^■hilst  the  psychological  has  been  sup- 
ported mainly  by  Mill.  Bain.  Spencer,  and  others.  A  third 
theory — the  theory  of  dialectic  evolution — is  elaborated  in  the 
philosophy  of  Hegel.  According  to  this  form  of  philosophy, 
four  presuppositions  are  involved — viz..  (1)  existence,  in  order 
that  there  may  be  a  philosophy  of  it ;  (2)  jpersonal  existence, 
as  distinct  from  existence  external  to  itself — from  nature,  as 
apart  from  the  thinker ;  (3)  experience  in  consciousness,  as 
aifording  knowledge  of  both  ;  and  (4)  the  conditions  of  thoin/Jit 
given  in  the  nature  of  our  intelligence.! 

Of  these  three  theories  we  have  to  concern  ourselves  with 
the  psychological ;  and  the  problem  resolves  itself  into  the 
question.  Is  sensation  the  germ  of  all  that  belongs  to  mental 
life"?  and  can  Ave  account  for  all  intellectual  action  by  evolution 
from  sensation y  James  Mill  says,  the  order  of  occurrence  lis 
this,  contact,  excitation  of  apparatus,  sensation.  The  spheres 
iif  occurrence  are :  the  external  world,  the  organism,  con- 
sciousness. Thereby  is  implied,  that  the  simplest  fact  in 
experience  is  consciousness  of  sensation.  It  suffices  us  to 
concern  ourselves  with  the  primary  fact — a  given  experience — 
out  of  which  an  hypothesis  of  evolution  is  to  be  constructed. 
Xow  we   naturally  ask,  Granted   that  sensation  is  consequent 

*  Calderw-ood,  "Moral  Philosophy,"'  p.  97. 
t  Calderwood,  ihid.,  p.  132. 


156  MIND. 

upon  excitation  of  a  sensory  nerve,  is  intelligence  a  pre- 
requisite for  sensation  ?  or,  adopting  tiie  formula  of  Waller. 
Granted  that  sensations  aiford  the  data  ("major,"  or  "minor" 
premises)  for  the  construction  of  a  syllogism,  do  the  data 
themselves  compound  and  evolve  an  intelligent  conclusion  y 
or,  does  the  intelligence  construct  a  conclusion  from  the  data 
presented  to  it  ?  If  the  former  is  possible,  then  the  advance 
of  the  sensational  theorjr  is  ensured.  If  not,  the  evolutionist 
finds  some  difficulty  in  extricating  himself  from  a  conclusion 
that  is  manifestly  absurd.  Consciousness  not  only  presup- 
poses sensation  as  derived  from  a  sensory  apparatus,  but  it 
also  implies  personalit}^ — that  is  to  say,  consciousness  is 
knowledge  of  personal  existence.  It  is  self-consciousness. 
There  is  knowledge  of  the  object  sensation,  in  contrast  with 
subject  self.  The  notion  of  self  as  a  consequence  of  memory, 
does  not  negative  the  presupposition,  that  intelligence  existed 
synonymously  with  sensation.  Mill*  says,  "  There  is  no 
meaning  in  the  word  ego  or  I,  unless  the  I  of  to-day  is  also 
the  I  of  yesterday."  A  conception  of  our  personality  is 
something  much  Avider  than  knowledge  of  self  as  intelligence. 
It  gathers  up  into  a  single  representation  the  several  charac- 
teristics of  our  intelligence  as  these  are  brought  to  unity  in 
life.  If  a  being  can  appear  anyhow  to  itself,  it  must  lie 
capable  of  unifying  manifold  phenomena  in  an  absolute  indi- 
visibility of  its  nature.! 

Mlinsterberg  ^  views  all  mental  states,  emotions,  and  voli- 
tions, as  well  as  cognitive  states,  as  being  simply  complexes  of 
sensations.  This  view  has  often  been  severely  criticised,  and 
it  has  been  called  intellectualism,  inasmuch  as  it  ignores  any 
elements  other  than  are  cognitive.  §  Ward  ||  calls  this  the 
theory  of  "  presentationiam."  It  may  be  used  in  a  narrow 
or  in  a  broad  sense.  In  its  narrow  sense  it  is  the  doctrine 
that  all  the  mental  states  may  be  resolved  into  sensations, 
and  this   is  the  sense  in  which  Wundt  condemns  it ;    ^A'hilst 

*  "Analysis,"  2nd  edit.,  i.,  229. 

+  Lotze's  "  Microcosmus,"  Tr.  i.,  157.      liant's  "  Transcendental  Unity  of 
Apperception." 

+  "Die  Willenshandling,"  1888. 

§  AVundt,  "Philos.  Studien."  vi.  3,  1890,  pp.  387,  388. 

li  "Modern  Psychology." — "Mind,"  Jan.,  1893. 


EVOLUTIOX  OF  MIND.  157 

in  it>^  In'oad   sense,   it  means   that   eunscioiisness   has   only  to 
do  with  conscious  events. 

The  narrow  sense,  that  all  the  elements  of  psychical  life  an- 
primarily  and  ultimately  cognitive  elements,  is,  to  us,  incon- 
ceivable :  ^\■llereas.  the  broad  sense,  that  all  the  elements  of 
psychical  life  are  facts  of  conscious  experience,  and  that 
j)sychology  has  to  do  solely  with  conscious  processes  and  events, 
admits  of  feelings  and  attention,  and  also  of  the  existence  of 
a  self  which  has  these  feelings  and  exerts  this  attention  as 
distinct  from  sensations  and  ideas  ;  i.e.,  it  holds  that  the 
feelings,  the  attention,  and  the  self,  are  facts  of  conscious 
experience.  The  veiy  existence  of  such  conditions  as  feelings, 
ideas,  and  self,  consists  in  their  being  facts  of  conscious 
experience ;  if  there  were  not  such  facts,  we  should  never 
know  anything  about  them.*  A^'ard  siimmarises  the  whole 
account  of  the  subject  in  an  introspective  observation,  and 
three  inferences. 

The  facts  of  mind  cannot  be  properly  expressed  by  saying, 
there  are  feelings,  ideas,  volitions,  biit  only  by  saying.  I  have 
feelings ;  I  have  ideas  ;  I  have  volitions ;  or.  I  feel.  I  know. 
I  will — i.e..  every  luental  state  in^•olves  a  subject  by  whom 
it  is  known,  felt,  or  Avilled. 

lufereucet:. — (1)  A  subject  must  be  conceived  as  distinct  froni 
the  state  which  it  knows,  or  feels,  or  wills ;  (2)  it  nuist  be  con- 
ceived as  different  in  kind  from  all  ideas  or  feelings,  or 
possibilities  of  such  ;  and.  (3)  since  all  knowledge  implies  a 
subject  which  knoA\'s,  all  feeling  a  subject  -which  feels,  it 
follows  that  this  subject,  just  because  it  is  the  subject,  cannot 
itself  be  directly  known  or  felt.  That  sensations  are  essential 
to  consciousness  is  evident,  but  to  argue  that  they  are  essential 
to  the  development  of  consciousness,  and  are  tluis  the  primary 
factors  in  the  evolution  of  intelligence,  is  as  forcible  as  to 
argue,  that  naitriment.  which  is  essential  to  us.  and  to  our 
physical  development,  is  the  primary  factor  through  which 
we  are   to  trace  the   biological    evohition   of  our   organism. 

And  no\\'  let  us  see  what  the  theory  of  evolution,  as  it  no^v 
stands,  has   to    say   upon  such   a   (juestion    as    memory.      AYe 
may    grant    that    the    sensitive    organism    transmits,   in    some^ 
*  Miinsterberg.  '•Psycli.  Review,"  vol.  i. 


158  MIND. 

way  or  another,  a  series  of  activities  wliicli  ultimately  manifest 
themselves  as  the  phj^siological  equivalents  or  correlates  of 
sensations;  but  we  have  still  to  explain  how  these  different 
sensations  could  form  an  aggregate  which  would  correspond 
to  intelligence.  Does  the  one  sensation,  b}^  a  force  of  attrac- 
tion, cohesion,  or  gravitation,  appose  itself  to  a  like  sensation  ? 
or  does  the  one  compare  itself  ■\^'ith  the  other,  and,  b}^  an 
inherent  power,  relegate  itself  to  its  proper  spheres  ?  Could 
we  conceive  the  millions  of  letters  received  into  St.  Martin's 
le  Grand  daily  sorting  themselves  into  their  respective  depart- 
ments without  the  intervention  of  an  intellectual  guidance. 
Or,  again,  do  the  numbers  of  facts  and  observations  at  our 
disposal  arrange  themselves  as  data  in  a  logical  sequence, 
the  result  of  which  is  our  conception  of  their  arrangement 
and  import  ?  A  sensational  theory  would  have  to  prove, 
that  succession,  relation,  and  difference  are  not  matters  of 
knowledge ;  and  those  who  uphold  the  view  must  show  \\ov>- 
observation,  comparison,  and  memory  can  be  originated.  Were 
we  to  grant  that  one  sensation  possessed  the  power  of  com- 
paring itself  with  another,  it  is  evident  that,  in  order  to  do  so. 
one  sensation  would  possess  at  least  the  power  of  distinction 
between  subject  and  object ;  and  here  would  be  acknowledged 
an  intelligence  pertaining  to  the  sensation  itself. 

"  According  to  evolution,"  says  Professor  Calderwood,  "  they  are  all 
to  be  created  by  advance  from  lower  to  higher,  yet  without  these  higher 
we  cannot  have  experience.  Without  observation,  involving  at  least 
the  distinction  of  subject  and  object,  there  can  be  no  such  memory  as 
we  rely  upon  in  building  up  our  knowledge ;  without  memoi'y  there  can 
be  no  thought ;  without  thought  no  rational  life.  Neither  from  organism 
nor  from  sensation  can  help  be  found  here. '  No  series  of  sensory 
impressions  will  produce  thought ;  no  series  of  sensations  can  result  in 
anything  higher  than  its  own  content." 

Cyples  says,  "Very  earlj'  we  learn  that  these  diversifications  of 
experience,  as  well  as  the  startings  and  stoppings  of  consciousness 
generally,  are  determined  not  by  ourselves — at  least,  not  in  their 
natural,  unartificially-produced  happenings.  They  are  somehow  im- 
posed and  prescribed.  Moreover,  the  intellect,  by  its  own  proper 
function,  comes  to  apprehend  that  a  certain  oi'der  discloses  itself  in 
these  occurrences,  one  event  following  upon  or  grouping  with  another. 
The  intellect's  complete  task  is,  from  these  data,  to  formulate  working- 
rules  which  will  explicate  the  arising  and  the  ceasing  of  our  conscious- 


EV(3LUT10N  OF  MIND.  159 

ness,  with  the  occurring  of  the  diversifications  of  experience  into  kinds 
while  it  subsists." 

The  failure  to  appreciate  liow  iiniutelligible  is  the  sensa- 
tional theory  of  evolution  may  be  attributed  to  the  fact,  that 
some  writers  direct  their  effi  )rts  more  in  the  direction  of  giving 
an  explanation  of  the  fundamental  nature  of  the  manifestations, 
than  of  trying  to  observe  the  manifestations  as  they  occur. 
To  us  it  is  all-important  to  accept  no  assumptions  as  valid 
unless  they  are  quite  intelligible.  Otherwise,  we  raise  for 
ourselves  barriers  which  arrest  our  progress  and  involve  us  in 
endless  difficulties.  From  all  points  of  view  the  evidence  in 
favour  of  the  theory  of  sensationalism  is  in  direct  opposition 
to  our  common  sense,  and  we  say  of  it.  as  it  now  stands,  the 
evolution  of  a  cognitive  state  from  a  sensation  without  the 
existence  of  an  intellectual  guiding  factor  or  personality  as 
a  pre-rec|uisite,  is  as  readily  conceivable  as  the  evolution  of 
a  sporran  from  the  classical  fig-leaf  without  the  intervention 
of  a  tailor. 

The  assumption  that  our  mental  states  are  composite — 
i.e.,  made  up  of  smaller  states  conjoined — has  been  termed 
the  "mind-stuff"  theor}^,  and  its  consideration  has  engaged 
the  attention  of  many  psj'chologists.  If  we  are  to  be  thorough 
in  our  scheme  of  the  evolution  of  mind,  we  must  either  account 
for  the  introduction  of  mental  factors,  at  some  period  in  the 
history  of  the  organisation  of  the  original  cosmical  chaos,  or 
we  m\ist  surrender  that  position,  and  grant  the  existence  of 
mind  from  the  beginning.  That  is  to  say,  we  must  either 
be  materialists,  or  accept  as  a  fundamental  truth  the  t\\in 
evolution  of  mind  and  matter.  To  enter  into  the  meta- 
physical cpiestions  involved  in  any  attempt  to  introduce  mental 
factors  among  the  chaotically-dispersed  atoms  of  the  universe, 
is  obvious!}'  beyond  our  scope  of  inquiry.  We  have  merely 
to  note  the  undeniable  discontinuity  of  the  data,  and  the 
failure  of  evolutionists  to  provide  us  with  explanations  upon 
these  points. 

The  advocates  of  true  parallelism  must,  of  necessity,  be  the 
enemies  of  evolutionists ;  and,  to  use  a  paradox,  the  strength  of 
the  chain  of  evidence  of  the  former  is  made  up  of  the  missing- 
links  of  the  latter.     It  is  pathetic  to  note  the  positive  affirma- 


160  MIND. 

tions  of  some  writers,  that  there  is  no  possible  or  conceivable 
causal  connection  between  mind  and  matter;  and  yet  they  are 
foremost  in  giving  the  body  priority  as  a  cansal  factor  in  the 
introduction  of  mind.  "When  the  evolutionary  afflatus  is  upon 
them,"  says  Professor  -James.  "  these  very  same  writers  leap  over 
the  breach,  whose  flagranc}'  they  are  the  foremost  to  announce, 
and  they  talk  as  if  the  mind  grew  out  of  the  body  in  a  con- 
tinuous way." 

Spencer*  attempts  to  demonstrate  how  we  pass  "  tvithout 
hreali,  from  the  phenomena  of  bodily  life  to  the  phenomena  of 
mental  life."  His  conception,  that  the  truth  of  life  is  the 
"  continuous  adjustment  of  internal  to  external  relations,"  is 
manifest  to  every  one;  but  Ave  fail  to  observe,  either  liouj  we 
pass  from  plwsical  to  psychical  actions,  or  the  moment  iflien 
we  rise  above  the  correspondences  that  are  few,  simple,  and 
immediate.  "  On  ascending  from  the  lowest  tj'^pes  of  life,'" 
says  Spencer,  "  one  marked  manifestation  of  the  heightening 
correspondence  is  the  increasing  distance  at  AA'hich  co-existences 
and  sequences  in  the  environment  produce  adapted  changes  in 
the  organism.  This  progress  accompanies  the  development  of 
the  senses  of  smell,  sight,  hearing,  etc.,  and  the  subsequent 
development  of  the  intellect."!  His  assumption — that  all  forms 
of  sensibility  to  external  stimuli,  are,  in  their  nascent  shapes, 
nothing  but  the  modifications  which  those  stimuli  produce 
in  that  "'  duplex  j^rocess  of  integration  and  disintegration, 
Avhich  constitutes  the  primordial  life,  plwsiologicallj'-considered" 
— is,  to  sa}^  the  least,  vague  and  confusing.:!:  To  speak  of  forms 
of  sensibility  as  modifications  produced  by  stimuli  AN-ould  appear 
to  be  warrantable ;  but  no  argument  would  warrant  the  con- 
clusion that  the  external  stimuli  determined  the  sensibility 
itself.  It  is  manifestly  true,  that  various  stimuli  determine 
modifications  of  the  organism  upon  which  they  act ;  but  they 

*  "Psychology,^'  §  131. 

t  Op.  cit.,  §  139. 

X  To  the  theory'  that  forms  of  sensibility  to  external  stimuli  are  in  their 
'•nascent"  state,  James  takes  serious  objection.  He  points  out,  that  merely 
to  call  the  consciousness  nascent  will  not  serve  our  turn.  He  says,  "  It  is 
true  that  the  word  signifies  not  yet  (juite  born,  and  so  seems  to  form  a  sort 
of  bridge  between  existence  and  nonentity.  The  fact  is  that  discontinuity 
comes  in  if  a  new  nature  comes  in  at  all. ' 


EVOLUTION  OF  MIND.  161 

do  not  determine  the  existence  of  that  organism.  "Were  such 
arguments  possible,  our  difficulties  in  accepting  the  evolution 
theories  ^^•o^lld  be  smoothed  over. 

The  theory  of  atomistic  hi/lozoism  seems  to  be  the  most 
philosophical  view  of  evolution,  and.  according  to  its  advocates, 
there  must  have  been  an  infinite  number  of  degrees  of  con- 
sciousness following  the  degrees  of  complication  and  aggre- 
gation of  the  primordial  mind-dust.  Here,  however.  Ave  are 
treading  upon  metaphysical  ground,  so  we  return  to  the 
psychological  significance  of  the  mind-dust  theories. 

SjDencer  concludes,  that  the  progress  of  the  correspondence 
between  the  organism  and  its  environment  necessitates  a 
gradual  reduction  of  the  sensorial  changes  to  a  succession  ;  and 
by  so  doing  evolves  a  distinct  consciousness — a  consciousness 
that  becomes  higher  as  the  succession  becomes  more  rapid  and 
the  correspondence  more  complete.*  The  question  naturally 
arises.  At  what  period  of  the  succession  of  sensorial  changes 
is  a  distinct  consciousness  evolved  ?  Spencer  f  denies  that  he 
means  by  this  passage  to  tell  us  an^-thing  about  the  origin  of 
consciousness  at  all.:^ 

In  a  succession  of  sensorial  changes  (psychologically-con- 
sidered), did  consciousness  evolve  with  the  first,  second,  or 
hundredth  sensation  in  that  series  ?  If  with  the  second,  the 
first  would  have  no  place  in  it ;  if  with  the  hundredth,  the 
previoiTS  ninety-nine  would  ha\'e  no  place,  because  they  could 
only  exist  so  far  as  they  were  manifested  in  consciousness.  To 
say  that  the  factors  in  the  succession  become  more  complex  as 
they  advance,  does  not  simplify  matters.  The  question  becomes 
(1)  did  the  primordial  bioplasm  answer  to  its  first  stimulus 
from  without,  or  did  it  wait  for  a  period  when  the  stimuli  had 
so  modified  it  that  it  was  then  able  to  respond  and  manifest 
itself  as  life  ?  (2)  did  the  first  stimulus  entail  even  the  most 
rudimentary  form  of  sensation  appreciable  by  the  bioplasm  ? 
or.  (3)  did  the  organism  appreciate  the  stimulation  only  when 

*  "Psychology,"  §  179. 

t  "Fortnightly  Review,"'  vol.  xiv.  p.  716. 

J  "  This  resembles,"  says  Professor  James,  "  too  many  other  passages  in 
his  'Psychology-'  not  to  be  taken  as  a  serious  attempt  to  explain  how 
consciousness  must  at  a  certain  point  be  evolved." 

11 


162  MIXD. 

previous  stimuli  had  advanced  the  evolution  of  its  complex 
adaptive  apparatus  ?  If  the  human  mind  is  to  he  evolved  from 
mere  complexity  of  physiological  arrangements,  then  why  not 
also  evolve  vitality  from  mere  complexity  of  mechanical  forces  y 
The  conclusion  of  the  sensationists  is,  obviously,  that  our 
knowledge  arises  from  the  evolution  of  data  unknown  to  us. 

Can  we  arrive  at  an  idea,  conclusion,  inference,  or  what- 
soever it  may  be  called,  only  at  some  period  in  the  evolution 
of  a  succession  of  data,  taking  no  account  of  data  which 
occurred  earlier  in  that  series  ?  Consciousness  must  start 
somewhere  within  that  series,  and  its  evolution  must  depend 
upon  initial  sensor\^  change  lyJus  subsecjuent  sensory  changes. 
The  contents  of  consciousness  at  any  period  in  that  succession 
must  involve  the  pre-existence  of  antecedent  states  right  to  the 
very  origin  of  that  consciousness.  Hence,  we  again  find  our- 
selves compelled  to  beat  consciousness  back  to  the  beginning 
of  sentient  existence.  In  fact,  the  theor}'  that  holds  conscious- 
ness to  be  dependent  upon  the  arrival  at  a  period,  when  the 
correspondence  of  the  mechanism  to  its  environment  is  more 
elaborate  and  complete.  conve3"s  as  nuTch  meaning,  concerning 
the  origin  of  intelligence,  as  do  the  activities  of  a  lamp-lighter 
concerning  the  origin  of  light. 

Spencer  says  that  the  doctrine  of  evolution,  under  its 
purely  scientific  form,  does  not  involve  materialism,  though  its 
opponents  persistenth'  present  it  as  doing  so.  He  also  speaks 
of  the  materialistic  hypothesis  as  being  ''  utterly  futile." 
Hughlings-Jackson  says,  that  to  describe  Spencer.  Huxley, 
and  Tyndall  as  materialists  is  as  absurd  as  to  speak  of  Sir 
Joseph  Lister  as  an  opponent  of  antiseptic  surgery.  The 
words  of  Spencer — "  No  effort  enables  us  to  assimilate  mind 
and  motion  ;  I  am  merely  showing  a  [jaralUlum  between  a 
certain  physical  evolution  and  the  correlative  psychical  evolu- 
tion " — would  apparently  place  him  above  any  effort  to  assimilate 
mind  and  matter,  or  any  attempt  to  show  that  material  actions 
thus  become  mental  actions.  But.  again,  we  ask.  If  a  parallelism 
between  a  certain  physical  evohition.  and  the  correlative  psj"- 
chical  evolution  has  taken  place,  was  that  parallelism  complete? 
or  was  a  certain  degree  of  physical  evolutionary  complexitj' 
essential  before  the  psychical  parallel  could  be  started  at  all  ? 


THE  MIND-STUFF  TIIEOKY.  IGo 

The  •*  liappenino"  of  consciousness  thus  becomes  a  problem  of 
the  ••first  cause."  and  the  psychical  functions  must  hav^"  existed 
coincidentally  to  the  beginnings  of  life.  Any  attempt  to  posit 
the  dawn  of  consciousness  coincidentally  to  a  more  complexly- 
developed  state  of  the  physical  organism  is  neither  true  evolu- 
tion nor  parallelism,  it  is  materialism,  and  seeks  to  account  for 
the  origin  of  one  series  of  events  bj'  taking  account  of  the  total 
complex  of  the  other  series.  If  the  two  series  of  events  are  to 
correspond  they  must  go  hand  in  hand  from  the  beginning. 
They  must  be  twins — the  one  must  not  be  born,  and  the  other 
happen  later  on.  If  there  is  to  be  a  period  of  nascence  with 
the  one.  so  there  must  also  be  with  the  other.  As  far  as  we 
can  see.  the  nascence  of  the  one  must  evolve  into  perceptible 
life  ;  that  of  the  other  into  conscious  experience.  The  one  is 
not  born  from  a  rib  of  the  fully  developed  other. 

One  contention  of  the  spiritualists  against  the  association- 
ists  in  psychology — that  individual  minds  do  not  agglomerate 
into  a  higher  compound  mind — has  never  been  ans^\'ered  by 
the  latter.  With  this  contention  we  have  little  to  do.  Our 
object,  however,  includes  some  discussion  of  the  theory  that 
mind-diist  exists,  and  that  mental  objects  can  be  com- 
pounded.* The  self-compoimding  of  mental  facts  is  quite 
inadmissible.  In  favoiir  of  this  view  Professor  James  lias 
pointed  out  in  very  clear  language,  that  at  most  A\'e  can 
compare  together  objects  previously  presented  to  us  ;  but  then 
Ave  find  each  object  stid^bornly  maintaining  its  separate  identity 
liefore  consciousness,  whatever  the  verdict  of  the  comparison 
may  be.  "  All  the  cctmbinations  which  we  actually  know  are 
effects,  wrought  by  the  units  said  to  be  '  combined,'  ujion  some 
entifij  other  tlian  ourselves.''  "'  In  other  words,  no  possible 
number  of  entities  (call  them  as  you  like,  whether  forces, 
material  particles,  or  mental  elements)  can  sum  tJieraselres 
together ;  each  remains,  in  the  sum,  what  it  always  A\as  : 
and. the*  sum  itself  exists  only  for  a  hi/staiuler  who  happens  to 
overlook  the  units,  and  to  apprehend  the  sum  as  such  ;  or  else 

*  See  Royce,  "  Mind,"  vi.  p.  376;  Lotze,  "  Microcosmus,"  Bk.  ii..  Ch.  I., 
,^  5  ;  Mivart,  "  Nature  and  Thought,"  p.  98  ;  Fechner,  "  Psychophysik,' 
Bd.  ii..  Cap.  XLY. ;  Brentano,  "  Psychologie,"  p.  '209  ;  Tyndall,  "  Fragments 
of  Science,"  p.  420  ;  Hughlings-Jackson,  "Croonian  Lecture?,"  1884, 


164  MIND. 

it  exists  in  the  shape  of  some  other  efed  on  an  entity  external 
to  the  sum  itself."  The  contention  of  the  spiritualists  holds 
good;  says  James,  against  any  talk  about  self-compounding 
amongst  feelings,  against  any  " iDlending,"  or  "complication," 
or  "  mental  chemistry,"  or  "'  psychic  sjaithesis,"  which  supposes 
a  resultant  consciousness  to  float  off  from  the  constituents  pe?* 
se.  in  the  absence  of  a  supernumeraiy  principle  of  consciousness 
which  they  may  effect.  "  The  mind-stuff  theor}^,  in  short,  is 
iinintelligible."  The  contentions  of  Ward*  and  James  agree 
in  their  main  points,  and  they  rightly  take  objection  to  the 
views  of  "  mind-stufiists,"  and  associationists,  that  the  "series 
of  states"  is  the  awareness  of  "itself";  that  if  the  states  be 
posited  severally,  their  collective  consciousness  is  eo  ipso  given; 
and  that  we  need  no  further  explanation  or  "  evidence  of  the 
fact.""  If  we  try  to  imagine  the  ideas  of  the  various  con- 
stituents of  a  haggis  positing  themselves  in  our  mind,  side  by 
side,  so  as  to  form  a  combination  or  resultant  idea  of  the  haggis 
in  its  entirety,  that  resultant  idea  would  really  consist  of  a 
reference  to  a  haggis  previously  compounded  and  presented  to 
us  in  its  entirety,  while  the  ideas  of  the  constituents  Avould 
remain  more  or  less  intact  and  separate. 

The  super-position  of  many  photographs  upon  one  another 
gives  ITS  a  composite  product  more  or  less  blurred  or  in- 
distinct, and  the  mind  becomes  aware  of  the  properties  ot 
that  product  as  presented  to  it ;  but  the  mind  cannot  look 
at  a  series  of  pictures,  and  by  placing  their  mental  images 
side  by  side  form  a  composite  mental  representation  of 
them.  The  mind  can  only  review  the  component  parts  of 
the  series,  and  it  can  only  view  an  external  resultant  com- 
bination.!     Thus,   it   deals    with    the   haggis.       The   taste  of 

*  ■' Eiicyclopiedia  Britannica." 

t  •■  I  find  in  my  students,"  says  James,  "  an  almost  invincible  tendency 
to  think  that  we  can  immediately  perceive  that  feelings  do  combine. 
'  "What ! '  they  say,  'is  not  the  taste  of  lemonade  composed  of  that  of  lemon 
/;^M.s  that  of  sugar?'  This  is  taking  the  combining  of  objects  for  that  of 
feelings.  The  physical  lemonade  contains  both  the  lemon  and  the  sugar, 
but  its  taste  does  not  contain  their  tastes,  for  if  there  are  any  two  things 
whicli  are  certainly  not  present  in  the  taste  of  lemonade,  those  are  the 
lemon-sour  on  the  one  hand  and  the  sugar-sweet  on  the  other.  These  tastes 
are  absent  utterly.  The  entiiely  new  taste  which  is  present  i-esembles,  it  is. 
true,  botli  those  tastes." 


UXCOXSCIOUS  CEIIEURATIOX. 


10^ 


the  compound  may  be  recognised  in  its  combination,  or  the 
(jourmet  may  even  succeed  in  the  detection  of  elements  A\'hich 
wonld  baffle  the  majority.  Let  the  nninitiated.  hciwever. 
separately  imagine  the  taste  of  linety-chopped  sheep"s  heart, 
liver,  etc.  etc.,  suet,  and  oatmeal  ;  then  let  him  conjure  up  a 
high  seasoning  of  onions  and  pepper,  and  then  let  him  sum 
up  the  sensation  that  wo\ild  correspond  to  such  a  compound 
after  it  has  been  '•  boiled  i'  the  maw."  Even  a  Scot  woiild 
confess  to  failure,  and  refer  to  the  taste  of  the  compound  as 
formerly  presented  to  him.  Of  the  views  of  the  associationists 
we  shall  have  much  to  say  in  subsequent  chapters,  so  that  we 
now  proceed  to  consider  a  question  implied  by  the  mind- 
stuff  theory — viz.,  that  states  of  mind  may  be  unconscious. 

Unconscious  Cerebration. 
The  arguments  for  and  against  the  theory  are  as  follows* : — 

Ayainst. 
]iecause  three  men  are  just  able 
to  lift  a  ton  weight  one  foot,  it 
does  not  follow  that  two  men 
are  able  to  lift  it  8  inches. 


For. 

1.  Below  the  point  of  liminal  in- 
tensity of  stimulation  there  must 
be  a  certain  degree  of  cerebration, 
because  only  a  small  addition  is 
necessary  to  produce  an  appreci- 
able sensation. 

2.  The  intelligence  displayed  in  so- 
called  automatic  acts. 

3.  Thinking  of  A,  we  presently  find 
ourselves  thinking  of  C.  Now  V>  is 
the  natural  logical  link  between  A 
and  C,  but  we  have  no  conscious- 
ness of  having  thought  of  B.  It 
must  have  been  in  our  mind  "  un- 
consciously," and  in  that  state 
affected  the  sequence  of  our  ideas. 

4.  Solving  problems  during  sleep, 
somnambulism,  awakening  at  a 
predetermined  hour,  unconscious 
thinking,  volition,  time  registra- 
tion, etc.  Consciousness  must 
have  presided  over  these  acts. 


There  may  have  been  conscious- 
ness,but  the  memory  of  it  absent. 

Either  memory  at  fault,  or  B"s 
brain  tract  alone  was  adequate 
to  do  the  whole  coupling  of  A 
with  C,  without  arousing  B. 


There  may  have  been  conscious- 
ness, but  it  is  forgotten,  as  in 
the  hypnotic  trance. 


*  James,  "  Principles  of  Psychology  "  ;  Carpenter,  "  Mental  Physiology,"' 
Chap.  XIII.;  Laycock, "  Edin.  Med.  Journ.,"  July,  1838;  Baldwin.  "Handbook 
of  Psychology,''  Chap.  lY,  ;  Wundt,  "  Ueber  den  Einfluss  der  Philosophie,'" 
Antrittsrede  (1876),  p.  10  ;  Hack  Tuke,  "  Unconscious  Cerebration  "" — 
"  Dictionary,"  p.  1336. 


166 


3I1ND. 


For. 

.  The  complicated  processes  per- 
formed in  epileptiform  uncon- 
sciousness (larvated  epilepsy). 
,  Our  conclusions  often  arrive  quite 
unexpectedly  without  any  attempt 
to  analyse  their  premises.  This 
pre-supposes  a  mass  of  ideas  in  an 
unconscious  state. 


7.  The  general  fitness  of  instinctive 
actions  indicates  unconscious  in- 
telligence, as  the  ends  ai'e  not 
foreseen. 

8.  Eapid  judgments  of  size,  distance, 
shape,  and  the  like,  are  ready-made 
conscious  percepts  derived  by  un- 
conscious inference. 

9.  We  constantly  discover  new  ele- 
ments in  accustomed  sensations. 
These  elements  must  have  existed 
in  an  unconscious  state,  otherwise 
we  could  not  single  out  the  sensa- 
tions containing  them  from  others 
nearly  allied. 


Against. 

Eapid  oblivescence,  as  in  dreams, 
occurs. 

Xo  such  mass  of  ideas  is  suppos- 
able.  The  predisposition  to 
bring  forth  a  conscious  idea 
is  no  evidence  that  the  idea 
existed  unconsciously.  Brain 
processes  form  the  predisposi- 
tion to  call  forth  the  idea,  just 
as  external  physical  processes 
form  the  predisposition  to  call 
forth  the  brain  processes. 

The  actions  may  be  explained 
physiologically  as  occurring 
along  the  lines  of  least  resist- 
ance. 

Results  like  those  of  reasoning 
may  accrue  without  any  actual 
reasoning  process  unconsciously 
taking  place. 

We  may  have  an  idea  and  subse- 
quently know  all  sorts  of  things 
about  it.  That  we  now  become 
aware  of  the  attributes  of  an 
object  formerly  presented  is 
no  proof  that  the  awareness 
of  these  attributes  must  have 
existed  unconsciously. 


That  unconscious  cerebration  can  go  on,  and  does  go  on, 
without  any  obvious  mental  accompaniment  is  readily  con- 
ceivable ;  but  when  it  refers,  not  to  cerebral  activities,  but  more 
particularly  to  mental  modifications,  without  the  consciousness 
of  the  subject,  we  find  ourselves  in  difficulties.  Undoubtedly, 
many  of  the  phenomena  described  as  evidences  of  unconscious 
cerebration  may  be  compared  to  the  automatic  unconscious 
movements  of  the  limbs  from  habit,  as,  for  instance,  in  playing 
the  piano.  Griesinger  has  termed  it  psychical  reflex  action. 
According  to  the  associationists,  the  development  of  a  single 
thought  is  effected  by  the  functional  activity  of  association 
bundles,  which  unite  in  a  very  complicated  way  the  component 
elements  of  a  so-called  residual  image  of  the  cortex.    These  groups 


rxc'oxscious  ceijebilvtiox.  167 

of  associated  cells,  which  harbour  residual  imaues.  are  the  startino- 
point  for  the  excitation  of  more  comprehensive  associations,  con- 
stituting simple  processes  of  induction.  In  this  way  every 
process  of  thought  originating-  from  residual  images  would  be 
connected  with  a  large  number  of  distinct  cerebral  elements, 
and  it  would  have,  as  its  physical  counterpart,  many  separate 
and  A\ell-defined  areas  of  excitation,  which  areas  are  united  for 
common  action  b}'  the  process  of  association.  Each  area  is 
regarded  as  a  separate  and  fairly-well-defined  group  of  ganglion- 
cells,  standing  in  relation  to  one  another  through  the  compli- 
cated system  of  association  fibres,  and  every  cortical  image  or 
inference  depends  iipon  the  union  of  these  groups  of  cells. 
This  view,  as  Me  have  already  seen,  precludes  the  possibility  of 
localising  the  excitation  in  the  forebrain,  and,  according  to 
Meynert,  the  projection  system  alone  stands  under  the  influence 
of  the  centres  of  excitation. 

For  illustration,  let  us  compare  the  centres  of  excitation  and 
the  projection  system  to  numerous  stations  on  a  complicated 
Ijranching  railway.  Some  associationists  hold  that  the  ideas 
gain  their  component  parts  from  the  separate  stations.  They 
imagine  that  the  physical  equivalents  of  these  component  parts 
travel  either  directly  or  indirectly  from  their  several  localities 
to  the  central  terminus  (consciousness)  and  emerge,  not  as 
separate  events,  biit  as  one  event — i.e.,  the  results  of  the  separate 
events  compounded  en  route.  Consciousness,  viewed  as  the 
central  terminus,  is  not  supposed  to  Avitness  the  arrival  of 
individuals,  it  only  witnesses  a  conglomerate  mass  of  fused 
passengers.  Such  is  the  line  of  thought  advocated  by  the 
mind-stuffists,  associationists,  and  unconsciovis  cerebrationists. 
They  postulate  that  psychological  data  self-compound  into  con- 
clusions. 

Let  us  continue  the  analogy  a  little  further.  The  official 
recorder  of  arrivals  (ticket  collector)  at  the  terminus,  on  entering 
upon  his  duties,  notes  the  individual  arrivals  with  more  or  less 
interest.  With  the  daily  repetition  of  the  numerous  arrivals, 
however,  his  acts  of  checking  become  more  and  more  auto- 
matic, and  the  individuality  of  each  passenger  less  distinct, 
until  finally  he  comes  to  view,  not  the  individuality  of  any 
passenger,  biit    the    sum  total    or    mass   of  individuals,  with, 


168  MIND. 

perhaps,  some  faint  qualifying  attribute,  sncli  as  "  pnshing," 
etc.  In  the  course  of  his  duties  he  one  day  experiences  the 
feeling,  that  a  certain  face  is  familiar  to  him,  but  he  cannot 
recall  where  or  when  he  has  seen  it  before.  Or  a  particularly 
vigorous  push  b}'  a  passenger  may  make  him  become  aware  of 
the  fact,  that  that  same  passenger  had  done  the  same  thing  on 
a  former  occasion.  We  might  continue  the  simile,  but  we 
should  find  that  every  contingency  would  fit  in  with  the  possi- 
bility of  the  occurrences  tvithin  the  realms  of  diffuse  conscious- 
ness, and  tvithoitt  the  direct  concentration  of  attention.  In  other 
words,  the  realms  of  diffuse  consciousness  are  so  wide,  that  they 
include  most  of  the  phenomena  regarded  as  evidences  of  un- 
conscious cerebration.  The  mere  fact,  that  there  is  inability  to 
recall  former  conscious  events,  is  insufficient  proof  that  those 
former  events  never  existed,  or  that  \h.ej  existed  unconsciously. 
The  theory  of  unconscious  cerebration  we,  therefore,  hold  to 
be  superfluous  and  unproved.  In  his  lectures  on  metaphysics* 
Sir  William  Hamilton  states,  that  the  greater  the  number  of 
objects  among  which  the  attention  of  the  mind  is  distributed 
the  feebler  and  less  distinct  will  be  its  cognisance  of  each — 
2Jluribus  intentus,  oninor  est  adj  sinr/ida  sensus.  As  we  shall 
have  occasion  to  speak  more  fully  of  these  things  when  con- 
sidering the  phenomena  of  trance,  somnambulism,  hypno- 
tism, and  epilepsy,  we  will  now  sum  up  in  general  terms 
our  present  position  with  regard  to  the  evolution  of  mental 
states. 

From  the  affirmation  of  a  universal  law  of  evolution  more 
information  is  derived  than  from  the  affirmation  of  particulars  ; 
it  logicall}^  follows,  that  more  information  can  be  derived 
from  the  denial  of  particulars  than  from  the  denial  of 
universals — i.e.,  there  are  cases  left  doubtful.  That  there  are 
cases  left  doubtful  requiring  the  proof  or  denial  of  jDarticulars 
is  manifest  in  current  literature  upon  mental  evolution.  By 
the  employment  of  terms  such  as  "  unconscious  inference," 
"  cortical  trace,"  "  subsidiary  image,"  "  nascent  consciousness," 
as  terms  of  propositions,  we  beg  questions,  and  imply  the 
existence  of  knowledge  which  we  really  have  not  got ;  and  in 

*  A-'ol.  i.,  p.  254. 


rXCONSCIOUS  CEREBEATIDX.  169 

the  attempt  to  define  that  of  which  we  know  nothing  we  enter 
upon  the  fallacy  of  a  circuhis  in  depniendo.  Thus,  if  the  student 
will  sift  the  terms  employed  in  the  various  propositions  put 
forward  by  the  mind-stuffists  and  cerebralists  he  will  readily 
detect  the  abuse  and  equivocation,  brought  about,  no  doubt. 
by  their  attempts  to  substitute  terms,  the  definitions  of  which 
they  neither  restrict  nor  explain. 


170 


CHAPTER   YI. 

Sensation. 
Sensation — Analysis  of  Sensations  and  Sense  Percepts — Relation  of 
Sensations  to  Perception — Molar  Motions — Atomic  and  Molecular 
Motions — Motions  of  Ether — The  Theory  of  Electricity — Latent 
Chemical  Energy — Power  of  Selection  possessed  by  Sense  Organs 
— Characters  of  Sensation — Intensity  or  Degree — Liminal  In- 
tensity— Forms  of  Excitation — Weber's  Law — Discriminative 
Sensibility  —  Maximum  Intensity  —  Fechner's  Psycho-Physical 
Interpretation  of  Weber's  Law — Wundt's  Psychological  Interpre- 
tation— The  Physiological  Interpretation — Validity  of  Weber's 
Law — The  Estimation  of  Magnitudes  by  Comparison — Measure- 
ment of  Absolute  Mental  Magnitudes  Impossible — Quality  of 
Sensations  —  Creneric  and  Specific  Quality  —  Duration  —  Local 
Characters  of  Sensations — Taste — Smell — Touch — Specific  Func- 
tions of  Tactile  Corpuscles  or  End  Bulbs — Pressure  Spots. — 
Temperature  Sense — Common  Sensation — Peripheral  Reference 
of  Sensations — Muscular  Sense — Hearing — Sight — Pressure  Phos- 
phenes — Quality  of  Sensations  of  Sight — Simple  and  Mixed 
Colours  —  Colour  -  Blindness  —  Young  —  Ilelmholtz  —  Hering  — 
Wundt — Von  Ivries — Franklin. 

In  the  analysis  of  sensation  and  sense-percepts  it  is  necessary 
(1)  to  distinguish  simple  sensations  from  those  derivative  and 
more  complex  psychic  manifestations,  to  which  our  educated 
consciousness  becomes  so  familiar,  that  it  loses  sight  of  their 
origin  and  integration  ;  (2)  to  demonstrate  the  quantitative  and 
qualitative  variations  of  sensations  and  their  relations  to  the 
various  stimtili ;  (3)  to  investigate  the  psychical  methods 
whereby  our  perceptions  of  time-form  and  space-form  are  arrived 
at ;  (4)  to  estimate  the  part  played  by  the  various  senses,  and 
to  see  how  far  the  higher  mental  activities  are  involved  in  the 
processes  of  perception. 

The  term  "  sensation  "  is  used  to  express  the  most  elementary 
form  of  conscious  experience.     It  is  a  mental  state  resulting 


ANALYSIS  OF  SENSATIONS.  171 

from  the  stinmlation  of  the  pei'ipheral  extremity  of  a  sensory 
nerve,  through  which  the  excitation  reaches  the  sensorium.  The 
senses  provide  our  minds  with  supply.  They  fill  up  our  con- 
sciousness Avith  data  from  Avhich  A\e  gain  our  ideas.  All 
sensations  appear  to  liave  some  physical  occasion.  They 
do  not  necessarily  involve  the  action  of  an  external  stimulus. 
When  a  sensory  '•  incarrying"  nerve  is  divided  there  is  no 
sensation  arising  from  external  stimuli,  but  subjective  sensa- 
tions may  still  arise  through  the  activity  of  a  central  process, 
the  nature  of  which  is  unknown  to  \;s.  In  mental  diseases  such 
modes  of  activity  within  the  sensorium  are  remarkably  freqi^ent. 

Coupland*  regards  the  term  sensation  as  connoting  a  sub- 
jective condition  which  has  no  mental  but  only  a  physical  occa- 
sion. He  claims  that  a  truly  original  mental  phenomenon  passes 
the  limits  of  imagination,  because  it  passes  the  boiandaries  of 
our  knowledge.  The  phenomenon  of  sensibility  niay  pertain 
to  the  organism,  but  the  phenomenon  of  sensation  pertains 
to  the  mind.  All  sensations  are  modes  of  behaviour  of  the  mind. 
Sensations  only  exist  in  so  far  as  they  form  contents  of  con- 
sciousness. They  are  not  copies  of  outside  molecular  activities  : 
they  are  modes  of  conscious  activity  of  the  mind.  If  we  take  an 
ordinary  psA^chical  activity,  and  seek  to  appose  it  to  its  material 
basis,  we  have  to  consider  (1)  the  external  stimulus,  which  is 
physical;  (2)  the  excitation  and  transmission  of  the  stimulus; 
and  (3)  the  psychical  process  itself. 

All  our  knowledge  is  obtained  from  objects  presented  in  con- 
sciousness, and  we  cannot  properly  speak  of  knowledge  where  no 
object  is  presented.  Sensations  are  the  mental  objects  pre- 
sented to  the  subject ;  they  only  exist  when  presented.  This 
presentation  of  objects  is  the  first  clear  act  of  consciousness. 
Sensations  do  not  exist  except  in  so  far  as  they  are  perceived  by 
the  subject.  Sensations  are  particularised  when  perceived,  and 
this  perception  is  the  first  mental  fact.  The  first  psychical 
element  perceived  by  the  mind  is  sensation ;  the  first  act  of 
viewing  that  sensation  is  perception. 

Thus  sensation  is  the  first  presentation  to  the  consciousness  ; 
perception  is  the  first  recognition  of  that  presentation.     Sensa- 
tion is  the   stimulus  AA'ithin   consciousness  ;  perception  is  the 
*  "Tukes  Diet,  of  Psych.  Med.,"  p.  32. 


17.2  SENSATION. 

appreciation  of  that  stimulus  by  the  mind.  What  happens  within 
the  cerebral  hemispheres  immediately  antecedent  toAvhat  happens 
within  consciousness  is  bej^ond  our  powers  to  determine.  Ward* 
thinks  a  presentation  (as  presented  to  a  subject)  might,  with 
advantage,  be  called  an  object,  or  perhaps  a  psj^chical  object. to  dis- 
tinguish it  from  what  are  called  objects  apart  from  presentation. 

In  the  meantime  we  shall  treat  of  presentations  in  their  literal 
sense,  as  presentations  to  the  subject  or  ef/o.  Each  presentation 
has  a  twofold  relation  :  (1)  Its  relation  to  the  subject;  and  (2) 
its  relation  to  other  presentations.  Ward  states,  that  the  mental 
facts  Mdiich  we  speak  of  as  sensations,  perceptions,  images, 
intentions,  concepts,  notions,  etc.,  have  two  characteristics  in 
common  :  (1)  They  admit  of  being  more  or  less  attended  to ; 
and  (2)  they  can  be  reproduced  and  associated  together.  Thus 
the  term  sensihility  -would  possess  a  psychical  significance. 
and  would  denote  the  mind's  capability  of  having  sensations. 
General  sensibility  is  that  sensibility  which  represents  all  the 
sensitive  parts  of  the  organism  other  than  the  special  sensory 
organs.  Sensations  of  this  character,  involving  no  characteristic 
nervous  structures,  are  vague  and  ill-defined.  Special  sensihility 
is  the  term  employed  to  indicate  the  mind's  sensibility  to  special 
sensations,  brought  about  in  most  cases  by  external  agents 
through  the  special  senses,  and  from  which  we  gain  a  know- 
ledge of  our  environment.  * 

One  simple  sensation  rarely  acts  alone.  All  our  senses  are 
open  to  imjDressions  from  AA'ithout,  and  our  minds  are  constantly 
open  to  impressions  from  within  the  body ;  so  that,  just  as  the 
external  environment  is  constantly  taking  efiect  upon  our 
physical  organism,  so  the  physical  organism  is  constantly  taking- 
effect  upon  our  consciousness. 

The  various  Jdnds  of  motion  ■\\diich  can  act  upon  the  peripheral 
organs  of  sense  are  as  follows  : — 

(1)  Molar  'motions  :  the  projection  or  impact  of  elastic  or 
inelastic  bodies.  Definite  motion  is  executed  in  a  definite 
direction  by  a  material  body.  To  this  class  belong  all  the 
stimuli  of  touch  and  pressure. 

(2)  Atoinic  and  molecular  motions :  Motions  resulting  in 
chemical   changes  within   and  among  the  molecules.     Besides 

*  Encyclop;eclia  Britannica,  "  Psychology." 


ATOAIIC  AND  MOLECULAR  MOTIONS.  173 

the  stimuli  of  taste  and  smell,  many  visceral   stimuli  also  ])ro- 
bably  belong  to  this  class. 

(3)  Tlte  motions  of  ether  :  The  vibrations  of  ether,  pervading 
the  space  between  the  molecules  of  matter,  according  to  their 
velocity,  produce  the  phenomena  designated  as  "  light "  and 
''  radiant  heat,"  and  probably,  also,  those  of  "  magnetism  "  and 
"  electricity."* 

The  forms  of  energy  may  exist  as  energies  of  motion  or  of 
position,  and  the  actual  constitiition  of  the  universe  is  due,  in  a 
great  measure,  to  the  alternation  of  these  two  energies.  The 
various  forms  of  active  energ}-  show  themselves  as  (1)  the 
energy  of  visible  motion,  which  may  be  transformed  into  an 
equivalent  amount  of  energy  of  position;  (2)  molecular  energy, 
which  causes  the  cohesive  attraction,  repulsion,  and  other  jorojDer 
motions  of  the  minute  and  invisible  particles  of  matter;  (3) 
energy  of  heat  and  light,  which  are  transmitted  by  Avaves  of  the 
assumed  imponderable  mediiim  called  ether ;  (4)  energy  of 
chemical  action,  by  which  the  small  ultimate  particles  of 
ponderable  matter,  called  atoms,  separate  and  combine  into  the 
various  combinations  of  molecules  constituting  visible  matter,  in 
obedience  to  cei'tain  affinities  or  inherent  attractions  and  repul- 
sions ;  (5)  electrical  energy,  which  includes  magnetism  as  a 
special  instance. 

We  cannot  enter  into  an  account  of  the  mutual  attractions 
and  repulsions  of  atoms  or  molecules ;  nor  can  we  discuss  the 
nature  of  the  laws  by  which  these  energies  manifest  themselves. 
The  most  subtle  and  the  least  understandable  of  all  these 
indestructible  energies  is  that  of  electricity.  The  theory  of 
electricity  assumes  the  existence  of  two  opposite  electric  fluids, 
which,  in  the  ordinary  or  unexcited  body,  are  combined  and 
neutralise  one  another,  biit  are  separated  by  friction,  and  flow^ 
in  opposite  directions,  accumulating  at  opposite  poles;  or,  it  may 
be,  that  one  is  accumulated  at  one  pole,  whilst  the  other  is 
diffused  through  some  conducting  medium  and  lost  sight  of. 
The  active  electricity,  be  it  positive  or  negative,  thus  accumu- 
lated at  one  pole,  and  retained  there  by  the  substance  in  contact 
with  it  being  a  non-conductor,  disturbs  by  its  influence  the 
electrical  equilibrium  of  any  body  brought  near  to  it,  separates. 

*  Ziehen,  "  Physiolog.  Psycliol."  p.  37. 


174  SENSATION. 

its  two  fluids,  and  attracts  the  one  opposite  to  itself".  This 
attraction  dra^vs  the  light  body  towards  it  nntil  contact  ensues, 
when  the  electric  fluid  of  the  excited  body  flows  into  the  smaller 
one,  so  that  its  opposite  electricity  is  expelled,  and  it  is  in  the 
same  condition  as  its  exciter,  and,  therefore,  liable  to  be  repelled 
by  a  similar  exciter,  or  attracted  by  the  opposite  one,  which 
formerly  repelled  it. 

The  ultimate  elements  of  the  material  universe  are  generally 
taken  to  be  ether,  energy,  and  matter.  Of  ether,  the  universal 
all-pervading  medium  whose  tremors  or  vibrations,  propagated 
as  Avaves,  transport  the  different  forms  of  energy,  light,  heat, 
and  electricity,  across  space,  we  know  nothing.  Neither  can 
we  here  discuss  the  dynamical  and  statical  aspects  of  energy 
as  it  manifests  itself  in  gravity,  mechanical  work,  molecular  or 
atomic  force,  light,  heat,  electricity,  or  magnetism..  We  are 
unable  even  to  speculate  as  to  the  actual  nature  of  energy  itself. 
Some  would  hold  that  energy  is  the  one  reality  of  nature,  while 
others  would  regard  the  seventy  elementary  atoms  as  ultimate 
facts.  In  any  case,  both  matter  and  energy  are  indestructible, 
and  their  present  co-existence  is  not  to  be  explained  by.  evolution. 

We  must,  however,  at  any  rate,  take  some  account  of  the 
activities  of  the  ultimate  elements  of  Avhich  the  human  organism 
is  built.  Tt  is  impossible  to  conceive  how  the  human  organism 
can  manufacture  molecules  of  living  protoplasm  like  its  own  out 
of  foreign  molecules — i.e. .how  life  manufactures  life  out  of  non- 
living materials.  A  similar  problem  awaits  us  in  the  analysis 
of  sensation.  The  molecular  motion  external  to  the  body 
becomes  transformed  into  another  form  of  energy — the  energy 
of  living  matter — whilst  that,  in  turn,  becomes  the  physical 
counterpart  of  consciousness. 

Dr.  Gowers*  has  recently  drawn  attention  to  the  source  of 
energy  manifested  in  the  animal  body  and  in  the  processes 
of  human  life,  and  he  believes  that  every  form  of  energy  ••  from 
a  sigh  to  a  convulsion,"  is  derived  from  "  latent  chemical  energy." 
He  discards  the  old  term  "  transformation  of  energy."  and  sub- 
stitutes that  of  the  '•'transition  of  motion."  "We  can,  I 
Think,  perceive  all  stimuli  to  be  forms  of  motion.  In  the  case 
of  many  physiological  stimuli  the  fact  is  too  obvious  to  need 
*  "  The  DvE.amics  of  Life." 


NERVE  EXEKGY.  175 

consideration,  and  I  believe  that,  Avliere  it  is  not  obvions.  the 
conception  ^^•ill  be  found  to  be  one  from  which  there  is  no 
escape.  If  that  which  is  added  is  motion,  it  is  probable  that  the 
energy  which  this  increases  is  also  motion."' 

It  is  commonly  assumed  that  nerve-force  is  of  the  nature  of 
molecular  or  atomic  motion  ;  it  remains,  however,  for  us  to  ask 
the  question.  AVhat  is  the  form  of  that  motion  ?  Dr.  Gowers 
advances  the  hypothesis  that  its  source  is  latent  chemical 
energy,  conceived  as  minute  motion,  liberated  and  released  by 
added  motion.  The  nerve-endings  receive  the  different  vibra- 
tions, by  A\'hich  vibrations  outward  energy  presents  itself,  and 
Mhich  propagate  a  current  or  succession  of  vibrations  of  nerve- 
energ}'  along  the  nerve-fibre.  The  mechanism  by  which  corre- 
spondence is  kept  up  between  the  living  individiial  and  the 
surrounding  universe  may  appear  to  be  simple  ;  but  the  notion 
of  its  simplicity  vanishes  when  we  attempt  to  comprehend  the 
transformation  of  the  vibrations  of  outward  energy  into  vibra- 
tions of  nerve  energy,  and  more  especiall}'  do  we  realise  our 
difficulties  ■\\hen  Ave  attempt  to  give  an  account  of  a  specific 
motion,  of  which  sensation  would  be  the  mental  counterpart. 

The  two  chief  groups  of  stimuli  are  chemical  and 
mechanical.  Hermann  *  believes  that  magnetism  does  not 
act  as  a  nerve-irritant.  Ziehen  advocates,  that  the  non- 
nervoiis  elements  of  the  sense-organ,  which  first  receives  the 
external  stimuhis,  act  like  a  sieve,  arresting  certain  qualities 
of  the  irritating  motions,  and  permitting  certain  other  qualities 
to  pass  on  and  irritate  the  nerve-ends.  In  this  way  the  organs 
of  sense  are  regarded  as  possessing  the  power  of  selection.  In 
the  new-born  brain  only  can  pure  sensations  be  experienced. 
AVitli  every  sulisequent  act  of  mental  stimulation  the  resultant 
action  is  made  up  in  part  of  antecedent  eifects.  In  adults  the 
immense  number  of  acquisitions  and  brain  modifications  render 
it  almost  impossible  to  realise  simple  sensations.  From  an 
analytic  point  of  view,  sensations  are  thought  to  differ  from 
perceptions  only  in  the  extreme  simplicity  of  the  object  or 
content  of  the  former.  Sensation's  function  is  that  of  mere 
acquaintance  with  a  fact.  Pei'ception's  function,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  knowledge  about  a  fact  (James).  Sensations  involve 
*  -'Pfliiger  Archiv.,""  Bd.  43. 


176  SENSATION. 

nerve-currents  coming  in  from  the  periphery.  In  perception 
it  is  thought  that  these  nerve-currents  arouse  associative  or 
reproductive  processes  in  the  cortex.  Perception  would  imply 
the  existence  of  an  efjo  ;  but,  inasmuch  as  the  e<jo  itself  cannot 
furnish  its  own  material,  it  also  would  iiuply  the  objective 
existence  of  sensations  which  must  be  posited  as  physically- 
occasioned  factors.  The  mind  is,  therefore,  essentially  receptive, 
and  depends  upon  the  material  which  it  is  able  to  absorb  and 
hold  within  itself.  Every  subjective  state  is  primarily  the 
result  of  some  mental  material  construed  into  an  objective 
external  reality.  Coupland  regards  the  mind  as  having  no 
creative  power.  "Along  with  laws  of  an  object- world  there  are 
laws  of  the  subject- world,  and  we  can  only  realise,  imagine,  and 
interpret  in  accordance  with  the  fixed  subjective  conditions." 

Modern  psychologists  challenge  the  assumptions  that  the 
relation  of  knowledge  logically  implies  two  terms,  a  knower 
and  a  known,  and  that  the  knower  must  needs  be  distinct  from 
the  known.  The  opponents  of  Mr.  Ward  conceive  conscious- 
ness as  analogous  to  light,  which  in  illuminating  other  objects 
illuminates  itself  also.*  The  greatest  objection  urged  against 
the  theory  that  conceives  consciousness  after  the  analogy  of  the 
eye,  which  sees  other  objects  but  cannot  see  itself,  is  found 
in  the  difficulty  with  regard  to  the  knowledge  of  the  subject. 
Professor  James  attempts  to  get  rid  of  the  difficult}^  by  identi- 
fying the  knower  as  the  passing  state  ;  and  he  finds  that  this 
state,  just  becaiTse  it  knows,  cannot,  also,  be  an  object  of 
knowledge.  Though  the  subject  cannot  know  itself  at  the 
moment  when  it  knows,  it  is  assumed  that  it  can  turn  and 
know  itself  the  moment  after.  The  main  line  of  argument 
adopted  by  those  ■\^dlo  uphold  the  analogy  to  light  is,  that, 
if  the  subject  be  not  directly  experienced  or  felt,  it  is  impossible 
to  understand  how  we  ever  learn  of  its  existence.  Were  we  to 
saj^  that  the  theory  of  life  is  to  be  found  in  the  conception  that 
an  organism  in  vitalising  other  objects  vitalises  itself  also,  we 
should  be  quite  within  bounds ;  but  can  we  deny  the  existence 
of  life  itself  in  the  abstract  merely  because  its  manifestations 
are  the  only  indications  of  its  existence?  We  are  unable  to 
form    any  concejj'.lon   as    to  the  nature    of  life  itself  in   the 

*  Wundt,  "Logik,,"  ii.  502  ff. 


CHARACTERS  OF  SENSATIONS.  177 

abstract,  but  merely  because  we  are  unable  to  do  so  we  do  not 
urge  a  false  theory,  that  because  of  that  inability  there  is  no 
such  thing  as  life  itself.  Similarly  with  consciousness,  the 
mind  in  illuminating  other  objects  may  illuminate  itself  also. 
But,  we  ask,  For  whom,  or  to  what,  does  the  illumination 
occur  ?  So  long  as  we  deal  solely  and  simply  with  mental 
manifestations  we  can  appreciate  the  analogy  ;  but  directly  we 
leave  the  manifestations  and  negative  the  idea  of  anything* 
beyond,  we  deny  the  rights  of  philosophy  to  assume  that  mind 
itself  exists  in  the  abstract,  and  that  we  only  deal  with  its 
manifestations.  Later,  we  shall  see  that  neither  the  present 
phenomena  nor  the  representative  phenomena  of  consciousness 
furnish  us  with  a  true  explanation  of  conscious  experience. 
For  the  present  we  say  of  mind  indestructible,  as  we  said  of 
life  indestructible,  that  merely  because  the  modes  of  its  be- 
haviour are  the  only  factors  with  \^'hich  we  are  competent  to 
deal,  is  no  argiiment  that  there  is  nothing  beyond. 

Characters  of  Sensations. — Intensit;/  or  degree  varies, 
within  certain  limits,  with  the  degree  or  force  of  a  stimulus. 
The  differences  in  intensity  or  degree  of  a  sensation  instruct 
our  minds  as  to  the  nature  and  structure  of  bodies,  the  forces 
exerted  by  them,  their  distance  from  us,  etc.  By  the  applica- 
tion of  a  graduated  series  of  stimuli  to  a  sense-organ,  and  by 
notino^  the  relation  of  successive  increments  to  the  resulting- 
sensation,  it  has  been  possible  to  establish  several  laws.  When  a 
stimulus  reaches  a  certain  intensity  it  results  in  an  appreciable 
sensation.  This  point  of  intensity  represents  the  liminal  intensity^ 
and  the  point  at  which  the  liminal  intensity  occurs  determines 
primordially  the  absolute  sensibility  of  an  organ  or  part  of  an 
organ. 

Whether  the  method  of  conduction  be  mechanical  or 
chemical  we  are  not  in  a  position  to  say.  It  is  sufficient 
for  us  to  know,  for  the  present,  that  the  nervous  system  is 
in  some  way  or  other  essential  to  the  conduction  of  ingoing 
impulses,  and  that  in  some  way  or  other  that  constitution 
determines  the  quality  of  the  sensations. 

In  the  attempt  to  determine  the  intensity  of  a  sensation 
many  difficulties  are  met  with:  (1)  We  can  only  estimate  the 
intensity     subjectively,    and    by    comparison    of    sensations; 

12 


178  SENSATION. 

(2)  we  can  estimate  to  a  certain  extent  various  external 
physical  motions ;  but  (3)  we  cannot  test  tlie  modifications  which 
occur  at  the  peripheral  end-organs  of  sense ;  nor  (4)  can  we 
estimate  the  intensity  or  nature  of  an  impulse  transmitted  or 
propagated  through  the  sensory  nerves  to  the  cerebrum ;  and 
(5)  finally,  we  cannot  estimate  the  nature  of  the  activities 
which  are  immediately  concerned  with  the  actual  production  of 
consciousness.  In  order,  therefore,  to  determine  ■  the  exact 
relationship  between  an  external  stimulus  and  a  sensation  we 
must  first  establish  the  proportional  relations  between  the 
external  impulse  and  its  physiological  modifications  during  the 
transmission  from  the  end-organs  of  sense  to  the  sensorium. 
When  we  speak  of  the  "  magnitude  of  a  stimulus"  we  speak  of 
a  force  which  is  capable  of  external  measurement  only,  and 
we  are  totally  ignorant  of  what  becomes  of  that  force  within 
the  nervous  system  until  it  is  experienced  as  a  sensation.  This 
is  a  gap  which  physiologists  will  have  to  fill  up  before  we 
•can  bring  a  brain  fact  into  apposition  with  a  mental  fact 
for  the  purpose  of  measurement.  From  all  this  the  student 
will  readily  grasp  the  fact  that,  in  measuring  stimuli,  we 
measure  external  or  phj^sical  forces,  and  not  physiological 
forces.  Physiological  psychology  has  sought  to  bring  the 
psychical  fact  within  measurable  distance  of  the  physiological 
fact,  but  in  realit)^  it  has  only  established  a  numerical  or  time 
relationship  between  the  psychic  event  and  an  external  physical 
event,  there  being  an  unknown  physiological  process  as  an 
intermediary  essential  to  their  effective  combination. 

We  have  already  seen  that  an  excitation  must  reach  a 
certain  degree  of  intensity  before  it  can  give  rise  to  a  sensation, 
and  that  this  point  determines  the  lower  limit  of  the  absolute 
sensibility  of  an  organ.  This  absolute  sensibility  varies  consi- 
derably— ex].,  that  of  the  sense  of  smell  in  the  dog  is  greater 
than  that  in  man.  After  the  point  of  liminal  intensitj^  is  passed 
there  is  not  always  a  corresponding  increase  in  the  intensity  of 
the  sensation  when  the  stimulus  is  increased.  No  appreciable 
change  need  be  effected  when  there  is  a  very  slight  increase. 
The  additional  amount  necessary  to  produce  an  appreciable 
difference  in  the  sensation  depends  on  the  absolute  intensity  of 
the  stimulus.     A  very  slight  increment  to   a  small  stimulus, 


WEBER'S  LAAV.  179 

such  as  would  be  sufficient  to  produce  an  increase  of  intensity 
in  the  case  of  a  feeble  sensation,  would,  in  the  case  of  a  power- 
ful one.  produce  no  effect. 

The  law  of  Weber  or  Fechner  is:— In  order  that  the 
iiitensity  of  a  sensation  man  i^i'Ci'sase  in  arithmetical  p7'0(/ressiorv, 
the  stimulus  imtst  increase  in  rieometricnl  proi/ression.  The 
amount  of  the  fraction  representing  the  additional  amount  of 
stimulus  necessary  to  produce  an  increase  of  sensation  deter- 
mines the  discriminative  sensihilif!/.  When  we  reach  a  point 
where  sensation  is  no  longer  capable  of  increase — i.e.,  when 
no  further  augTiientation  is  perceived — that  point  is  termed 
the  "  maximum  of  intensiti/.''  We  shall  better  comprehend 
this  law  with  the  aid  of  a  simple  diagram.'*     E  represents  the 


Fig.  13. 

first  of  a  series  of  intensities  of  excitations.  Up  to  the  point 
10  the  intensity  of  stimulus  is  insufhcient  to  cause  sensation. 
At  point  14  sensation  is  first  experienced  (the  liminal  intensity). 
From  this  point  the  intensity  of  the  sensation  increases  with 
the  intensity  of  the  excitation.  At  a  later  point,  S.  although 
the  excitation  may  continue  to  be  augmented  the  sensation 
does  not  gain  in  intensity  (maximum)  but  remains  constant. 
Ziehen  shows  that  the  sensation  does  not  increase  in  pro- 
portion to  the  stimulus  when  it  has  just  passed  the  point 
of  liminal  intensity.  The  crescendo  of  sensation  will  present 
a  curve  that  rises  at  first  swiftly  and  abruptly",  then  more  and 
more  slowly,  until  it  finally  vanishes  at  the  point  corresponding 
to  the  maximum  of  stimulus,  and  becomes  a  straight  line 
parallel  to  the  axis. 

These  tlu-ee  essential  features  of  the  sentient  life — the  presence 
■of  a  minimum   and  maximum  of  excitation,  and  finally  the  increase 

*  Ziehen,  op.  cit.,  p.  47. 


180  SENSATION. 

of  the  intensity  of  the  sensation  that  takes  place  between  the  minimum 
and  maximum  of  stimulation,  at  first  rapidly,  and  then  gradually  more 
slowly — are,  according  to  Ziehen,  "  exceedingly  fitting."  "  These 
peculiarities  have  been  developed  simply  because  they  are  fitting  in 
the  struggle  for  existence.  Natural  selection  is  just  as  efficient  in 
the  development  of  psycho-physiological  characteristics  as  in  the 
development  of  the  purely  physiological.  The  existence  of  a  minimum 
of  excitation  protects  us  from  an  inundation  of  small  stimuli,  that 
would  flood  the  consciousness  by  their  very  superabundance,  and 
prevent  the  employment  of  the  greater,  more  important  stimuli. 
The  existence  of  a  maximum  limit  of  excitation  prevents  a  super- 
abundance of  too  powerful  stimuli,  and  secures  the  medium  stimuli 
and  their  concomitant  sensations  from  being  overshadowed  and  over- 
looked. Both  the  distracting  preponderance  of  many  insignificant 
stimuli,  and  the  partiality  and  tyranny  of  one  or  a  few  too  potent  stimuli, 
are  avoided  by  this  restriction  of  the  sentient  life  to  a  range  lying 
between  a  maximum  and  minimum  of  stimulation." 

The  first  abrupt  ascent  in  the  curve  of  sensation  is  also  regarded  as 
an  indication  that  the  sensation  is  generally  fitting.  In  consequence  of 
this  peculiarity,  the  same  author  observes — (1)  we  are  very  sensitive  to 
those  small  stimuli  that  are  just  sufficient  to  produce  sensation,  in  fact, 
we  are  very  liable  to  overestimate  them ;  (2)  we  estimate  the  medium 
stimuli  very  accurately,  since  here  the  curve  approaches  a  straight  line  : 
and  (3)  we  begin  to  lose  the  ability  to  distinguish  the  difference  in  the 
intensity  of  only  those  stimuli  that  approach  the  maximum  limit. 

Fecliner  tried  to  give  a  psycho-iohysical  interpretation  of  tlie 
law  of  Weber.  Many  others  have  tried  to  give  a  physiolocjical 
interpretation,  but  the  modifications  which  the  excitation  must 
tindergo  in  its  propagation  render  an  exact  knowledge  im- 
possible. Wundt  gives  a  third  interpretation,  the  j^sycholor/iccd. 
He  believes  that  every  mental  condition  is  measured  in  relation 
to  some  other  hj  "  apperception  " — i.e.,  we  become  aware  of  a 
definite  difference  only  when  the  increase  of  one  sensation  has 
reached  a  certain  constant  fractional  part  of  another  sensation 
that  either  preceded  or  accompanied  it.  This  "  apperception  " 
faculty  has  met  with  severe  criticism  and  is  negatived  by  most 
observers. 

We  have  seen  that  Weber's  law  only  holds  good  in  so  far  as 
stimuli  of  medium  strength  are  concerned.  As  we  approach 
the  points  of  liminal  or  maximum  intensity  considerable  devia- 
tions from  it  occur.  It  is  now  more  commonly  held,  that  the 
sensation  increases  much  more  slowly  than  the  stimulus,  and 


AVEBEK'S  LAW.  181 

that  an  increase  of  stimulns  sufficient  to  impart  a  barely  per- 
ceptible increment  of  sensation  generally  stands  in  an  approxi- 
mately constant  relation  to  the  original  magnitude  of  the 
stinnilns.* 

The  relation  between  the  sensation  and  the  stimulus  is  of 
importance,  inasmuch  as  it  allows  us  to  apply  something  of 
exact  measurement  to  mental  magnitudes.  The  ph3'siological 
interpretation  involved  in  the  law  of  Weber  will,  however, 
remain  as  a  useful  criterion,  because  the  relation  of  external 
to  internal  stimulus,  such  as  that  expressed  b}'  the  law,  is  as 
yet  only  a  matter  of  hj'pothesis  based  on  the  principle  of 
psycho-physical  parallelism,  and  can  by  no  means  be  proven,  f 
The  estimate  of  magnitude  is,  therefore,  made  by  comparison : 
but.  it  must  be  remembered  that,  our  sensations  only  furnish 
ITS  with  measures  of  relative  magnitudes — i.e.,  we  are  unable 
to  measure  absolute  mental  magnitudes.  This  statement 
holds  good  in  every  case ;  we  can  only  measure  relatively 
by  the  comparison  of  magnitudes.  Wundt  regards  the  law  of 
the  logarithmic  relation  of  sensation  to  stimulus  as  a  mathe- 
matical expression  for  a  psychological  process  of  universal 
validity.  This  application  of  the  relativity  of  sensations  to  the 
law  of  Weber  has  led  Wundt  to  conclude  that,  in  order  that  a 
more  intensive  sensation-magnitude  may  increase  by  as  much 
as  a  lesser  sensation,  the  sensation-increase  must  be  corre- 
spondingly greater ;  and  two  sensation-increases  which  lie  at 
different  parts  of  the  sensation-scale  A\ill  be  ecpially  noticeable 
when  they  stand  in  equal  relations  to  the  stimulation-intensities 
to  which  they  are  added. :|: 

The  student  Mill  now  comprehend  that,  whether  a  mathe- 
matical formula  can  be  successfully  applied  or  not.  ^^'e  cannot 
eliminate  from  our  calculations  the  relation  of  one  sensation  to 
other  sensations.  Psychologically,  there  is  no  series  of  abso- 
lutely independent  sensations,  but  every  sensation  is  determined 
by  its  relation  to  the  one  experienced  immediately  before  it  or 

*  The  law  of  Weber  only  holds  good  when  attention  is  given  to  one 
sensation  of  a  similar  series,  to  the  exclusion  of  all  other  sensations. 

+  Wiindt,  "  Human  and  Animal  Psychologj'."  p.  61. 

J  It  is  assumed  that  the  "  attention  "  remains  a  constant  quantity.  The 
magnitude  of  a  sensation  also  depends  upon  the  amount  of  attention  bestowed 
upon  it. 


182  SENSATION. 

at  the  same  time.*  The  la/w  of  relativity  is  that,  from  the 
moment  of  its  first  coming  into  being,  the  existence  and 
properties  of  a  sensation  are  determined  by  its  relation  to  other 
sensations,  j 

duality  of  Sensations. — When  we  speak  of  the  "generic" 
quality  of  a  sensation,  we  nse  the  term  in  its  broad  sense  to 
indicate  a  wide  difference  of  origin  (in  an  orchestra  a  com- 
bination of  wood-winds,  brass,  or  strings  would  indicate  a 
generic  quality) ;  ■\^'hen  we  wish  to  signify  special  qualities  or 
finer  differences  (e.g.,  modulations  of  tone  in  orchestra),  we  use 
the  term  specific  quality.  In  the  study  of  the  qualitj''  of  sensa- 
tions we  have  to  ask  ourselves,  (1)  where  does  the  specific 
excitation  give  rise  to  sensation,  and  what  is  the  nature  of  the 
internal  physiological  stimulus  ?  We  have  already  said  that 
we  are  quite  unable  to  answer  this  question.  (2)  What  kinds 
of  sensations  result  from  the  various  excitations  ? 

The  theory  of  qualitoMve  selection  of  stimuli  by  the  end- 
organs  of  sense  has  received  favour  at  the  hands  of  most 
observers.  The  various  sensorj^  nerves  are  assumed  to  possess 
a  specific  energy  that  responds  only  to  specific  modes  of  stimu- 
lation— e.g.,  the  optic  nerves  are  onl}^  sensitive  to  chemical 
stimuli  produced  hj  the  vibration  of  ether,  and  the  auditory 
nerves  onh''  to  acoustic  stimuli.  We  are  not  in  a  position  to 
support  or  to  negative  this  theory.  We  know  that  mechanical 
stimulation  of  the  retina  in  the  dark  will  produce  sparks  of  light, 
but  no  amount  of  difference  in  the  form  of  stimulation  will  pro- 
duce an5^thing  else  than  the  sensation  of  light.  Ziehen  believes 
that  the  adaptation  of  nervous  elements  to  inadequate  stimuli  is 
accomplished  chieflj^  in  the  nervous  centre.  He  also  believes 
that  to  deny  the  validity  of  the  theory,  as  thus  understood, 
A\'0uld  be  to  contradict  all  the  fundamental  principles  of  evolu- 
tion, which  assert  that  ever}^  function  determines  the  character 
of  its  organ,  or,  in  a  certain  sense,  trains  its  organ  for  its  own 
use.     He  therefoi-e  rejects  Wundt's  assumption  that,  all  paths 

*  Hoffcling,  "  Outlines  of  Psychology,"  p.  112. 

t  See  Wundt,  "  Animal  Psychology  "  ;  and  for  its  several  applications, 
"  Psych ologj',"  Ency.  Brit. ;  Weber,  "Tastsinnund  Gemeingefiihl";  Wagner's 
"Physiol.  Handworterbuch,"  iii.  2,  p.  544;  Fechner  "  Elemente  der  Psycho- 
physik,"  i.,  p.  174  ;    Schneider,  "  Vierteljahrsschr.  fiir  Wissensch.  Philos., 
ii.,  p.  411. 


QUALITY  OF  SENSATIONS.  183 

and  centres  are  functionally  indifferent,  and  that  the  processes 
generated  in  the  central  cells  are  only  different  because  the 
stimuli  are  different,  and  because  the  irritation  is  transmitted 
to  the  nerve-paths  in  all  its  native  individuality.  That  the 
constitution  of  the  nervous  system  is  an  essential  factor  in 
determining  the  quality  of  sensation  we  can  readily  believe ; 
but  we  do  not  in  the  least  know  where  or  how  that  quality 
is  determined. 

The  duration  of  all  sensations  bears  some  relation  to  the 
process  of  nervous  stimulation.  The  correspondence  is  not 
always  exact.  There  may  be  a  lingering  effect  which  is  termed 
"  after-sensation."  In  sensations  of  sight  we  witness  such  effects 
as  occasional  phenomena  known  as  positive  after-images. 

In  addition  to  the  intensity,  quality,  and  duration  of 
sensations  we  must  take  account  of  the  tone  of  feeling  that 
accompanies  every  sensation.  This,  however,  will  occupy  our 
attention  later. 

A  review  of  the  facts  in  connection  with  the  measurement 
of  sensations  leads  us  to  conclude,  that  (1)  statements  in  proof 
of  the  principle  of  Weber's  law  are  only  approximately  correct ; 
(2)  from  the  fact  that  numerous  other  factors  almost  constantly 
mix  Mith  or  intervene  between  the  quantitative  amounts  of 
stimuli  and  their  sensations,  stimuli  and  sensations  are  not 
connected  quantitativel}'  in  such  a  simple  manner  that  ^^■e  can 
measure  one  off  in  terms  of  the  other ;  (3)  the  psycho-phj'sical 
explanation  of  Weber's  law,  as  given  by  Fechner,  is  so  obscure 
and  speculative  that  it  scarcely  merits  attention ;  (4)  the 
psychological  explanation  alone  can  account  for  the  facts  within 
consciousness  ;  (5)  the  various  laws  about  the  cjuantitative  and 
qualitative  relations  between  stimuli  and  sensations  must  of 
necessity  be  with  reference  to  external  physical  and  internal 
psychical  facts,  the  intermediary  physiological  problem  being 
as  yet  unsolved. 

Local  Characters  of  Sensation. — We  may  arrange  the 
senses  in  the  following  ascending  order  according  to  their 
degree  of  refinement,  viz.,  taste,  smell,  touch,  hearing,  sight. 

The  senses  of  taste  and  smell  are  (1)  somewhat  similar  to 
the  organic  sensations,  inasmuch  as  there  is  in  them  a  want  of 
refinement  and  definiteness.     (2)  They  are  of  little  use  as  know- 


184  SENSATION. 

ledge-giving  senses.  (3)  They  do  not  aid  iis  in  localisation 
in  space.  (4)  Only  under  special  circnmstances  do  they  give 
exact  knowledge  abont  objects  (e.g.,  in  wine  tasters,  etc.). 
(5)  The  two  senses  are  easily  confused  together.  (6)  Owing  to 
the  persistence  of  these  sensations  \\e  cannot  discriminate  two 
odours  and  two  tastes  in  rapid  succession.  (7)  Their  function 
is  to  discriminate  what  is  "\^'holesonie  or  un\^'holesome  to  the 
organism.  (8)  Their  sensations  are  caused  by  chemical  stimuli- 
(9)  There  is  with  them  a  predominance  of  feeling  of  pleasure 
or  pain. 

Sensations  of  Taste. — The  terminations  of  the  gustatory 
nerves  are  thought  to  be  only  sensitive  to  chemical  stimulation, 
and  it  is  believed  that  the  sour  taste  produced  by  an  electric 
current  is  caused  by  the  products  of  electrolysis.  The  experi- 
ments of  Bois-Reymond  and  Eosenthal.  however,  seem  to 
demonstrate  that  sensations  of  taste  may  be  due  to  electrical 
stimulation.  Usualty,  four  classes  of  tastes  are  distinguished — 
sour,  sweet,  salt,  and  bitter.  To  these  Wundt*  adds  alkaline 
and  metallic.  The  sensations  of  taste  depend  upon  several 
other  factors,  such  as  smell,  touch,  common  feeling,  and 
muscular  sense.  The  intensity  of  taste  depends  upon  (1)  the 
extent  of  surface  excited;  (2)  the  amount  of  mechanical  influence 
exerted  hj  movements  in  the  mouth ;  (3)  the  ternjjcrature  also 
exerts  an  important  influence.  Substances  too  hot  or  too  cold 
have  diminished  intensities  of  tastes.  Weber  demonstrated 
that  if  the  tongue  is  held  for  half  to  one  minute  in  very  cold 
water,  or  in  water  of  about  125°  Fahr.,  the  sweet  taste  of  sugar 
can  no  longer  be  perceived.  Whether  specific  sensations  of 
taste  can  be  excited  by  mechanical  or  other  means  is  doubtful. 
Hitherto  the  attempt  to  apply  Weber's  law  to  the  sense  of  taste 
has  proved  a  failure,  because  so  man}-  other  elements  enter  into 
the  calculations. 

Kiesowf  found  that,  besides  the  whole  surface  of  the  tongue, 
together  with  its  base  and  the  under  surface  of  its  tip — the 
hard  and  soft  palate,  the  arcus  glosso-palatinus,  the  tonsils,  the 
uvula,  the  isthmus  faucium,  the  inside  of  the  epiglottis,  and  the 
mucous  membrane    of  the  cheeks  participate   in  the  sense   of 

*  "  Physiol.  Psychologie,"  i.,  p.  382. 

t  "  Philosophische  Studien,"  Bd.  x.,  Heft.  3,  pp.  329  ff. ;  Heft.  4,  pp.  523  ff. 


SMELL  AND  TOUCH.  185 

taste.  Michelson  and  Langenclorff  *  tested  the  sensitiveness  of 
the  inner  epiglottis  ;  Avhilst  Urbantschitsch  tested  the  mucoiTS 
membrane  of  the  cheeks  in  childhood.  Kiesow  found  that  all 
the  parts  before  mentioned  are  sensitive  in  childhood;  in  adults, 
however,  the  mucous  membrane  of  the  cheeks,  the  middle  of 
the  tongue,  and,  with  a  few  exceptions,  the  hard  palate  lose 
their  sensitiveness.  In  some  cases  the  under  surface  of  the  tip 
of  the  tongue  on  both  sides  of  the  frenulum  remains  receptive 
also  in  adults,  f 

Sensations  of  Smell. — These  sensations  are  supposed  to 
be  caused  by  minute  particles  contained  in  odorous  gases  or 
vapours.  Whether  mechanical,  electrical,  thermic,  or  other 
conditions  also  excite  the  sensation  of  smell  is  doubtful.  If 
the  membrane  of  the  regio  olfactoria  is  soaked  with  fluid,  the 
sense  of  smell  is  lost  for  a  time.  A  scientific  classification  of 
the  kinds  of  smells  is  almost  impossible.  Just  as  with  the  sense 
of  taste,  other  factors  co-operate  with  the  simple  qualities  and 
render  a  differentiation  extremely  difficult.  The  validity  of 
Weber's  laAv  has  not  been  tested  hj  the  sensations  of  smell. 

Sensations  of  Touch. — The  sensations  of  touch  provide 
us  with  much  more  knowledge  of  space  than  those  of  taste 
or  smell,  and  it  is  through  this  sense  that  we  ascertain,  to  a 
large  extent,  the  properties  of  bodies.  The  sense  of  touch  is 
finer  in  the  mobile  parts  of  the  body  than  in  the  fixed.  The 
discriminative  ability  of  the  various  parts  of  the  body  varies 
considerably;  and,  according  to  Wundt,^  the  variations  in  dis- 
criminative sensibility  at  different  parts  of  the  same  sense- 
organ  do  not  run  parallel  to  variations  in  absolute  sensibility. 
Krohn  and  Bolton  §  performed  a  series  of  exj)eriments  to  determine 

*  "  Centralblatt  fiir  Physiol.,"'  1S92,  p.  204. 

t  The  great  influence  in  the  region  of  taste  Kiesow  ascribes  to  associa- 
tion and  the  effects  of  contrast.  The  total  results  of  his  investigations  upon 
the  conditions  of  contrast  were  that — (1)  contrasting  stimuli  must  be  recog- 
nised in  the  sense  of  taste ;  (2)  salt  contrasts  with  sweet,  salt  with  sour, 
sweet  with  sour ;  (3)  salt  and  sw^et,  and  salt  and  sour,  contrast  both  on 
simultaneous  stimulation  of  corresponding  parts  of  the  tongue,  and  on 
successive  stimulation  of  the  same  taste-surface.  The  contrasts  of  sweet 
and  sour  could  only  be  observed  in  the  latter  case.  (4)  Bitter  forms  an 
exception,  but  yet  perhaps  gives  rise  to  contrasts  restricted  to  individuals. 

X  "  Physiol.  Psychologie,''  i.,  cap.  8,  §  2,  p.  .S42. 

§  "Jour.  Nerv.  and  Ment.  Disease,"  March,  lb93. 


186  SENSATION. 

the  relative  sensitiveness  of  different  portions  of  the  skin,  to  find  the 
nature  and  direction  of  the  errors  of  localisation,  and  to  study  the 
influence  of  attention  upon  the  localisation  and  interpretation  of  the 
simultaneous  touch  stimulations.  It  was  shown — (1)  that  the  skin  over 
the  joints  is  more  sensitive  than  elsewhere,  permitting  greater  accuracy 
of  localisation ;  (2)  that  touches  on  the  back  are  more  distinctly  felt, 
more  clearly  remembered,  and  therefore  better  localised  than  touches 
on  the  front  of  the  body ;  (3)  that  on  the  left  side  touches  are  not  so 
well  localised  as  on  the  right  side ;  (4)  that  localisations  are  more 
correct  when  the  touches  occur  at  points  removed  from  the  median 
line — touches  on  the  median  line  being  very  poorly  located;  (5)  that 
exposed  surfaces  localise  better  than  portions  usually  covered  with 
clothing ;  (6)  that  piliferous  parts  are  more  sensitive ;  (7)  that  errors 
in  localisation  follow  certain  fixed  rules  ;  (8)  that  the  influence  of  atten- 
tion is  very  marked :  (9)  that  the  effect  of  practice  is  plainly  shown ; 
(10)  that  two  pressure-stimulations  are  often  fused  into  one  single 
sensation,  localised  at  a  point  removed  from  either  of  those  at  which 
the  stimulations  were  received ;  (11)  that  there  is  a  strong  tendency  to 
perceive  dermal  sensations  of  purely  subjective  origin  ;  (12)  that  bilateral 
asymmetry  of  function  is  plainly  evident  in  dermal  sensations. 

Sensations  of  toucli  involve,  to  a  certain  extent,  the  presence 
of  muscular  sensations,  and  this  additional  factor  renders  the 
results  of  experiment  some\A'hat  untrustworthy^.  That  tactual 
sensations  and  sensations  of  muscular  innervation  do  not  agree 
with  the  law  of  Weber,  near  the  lower  limits  of  perceptible 
intensit)^,  is  generally  admitted.  Weber  found  that  a  present 
sensation  could  be  compared  with  the  mnemonic  image  of  one 
recently  experienced,  with  greater  facility  than  two  present 
sensations  could  be  compared.  A  stronger  sensation  of  pressure 
is  experienced  when  the  weight  is  laid  on  the  left  than  when 
it  is  laid  on  the  corresponding  part  of  the  right  side.  The 
sensations  of  tovich  are  held  to  include  not  only  sensations  of 
contact  or  pressure,  but  also  those  of  temperature.  Cold  and 
heat  are  sometimes  regarded  not  as  direct  caloric  stimuli,  but 
only  as  indirect  stimuli  by  warming  and  cooling  the  skin 
beyond  its  "physiological  zero-point."*  Weber's  law  seems 
to  have  little  or  no  application  to  temperature-sensations.  The 
only  c|ualitative  law  for  sensations  of  temperature  is,  that  the 
skin  is  most  sensitive  to  changes  which  lie  near  its  own  zero- 
point.     Goldschneidert  investigated    the  temperature-sense  of 

*  Zero-point  is  supposed  to  be  18-71°  C.  or  65'66°  Fahr. 
t  "  Archiv.  f.  Anat.  u.    Physiol.,   Physiolog.  Abth.,"   18S5,   Supplement 
Band.,  pp.  60  ff. 


TOUCH.  187 

the  body,  and  found  that  the  sense  of  cold  is  Httle  appreciated 
by  the  skin  of  the  head,  and  the  sense  of  heat  only  in  a  few 
places.  The  sensitiveness  of  the  forehead  to  cold  is  intense, 
but  to  heat  only  moderate  ;  that  of  the  breast  to  cold  moderate 
along  the  sternum,  and  elsewhere  very  intense,  while  to  heat 
it  is  onl}'  moderate,  except  near  the  nipples ;  that  of  the  back, 
everywhere  very  intense  to  cold,  and  only  moderate  to  heat; 
while  in  parts  of  the  hand  the  intensity  of  sensitiveness  to  both 
cold  and  heat  is  alike.  In  general,  the  skin  in  the  median  line 
of  the  body  seems  much  less  sensitive  to  changes  in  tem- 
perature than  at  its  sides ;  and  the  number  of  thermic 
elements,  the  thickness  of  the  skin,  etc.,  are  determining- 
factors.* 

Let  us  now  inquire  what  histology  has  taught  us  as  to  the 
specific  functions  of  the  so-called  tactile  corpuscles  or  end-buH^s. 
Merkelf  has  given  an  accoiint  of  the  different  kinds  of  ter- 
minal corpuscles.  To  enter  into  a  description  of  these  varieties, 
however,  is  beyond  our  scope;  so  we  will  ask  the  question 
briefly,  Can  the  corpuscles  of  Pacini  or  Vater,  the  end-bulbs 
of  Krause,  the  corpuscles  of  Wagner  or  Meissner,  or  the 
intricate  plexus  of  non-medullated  nerve-fibres  of  modern  his- 
tology, be  proved  to  possess  specific  functions  for  sensations  of 
pressure  or  temperature  ?  Ladd  answers  this  question  with 
the  statement,  that  nothing  is  kno^^'n  on  this  point  beyond  the 
fact  that  the  skin,  within  ^vhich  the  sensory  fibres  terminate 
externall}^  either  in  free  ends  or  in  special  tactile  corpuscles, 
is  the  organ  fjr  all  the  varieties  of  sensation  brought  under 
the  most  general  meaning  of  the  word  touch. 

Whether  the  sensory  impression  is  received  by  the  end- 
bulb,  or  by  the  peripheral  process  between  the  elements  of  the 
integumental  and  other  structures,  or  not,  must  be  decided  by 
physiologists.  Schiifer  believes,  that  the  sensory  impression  is 
not  received  by  the  body  of  the  sensory  cell,  but  by  a  peripheral 
process,  which,  passing  either  to  a  special  end-organ,  such  as  a 
tactile  corpuscle  or  end-bulb,  or  insinuating  itself  between  the 
elements  of  the  integumental  and  other  structures,  receives  the 

*  Ladd,  "Phys.  Psych.,"  p.  370. 

t  "  Ueber  die  Endigungen  der  Sensiblen  Nerven  in  der  Haut  der  Wirbel- 
thiere."    Rostok,  1880. 


188  SENSATION. 

impressions  which  cause  nerve-inipnlses,  and  transmits  those 
impulses  upwards  towards  the  nerve-centres.  It  is  not  only 
the  case  with  those  sensations  which  are  received  through  the 
surface  of  the  skin  or  by  the  action  of  the  muscles,  that  sensory 
impressions  are  in  the  first  instance  communicated  to  processes 
of  nerve-cells ;  but  the  same  is  true  for  the  auditory  and  for 
the  gustatory  organ,  the  nerve  terminations  in  which  do  not, 
as  was  at  one  time  supposed,  emerge  from  the  receptive  hair- 
cells,  but  really  originate  from  bi-polar  or  uni-polar  cells 
which  are  placed  somewhere  in  the  course  of  the  sensorj^ 
nerve,  and  which  resemble  the  cells  found  upon  the  spinal 
ganglia  in  sending  a  peripheral  process  to  penetrate  between 
the  (somewhat  modified)  cells  of  the  epithelium,  and  a 
central  process  to  penetrate  the  grey  matter  of  the  nerve- 
centres. 

In  the  sensory  nerve-trunks  a  distinction  has  been  made 
between  fibres  which  have  to  do  with  painful  impressions,  and 
fibres  which  have  to  do  with  ordinary  tactile  impressions,  the 
latter,  or  tactile  group,  only  having  to  do  with  the  sensations  of 
pressure  and  temperature.  It  has  also  been  thought  probable 
that  the  sensorj^  and  tactile  nerves  have  special  perceptive 
centres  in  the  brain.  In  support  of  this  view  we  have  the 
following  facts : — (1)  Sensory  and  tactile  impressions  cannot 
be  discharged  at  the  same  time  from  all  the  parts  which  are 
endowed  with  special  sensibility.  Tactile  sensations,  including 
pressure  and  temperature,  are  only  discharged  from  the  cover- 
ings of  the  skin,  the  mouth,  the  entrance  to  and  the  floor  of 
the  nose,  the  pharynx,  the  lower  end  of  the  rectum  and  genito- 
urinary orifices ;  feeble  and  indistinct  sensations  of  tempera- 
ture are  felt  in  the  oesophagus.  Tactile  sensations  are  absent 
from  all  internal  viscera,  as  has  been  proved  in  man  in  cases  of 
gastric,  intestinal,  and  urinary  fistulge.  Pain  alone  can  be  dis- 
charged from  these  organs.  (2)  The  conduction  channels  of  the 
tactile  and  sensory  nerves  lie  in  different  parts  of  the  spinal 
cord,  which  renders  probable  the  assumption  that  their  central 
and  peripheral  ends  also  are  different.  (3)  Very  probably  the 
reflex  acts  discharged  by  both  kinds  of  nerve-fibres — the  tactile 
and  the  pathic — are  controlled,  or  even  inhibited,  by  special 
central  nerve-organs.     (4)  Under  pathological  conditions,  and 


PRESSURE   SPOTS.  189 

under  the  action  of  narcotics,  the  one  sensation  may  be  sup- 
pressed while  the  other  is  retained.* 

It  has  been  found  impossible  to  classify  the  various  sensations 
of  ijressure.  The  pressure  sense  is  supposed  to  be  connected 
with  a  specific  end-apparatus,  arranged  in  a  punctated  manner. 
These  points  are  known  as  ''pressure  Sjjofs,"  and  possess  varying 
degrees  of  sensibility.  There  are  supposed  to  be  separate  spots 
for  heat.  cold,  and  touch,  and  it  is  thought  that  each  nerve-fibre 
transmits  but  one  sensation.  In  the  back  and  thigh  these  spots 
are  marked  by  a  distinct  after-sensation.  The  pressure-sj)ots 
are,  as  a  rule,  denser  than  the  hot  and  cold  spots,  and  usually 
have  another  direction.  They  vary  considerably  according  to 
the  locality.  Kammler  and  Aubert  found  the  greatest  acuteness 
of  sensibility  on  the  forehead,  temples,  and  back  of  the  hand. 
Eulenburg  gave  the  following  order  of  acuteness :  forehead, 
lips,  dorsum  of  cheeks,  temples,  etc.  The  pressure-spots  are 
arranged  in  chains  which  radiate  from  a  central  point,  and  run 
in  such  directions  as  to  form  either  circular,  longitudinal,  or 
pyramidal  figures,  f  These  pressure-spots  themselves  vary  in 
sensitiveness.  The  sensation  of  after-pressure  is  sometimes 
very  marked,   and  is  liable  to  cause  illusory  phenomena. 

The  temperature  sense  also  possesses  a  similar  arrangement 
of  spots,  known  as  temperature-spots.  These  spots  are  insensi- 
tive to  pressure  and  pain.  They  are  arranged  in  a  linear  series, 
usually  slightly  curved,  and  radiate  from  certain  points  of  the 
skin,  generally  the  hair-roots.  The  chain  of  cold-spots  does  not 
coincide  with  the  hot-spots.  Sometimes  spots  for  other  qualities 
of  sensation  are  mixed  with  them  at  scattered  points.  Tem- 
perature-spots are  always  more  abundant  near  the  hairs,  and 
sometimes  only  near  them.  Cold-spots  are  more  abundant 
than  hot.  Sensibility  for  cold  is  more  responsive  and  more 
intense  than  for  warmth ;  that  of  the  left  hand  greater  than 
the  right. 

Common  Sensation. — Sensations  of  pain,  hunger,  thirst, 
fatigue,  vertigo,  well-being,  illness,  and  the  innuinerable  variety 
of  sensations  we  experience  may  occur  wherever  sensory  nerves 
receive  an  unusual  amount  of  stimulation.  No  matter  in  what  part 

*  Landois  and  Stirling,  "  Physiologj',"  p.  831. 
t  Ladd,  "  Phys.  Psych.,"  p.  346. 


190  SENSATION. 

of  the  nen'e's  course  the  stinmlation  is  effected,  the  pain  is  referred 
to  its  peripheral  termination.  Tliis  is  the  law  of  the  'periiDheral 
reference  of  sensations.  Pain  is  seldom  strictly  uniform  or  con- 
tinuous; it  is  liable  to  irradiation,  or  exacerbations  in  intensity. 
With  increase  of  nerve-excitability  there  is  apt  to  be  increased 
intensity  of  pain,  and  some  nerves  are  more  excitable  than 
others.  Our  knowledge  of  the  ingoing  channels  of  conduction 
of  pain  to  the  brain  is  deficient.  It  is  generally  supposed  that 
touch,  pressure,  and  temperature  impressions  travel  by  the 
posterior  columns,  or  perhaps  in  the  lateral  sensory  tracts,  or 
elsewhere.  Pain  impressions  are  thought  by  Bechterew  to  pass 
upwards  through  the  lateral  sensory  tracts.  After  passing- 
through  portions  of  the  posterior  columns,  thej^  are  supposed 
principally  to  traverse  the  grey  matter  of  the  cord.  All  that 
'^ve  do  know  is,  that  disease  or  damage  of  the  posterior  columns, 
as  well  as  of  the  grey  matter,  often  causes  delay  in  the  trans- 
mission of  such  impressions. 

Muscular  Sense.  —  The  much-vexed  question  of  the 
relation  of  the  muscular  sense  to  mental  states  has  occupied 
the  attention  of  nearly  every  neurologist  and  josychologist  for 
many  j^ears.  The  muscular  sense  is  defined  as  "the  sum  of 
simple  mental  states  or  sensations  Avhich  immediately  accom- 
pany the  action  of  the  muscles  ; "  and,  inasmuch  as  the  muscular 
sensations  are  due,  not  to  the  action  of  external  objects  like  sense- 
impressions,  but  to  our  own  actions,  they  are  regarded  as  essen- 
tially active  states,  and  so  stand  in  antithesis  to  the  sensations  of 
the  five  senses  which  are  passive.  They  have  been  described  as 
feelings  of  "  effort,'"'  "  exertion,"  "  energy,"  "  innervation,"  etc. 
Some  say  the  sensations  arise  in  connection  with  the  process  of 
"  innervation" — i.e.,  that  they  are  due  to  the  feeling  of  energy 
imparted  through  the  efferent  nerves.  Others  say,  that  the 
condition  is  due  entirely  to  sensations  arising  in  the  ordinary 
way  and  conveyed  through  the  afferent  sensory  channels. 
Others,  again,  maintain,  that  probably  there  is  a  process  both 
of  motor  innervation  and  of  sensory  stimulation  involved,  and 
that  the  degree  of  innervation  determines  the  intensity  of  the 
sensation  of  effort.  The  muscular  sense  is  supposed  to  stand 
midway  between  special  and  common  sensations,  and  by  it  we 
obtain  a  knowledge  of  the  condition  of  our  muscles,  and  to 


MUSCULAR  SENSE.  191 

what  extent  tliey  are  contracted ;  also  the  position  of  the 
various  parts  of  our  bodies  and  the  resistance  offered  by  ex- 
ternal objects.  On  the  sensations  which  are  convej^ed  to  the 
sensorium  by  the  muscular  sense  we  form  judgments  as  to 
the  spatial  qualities  of  objects,  and  in  this  respect  our  muscular 
sense  is  intimately  related  to,  and  often  combined  with,  the 
exercise  of  the  senses  of  touch  and  sight.  Muscular  sensibility 
is  apparently  absent  in  the  heart  and  all  non-striped  muscle ; 
whilst  many  muscles — e.;/.,  those  of  respiration — only  possess  it 
in  a  slight  degree.  The  sensibility  of  the  joints,  bones,  fascise, 
serves  to  inform  us  about  our  "posi^io?i,"  and  this  is  further 
aided  by  sensations  of  touch.  Sensations  of  motion  have  been 
distinguished  as  active  and  passive,  according  to  A^-hether  we 
move  ourselves  or  are  moved  by  others.  Goldschneider's 
investigations  have  made  it  probable,  that  the  sensation  of 
passive  motion  depends  less  upon  the  successive  sensations 
imparted  by  different  positions  of  the  limb  at  rest,  than  upon 
sensations  of  pressure  or  friction  in  the  joints  directly  imparted 
by  the  motion  itself.  Some  authors  conclude  that  the  sensi- 
iDility  of  the  joints  is  almost  the  only  essential  factor  in  the 
production  of  sensations  of  motion.  The  combination  of 
sensations  of  motion  with  sensations  of  touch  received  from 
the  same  object  is  of  special  importance.  The  succession  of 
combined  sensations  of  touch  and  motion  is  designated  as 
sensation  of  active  touch.  A  distinction  has  also  been  made 
between  active  and  passive  touch,  by  the  precedence  of  motor 
ideas  in  the  former. 

In  the  following  chapter  we  shall  discuss  the  "perceptions 
of  space,"  and  later  still  we  shall  take  account  of  the  vicAv  of 
Bastian  that  "  kingesthetic  impressions,  and  especially  those  of 
which  we  are  least  conscious,  are  the  last  to  be  reviewed  iii  the 
cerebral  cortex,  anterior  to,  and  as  actual  last  links  in,  the 
chain  of  cerebral  processes  concerned  with  and  previous  to 
the  excitation  of  the  motor-centres  themselves." 

Sensations  of  Hearing. — The  sense  of  hearing  possesses 
little  localising  power,  and  gives  us  little  knowledge  of  the 
position  of  bodies  in  space,  or  of  their  figure  and  magnitude. 
Possibly  the  concha  sharpens  our  hearing  very  slightly  by 
reflecting  vibrations.      The    external   ear  in  man   may  be   of 


192  SENSATION. 

slight  service  in  localising  the  direction  of  sound.  Acoustic 
molecular  motions  are  modified  and  transmitted  by  means  of 
the  tympanum  to  the  elements  of  the  inner  ear.  In  the  laby- 
rinth the  acoustic  waves  become  transformed  into  nerve- 
commotion  b}^  the  special  end-apparatus  of  hearing. 

How  the  auditory  hairs  and  stones  and  cells  of  the 
vestibule  and  ampuUge,  the  rods  of  Corti,  the  fibres  of  the 
basilar  membrane,  and  the  conical  hair-cells  of  Deiters,  in  the 
cochlea  perform  their  required  functions  of  analysis  of  acoustic 
oscillations,  is  beyond  our  scope  to  incjuire.  The  sensory 
impressions  are  supposed  to  be  communicated  in  the  first 
instance  to  the  processes  of  the  auditory  nerve-cells,  and  not 
directly  to  the  cells  themselves  as  in  the  case  of  the  olfactorj^ 
cells  and  the  rod-and-cone  cells  of  the  retina.  In  this  respect 
the  peripheral  reception  of  their  impressions  is  supposed  to 
resemble  those  of  the  tactile  and  gustatory  organs.  From  the 
differences  in  the  mode  of  reception  of  impressions  in  the 
various  sense  organs — -viz.,  that  the  sensations  received  through 
the  skin  and  from  the  auditory  and  gustatory  organs  are  taken 
up  by  the  terminal  branchings  of  neurons,  and  that  the  sensa- 
tions of  light  and  of  smell  are  taken  up  by  the  bodies  of 
nerve-cells  themselves — one  is  tempted,  says  Schafer,  to 
generalise  from  this  to  the  effect  that  there  is  some  essential 
difference  between  the  two' kinds  of  receptive  organ  correlated 
with  differences  of  function  or  of  excitation.  From  the  obser- 
vations of  Lenhossek*  and  Eetzius,t  upon  the  sensory  cells  of 
the  earth-worm,  such  a  generalisation  is  proved  to  be  invalid.:!: 
When  we  enter  upon  the  question  of  the  psycho-physics  of  the 
auditory  sense  we  fi.nd  a  great  wealth  of  material  at  our  dis- 
posal. We  are  obliged,  however,  here,  as  elsewhere,  to  confine 
ourselves  in  the  main  to  the  consideration  of  the  relation 
between  the  vibratory  energ}^  of  the  air  and  certain  states  of 
consciousness,  without  attempting  to  explain  the  many  inter- 
mediary links. 

The  external  vibratory  stimuli  which  determine  the  subjec- 
tive mental  state,  "  sound,"  have  been  more  or  less  accurately 

*  "Arch,  fiir  Mikr.  Anatomie,"  1892,  Bel.  xxxix. 

t  "  Biologische  Untersuchimgen,"  Neue  Folge,  1892,  Bd.  iii. 

+  See  Schafer,  "  Brain,"  1893,  p.  162. 


IIEAEING.  193 

investigated.  From  a  psychical  point  of  view  the  various 
sounds  have  been  divided  into  two  classes — \'iz.,  tones,  or 
musical  sounds,  due  to  periodic  or  rh3i:hmical  motions  of 
sonorous  bodies ;  and  noises,  due  to  non-periodic  motions. 
Objectively  considered,  tones  and  noises  invariably  accompany 
one  another  in  some  degree ;  subjectively  considered,  the  pre- 
ponderance of  the  one  over  the  other  gives  the  feeling  of  pleasure 
or  the  reverse.  Since  all  sounds  are  for  us  the  subjective 
result  of  various  combinations  of  tones,  both  musical  sounds 
and  noises  may  be  reduced  to  a  general  form  of  vibration 
termed  in  physics  a  "  sinusoid." 

Sounds  of  a  musical  character — that  is,  sounds  which 
present  an  appreciable  consistency  in  their  rapidity  of  vibra- 
tion— depend  for  their  pitch  upon  the  number  of  vibrations, 
and  for  their  intensity  upon  the  amplitude  of  those  vibrations. 
When  the  rate  of  vibration  is  doubled,  the  octave  of  the 
fundamental  note  is  produced.  Sounds  whose  relativity  of 
vibration  can  be  expressed  by  the  simple  numerical  ratios  are 
perceived,  when  blended,  to  be  harmonious.  Other  combina- 
tions are  more  or  less  discordant.  The  quality  of  a  musical 
soimd.  the  timhre  of  a  musical  instrument,  depend  upon  the 
number  of  over-tones  or  partial  tones  involved.  Thus,  there 
are  more  partial  tones  in  a  violin  tone  than  in  the  corre- 
sponding flute  tone.  etc. 

Musical  sounds  may  vary  in  loudness,  pitch,  and  quality. 
These  three  conditions  determine  the  sound.  The  pitch  of  a 
sound  is  determined  by  the  number  of  aerial  ^dbrations  exe- 
cuted in  a  given  time.  The  lowest  vibration-number  which 
can  be  termed  musical  is  about  16  per  second.  The  musical 
character  continues  imperfect  until  about  40  vibrations  per 
second  are  reached.  The  powers  of  sensory  discrimination  vary 
considerably  in  different  individuals.  Some  fail  in  the  upper 
registers,  others  in  the  lower.  The  highest  note  of  the  piccolo 
(4,752  vibrations  per  second)  is  practically  the  superior  limit  to 
the  scale  of  pitch  in  music.  If  above  this  degree  of  acuteness 
the  sound  becomes  painful.  Some  individuals  possess  a  fine 
discrimination  for  the  detection  of  over-tones ;  others  acqu.ire 
the  power  by  training.  Habit  or  experience  does  much,  but 
not  all.     A  good  piccolo  player  would  experience  greater  diffi- 

13 


194  SENSATIOX. 

culty  in  tuning  a  "double-bass"  than  in  tuning  his  o^^'n 
instrument,  and  vice  versa. 

The  ear  is  capable  of  analysing  complex  aerial  waves,  thus 
enabling  us  to  perceive  the  elements  of  which  they  are  com- 
pounded. The  aerial  wave  which  reaches  the  ear  at  any 
moment  is  the  summation  of  the  individual  systems  of  waves 
which  are  in  course  of  propagation  in  the  vicinity  at  the  time. 
For  instance,  the  sounds  produced  in  an  orchestra  are  ex- 
tremely varied,  but  the  aerial  waves  arising  from  each  instru- 
ment, as  a  centre,  are  superposed,  and  arrive  at  the  ear  as  a 
wave  of  great  complexity.  The  ear,  however,  differentiates  this 
intricate  combination  into  simpler  elements,  and  we  are 
enabled  to  distinguish  the  sound  of  the  Adolin  from  that  of  the 
clarionet,  etc. 

In  addition  to  adequate  stimuli  affecting  the  end  organ  of 
sense,  various  sensations  of  sound  may  arise  in  connection  vnth 
electric  stimulation  of  the  auditory  nerve,  or  disease  of  the 
cerebrum.  These  subjective  effects  are,  however,  simple  and 
often  indistinct,  until,  b}-  repetition,  and  by  a  mental  pre- 
paredness or  expectancy,  the  attention  evolves  them  into 
definite  tones  or  noises  having  a  subjective  equivalence  to 
sounds  determined  b}'  external  vibrator}^  causes.  The  psy- 
chological aspects  of  auditory  sensations  do  not  differ  in  the 
main  from  those  of  other  sensations.  AVe  must  assume  a 
power  of  sensory  discrimination  within  the  mind  itself.  We 
shall  see  later  that  muscular  sensations  do  not  entirely  account 
for  all  the  power  of  the  mind  in  this  direction ;  nor  can  we  say 
that  the  mind  is,  in  some  cases,  dependent  at  all  upon  the 
addition  of  visual  spatial  relations. 

The  psycho-physical  asj)ects  of  feeling  associated  with 
musical  sounds  and  noises,  as  investigated  by  Helmholtz,* 
give  a  negative  reason  for  the  feeling  of  dissonance — i.e.,  the 
feeling  of  consonance  is  due  to  absence  of  the  successive 
shocks  or  "  beats,'"'  which  occur  less  frequently,  but  more 
decidedly  aiad  unpleasantly  as  the  pitch  of  the  notes  becomes 
more  nearly  the  same.t 

*  "  Sensations  of  Tone,"  p.  255  f. 

t  "  Beats  "  in  music  are  due  to  the  alternate  coincidence  and  interference 
of  two  systems   of   sonorous  waves.      "Wlien  two   sonorous   bodies,  whose 


IIEAKIXG.  195 

In  all  marked  dissonances  siicli  beats  occur  at  the  rate  of 
from  20  to  40  per  second.  The  most  perfect  consonance  of 
two  tones  results  from  a  note  and  its  octave.  Hei'e  the  coin- 
cidence or  interference  of  the  vibrations  is  ver^^  frequent,  for 
whilst  the  one  note  performs  one  vibration,  the  octave  performs 
two,  and  thus  there  are  no  beats  perceptible.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  most  iinpleasant  discord  is  produced  by  two  notes 
differing  by  a  semitone — -in  this  case  there  is  great  infrequency 
in  the  coincidence  or  interference  of  the  vibrations — and  the 
beats  become  very  marked.  Helmholtz  found  that,  as  long  as 
no  more  than  four  to  six  beats  occur  in  a  second,  the  ear 
readil}^  distinguishes  the  alternate  reinforcements  of  the  tone. 
If  the  lieats  be  more  rapid,  the  tones  grate  on  the  ear.  or  they 
become  cutting.  Roughness  of  tone  is  the  essential  character 
of  dissonance.  He  also  found,  that  even  when  the  fundamental 
tones  have  such  widely  different  pitches  that  they  cannot 
prodiice  audible  beats,  the  upper  partial  tones  (over-tones) 
may  beat  and  make  the  tone  rough. 

Pettingen  gives  a  positive  reason — i.e.,  that  the  consonance 
or  pleasantness  of  harmon}"  is  due  to  tonicitif  and  'pJionicitij  of 
certain  intervals  and  combined  notes.  Tonicity  is  the  propert)^ 
of  being  recognised  as  a  constituent  of  a  single  fundamental 
tone,  which  is  designated  by  the  name  ''tonic."  Phonicity 
is  that  property  of  a  chord  or  interval  which  consists  in  the 
possession  of  certain  partial  tones  that  are  common  to  all  tones. 
The  first  of  these  cjualities  of  harmony  seems  to  ally  the 
pleasure  it  yields  to  that  which  follows  even  the  obscure  and 
only  half-conscious  perception,  as  it  were,  of  all  relations,  as 
such,  between  our  sensations. 

The  law  of  Weber,  as  applied  to  sensations  of  sound,  has 

periods  of  vibration  slightly  differ,  emit  sound  together,  at  first  the  conden- 
sations and  rarefactions  which  they  separately  pi'oduce  in  the  air  coincide, 
causing  an  increase  in  the  sound.  After  a  short  time,  however,  the  conden- 
sation produced  by  the  one  body  encounters  the  rarefaction  produced  by 
the  other,  and  there  results  a  mutual  interference,  Avhich  causes  a  partial 
destruction  of  the  sound.  Coincidence  sets  in  a  second  time,  to  be  followed 
by  another  interference,  and  so  on.  Thus,  whilst  the  bodies  continue  sound- 
ing, there  will  be  an  alternate  increase  and  diminution  of  the  sound,  caused 
by  the  coalescence  and  interference  of  the  vibrations  respectively;  it  is 
these  alternations  of  loudness  and  faintness  that  get  the  name  of  "  beats." 


196  SENSATION. 

given  rise  to  much  misconception.  By  this  law  we  can  only  ' 
compare  the  intensity  of  a  stimulus  with  the  intensity  of  a 
sensation,  and  we  must  not  include  qualitative  effects  amongst 
the  sensations.  The  sensation  of  pitch  has  nothing  to  do  with 
the  intensit}^  of  the  sensation,  nor  has  the  number  of  vibrations 
anything  to  do  with  the  intensity  of  the  acoustic  stimulus. 
Weber's  laAv  is  held  to  be  comparatively  exact  for  the  intensity 
of  acoustic  sensations.  The  intensity  of  sound  depends  upon 
(1)  the  distance  of  the  individual  from  the  sounding  body. 
The  law  of  inverse  squares  is,  that  in  free  homogeneous  air  the 
intensity  varies  inversely  as  the  square  of  the  distance. 
Thus,  the  distance  being  as,  1,  2  3,  4,  ^,  ^,  the  intensities  are 
as,  1,  5-,  y,  yV'  4^  9.  (2)  The  density  of  the  air  in  which  the 
sound  is  generated,  not  upon  that  in  which  it  is  heard ; 
(3)  the  amplitude  of  the  vibration — i.e.,  the  intensity  is  in 
proportion  to  the  square  of  the  amplitude.  Thus,  the  ampli- 
tude being   as    1,  2,  3,  4,   ^,  ^,  the  intensities    are    as    1,   4, 

To  the  question  as  to  whether  the  same  acoiistic  stimulus 
can  act  on  several  nerve-terminations,  or  whether  there  is 
qualitative  adaptation  of  the  auditory  fibres,  so  that  no  two 
fibres  can  partake  of  the  same  kind  of  excitation,  we  shall 
return  when  we  discuss  the  power  of  discrimination  of  spatial 
relations. 

Sensations  of  Sight. — The  transverse  vibrations  of  ether^ 
which  are  supposed  to  diffuse  light  through  space,  impart  sensa- 
tions of  light  to  the  eye.  By  the  periodic  vibrations  of  these 
particles  of  ether  our  mental  vision  is  thought  to  be  governed  in 
a  somewhat  similar  manner  to  the  mode  in  which  our  mental 
ear  is  governed  by  the  vibrations  of  sound.  This  idea  has  given 
rise  to  the  theory,  that  consciousness  is  analogous  to  light, 
which,  in  illuminating  other  objects,  illuminates  itself  also.* 
Of  this  theory,  and  of  the  other,  which  regards  consciousness  as 
the  analogue  of  the  eye  itself,  which  sees  other  objects,  but 
cannot  see  itself,  we  shall  have  more  to  say  later.  Let  us  now 
see  what  data  we  have  for  the  construction  of  an  intelligible 
account  of  the  j^henomena  of  vision. 

The  cornea,  aqueous  humour,  crystalline  lens,  and  vitreous. 
*  Cf .  Wundt,  "  Logik.,"'  ii.  502  ff. 


SIGHT.  197 

humour,  form  tlie  four  translucent  refracting  media  of  the  eye  ; 
their  function  is  to  transmit  and  apply  the  external  stimulus  to 
the  retina  in  the  form  of  an  image,  and  in  an  order  correspond- 
ing to  the  external  object.  To  trace  the  course  of  the  rays  of 
light  throiTgh  these  media,  and  to  give  an  account  of  their 
indices  of  refraction,  and  of  the  geometrical  form  and  position 
of  their  limiting  surfaces,  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  work.  It 
must  suffice  for  us  to  recognise  that  each  refracting  surface  is 
separate,  and  that  each  one  of  these  refractive  media  plays  its 
part  in  projecting  an  inverted  diminished  image  of  the  objects 
of  the  external  world  upon  the  retina.  The  construction  of  the 
inverted  image  upon  the  retina  is  comparatively  simple  ;  but.  as 
the  retinal  image  is  inverted,  we  have  to  explain  how  it  is  that 
objects  appear  upruiM  to  us.  The  impulses  from  any  point  of 
the  retina  are  referred  by  the  mind,  to  the  exterior,  in  the  direc- 
tion through  the  nodal  point.  The  image  appears  to  be  exter- 
nal, because  all  points  appear  to  lie  in  a  surface  floating  in  front 
of  the  eye  (the  "■  field  of  vision  ").  The  field  of  vision  is  the 
inverted  surface  of  the  retina  projected  externally ;  hence  the 
field  of  vision  appears  erect  again,  as  the  inverted  retinal 
image  is  again  projected  externally.  With  the  formation 
of  an  image  upon  the  retina  we  have  to  give  an  account  of 
a  corresponding  physiological  process  which  would  serve  to 
conduct  the  external  impression  to  the  sensorium.  Tlie  retina 
has  to  solve  the  unknown  photo-chemical  process.  Some^^'here 
within  the  nervous  and  other  elements  of  the  retina  must  be 
found  the  specific  end  apparatus  which  receives  the  external 
stimuli  and  modifies  them  into  physiological  processes.  Anato- 
mists and  physiologists  refer  to  the  layer  of  rods  and  cones  as 
the  elements  which  appear  to  be  directly  affected  by  the  action 
of  light.  A  chemical  process  is  regarded,  by  most  observers,  as 
insufficient.  A  photo-chemical  process  is.  however,  considered 
as  furnishing  the  best  hypothesis. 

In  an  ordinary  act  of  vision  the  external  vibratory  stimuli 
determine  various  photo-chemical  retinal  effects.  The  nerve- 
ends  in  some  way  become  affected,  and  transmit  or  set  up 
excitations,  which  are  conducted  to  the  cereljrum.  At  present 
there  is  considerable  doubt  as  to  what  visual  substances  are 
decomposed  in  the  photo-chemical  process. 


198  SENSATION. 

The  impnentum  nir/mm  is  supposed  to  be  of  importance  in 
the  formation  of  visual  sensations,  and  the  so-called  visual  loiir pie 
is  thought  to  be  related  in  some  way  to  the  siisceptibility  of  the 
eje  for  different  colours. 

When  the  eye-ball  is  pressed  we  get  the  so-called  "p/ios- 
phenes,'''  or  "  pressure-pictures."  The  impression  is  always 
referred  externally,  and  is  always  perceived  on  the  side  of  the 
field  of  vision  opposite  to  where  the  pressure  affects  the  retina 
— e.g.,  pressure  upon  the  outer  surface  of  the  eyeball  causes  the 
flash  of  ■  light  to  appear  on  the  inner  side.  If  the  retina 
is  not  well  lighted,  the  phosphene  appears  luminous ;  if  it  is 
well  lighted  the  phosphene  appears  as  a  dark  speck,  within 
which  the  visual  perception  is  momentarily  abolished.  Purkinje 
pointed  out  that  if  a  uniform  pressure  be  applied  to  the  eyeball 
continuously,  from  before  backwards,  after  some  time  there 
appear  sparkling  variable  figures,  somewhat  kaleidoscopic  in 
effect.  By  appljdng  steady  and  continuous  pressure,  Steinbach 
and  Purkinje  observed  a  network  with  moving  contents  of  a 
bltiish-silvery  colour,  which  seemed  to  correspond  to  the  retinal 
veins.  Vierordt  and  Laiblin  observed  the  branching  of  the 
blood-vessels  of  the  choroid  as  a  red  net-work  upon  a  black 
ground.  HoiTdin  believes  we  may  detect  the  position  of  the 
yellow  spot  by  pressure  upon  the  eyeball.  Mechanical  and 
electrical  stimuli,  when  applied  to  any  part  of  the  course  of  the 
visual  tracts,  are  liable  to  cause  visual  phenomena,  although  the 
resulting  phenomenon  has  not  the  same  intensity  or  clearness 
as  when  the  cause  is  due  to  activity  of  the  ethereal  vibrations. 

Quality  of  sensations  of  sir/Jd. — Under  this  heading  we  shall 
have  to  consider  chiefly  the  sensations  of  colour  and  light. 
These  impressions  fall  into  a  series  of  gradual  changes,  varying, 
for  the  most  part,  with  the  changes  in  rapidity  of  the  vibratory 
stimulus.  This  is  not  an  invariable  rule,  however,  for  consider- 
able variations  may  occur  in  the  rate  of  vibration  without  an 
appreciable  corresponding  effect  on  the  sensation.  Hence,  the 
quality  of  the  sensation  cannot  be  said  to  correspond  so 
exactly  with  changes  in  the  stimulus  as  was  the  case  with  tone 
sensations.  The  degree  of  colour  is  dependent  upon  the  pro- 
portion of  white  light  to  the  special  kind  of  light.  Thus,  differ- 
ences  in  degrees  of  saturation  of  the  spectral  colours   cause 


SIGHT.  199 

considerable  A-ariations  in  the  quality  of  the  sensations.  Simi- 
larly, the  size  of  the  coloured  object  and  the  resulting  breadth 
of  the  sensation,  as  Avell  as  the  intensity  of  the  stimulus,  and 
the  time  dui'ing  which  it  acts,  also  affect  the  quality  of  the 
sensation.  Further,  the  same  stimulus  produces  different  sensa- 
tions as  it  falls  upon  different  portions  of  a  normal  retina 
(Ladd).  The  fineness  of  discrimination  varies  with  different 
parts  of  the  retina.  From  a  quantitative  point  of  view  the 
central  area,  or  the  area  of  perfect  vision,  is  more  discriminative 
than  the  side  parts  of  the  retina.  The  discrimination  of  degree 
is  much  less  fine  when  coloured  light  is  employed.* 

Light  is  the  chief  stimulus  which  acts  upon  the  retinal 
elements.  Some  observers  hold,  that  the  retina  has  a  light  of 
its  own,  which  is  due  to  the  ever-active  tonic  excitation  of  its 
nervous  elements  by  the  chemical  constituents  of  the  blood. 
Spectral  colours  may  be  arranged  in  the  following  order :  red, 
orange,  yellow,  green,  blue,  violet.  If  a  beam  of  white  light 
be  transmitted  through  a  prism,  the  light  rays  are  refracted  and 
dispersed.  The  dark  heat-rays  are  refracted  least ;  they  are 
invisible  to  the  retina.  The  oscillations  of  the  light-ether 
excite  the  retina  in  the  following  order  (of  billions  per  second)  : 
red,  481 ;  orange,  532 ;  yellow,  563  ;  green,  607  ;  blue,  653 ; 
indigo,  676 ;  violet,  764.  The  sensations  of  colour  would 
thus  depend  upon  the  number  of  vibrations  of  the  light  ether. 
The  series  of  colours  obtained  by  the  aid  of  a  prism  do  not, 
however,  include  the  innumerable  shades  and  varieties  of 
colour  with  which  our  sensations  are  furnished ;  nor  can  we 
account  for  all  the  variations  in  the  quality  of  our  sensations 
from  the  point  of  view  of  intensity  or  rapidity  of  vibration  of 
the  stimulus. 

Simple  and  mixed  colours. — The  simj^le  colours  are  those  of 
the  spectrum ;  and  to  the  vibrations  of  which  the  retina  has  a 
corresponding  excitation.  MixeJj  colours  are  those  whose  sensa- 
tions are  produced  when  the  retina  is  excited  by  two  or  more 
simple  colours.  The  colour  ivliite  is  a  mixture  of  all  the  colours 
of  the  spectrum.  When  two  spectral  colours  act  together  and 
give  the  colour  white,  they  are  said  to  be  complementary  to 
each  other,  or  "  comjdemental  colours."  Any  tA\'o  colours  which, 
*  Wundt,  "Physiolog.  Psychologie,"'  i.  cap.  8,  §  2,  p.  335. 


200  SENSATION. 

when  mixed,  supplement  the  prevailing  tone  of  the  light  are 
termed  contrast  colonrs.  When  a  colour  is  simple  and  free 
from  mixture  with  other  colours,  its  colour-tone  is  said  to  be 
2ytire  or  saturated.  The  colour-tones  of  the  spectrum  pass 
imperceptibly  into  one  another ;  and  the  fact  that  the  ultra-ved 
and  ultra-violet  rays  do  not  excite  ^dsual  sensations  is  thought 
to  be  due  to  the  structure  of  the  retina.  Mixed  colour-im- 
pressions vary  with  the  intensity  of  the  various  components. 
Taking  into  account  the  number  of  colour-tones  distinguishable 
by  the  human  eye,  together  with  their  variations  due  to 
differences  in  brightness  and  intensity,  Von  Kries  estimates 
that  there  are  about  500,000  to  600,000  colour  sensations.  At 
the  minimum  of  intensity  of  light  every  colour-tone,  except  the 
jDure  red  of  spectral  saturation,  appears  colourless  when  seen 
alone  on  a  perfectly  black  ground.  The  different  colours 
appear  and  disappear  at  different  degrees  of  intensit}^  of 
the  stimulus ;  green  remains  visible  in  the  weakest  light. 
Before  the  maximum  of  intensitj^  is  reached,  red  and  green 
pass  over  into  yellow;  whilst  at  the  maximum  all  sensations 
of  colour-tone  cease,  and  even  homogeneous  rays  appear 
white. 

Colour-blindness  appears  to  be  due  to  a  defective  structure 
of  the  retina.  The  most  common  form  is  where  tlie  spectrum 
is  shortened  at  the  red  end.  Fick  states,  that  the  farther  out- 
ward this  imperfect  condition  of  the  retina  extends,  the  nearer 
does  the  defect  approach  to  total  colour-blindness.  Kries  esti- 
mates that  colour-blind  persons  are  reduced  to  colours  which 
are  either  red  and  blue-green,  or  greenish-5'"ellow  and  blue- 
violet.  In  total  colour-blindness  only  shades  of  grej^  from 
^'S'hite  to  black  may  be  visible.*  Violet  coZotir-blindness  is 
comparatively  infrequent.  It  has  been  observed  after  the 
administration  of  santonin.  Those  who  have  red-blindness  see 
only  blue  and  yellow ;  red,  orange,  and  green  appear  like 
yellow,  and  violet  like  blue.  Those  M^ho  are  colour-blind  to 
green  see  all  colours  as  blue  and  red. 

*  AVhen  the  image  of  an  object  remains  active  upon  the  retina  and 
corresponds  to  the  primary  image,  this  image  is  termed  a  positive  after- 
imafje;  a  negative  after-imafje  is  due  to  the  exhaustion  of  the  retinal 
elements,  and  is  made  up  of  the  complementary  colours  of  the  objects. 


COLOUR-SENSATION.  201 

Theories  of  Colour-Sensation. — 1.  The  Yo^mg-Helm- 
holtz*  tlieortj  assumes  the  presence  of  three  different  kinds  of 
nerve-elements  corresponding  to  the  three  primary  colours — red, 
green,  and  violet — in  the  retina.  This  theory  also  assimies  that, 
every  colour  of  the  spectrum  excites  all  the  kinds  of  fibres, 
some  of  them  feebly,  others  strongly.  The  elements  sensitive 
to  red  are  most  strongly  excited  by  light  with  the  longest  wave 
length,  the  red  rays ;  those  for  green  by  green  rays  of  medium 
wave  leng-th;  those  for  violet  by  the  rays  of  shortest  wave 
length,  -vdolet  rays.  The  rods  of  the  retina  are  said  to  be  con- 
cerned only  with  the  capacity  to  distinguish  quantitative  sensa- 
tions of  light.  This  hypothesis,  that  there  are  three  special 
kinds  of  fibre  in  the  optic-nerve,  is  quite  uncertain,  and  it  does 
not  aid  us  in  the  least,  from  a  psychological  point  of  view. 
Ziehen  believes,  that  all  terminations  of  the  nerve-fibres  in  the 
central  parts  of  the  retina  must  be  very  sensitive  to  many,  if 
not  to  all,  colour  stimuli.  The  theory  would  explain  many  of 
the  sensations  of  light  and  colour,  especially  those  relating  to 
mixed  and  complementary  coloiirs ;  but  it  does  not  account 
sufficiently  for  the  facts  of  contrast   and  colour-blindness. 

2.  The  Ilering  theoryf  assumes,  that  there  are  six  funda- 
mental colour-tones — viz.,  black  and  white,  green  and  red, 
blue  and  j^ellow.  These  three  pairs  of  colours  are  regarded 
as  antagonistic,  the  one  to  the  other.  The  changes  which  give 
rise  to  sensations  of  black,  green,  and  blue,  are  assumed  to  be 
due  to  the  process  of  "  constriiction  "  of  a  so-called  visual  sub- 
stance ;  those  which  give  rise  to  white,  red,  and  yellow  are  due 
to  the  "  destruction  "  of  such  visual  substance. 

3.  The  theory  of  Wundt.X — (1)  In  every  retinal  excitation 
there  is  a  chromcUic  and  an  achromatic  process  set  up.  (2) 
The  achromatic  excitation  consists  in  a  uniform  photo-chemical 
process,  which  reaches  its  maximum  at  yellow,  and  falls  off 
towards  both  ends  of  the  spectrum.  (3)  The  chromatic  excita- 
tion is  a  polyform  photo-chemical  process,  which  changes  con- 
tinuously with  the  wave-lengths  of  light.  The  extreme 
difierences  of  this  leng-th  are  such  as  to  produce  effects  that 

*  Helmholtz,  "  Physiolog.  Optik." 

t  '•  Zur  Lehre  vom  Lichtsinne,  Sitzgsber.  d.  Wiener  Acad.,"  1872 — 1874. 

J  "  Physiolog.  Psyehologie,"  i.  pp.  450  ff. 


202  SENSATION. 

approximate  to  each  other ;  while  the  effects  of  certain  different 
intervening  wave-lengths  are  related  in  snch  a  way,  that 
opposed  phases  of  one  and  the  same  movement  equalise  each 
other  perfectly.  (4)  Every  process  of  excitation  of  the  retina 
outlasts  the  stimulation  for  a  certain  time,  and  exhausts  the 
sensibility  of  the  nerve-substance  for  that  particular  form  of 
stimulation.  The  positive  after-images  are  due  to  the  per- 
sistence of  the  retinal  excitation — ^the  negative  to  exhaustion. 
(5)  The  phenomena  of  contrast  are  to  be  explained  by  the  laAv 
of  relativity. 

4.  The  theory  of  Von  Kries.^^ — (1)  Three  series  of  components 
are  requisite — one  for  the  bright  and  dark,  but  colourless, 
sensations ;  and  two  colour-tone  series,  a  red  green-series,  and 
a  yellow  blue-series.  (2)  White  is  not  to  be  considered  as 
belonging  to  the  three,  since  it  corresponds  to  all  the  colour- 
tones,  whenever  they  reach  a  minimum  of  saturation.  (3) 
The  processes  corresponding  to  these  three  series  of  com- 
ponents may  be  located  at  different  places  in  the  nervous 
apparatus  of  vision,  either  more  centrally  or  more  peripherally. 
(4)  The  articulation  and  adjustment  of  these  three  processes 
are  assigned  to  the  central  organs. 

5.  The  FranMm  theoryf  is  (1)  that  in  its  earliest  stage 
of  development,  vision  consisted  of  nothing  but  a  sensation  of 
grey  (the  word  grey  covering  the  whole  series  black-gre}^- 
white) .  (2)  This  sensation  of  grey  was  brought  about  by  the 
action  upon  the  nerve-ends  of  a  certain  chemical  substance  set 
free  in  the  retina  under  the  influence  of  light.  (3)  In  the 
course  of  development  of  the  visual  sense,  the  molecule  to  be 
chemically  decomposed  became  so  differentiated  as  to  be 
capable  of  losing  only  a  part  of  its  exciting  substance  at  once  ; 
three  chemical  constituents  of  the  excitant  of  the  grey  sensation 
can,  therefore,  now  be  present  separately  (under  the  influence  of 
three  different  parts  of  the  spectrum  respectively),  and  they 
severally  cause  the  sensation  of  red,  green,  and  blue.  (4)  But 
when  all  three  of  these  substances  are  present  at  once,  they 
re-combine  to  produce  the  excitant  of  the  grey  sensation,  and 
thus  it  happens,  that  the  objective  mixing  of  three  coloiirs,  in 

*  "  Archiv.  f.  Anat.  u.  Physiol.,  Abth.,''  1882,  Appendix,  pp.  1—178. 

t  "  International  Congress  of  Experimental  Psychology,"  London,  1892. 


COLOUE-SEXSATIOX.  203 

proper  proportions,  gives  a  sensation  of  no  colour  at  all,  but 
only  grey. 

Goller  *  has  given  a  physical  theory,  and  Donders  f  a 
chemical  one  somewhat  like  that  of  Franklin.  The  distribution 
of  the  rods  and  cones  corresponds  exactly  with  the  distribution 
of  sensitiveness  to  just  perceptible  light  and  colour  excitations,:|: 
and  this  fact  is  what  we  might  expect,  if  we  assume,  with 
Franklin,  that  the  rods  contain  the  undeveloped  molecules 
which  give  us  the  sensation  of  grey  only,  while  the  cones 
contain  the  colour  molecules,  which  cause  sensations  of  grey 
and  of  colour  both. 

All  the  theories  hitherto  advanced  are.  of  necessity,  based 
upon  unverifiable  hypotheses.  The  difficulty  in  all  colour- 
sensation  theories  is  to  account  for  the  fact,  that  any  two  com- 
plemental  colours  lose  themselves  in  a  totally  diiferent  sensation, 
and  that  other  sensation-pairs,  indistinguishable  from  these 
objectively,  do  nothing  of  the  sort.  The  plwsiological  require- 
ments would  appear  to  be  better  met  by  the  theory  of  Franklin 
than  by  that  either  of  Helmholtz  or  Hering.§  The  chief 
advantae-e  of  the  theorv  is  shared  bv  that  of  Donders,  which 
also  assinnes  the  partial  decomposition  of  the  photo-chemical 
substance.  Sandford  ||  raises  the  objections  (1)  that  the  theory 
does  not  account  for  black,  especially  for  black  in  simultaneous 
contrast.  (2)  Granting  that  the  retinal  circulation  is  rapid 
enough  for  the  use  made  of  it  in  explaining  simultaneous 
contrasts,  how  is  the  reversal  of  colours,  which  is  found  in  the 
after  image  of  the  contrasting  field,  to  be  accounted  for? 
Franklin,  however,  accounts  for  the  sensation  of  black  as 
the  eflect  on  the  nerve-ends  of  the  resting  condition  of  the 
photo-chemical  substance :  it  is,  therefore,  the  antithesis  to 
every  colour  as  well  as  to  white,  and  it  is  the  constant  back- 
ground against  ^^"hich  all  coloiirs  and  white  are  seen.  In 
reply  to  the  objection  to  the  explanation  of  simultaneous  con- 
trast, the  phenomena  is  attributed  to  a  purposeful  reflex  action. 

*  "  Du  Bois  Reymond's  Archiv.,"  1889. 

t  Grafe,  "  Archiv.  f  iir  Ophthalmologie."  B.S.  30  (1),  1884. 

+  Fick,  "  Pfliigers  Archiv.,"  Bd.  xliv.  s.  441.  1888. 

§  Biirdon-Sanderson,  ''Xatiire,"'  vol.  48,  p.  469. 

II  "Pysch.  Eev.,'"  Jan.  1894.  p.  99. 


204  SENSATION. 

In  concluding  this  chapter  we  may  say  that,  before  we  can 
hope  to  establish  a  psycho-physiological  formula  which  shall 
embrace  the  relationship  of  the  physical  activities  to  the  actual 
sensation  (1)  we  must  determine  more  particularly  how  the 
different  parts  of  the  retina  are  arranged  together   spatially; 

(2)  we  must  endeavour  to  explain  how  the  physical  vibrations 
of  ether,  the  modes  of  refraction  of  the  eye,  and  the  spectral 
characters  of  light,  determine  physiological  nerve  excitation ; 

(3)  we  must  further  test  the  validity  of  Weber's  law  when 
applied  to  the  intensity  of  visual  sensations  ;  *  (4)  we  must 
determine  the  anatomical  relations  of  the  visual  path  more 
accurately.  We  believe  that  the  external  geniculate  body,  the 
pulvinar,  and  the  corpora  quadrigemina  anterior,  all  receive 
fibres  from  the  optic  tracts,  but  it  is  uncertain  whether  they 
all  receive  visual  fibres.  The  occipital  visual  path,  the  exact 
centre  for  vision,  and  the  functions  of  a  great  part  of  the 
occipital  cortex  and  angular  gyrus,  are  not  yet  well  known. 

*  The  researches  of  Fechner,  Merkel,  Konig,  and  Broohiin  demonstrate  that 
in  the  case  of  light  stimuli  of  medium  intensity  the  law  of  Weber  is  approxi- 
mately correct.  Deviations  occur  at  the  "  lower  deviation,"  and  owing  to 
the  retina's  OAvn  light. 


205 


CHAPTEE  YII. 

Pekception. 

Perception — External  and  Internal  Perception — Apperception — Physio- 
logical Conditions  of  Perception — Space  Form — Nativistic  and 
Empiristic  Theories  of  Perception — Perception  of  Spatial  Order 
— Theory  of  Local  Signs — Eccentric  Proieetion  of  Sensations — 
Spatial  Discrimination — Special  Channels  of  Perception :  Per- 
ceptions of  Smell  and  Taste  :  Hearing ;  Touch ;  Muscular  Sensa- 
tion; Sight  (Retinal,  Monocular,  Binocular). 

When  we  refer  sensations  to  objects  in  space — that  is  to  say, 
when  we  localise  or  externalise  them — we  attribute  some  quality 
to  a  particular  object  in  space  as  distinct  from  the  mind  which 
perceives  it.  Perception  is  this  process  of  localising  sensations 
and  referring  them  to  definite  objects,  and  the  result  of  this 
process  is  usually  called  a  percept.  This  acceptation  of  the 
term  is,  perhaps,  moi-e  convenient  than  the  one  of  some 
psychologists,  which  includes  sensation  and  perception  as  part 
of  the  same  process.  This  process  of  perceiving  sensations  and 
referring  them  to  the  outer  world  is  sometimes  called  external 
or  sense  pjerception,  to  distinguish  it  from  the  cognition  of  the 
mind's  own  states  which  is  termed  internal  percepAion.  Per- 
ception is  more  an  act  of  mind  than  sensation,  which  is  passive. 
Early  writers  employed  the  term  in  a  wide  sense ;  recent 
writers  restrict  the  AA'ord  to  that  act  of  the  mind  by  which  we 
discern  an  external  object  by  way  of  the  senses.*  Perception 
is,  therefore,  a  mental  process  which  involves  the  analysis  of  a 
number  of  sense-data.  Wundt  has  divided  perception  into 
simple  perception  and  apperception;  the  former  being  the  simple 
apprehension  that  we  are  somehow  mentally  affected,  the  latter 

*  Sully,  "  Outlines  of  Psychology'." 


206  PERCEPTION. 

"being  the  mental  state  after  discerning  attention  has  been 
given  by  the  observer  to  the  sense  data.*  Perception  is  the 
invariable  accompaniment  of  sensation,  inasmnch  as  every  sen- 
sation is,  more  or  less,  referred  to  some  position  in  space.  This 
perceptual  or  localising  interpretation  may  be  slight  when  the 
sensation  is  little  attended  to,  but  it  occurs  nevertheless  even 
in  the  remote  regions  of  diffuse  consciousness.  Thus,  when  we 
analj^se  the  perceptual  process  we  find  that  a  sensation  is  first 
discriminated  as  a  sensation ;  then  it  is  identified  as  pertaining 
to  some  particular  kind  of  object,  and  this  involves  a  germ  of 
representation,  or  the  recalling  of  other  sense-impressions  gained 
by  past  experience.  A  perception  is,  therefore,  a  complex 
mental  act  of  which  sensations  form  the  component  factors. 
Spencer t  regards  perception  as  a  '■'■  iwesentative  representative 
process  "  because  it  contains  a  presentative  element^ — the  actual 
sensation — and  also  a  number  of  recalled  or  representative 
elements.  Wundt  does  not  regard  the  representative  element 
as  essential  to  perception.  Several  others  speak  of  percepts  in 
their  totality  as  presentation.  For  ovir  part,  the  only  percept 
A\'hich  "s^-e  can  consider  as  not  involving  a  representative  element, 
is  that  attending  the  first  sensation  of  life ;  ever}:-  subsequent 
2)ercept  or  process  of  external  reference  to  sensation  is  the  sum 
total  of  previous  acquisitions ;  and  a  representative  element  is 
more  or  less  consciously  combined  with  the  presentative 
element  in  every  psychical  perceptual  act.  Perception,  as 
defined  b}^  Sully,  is  "a  complex  mental  act  or  process,  in- 
volving presentative  and  representative  elements.'"'  "  Percep- 
tion is  that  process  by  which  the  mind,  after  discriminating 
and  identifying  a  sense-impression  (simple  or  complex)  supple- 
ments it  by  an  accompaniment  or  escort  of  revived  sensations, 
the  whole  aggregate  of  actual  and  revived  sensations  being- 
solidified  or  integrated  into  the  form  of  a  percept — -that  is, 
an  apparently  immediate  apprehension  or  cognition  of  an  object 
now  present  in  a  particular  locality  or  region  of  space." 

Physiological  Conditions  of  Perception. — An  act 
of  perception  involves  the  co-operation  of  different  motor  as 
well  as  sensory-centres.     The  element  of  attention  is  attended 

*  "Tuke's  Diet,  of  Psych.  Med.,"'  p.  923. 

t  "Principles  of  Psychology,"'  vol.  ii.,  part  VIII.,  ch.  II.,  p.  5l3. 


PHYSIOLOGICAL  COXDITIOXS.  207 

by  certain  activities  of  the  motor  elements.  The  nervous 
accompaniments  are,  therefore,  mnch  more  complex  than  in  the 
case  of  simple  sensation.  Since  sensations  themselves  are  the 
elements  of  the  so-called  presentations  of  sense,  we  are  forced 
to  accept  sensations  as  the  data  upon  which  mental  products 
are  formed.  Thus  sensations  are  the  mental  factors  upon 
which  the  development  of  all  psychical  states  depends. 

In  reg-ard  to  the  ideas  of  "space."'  "time"  (and  the  "moral 
sense "),  it  may  be  well  to  say,  at  the  outset,  that  no  attempt 
will  be  made  in  this  -work  to  determine  -^^diether  such  per- 
ceptions, in  their  ultimate  essence,  can  be  resolved  into  mere 
transcendental  faculties  and  functional  processes  of  mind.  To 
the  physiologist,  above  all  other  men,  it  would  appear  to  be 
clear  that,  whatever  may  be  the  ultimate  foundations  of  their 
existence,  as  associated  with  other  causes  and  effects  of  our 
physical  and  mental  life  than  those  we  know,  the  mode  of  their 
appearance  with  us  is  distinctly-  empirical,  and  depends  directly, 
in  reg"ard  to  each  psychic  manifestation,  upon  the  quality  and 
combinations  of  the  stimuli  both  exoneural  and  esoneural.  which 
give  rise  to  that  manifestation.  And,  therefore,  folloAving  in 
the  footsteps  of  those  workers  who  have  given  their  attention 
to  the  distinctly  practical  side  of  this  subject,  it  will  be 
sufficient,  for  our  purpose,  to  inquire  how  the  appearance  of 
these  modes  seems  to  become  manifest  through  excitations  of 
the  special  organs  of  sense,  external  and  internal,  and  through 
the  combination  of  the  effects  of  such  excitations. 

Presentations  of  sense  differ  from  simple  sensations,  in  that 
they  exhibit  the  psychical  power  of  estimating  space  form.  In 
order  to  explain  on  what  combinations  of  physical  processes  of 
sense,  the  different  resulting*  sensations  are  combined  into  pre- 
sentations of  sense  under  the  new  characteristic  of  space-form. 
the  followino-  truths  are  to  be  recognised  : — * 

1.  A  combination  of  two  or  more  qualitative!}-  difierent 
series  of  sensations  is  necessary. 

2.  There  must  be  adaptability  of  special  senses  to  form  a 
graded  series  of  the  characteristic  differences  in  quality  of 
sensations  (e.g.,  spatial  series  of  sight  and  touch),  called  the 
geometrical  senses. 

*  Ladd,  "  Phys.  Psych.,"  p.  38.5 


208  PERCEPTION. 

3.  There  must  be  a  mental  representative  in  tlie  sensations 
whicli  stimulation  of  the  different  parts  of  the  organ  of  sense 
calls  forth  (the  theory  of  ''local  signs"). 

4.  VarioiTS  stages  in  the  process  of  elaborating  the  presen- 
tations of  sense,  from  the  material  of  simple  sensations,  must  be 
recognised.  These  stages  are  (a)  localisation,  or  the  trans- 
ference of  the  composite  sensations  from  mere  states  of  the 
mind,  to  processes  or  conditions  associated  with  more  or  less 
definitely  fixed  points  or  areas  of  the  body ;  and  (/;)  eccentric 
projection,  or  the  giving  to  these  sensations  an  objective 
existence  as  qualities  of  objects  situated  within  a  field  of 
space,  and  in  contact  with,  or  more  or  less  remotely  distinct 
from,  the  body.  The  law  of  eccentric  projection  is,  "  Objects 
are  perceived  in  space  as  situated  in  a  right  line  off  the  ends  of 
the  nerve-fibres  which  they  irritate." 

5.  A  constant  activity  of  mind  is  presupposed,  whereby 
presentations  of  sense  are  elaborated  (by  synthesis)  by  the 
mind  itself. 

Theories  as  to  the  origin  of  presentations  of  sense. — 
Two  theories  have  been  given  to  account  for  the  genesis  of 
presentations,  and  these  have  been  termed  the  '  nativistic,' 
and  '  empiristic'  The  nativistic  theory  (Helmholtz)  assumes 
the  presence  of  an  intuitive  or  underived  activit}?-  of  the  mind, 
which  enables  the  mind  to  appreciate  the  characters  of  the 
presentations  of  sense  by  force  of  its  own  inherent  funda- 
mental capabilities.  It  also  assumes  that  a  definite  point  in 
space  is  allotted  to  each  of  the  retinal  points  from  birth,  which 
would  account  for  some  of  the  spatial  relations  of  presenta- 
tions. The  empiristic  or  genetic  theory  objects  to  the  mind's 
native  intuition.  It  denies  the  native  power  of  the  mind  to 
intuit  space,  and  relies  upon  kinsesthetic,  muscular,  and  tactual 
sensations  to  account  for  the  spatial  phenomena.  The  advo- 
cates of  either  of  these  theories  must  admit,  that  sensations  are 
presentations  to  the  mind,  and  that  unless  the  mind  perceives 
them  they  are  not  presentations.  The  perceptual  power  of  the 
mind  is  dependent  upon  the  presentations  of  sense  for  its 
development,  but  the  individiial  presentations  do  not  mass 
themselves  into  a  "mind-stuff"  which  corresponds  to  percep- 
tion ;    that   is   to    say,   the  sensations    do    not   present   them- 


ORIGIN  OF  PRESENTATIONS.  209 

selves  to  themselves,  and  by  their  combination  evolve 
perception. 

No  matter  how  much  the  empiristic  school  advocates  the 
la^^'S  of  development,  it  must  still  admit  the  so-called  native 
power  of  the  mind  as  that  which  perceives.  Ziehen 
adopts  the  genetic  standpoint  to  account  for  the  spatial  rela- 
tions of  sight,  but  he  admits  that  in  the  course  of  the  phylo- 
genetic  development  of  the  animal  series,  that  capacity  to 
localise  visual  sensations  was  first  developed,  which  made  the 
eye  a  proper  organ  for  the  perception  of  space.  He  says, 
'•'  We  find  the  wondei'ful  rapidity  with  which  this  arrangement 
of  the  sensations  is  accomplished  inconceivable ;  at  once, 
without  a  moment's  thought,  the  image  is  before  us,  well 
arranged  and  unmarred  b}^  the  slightest  error.  To  be  sure, 
a  process  of  evolution,  extending  through  almost  endless 
ages,  was  necessary  to  produce  and  train  a  cortical  apparatus 
that  can  react  with  such  fitness.  The  new-born  animal  or  child 
inherits  this  apparatus.  Each  single  individual  does  not  need 
to  acquire  it  again  laboriously,  but  only  to  learn  to  use  it." 
This  attempt  to  shift  the  native  power  to  the  ancestry  must 
be  the  method  of  procedure  of  all  empiristics.  The  nervous 
organism  of  every  child  probably  does  inherit  an  innate  power 
of  co-ordinating  certain  retinal  sensations  with  sensations  of 
ocular  movement,  and  visual  sensations  with  experiences  of 
active  touch ;  by  a  slow  process  of  acquisition,  however,  the 
muscular  and  tactual  sensations  become  more  or  less  absorbed 
in  the  visual  elements,  so  that  the  comprehensive  range  of 
vision  far  exceeds,  and  becomes  in  a  manner  independent  of,  the 
muscular  and  touch  elements.  This  hypothesis  of  inherited 
tendency  accords  more  with  the  theory  of  an  original  intuitive 
knowledge,  than  with  the  opposite  theory  of  a  derived  space- 
intuition. 

Schopenhauer,  Spencer,  Hartmann,  Wundt,  Helniholtz,  and 
Buret,  have  held  the  opinion,  that  perception  is  a  sort  of 
reasoning  operation,  more  or  less  unconsciously  and  auto- 
matically performed,  which  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  the 
characters,  qualitative  and  spatial,  of  external  objects  are  treated, 
combined,  and  arranged,  by  the  nervous  apparatus,  and  handed 
to  consciousness  in  their  new  form  as  fully  developed  percepts. 

14 


210  PERCEPTION. 

We  have  already  mentioned  that  the  localisation  of  organic 
visceral  sensations  is  confused  and  indistinct.  The  exonenral 
reference  by  the  special  senses  is  much  more  accurate  and 
defined.  The  mind  passes  from  the  mental  phenomenon,  the 
sensation,  to  the  contemplation  of  the  object  which  it  serves 
to  qualify.  The  theory,  that  in  sensations  of  hearing,  touch, 
sight,  and  pain,  we  are  accustomed  to  distinguish  from  among 
the  other  elements  the  elements  of  voluininousness,  has  much 
in  its  favour.  Professor  James  holds,  that  this  element  of 
voluminousness  is  discernible  in  each  and  every  sensation, 
though  more  developed  in  some  than  in  others,  and  that  it 
is  the  original  sensation  of  space,  out  of  which  all  the  exact 
knowledge  about  space  that  we  afterwards  come  to  have  is 
woven  by  processes  of  discrimination,  association,  and  selection. 

■  The  perception  of  spatial  order. — To  account  for  the  order  in 
which  space  perceptions  are  arranged  in  our  minds,  two  theories 
have  been  advocated. 

1.  By  the  one,  the  spatial  order  would  appear  to  result 
from  the  massing  together  of  a  multitude  of  sense-space 
phenomena  in  consciousness,  and  this,  through  the  inter- 
vention of  physiological  processes,  equivalent  to  the  pro- 
cesses of  the  "  mind-stuffists."  Thus  the  abstract  pheno- 
menon of  spatial  order  is  supposed  to  be  formed  by  the 
synthesis  of  concrete  perceptions ;  the  physiological  processes, 
which  correspond  to  the  estimation  of  figures,  magnitudes, 
and  distances,  are  held  to  combine  in  an  orderly  ^^'ay,  giving, 
as  the  result  of  their  combination,  an  abstract  apprehension 
of  spatial  order. 

2.  The  other  theory  assumes  that,  for  the  orderly  arrange- 
ment of  a  multitude  of  sense-spaces  in  consciousness,  something 
more  than  their  mere  separate  existence  is  required.  In  order 
that  a  sensation  may  be  discriminated  spatially,  it  is  essential 
that  the  various  extents  of  the  objects  should  be  perceived 
as  part  of  the  total  extent.  This  would  •  imply,  either  that  the 
various  extents  are  perceived  in  a  definite  order,  or  that  they 
are  perceived  by  the  mind  synchronously,  and  at  once.  The 
difficulty,  therefore,  arises  of  having  to  account  for  the  dis- 
crimination not  only  of  co-existent  spatial  extents,  but  also  of 
co-existent  sounds  and  extents  of  other  senses. 


LOCALISATION.  211 

Some  authors  uphold  the  view  that  a  new  element  comef^* 
into  play  when  the  mind  estimates  or  perceives  some  spatial 
relation.  The  relation,  when  perceived,  however,  is  nothing- 
more  than  a  sensation  which  is  perceived.  That  is  to  saj',  the 
relation  of  two  bodies  in  space,  the  line  of  demarcation  bet^^'een 
the  two,  or  the  particular  forms  of  transition  between  two 
sensations,  are  as  definitel}^  sensational,  in  their  sul-)jective 
aspects,  as  the  sensations  of  all  related  bodies  themselves. 
Spatial  knowledge,  therefore,  like  every  other  form  of  know 
ledge,  as  we  know  it,  depends  upon  sensations.  The  mind 
would  appear  to  pass  from  its  comprehensive  view  of  the 
vaster  extents  to  an  analysis  of  spatial  relations  in  detail. 

Localisation,  or  the  theory  of  '■  local  signs."  —  It  is 
assumed,  that  every  visual  and  tactual  sensation  derives  its 
peculiar  shade  of  feeling  from  the  peculiarities  of  the  end- 
organ  of  sense  stimulated.  These  local  contrasts  of  sensations 
have  been  termed  "  specific  qualia,''  '•  loccd-colouriwis,"  or 
"  local  sicpis."  In  referring  to  a  local  sign,  we  refer  to  a  thing 
having  a  position  in  space,  and  this  is  determined  by  its 
relations  to  other  positions  in  space.  When  we  refer  to  two 
separate  points  ^^'e  become  a^^■are  of  an  interval,  which  is 
unexcited,  between  the  two  points.  We  can  localise  one  point 
only  in  its  relation  to  the  \^'hole  body,  and  two  points  in 
their  relation  to  each  other.  In  both  cases,  however,  we  refer 
the  points  to  some  part  of  a  visual  image  of  the  body.  In  an 
ordinary  way  we  are  apt  to  utilise  the  fittest  part  of  our  sensor}' 
mechanism  to  discriminate  sensory  events.  We  employ  the 
most  sensitive  parts  of  our  limbs  to  investigate  the  nature  of  a 
local  stimulus,  and  in  a  similar  way  the  fovea  and  yellow  spot 
of  the  retina  are  employed  when  we  wish  to  focus  our  attention 
more  particularly  upon  some  visual  object.  The  movement 
bringing  the  fovea  into  direct  action  involves  a  transition  of 
action  from  the  retinal  elements  first  stimulated  to  the  elements 
possessing  greater  discriminative  sensibility.  In  this  way  we 
get  an  "  ideal  streak "  (James)  awakened  first  at  the  point 
of  retinal  stimulation  and  extended  to  the  centre  of  focus. 
Professor  James  believes  that  the  result  of  this  incessant  trac- 
ing of  radii  is,  that  whenever  a  local  sign  is  awakened  by  a  spot 
of  light  falling  upon  it,  it  recalls  forthwith,  even  though  the 


212  PERCEPTION. 

\eyeball  be  unmoved,  the  local  signs  of  all  the  other  points  which 
lie  between  the  first  spots  stiniiilated  and  the  fovea.  In  this 
way  no  ray  of  light  can  fall  on  any  retinal  spot  withoiit  the 
local  sign  of  that  spot  revealing  to  us,  by  recalling  the  line  of 
its  most  habitual  associates,  its  direction  and  distance  from  the 
centre  of  the  field.  The  fovea  is  thus  regarded  as  the  origin  of 
a  system  of  "  polar  co-ordinates,"  in  relation  to  which  each  and 
every  retinal  point  has,  through  an  incessantly  repeated  pro- 
cess  of  association,  its  distance  and  direction  determined. 

The  physical  basis  of  this  process  of  localising  by  local 
signs  is,  therefore,  supposed  to  depend  upon  the  connection 
between  sensory  and  motor  nerves ;  and,  according  to  Lotze, 
the  local  character  of  ever}^  colour-impression  is  due  to  the 
excitations  of  the  central  endings  of  the  motor  nerves,  and  the 
sign  determines  the  motor  tendencies,  or  associated  feelings  of 
movement.  The  theory  of  local  signs,  as  applied  to  tactual 
sensations,  has  received  much  attention,  and  it  is  regarded  as 
comparatively  certain  that  local  signs  facilitate  the  localisation 
of  sensations  of  pressure,  and  that  the  same  stimulus,  acting 
upon  different  nerve-fibres  separately,  also  causes  a  slightly 
perceptible  difference  in  quality  of  the  resulting  sensation. 
From  these  considerations  we  are  now  in  a  position  to  recognise, 
that  the  capability  of  localisation  of  sensations  of  sight  and  of 
pressure  is  due  to  the  difference  in  the  sensations  produced 
when  a  stimulus  acts  upon  different  nerve-ends  separatelj^. 
The  localisation  is  brought  about  by  the  aid  of  association. 
The  mere  sensation  in  itself  is  insufficient ;  it  only  aids  us  in 
localising  by  means  of  its  local  sign,  and  this  again  is  further 
aided  by  its  relativity  as  evidenced  through  the  "  ideal-streak." 
Eccentric  Projection  of  Sensation. — How  a  sensation 
can  be  projected  into  space  is  quite  inconceivable.  We  are  not 
warranted  in  assuming  that  a  sensation  becomes  manifested 
psychically  in  the  region  of  the  bodily  processes  from  which  it 
has  its  starting  point.  Sensations  are  the  mental  equivalents 
of  cerebral  processes,  and  these  cerebral  processes  are  the  physio- 
logical effects  of  physically-determined  processes  elsewhere. 
The  eccentric  projection  of  sensations  is  thought  to  involve 
a  somewhat  different  class  of  sensations,  and  the  process  of 
attention  is  regarded  as  often  determining  between  the  motifs  to 


ECCEXTEIC  PROJECTION.  213 

localisation  and  those  to  eccentric  projection.  The  two  mntiially 
opposing  views  are :  (1)  The  system  of  mnscnlar  sensations  of 
movement  and  the  system  of  visual  sensations  are  thought  to 
combine  to  develop  our  perceptions  of  objective  space  in  its 
three  dimensions ;  the  sensations  of  touch  being  subseqiiently 
projected  into  a  space  thiis  originally  constituted  by  combined 
muscular  sensations  and  visual  sensations.  The  eye  and  hand 
in  motion  are,  therefore,  thought  to  project  their  extended 
objects  into  a  space  which  they  develop  themselves ;  while 
the  ear  and  the  nose  project  their  perceptions  into  a  space 
which  they  are  compelled  to  assume  on  the  aiithority  of  the 
other  senses  (Ladd).  (2)  In  opposition  to  this  view,  we  are 
more  inclined  to  believe,  with  James,  that  the  objectivity  with 
which  each  of  our  sensations  originally  comes  to  us  is  not,  in 
the  first  instance,  relative  to  any  other  sensation.  That  is  to 
say,  our  perception  of  space  is  jrrimarili/  one  of  vastness ;  the 
spatial  relations  themselves  are  secondarih/  determined  by  a 
process  of  anabasis,  and  this  by  the  activities  of  our  muscular 
and  visual  senses.  When  we  speak  of  hallucinations  and  the 
various  perversions  of  the  sense  of  movement,  we  shall  see 
that  we  almost  constantly  regard  the  seat  of  stimulation  as 
the  seat  of  sensation  also.  This  tendency  is  the  natural  out- 
come of  our  habitiial  reference  to  sensations  as  exoneural.  In 
our  ordinary  waking  moments  we  regard  many  of  our  sensa- 
tions as  external  realities ;  others  we  regard  as  merely  the 
mental  counterparts  or  imaginings  of  physically-occasioned 
sensations.  In  reality,  of  course,  the  sensation  is  in  both 
cases  the  psj'chical  equivalent  of  cerebral  effects,  either  peri- 
pherally or  centrally  determined.  In  dream  states,  and  in 
artificially  induced  hypnosis,  however,  the  hallucinatory  in- 
tensification of  the  exoneural  reference  of  sensations  is  often 
morbidly  exaggerated.  Similarly,  in  the  insane,  passing  ideas 
may  acquire  hallucinatory  streng-th,  and  there  is  failure  to 
recognise  their  true  objective  import.  We  shall  have  occasion, 
however,  to  return  to  these  considerations,  so  we  now  pass  to 
the  question  as  to  how  the  various  actual  presentations  of 
sense  are  elaborated  by  the  mind  itself. 

Spatial  discrimination   is   dependent  upon — 

1.  Certain  conditions  of  the  sense-spaces — i.e..  each  space 


214  PEECEPTION. 

must  contain  its  special  local  sign ;  two  spaces  which  have 
the  same  local  sign  cannot  be  discriminated  from  each  other. 
Unless  these  local  sense-spaces  are  excited  by  external  stimnli, 
there  is  little  or  no  local  difference  of  feeling. 

2.  Partial  stimulation  must  be  possible,  otherwise  no  power 
of  differentiation  would  be  afforded  to  the  sensitive  siirface. 
In  order  that  a  sensation  jna,j  be  aroused,  the  local  differences 
must  have  their  appropriate  or  specific  quale. 

3.  There  must  be  sensations  of  active  or  passive  motion. 
In  passive  motion  the  sensibility  of  the  joints  is  one  of  the 
essential  factors  in  determining  the  sensation  ;  whilst  in  active 
motion  sensations  of  position  are  of  great  importance.  Our 
sense  of  movement  is  much  more  delicate  than  our  sense  of 
position,  and  the  important  part  that  the  former  sense  plays  in 
our  perceptive  activity''  has  given  rise  to  the  opinion  that 
the  muscular  sense  is  the  primary  source  of  all  our  space- 
perceptions. 

4.  The  sense-spaces  must  be  measured  against  each  other — 
i.e.,  the  experiences  of  one  sensory  surface  must  be  com- 
pared and  corrected,  if  necessary,  by  comparison  with  the 
experience  of  other  sensory  surfaces.  In  this  way  a  com- 
parison of  spatial  surfaces  or  extent  is  obtained.  When  we 
are  not  able  to  estimate  the  dimensions  of  an  object  by  the 
superposition  of  one  surface  iipon  another,  or  by  the  super- 
position of  one  thing  upon  many  sui'faces,  we  naturally  fall 
into  erroneous  or  illusor}^   assumptions. 

5.  The  mind  must  be  able  to  interpret  the  different  sense 
experiences.  The  mind  experiences  a  sensation  through  the 
instrumentality  of  the  local  sign.  With  the  interpretation  of 
the  objective  causality  of  the  local  sign,  data  from  other  senses 
enter  into  serial  relation.  The  act  of  attention  to  the  several 
data  thus  presented  in  a  definite  and  relative  order  favours  the 
tendency  of  these  data  to  be  located  together,  so  that  ultimately 
their  several  locations  tend  to  merge  into  one  location,  and  are 
apprehended  as  one  extent,  yielding  on  analysis  its  several 
data.*  This  tendency  to  form  serial  or  intimatelj^  connected 
sense-data  perceptions,  is,  in  great  part,  the  apparent  physio- 
logical basis   of  what  has   been   termed  intuitive   pei'ception. 

*  Prof.  James,  "Principles  of  Psychology,"  vol.  ii.  p.  182. 


SMELL,  TASTE,   AND  HEAEIXG.  215 

When  sense-data  originate  from  stimuli  affecting  two  or  more 
points  of  the  same  sense-organ,  the  resulting  sensations  are 
arranged  imaginatively  in  an  exoneural  serial  order.  The  mind 
apprehends  first  one  sensation  then  another,  and  the  image  of 
their  spatial  relations  is  thus  analysed  b}^  the  mind.  The  mind 
itself  does  not  attend  to  the  several  local  signs  simultaneously, 
and  with  an  equal  amoiTnt  of  intensity.  First  one  is  attended 
to,  then  another,  and  the  relative  series  forms  a  more  or  less 
indistinct  perceptual  image.  Thus  it  would  appear  that  the 
intuition  of  space  is.  pi'imarily,  one  of  vastness ;  the  spatial 
relations  of  stimuli,  affecting  the  various  spaces  of  the  same 
sense-organ,  being  determined  by  an  analytic  or  serial  process. 
Special  Channels  of  Perception.  — We  have  already 

seen  that  the  senses  of  touch  and  sight  differ  from  the  other 
senses  in  their  greater  power  of  local  discrimination.  These 
senses  only  give  us  knowledge  of  the  primary  c[ualities  of 
objects.  By  their  activities  we  obtain  our  empirical  knowledge 
of  space ;  space  cpialities  of  objects ;  knowledge  of  figure,  size, 
and  mechanical  or  force  properties.  This  knowledge  is  of  more 
importance  to  us  than  that  gained  from  the  other  senses.  In 
order  to  complete  our  account  of  the  synthesis  of  simple  sensa- 
tions we  must  devote  some  attention  to  the  presentations  ot 
sense  which  come  through  the  special  senses. 

1.  Perceptions  of  smell  and  taste  differ  in  fineness,  duration, 
and  accompanying  tone  of  feeling.  The  pure  perceptions  of 
these  sense-organs  possess  little  or  no  spatial  value.  Taste 
involves  an  element  of  touch  and  muscular  sensation. 

2.  Perceptions  of  hearinij. — Sensations  of  sound  are  localised 
only  through  complicated  indirect  inferences.  Those  abnormal 
sensations  which  are  localised  as  originating  within  the  ear,  or 
in  the  physical  apparatiis  near  to  the  ear,  are  termed  '■  entotic." 
Subsequently  we  shall  see  that  these  entotic  sensations  are 
often  misinterpreted  by  the  insane.  In  some  instances,  the 
po^^■er  to  distinguish  between  entotic  sounds  and  those  having 
external  origin  is  almost  entirely  lost.  Whether  a  distinct 
spatial  contiguit}'  in  the  arrangement  of  several  tones  heard  at 
the  same  time  is  ever  developed  is  open  to  discussion.  Some 
authors  hold,  that  the  favourable  condition  for  the  development 
of  the  spatial  character  of  our  sensations  is  to  be  found  in  the 


216  PERCEPTION. 

sinmltaneous  existence  of  several  sensations  alike  in  quality. 
This,  however,  wonld  appear  to  be  only  in  part  true.  As  we 
have  already  seen,  the  existence  of  several  acoustic  sensations 
alike  in  qiiality  would  depend  upon  the  existence  of  several 
tones  corresponding  to  the  number  of  vibrations  of  the  sound- 
wave per  second,  and  the  combination  of  like  tones  would  only 
increase  the  mass  of  the  sound-waves,  and  thereby  cause  an 
increase  in  the  intensity  of  the  acoustic  sensation.  Sensations 
of  sound  vary  in  quality,  and  it  is  by  this  very  difference  in 
quality  that  the  musician  is  able  to  refer  to  the  spatial  relations 
of  the  component  parts  of  chords. 

Undoubtedly,  we  do  not  find  siifficient  explanation  of  the 
spatial  relations  of  sound  in  the  highly-differentiated  characters 
of  the  auditory  fibres,  and  their  adaptation  to  the  niimerous 
qualities  of  sound ;  nor  do  we  get  much  aid  from  the  elements 
of  touch  or  muscular  sensibility.  We  can  form  a  rough  estimate 
of  the  direction  or  distance  of  a  sound  by  the  adaptive  move- 
ments of  the  head.  Some  aiithors  believe  that  an  approximate 
judgment  is  possible,  owing  to  slight  concomitant  sensations  of 
touch  on  the  skin,  appearing  in  different  localities,  according  to 
the  direction  of  the  sound  produced  by  delicate  sympathetic 
vibrations  of  the  hairs  in  the  concha,  and  possibly,  also,  by 
vibration  of  the  bones  (cranio-tympanal  conduction).  The 
estimation  of  the  spatial  relations  of  several  combined  acoustic 
stimuli  is  largely  aided  by  the  sensations  of  sight.  Some 
musicians  relegate  the  component  parts  of  a  common  chord  to 
their  visual  series  of  intervals  or  spaces.  With  them,  the 
varying  qualities  of  tones,  of  a  major  or  minor  chord,  or  even 
the  series  of  tones  of  a  melody,  are  projected  into  visual  space. 
Thus,  in  the  analj^sis  of  musical  sounds,  reference  is  made  to 
these  visual  spatial  relations,  the  knowledge  of  which  has  been 
gained  by  experience.  The  spatial  relations  of  sound  would, 
therefore,  appear  to  be  mainly  determined  by  secondary  asso- 
ciative processes. 

Usually,  the  localisation  of  sound  is  thought  to  be  explained 
mainly  by  reference  to  the  data  derived  from  sensations  of  touch 
and  sight.  It  is  necessary,  however,  that  we  should  take  some 
account  of  other  factors  which  have  been  regarded  as  essential. 
There  are  two  opposing  theories  of  sound-localisation. 


HEARING.  217 

I.  («)  Aniditoiy  sensations  in  the  right  and  left  ear  are 
different,  and  this  original  difference  is  the  foundation  upon 
which,  by  means  of  association,  the  whole  localisation  is  built  up 
(Stumpf).  (h)  Sound-stimuli  arouse  special  space-sensations  in 
the  semicircular  canals.  The  nerves  of  the  canals  act  like  a 
sense-organ,  which  is  stimulated  in  various  portions  when  the 
stimulus  enters  from  different  directions  (Preyer).  (c)  The 
localisation  depends  upon  a  judgment  of  the  difference  of 
the  intensities  received  by  the  two  ears  (v.  Kries,  Bloch). 
(d)  Sensations  of  touch  in  the  shell  and  drum  of  the  ear 
assist  in  the  localisation. 

II.  In  opposition  to  these  theories  Miinsterberg*  upholds 
the  view,  that  the  assigning  of  direction  to  sounds  rests  upon 
the  union  of  sensations  of  sound  and  sensations  of  movement, 
the  latter  originating  from  actual  or  intended  movements  of 
the  head  in  the  direction  of  the  sounding  body.  The  objection 
has  been  raised  by  v.  Kries,  Stumpf,  and  others,  that,  if  we 
localise  a  tone  by  uniting  it  with  a  sensation  of  movement, 
how  is  it  that  we  are  able  to  localise  two  different  tones 
that  are  strictly  simultaneous  ?  This  difficulty  must  arise  with 
every  single  instance  of  association.  Two  sensations  of  colour 
may  arise  simultaneously  within  the  field  of  vision,  but  the 
perception  of  the  qualities  of  the  two  sensations  is  not  neces- 
sarily also  simultaneous.  The  perceptive  process  is  essentially 
analytic,  and  the  attributes  of  the  object  presented  are  viewed 
seriatim.  Mlinsterberg  grants  that  the  objections  of  v.  Kries 
and  Stumpf  point  to  a  universal  defect  in  the  usual  psycho- 
physical theories.  This  defect,  we  believe,  is  due  to  the 
misconception  that  because  two  sensations  may  arise  within 
the  same  field  simultaneously,  therefore  the  perception  of  the 
cjualities  of  the  sensations  must  also  be  simultaneous.  Preyer's 
theory  is  untenable  both  physically  and  physiologically. 

From  the  experiments  of  Mlinsterberg  and  Pierce,  con- 
ducted at  the  Harvard  psj'chological  laboratory,  it  was  found 
that  a  conscious  relation  of  tones  to  either  of  the  ears  does  not 
exist ;  that  sensations  of  touch  play  no  essential  role  ;  and  that 
Ave  are  not  justified  in  speaking  of  the  difference  of  intensities 
in  the  two  ears.  Many  things  go  to  show  that  the  accom- 
*  -'Beitrage,"  H.  ii.  §  182. 


218  PERCEPTION. 

panying  sensations  of  movement  are  to  be  regarded  as  the 
psychological  basis  of  auditory  spatial  relations.  The  results 
of  the  various  rotation  experiments  indicated,  that  the  localisa- 
tion depended  upon  sensations  of  movement,  and  not  iipon 
the  comparison  of  auditory  intensities.  Further,  the  localisa- 
tion was  independent  of  any  misplacements  in  the  visual  field.* 

3.  PerceiMons  of  totich. — The  most  important  factor  in  the 
perception  of  touch  is  the  '^  sense  of  locality."  Weber  measured 
the  fineness  of  this  sense,  in  regard  to  the  skin,  by  ascertain- 
ing the  minimum  distance  at  which  tAvo  points  could  be  per- 
ceived as  distinct  in  different  localities  of  the  surface  of  the 
body.  The  so-called  "sensation  circles"  are  those  areas  within 
which  the  minimum  distances  of  the  dividers'  points  are  distin- 
guished as  two  points.  These  areas  are  in  reality  elliptical,  and 
have  their  major  axis  extending  down  the  limb.  They  decrease 
in  size  as  we  pass  from  the  trunk  to  the  peripherj^  of  the 
limbs,  and  this  depends  mainly  upon  the  facility  of  the  parts 
for  exercise.  By  practice  this  discriminative  ability  can  be 
considerably  increased.  Within  the  circles  two  sensations  can 
only  be  discriminated  as  one.  Sometimes  two  points  are  only 
felt  as  one  Mdien  the  pressure  spots  stimulated  are  separated 
from  each  other  by  other  pressure  spots.  This  fact  seems  to 
indicate  that,  in  addition  to  the  local  signs,  accompanying  ideas 
of  motion  play  an  important  part  in  determining  the  ability 
for  localisation.  The  distinction  of  neighbouring  sensations 
from  one  another  is  held  to  be  only  possible  by  means  of  local 
signs  and  ideas  of  motion.  To  account  for  the  "  sensation 
circles  "  of  the  skin  many  theories  have  been  advanced.  These 
are  :— 

(1.)  Each  circle  has  only  one  nerve-fibre,  whose  terminal 
expansion  covers  the  circle,  and  whose  excitation  is  represented 
in  consciousness  by  a  sensation  of  a  special  value. 

(2.)  Each  circle  contains  a  number  of  pressure  spots,  and 
each  pressure  spot  has  a  sensory  fibre.  Each  point  within  the 
circle  is  itself  sensitive,  and  the  limits  of  none  of  the  circles 
are  fixed  as  would  be  the  expanse  of  a  single  nerve-fibre 
distributed  over  them  (Goldschneider). 

(3.)  Each  circle  contains  a  number  of  isolated  nerve-fibres, 
*  "Psychological  Eeview,"  September,  1894,  p.  475. 


TOUCH.  219 

and  in  order  to  produce  the  impression  of  two  localised  sensa- 
tions, several  nnexcited  fibres  must  exist  between  the  two 
excited.  The  number  of  these  unexcited  fibres  serves  the 
mind  as  a  kind  of  means  for  the  approximate  measurement 
of  distances  on  the  skin  (Weber). 

(4.)  The  circles  represent  the  local  difference  bet^^■een  the 
points  at  which  a  stimulus  must  be  applied  to  the  skin,  in 
order  to  produce  enough  of  difference  in  the  colour-tone  of  the 
resiilting  sensations  to  make  them  observable  by  the  mind 
(Wundt). 

Under  tactual  perception  we  are  able  to  determine — (1)  The 
weight,  hardness,  or  smoothness  of  a  material  object.  (2)  The 
position  of  points  both  in  our  own  organism,  and  in  external 
bodies  (size  and  figure).  (3)  The  sit;iation  of  objects  through 
movement — (a)  changes  in  velocity  of  movement,  (/>)  re- 
versing movements,  (c)  repetition  of  movements.  (4)  The 
size  and  form  of  objects  through  movement.  Tactual  percep- 
tion proper  is  acquired  by  movement,  and  there  is  interpreta- 
tion of  the  local  characters  of  sensations  by  movement.  (5) 
The  simultaneous  perception  of  points.  The  tactual  perception 
of  space  is  a  product  of  two  factors,  movement  and  muscular 
sensation,  and  a  plurality  of  sensations  of  contact.  (6)  The 
solidity  of  an  object.  (7)  The  discrimination  of  single  things, 
and  of  a  number.  (8)  The  perception  of  moving  objects  (under 
this  must  be  distinguished  the  difference  between  objective 
and  subjective  movement).  (9)  The  sensations  of  temperature. 
(Our  sensations  of  temperature  vary  according  to  the  tempera- 
ture of  the  subject.)  Our  space,  however,  will  not  permit  us 
to  enter  into  the  numerous  details  of  these  relations.  We 
must  content  ourselves  with  a  few  remarks  upon  the  discrimi- 
nation of  the  amount  and  direction  of  motion  in  contact  with 
the  body. 

The  discriminative  sensibility  of  the  skin  is  much  greater 
for  motion  than  for  touch,  and  this  power  of  discrimination 
varies  with  different  parts  of  the  skin.  Stanley  Hall  found 
that  these  differences  do  not  completeh'  correspond  to  the 
differences  met  with  in  the  sensation-circles.  The  fact  that 
our  sensibility  to  motion  is  so  much  greater  in  each  area  of 
the  skin  than  our  susceptibility  to  the  distance  of  stationary 


220  PERCEPTIOX. 

points,  is  held  to  accord  with  the  theory  of  local  signs,  and  it 
is  thought  that  onr  ability  to  localise  the  dermal  sensations  is 
dependent  npon  the  degree  and  rate  of  the  clian^jes  in  the 
colour-tone  of  these  sensations.  Other  facts  of  importance. 
derived  from  the  experiments  of  Stanley  Hall,  may  be  briefly 
mentioned.  AVe  are  more  likely,  when  in  doubt,  to  judge 
motion  on  the  surface  of  the  limbs  to  be  up  rather  than  do^n 
their  axis;  on  the  breast,  the  shoulder-blades,  and  the  back, 
the  tendency  is  to  jtidge  motion  to  be  toward  the  head.  The 
rate  of  movement  causes  variations :  thus,  a  very  rapid  move- 
ment may  appear  to  be  shortened,  or  a  very  slow  movement 
may  not  be  discriminated  at  all.  Heavy  weights  seem  to  move 
faster  than  light  ones  going  on  at  the  same  rate:  but  here 
other  sensations  are  called  out  by  the  deep  pressure,  com- 
bined with  those  of  contact.* 

4.  The  perceiAion  of  muscular  sensations. — The  chief  theo- 
ries to  account  for  the  so-called  muscular  sensations  have 
already  been  given.  The  theory  that  these  sensations  are- 
specific  sensations,  dependent  on  a  specific  nerve-apparatus 
of  sense,  which  has  its  end-organs  in  the  muscle-fibre, 
finds  the  most  favour.  It  is  doubtful,  however,  whether 
the  muscular  sensations  do  differ  qualitatively.  They  may 
have  a  different  colour-tone,  and  act  like  local  signs ;  but  the 
muscular  sensations  alone  do  not  afford  us  sufficient  data  to 
account  for  our  perceptions  of  spatial  qualities  and  relations. 
In  addition  to  the  muscular  sensations  the  tactual  discrimina- 
tive element  is  essential  for  the  perception  of  spatial  relations. 
Several  writers  uphold  the  view,  that  all  spatial  measurement 
arises  primarily  from  the  perception  of  muscular  movement. 

Professor  James  believes  that  no  evidence  of  muscular- 
measurements  exists:  but  that  all  the  facts  may  be  explained 
by  surface-sensibility,  provided  we  take  the  joint  surfaces  also 
into  account.  Goldschneider  goes  further,  and  believes  that  the 
joint-surfaces  alone  are  the  starting  points  of  sensations  by 
which  the  movements  of  our  limbs  are  perceived.  From  an 
analysis  of  the  experiments  of  Goldschneider  and  Lewinski,  it 
would  appear,  however,  that  the  joint-feeling  is  not  the  sole 
source  of  spatial  perception  of  movement.  The  absolute  space- 
*  Ladd,  "  Phys.  Psych.r  P-  411. 


^TSUAL  SPACE.  221 

value  is  derived  from  secondary  suggestive  influences  brought 
about  by  associated  tactual  and  visual  perceptions.  Professor 
James  says.  "The  joint-feeling  can  excellently  serve  as  a  map 
on  a  reduced  scale,  of  a  reality  which  the  imagination  can 
identify  at  its  pleasui'e  A\*ith  this  or  that  sensible  extension 
simultaneously  known  in  some  other  way.*"  The  muscular 
sensations  in  themselves  give  us  knowledge  of  spatial  relations 
only  in  an  indirect  way  by  the  efiects  of  muscular  contraction 
upon  the  surfaces  of  the  skin  and  joints.  Spatial  discrimina- 
tion would,  therefore,  appear  to  be  related  to  the  efiects  of  move- 
ments upon  these  surfaces,  and  the  secondary  suggestions  of 
visual  imagination.  James  accounts  for  the  phenomenon  of 
eccentric  projection  by  the  localisation  of  the  joint-feeling  in 
a  space  simultaneously  I'ecognised  from  other  sources — i.e.. 
thi'ough  the  skin  or  the  eye. 

5.  The  percepiion  of  visual  space. — In  the  perception  of 
smell,  taste,  touch,  and  hearing,  we  have  seen  that  there 
is  usually  a  corresponding  visual  presentation.  According  to 
the  Berkeleian  theory  the  visual  sense  derives  much  of  its 
knowledge  of  external  things  from  touch.  The  local  discrimi- 
native sensibility  of  the  retina  is  insufficient  by  itself  to 
determine  spatial  relations.  Volkmann*  gives  eight  difierent 
data  which  are  used  in  monocular  vision  for  perceiving  the 
third  dimension  of  space  and  of  visual  objects  in  space — viz.. 
monocular  vision.  (1)  Extent ;  (2)  clearness,  of  the  complex 
of  the  sensations  of  colour  and  light,  as  dependent  on  distance : 
(3)  the  perspective  elevation  of  the  bottom  of  distant  objects 
above  the  horizon ;  (4)  the  covering  of  known  distant  objects 
by  those  placed  nearer  ;  (5)  the  alterations  of  light  and  shadow 
on  the  curved  surfaces  of  the  object,  according  as  they  are 
nearer  or  more  remote :  (6)  the  perspective  contraction  of  the 
retinal  image ;  (7)  the  change  of  the  A"isor  angle  in  proportion 
to  the  distance  of  the  object ;  (S)  the  muscular  sensations  of 
the  accommodation  of  the  eye. 

To  these  data  Laddt  adds  two  othei-s  for  binocular  vision — 
viz.,  (9)  the  stereoscopic  double  images :  (10)  the  sensations 
arising  from  convergence  of  the  axes.     The  question  has  been 

*  "Lehrb.  d.  Psyehologie,"  ii.  p.  S-l. 
t  "  Phys,  Psyeh.,"  p.  421. 


222  PERCEPTION. 

raised  whether  tactiial  sensations  which  accompany  the  move- 
ments of  the  eyeballs  in  their  sockets  do  not  possess  some 
spatial  value.  The  local  ([uale  of  the  retinal  signs  has  already 
been  referred  to. 

In  an  act  of  visual  perception  certain  data  are  essential. 
There  must  be  sensations  of  light  and  colour  simultaneously 
present  in  consciousness.  The  subsequent  perception  of  their 
spatial  relations  only  becomes  possible  with  the  help  of  retinal 
signs,  and  the  series  of  sensations  derived  from  the  movements 
of  accommodation.  Lipps,  Wundt,  Mlinsterberg,  and  others, 
share  this  view  of  the  importance  of  eye-movements,  and  the 
sense  of  their  position  in  determining  a  spatial  series.  Volk- 
mann,  Hering,  Helmholtz,  Goldschneider,  James,  and  others, 
on  the  other  hand,  believe  that  eye-muscle  contractions  have 
only  a  feeble  share  in  determining  sensations  of  the  third 
dimension.  For  our  part,  we  believe,  that  the  purel}^  muscular 
sensory  element  plays  quite  a  subordinate  part  to  that  of  the 
tactual  and  retinal  elements  in  the  estimation  of  space. 

Wundt*  saj'-s,  there  are  three  things  to  be  determined  in 
explaining  perceptions  of  sight :  (1)  the  retinal  image  of  the 
eye  at  rest,  and  the  motifs  which  it  furnishes ;  (2)  the  single 
eye  as  moved,  and  the  influence  of  these  movements ;  (3)  the 
conditions  furnished  by  the  existence  and  relations  of  the  two 
eyes  exercising  their  function  in  common.  We  have,  there- 
fore, to  consider  the  retinal  field  of  vision,  and  the  fields  of 
monocular  and  binocular  vision. 

The  problem  of  the  physiological  process,  which  underlies 
the  perception  of  distance,  has  occupied  the  attention  of  many 
psychologists.  Helmholtz  and  Wundt  affirm,  that  the  organic 
eye-process  pure  and  simple,  without  the  aid  of  other  sense 
data,  cannot  give  us  any  sensation  of  a  spatial  kind  at  all. 
That  it  does  not  depend  upon  the  combination  of  images 
through  binocular  vision,  is  proved  b}^  the  fact  that  one-eyed 
people  have  it.  Nor  can  it  be  explained  by  convergence  or 
accommodation  feelings.  Lipps  concludes  that  our  knowledge  of 
the  third  dimension  must  needs  be  conceptual,  and  not  sensa- 
tional or  visually  intuitive.  Stumpf  thinks  that  the  primitive 
sensation  of  distance  must  have  an  immediate  phj^sical  ante- 
*  "  Physiolog.  Psychologie,"  ii.  p.  62. 


VISUAL  SPACE.  22o 

cedent,  either  in  the  shape  of  an  organic  alteration  accom- 
panying the  process  of  accommodation,  or  else  given  directly 
in  the  specific  energy  of  the  optic  nerve.  He  also  thinks  that 
it  is  the  absolute  distance  of  the  spot  fixated  which  is  thus 
primitively,  immediately,  and  physiologically  given,  and  not 
the  relative  distances  of  other  things  about  this  spot.  James 
believes  the  neui-al  process  is  to  be  found  in  the  number  of 
retinal  elements  affected  by  the  light ;  but  that  in  the  case  of 
"  pretension  "  or  mere  farness,  it  is  more  complicated,  and  is 
still  to  seek.  He  says,  "  The  two  sensible  qualities  unite  in  the 
primitive  visual  bigness.  The  measurement  of  their  various 
amounts  against  each  other  obeys  the  general  laws  of  all  such 
measurements.  We  discover  their  equivalencies  by  means  of 
objects,  apply  the  same  units  to  both,  and  translate  them 
into  each  other  so  habitually,  that  at  last  they  get  to  seem  to  us 
even  quite  similar  in  kind.  This  final  appearance  of  homo- 
geneity may  perhaps  be  facilitated  by  the  fact  that  in  binocular 
vision  two  points  situated  on  the  prolongation  of  the  optical 
axis  of  one  of  the  eyes,  so  that  the  near  one  hides  the  far  one, 
are  by  the  other  eye  seen  laterally  apart." 

When  we  come  to  consider  the  various  illusions  of  the 
senses,  we  shall  return  to  the  view  of  James,  that  every  spatial 
determination  of  things  is  originally  given  in  the  shape  of 
a  sensation  of  the  eyes.  He  sums  up  his  theory  in  the  state- 
ment that  "  measurement  implies  a  stuff  to  measure ;  retinal 
sensations  give  the  stuff;  objective  things  form  the  yard-stick  ; 
motion  does  the  measuring  operation.''  The  numberless  inves- 
tigations and  discussions  which  have  been  brought  to  bear  upon 
the  question  of  binocular  vision,  and  to  explain  how  it  is  that  a 
double  retinal  image  is  only  perceived  as  one,  cannot  occupy 
our  attention  here;  nor  can  we  afford  space  to  elaborate  the 
theories  as  to  how  vision  receives  its  stereometric  character  by 
association  with  ideas  of  motion  and  touch.  The  law  of  Weber 
is  only  valid  in  the  case  of  sight  for  medium  distances  in  the 
estimate  of  magnitudes  of  extension.  It  remains  for  us  now 
to  recognise  the  relationship  of  the  data  presented  to  us  in 
the  attempt  we  have  made  to  explain  perception. 

We  have  seen  that  these  data  depend  upon  external 
stimuli,  and  we    have  assumed  the  existence   of  specific    and 


224  PERCEPTION. 

qualitatively-different  functional  nerve-elements,  by  the  instru- 
mentality of  which,  either  separately  or  in  combination  with 
each  other,  these  data  are  presented  to  the  psychical  subject. 
Our  efforts,  however,  have  ended  in  a  mere  enumeration  of  data 
and  their  possible  laws  of  analysis  and  synthesis. 

The  influence  of  the  retinal  field  of  vision  in  determining 
spatial  perception  has  already  occupied  our  attention.  We  do 
not  hold,  that  the  retinal  field,  when  its  mosaic  of  nervous 
elements  is  stimulated,  alone  can  determine  a  spatial  series ; 
nor  do  we  believe  that  sensations  of  light  and  colour  would  have 
space-form  if  they  only  came  from  an  excited  but  motionless 
retina  without  being  combined  with  other  sensations  of  a 
spatial  series ;  we  merely  assume,  that  spatial  perception,  at 
least  in  a  germinal  form,  is  native  to  the  mind  by  reason  of  the 
q^uale  of  the  retinal  elements,  and  that  the  fully-developed  per- 
ception of  spatial  quality  cannot  be  entirely  explained  by 
tactual  or  so-called  muscular  sensations  of  movement — i.e,  we 
assmne  that  there  is  a  native  content  of  vastness,  and  that  the 
spatial  relations  of  the  integral  parts  of  the  vastness  are  per- 
ceived by  a  process  of  analysis  effected  partly  through  the 
sensations  of  movement.  We  cannot  enter  into  the  question  of 
the  law  which  governs  all  the  movements  of  the  eye.  We  must, 
however,  note  the  general  law,  as  given  by  Ladd,  that  "  the 
construction  of  the  field  of  monocular  or  binocular  vision  is  a 
synthetic  mental  achievement,  dependent  upon  the  varying 
sensations,  which  results  from  the  wandering  of  the  point  of 
regard  over  the  outline  of  an  object." 

This  view,  as  we  have  just  seen,  is  open  to  criticism,  and  we 
hold  that  the  field  of  vision  in  its  entire  content  is  one  primarily 
of  vastness,  and  that  the  perception  of  the  component  parts  of 
that  field  is  an  analytical  mental  achievement,  depending  upon 
the  varying  sensations  which  result  from  the  wandering  of  the 
point  of  regard  over  the  contents  of  the  field  of  vision.  That  is 
to  say,  oin^  perception  of  objective  space,  in  its  vaster  extents,  is 
originally  constituted ;  the  subsequent  perception  of  its  spatial 
contents  is  secondarily  analysed. 


225 


.     CHAPTEE    VIII. 

Sensory  Pebveesions. 

The  Origin  and  Development  of  Sensoi'y  Perversions — Abnormal  Con- 
ditions of  Perception — Definition  of  Illusion — Sources  of  Illusion 
—  Classification  —  Passive  Illusions  —  Exoneural  —  Esoneural  — 
Active  Illusions — Voluntary — Involuntary. 

Secondary  Sensations  —  Sound  Photisms  —  Light  Phonisms  —  Taste 
Photisms  — ■  Odour  Photisms  —  Pain  Photisms —  Chromatisms — 
Gustatisms — Olfactisms — Laws  concerning  Secondary  Sensations. 

The  Origin  and  Development  of  Sensory  Per- 
versions. —  In  the  consideration  of  illusory  phenomena  it 
is  necessary  to  remember  that  the  perception  of"  sense-data 
derived  from  the  finer  senses  is  more  readily  revivable  under 
abnormal  conditions  than  the  perception  of  those  sense-data 
derived  from  the  less  refined  senses.  The  development  of 
perceptual  power  involves  an  increasing  power  of  sense-dis- 
crimination, and  also  an  increasing  power  of  identifying 
impressions  through  the  "  cumulation  of  traces."  That  is  to 
say,  our  senses  become  more  acute  in  distinguishing  impres- 
sions by  means  of  their  local  signs,  and  the  mind  becomes 
qviicker  and  keener  in  identifying  them. 

The  sense-capacity  varies  in  different  individuals  in  its 
absolute  sensibility  and  in  its  discriminative  power.  A  general 
discriminative  power  probably  implies,  from  the  first,  a  fine 
organisation  or  nativistic  power  of  the  brain  as  a  whole ; 
whereas,  a  special  discriminate  sensibility  implies  rather  an 
original  structural  excellence  of  the  particular  sense-organ 
concerned.     The  prominent  part  taken  by  the  visual  sense  in 

16 


226  SENSOEY   PERVERSIONS. 

the  development  of  perception  as  a  whole  lias  been  already 
mentioned.  Complete  development  of  the  perceptual  power 
involves  (a)  sense-perceptions  in  their  various  degrees  of 
perfection ;  (h)  daily-renewed  conjunctions  of  simple  sense- 
experiences — e.g.,  between  touch  and  sight ;  (c)  noting  nature 
of  objects  as  such  and  recognising  them ;  (d)  after  this  the 
growth  of  perception  is  mainly  due  to  an  improvement  of  visual 
capacity,  or  increase  in  visual  discrimination  •  and  (e)  develop- 
ment of  the  power  of  attention,  which,  however,  is,  to  a  certain 
extent,  pre-supposed. 

Our  knowledge  of  external  things  depends  upon  the 
training  of  our  perceptual  power.  Unless  we  have  cultivated 
the  practice  of  accurately  discriminating  the  forms  of  things  all 
our  after  knowledge  will  be  inaccurate.  We  must  not  only 
treat  the  forms  of  concrete  objects  from  an  analytical,  but 
also  from  a  synthetical  point  of  view — i.e.,  the  analytic  and 
synthetic  treatment  of  the  forms  of  objects  should  be  equally 
cultivated. 

The  blind  man  is  able  to  construct  perceptions  of  space 
quite  independently  of  a  visual  sense.  He  is  conscious  of  a 
horizon,  and  can  appreciate  arrangement  and  dimensions.  By 
a  synthetical  process  he  can  summarise  in  his  imagination  a 
fairly  accurate  estimate  of  the  spatial  relations  of  objects.  The 
absence  of  this  sense  need  in  no  way  interfere  with  the  develop- 
ment of  a  full  and  powerful  intellect.  What  the  psychology 
of  a  blind  man's  spatial  perceptive  power  is  can  only  be 
explained  by  the  assumption  that  there  is  a  nativistic  power 
within  the  mind  itself,  which  can  assert  itself  with  freedom 
apart  from  the  direct  influence  of  the  visual  sense. 

Abnormal  Conditions  of  Perception  may,  for  con- 
venience, be  described  as  they  occur  : 

(1)  In  the  sane. 

(2)  In  intermediate  states  between  sanity  and  insanity. 

(3)  In  the  insane. 

A  false  perception  is  technically  called  an  illusion,  and  it 
must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  process  is  often  largely  the  same 
in  a  false  perception  as  in  a  true  one.  Some  authors  would 
seek  the  explanation  of  the  fallacy  in  an  illusion,  by  taking  into 
account  the  action  of  the  senses  only,  and  they  would  assume 


ABNOEMAL  PERCEPTION.  227 

the  mental  interpretation  of  the  false  sensoiy  impression  to  be 
the  abstract  result  of  a  fallac}^  of  the  senses. 

We  have  alreadj^  discussed  the  law  of  the  specific  energy 
of  nerves,  and  we  have  spoken  of  adequate  (or  homologous) 
stimuli.  We  have  also  briefly  referred  to  stimuli  (heterologous) 
which  act  upon  the  nervous  elements  of  the  sensory  apparatus 
along  the  entire  course  from  the  end-organ  to  the  cortex 
cerebri.  These  latter  stimuli,  when  of  internal  somatic  origin, 
give  rise  to  subjective  mental  phenomena  of  varying  degrees  of 
quality  and  intensity. 

In  the  s(ine  person  there  is  a  constant  liability  to  errors  of 
perception.  Illusions  are  common  to  us  all.  Our  discrimina- 
tive power  is  necessarily  limited  and  defective.  Thus  the 
study  of  sensory  perversions  belongs  both  to  the  psj^chologist 
and  to  the  mental  pathologist.  There  is  no  sudden  break 
between  the  illusions  of  the  sane  and  those  of  the  insane,  and 
there  is  often  great  difficulty  in  distinguishing  between  them. 
Our  judgments  are  liable  to  be  distorted  at  a,nj  time,  and  our 
sensory  discriminations  may  be  at  variance.  Any  emotional 
disturbance,  any  state  of  exhaustion,  inattention,  expectancy, 
or  mental  preparedness,  may  favour  the  development  of  some 
false  sensory  perception.  The  transition  from  sane  to  insane 
perceptions  is  often  difficult  to  demonstrate. 

In  the  intermediate  conditions,  half-^^'ay  conditions  between 
sanity  and  insanity,  we  have  many  examples  of  sensory  dis- 
tiTrbances.  Thiis  in  some  dream-states,  night-mare,  religious 
fanaticism,  and  manj-  excessive  emotional  states,  we  have 
perversions  which  are  suggestive  of  a  neurosis  rather  than 
true  nerve  health.  In  hysterical  temperaments,  especially,  do 
we  find  illusory  morbid  conditions.  In  the  sane,  the  illusory 
percepts  may  be  due  to  defective  knowledge ;  or  the  illusory 
nature  of  the  percepts  may  be  recognised  by  the  individuals  in 
whom  they  occur  as  the  results  of  defective  energisation.  In 
the  intermediate  states  there  is  often  failure  to  recognise  the 
true  natu.re  of  the  illusory  phenomena  at  the  time  of  their 
occurrence,  but  this  knowledge  may  be  gained  at  some 
subsequent  period. 

In  the  insane  there  is  not  only  a  failure  to  recognise  the  true 
nature  of  the  phenomena,  but  also  a  belief  in  their  objective 


228  SENSORY  PERVERSIONS. 

reality,  and,  as  a  consequence,  there  is  a  tendency  on  the  part 
of  the  individual  in  whom  they  occur  to  act  upon  the  false 
evidence  presented  to  the  mind  by  wa.j  of  the  senses. 

Definitions  of  Illusion. — In  order  that  we  may  fully 
comprehend  the  meaning  of  an  illusion,  we  must  take  account 
of  its  factors  from  several  points  of  view  To  define  it  as  a 
false  sensory  perception  is  insuflacient.  There  is  a  standard  of 
falseness,  and  one  must  remember  that  human  experience  is 
fairly  consistent.  Our  perceptions  and  beliefs  fall  into  a  con- 
sensus. Some  metaphysicians  hold  the  idealistic  view,  that 
perception  itself  is  an  illusion,  inasmuch  as  it  involves  the 
fiction  of  a  real  thing  independent  of  the  mind,  yet  somehow 
present  to  it  in  the  act  of  sense-perception.  With  this  question, 
however,  we  have  nothing  to  do. 

An  illusion  is  further  defined  as  a  "  mistaken  identity" — i.e., 
a  partial  displacement  of  an  external  fact  by  a  fiction  of  the 
imagination.  Another  definition  is,  that  an  illusion  is  a  false 
percept  which  arises  in  the  mind  of  an  individual  iinder 
circumstances  which  would  not  give  rise  to  similar  percepts  in 
the  case  of  other  people.  This  is  still,  however,  inadequate. 
There  are  special  circumstances  which  are  fitted  to  excite  a 
momentary  illusion  in  all  minds — e.r/.,  optical  illusions  may  be 
due  to  refraction  of  light,  reflection,  etc.,  and  these  may  arise 
in  all  minds  under  precisely  similar  circumstances.  Any 
definition  mast  be  relative.  The  false  percept  must  be  one  that 
can  be  contradicted  by  a  more  acciirate  percept ;  or,  as  Sully 
puts  it,  it  is  a  deviation  from  the  common  or  collective  ex- 
perience. This  deviation,  as  met  with  in  the  insane,  is  a  species 
of  perceptual  error,  which  is  peculiar  to  the  individual,  and,  as 
we  shall  see  later,  it  involves  not  only  present  sense-data  but 
also  other  psychical  factors. 

The  sources  of  illusions  of  perception  are :  (1)  Suitable 
soil ;  a  neurotic  type,  or  physical  preparedness,  due  to  inherit- 
ance or  disease.  (2)  Expectancy  ;  a  mental  preparedness  is  the 
most  prominent  factor  in  the  causation  of  so-called  "  active " 
illusions.  (3)  Inattention  or  incomplete  attention  to  the  sense 
presentation.  Closely  allied  to  this  is  (4)  confusion  of  sense- 
impression.  In  the  regions  of  hazy  impression,  or  of  diffuse 
consciousness,   illusions    are    most  apt  to  occur,  and  play  the 


ILLUSIONS.  229 

greatest  pranks.  Every  cricketer  appreciates  the  difficulty,  or 
confusion  of  sense-impression,  that  is  apt  to  arise  when  tliere  is 
any  movement  in  the  fiekl  behind  the  bowk-'r's  arm.  In  the 
same  wa}',  the  presence  of  a  swallow  on  the  cricket  field,  as 
viewed  by  the  retinal  points  outside  the  field  of  central  focus,  is 
apt  to  give  a  confused  impression  of  a  ball  moving  in  space. 
Organic  sensations,  occurring  in  the  regions  of  sub-conscious- 
ness in  both  sleeping  and  waking  moments  or  between  them,  give 
rise  to  illusions.  (5)  In  mental  states,  which  are  the  result  of 
habits  of  inaccurate  discrimination — i.e.,  in  mental  states  built 
upon  data  which  have  not  been  analj^sed — the  interpretation  of 
the  present  sense-impression  is  apt  to  follow  the  law  of  habit, 
and  the  habit  of  loose  inference,  or  misinterpretation  of  sense- 
impressions,  may  result  in  the  acquisition  of  so-called  uncon- 
scious fallacious  inferences,  and  fallacious  conclusions  from 
present  determining  sense-data. 

Varieties  of  Illusions  of  Perception. — These  have 

been  arranged  according  as  they  arise  from  irithottt,  by 
suggestion  of  external  or  physical  factors ;  or,  as  they  arise 
from  ivithin,  due  to  the  development  of  preperception,  or 
the  element  of  expectancy.  The  former  have  been  termed 
passive  illusions,  the  latter  adire.  The  factors  of  causation  may 
be  grouped  in  the  following  order  : — * 

PASSIVE  ILLUSIONS. 

1.  Exoneural,  determined  by — 

(a)  Exceptional  external  arrangements. 

(/>)   Exceptional  relation  of  stimulus  to  organ. 

(c)  Illusions  of  art. 

(d)  The  particular  forms  of  objects. 

(e)  The  points  of  similarity  of  objects. 
(/)  The  reverse  illusions  of  orientation. 

2.  Esoneural,  determined  by — 

(ft)   The  limits  of  sensihiliti/  : 
Degree  of  stimulus.  After  sensations. 

Number  of  stimuli.  Specific  energy  of  nerves. 

Fusion  of  stimuli.  Eccentric  projection. 

*  See  Sully's  "  Illusions." 


230  SENSORY  PER^'ERSIONS. 

(/j)  By  the  variations  in  sensibility  ; 

(1)  Momentary,  or  transient,  caused  by  fatigue, 
malnutrition,  or  toxic  agents. 

(2)  Permanent,  caused  by  variations  in  excita- 

bility of  sensory  organs,  hereditary  or 
acquired.  In  conditions  of  liypergesthesia, 
angestliesia,  and  parEesthesia. 


ACTIVE  ILLUSIONS, 

which  involve  the  element  of  expectanc}" : — 

1.  Voluntar}^  selection  of  interpretation. 

2.  Involuntary  mental  pre-adjustment. 

(a)   Temporary  exijectation  or  preparedness  : 
Snh-expedation. 
Vivid  expjectation. 
both  of  which  \\iq.j  arise  from — 
Present  objective  facts. 
Verbal  suggestion. 
Imagination. 

(6)  Compjaratively  permanent  disposition, 

as  seen  in  the  evolution  of  conceit,  hypochon- 
driasis, etc. 
In  the   account  of  all  these   states,   it   must  be  remembered, 
that  every  function  is  rendered  more  facile  by  exercise,  and  that 
illusions  become  more  real  by  repetition. 

Passive  Illusions  determined  by  environment — 

1.  JSxceptional  external  arrangements. — The  ordinary  physical 
phenomena  of  the  refraction  of  light  and  the  reflection  of  sound. 
A  stick  half-immersed  in  water  appears  to  be  bent.  The 
optical  illusions  of  magniitude,  due  to  external  conditions,  are 
numerous  and  well  known.  The  atmosphere  has  to  account  for 
various  illusions  as  to  distance.  Thus,  the  person  unused  to 
the  clear  atmosphere  of  Switzerland  is  unable  to  realise 
distances.     At  times,  great  difficulty  is  experienced  in  deter- 


EXONEUKAL  CAUSES.  231 

mining  whether  our  train  or  the  one  alongside  it  is  moving. 
When  we  move  forward  all  objects  appear  to  glide  backwards. 
The  faster  we  go,  the  nearer  do  the  objects  seem,  and  the  nearer 
they  seem,  the  smaller  do  they  look.  This  fact  is  explained  by 
the  greater  rapidity  of  their  apparent  translocation  (Helmholtz). 
2.  Exceptional  relationship  of  stimahis  to  onjan. — Aristotle's 
experiment,  of  crossing  two  fingers  of  the  same  hand  and  rolling 
a  pea  between  them,  is  attended  by  the  illusion  of  there  being 
two  peas  instead  of  one.  Each  of  the  two  points  of  contact 
has  its  local  sign  ;  but,  from  their  inexperience  of  working  in 
unison  under  certain  particular  conditions,  there  is  distortion  of 
the  inference.  In  a  similar  way  the  experience  of  having  "  sea- 
legs  "  on  land  is  to  be  explained  by  the  absence  of  the  accus- 
tomed undulations  of  the  structure  on  which  we  walk,  and  the 
want  of  the  customary  tactual  and  surface  sensation  experi- 
ences. The  examples  given  by  Sully  afford  further  illustration. 
AVhen  a  man  crunches  a  biscuit,  the  sound  is  intensified 
owing  to  the  propagation  of  the  stimulus  by  other  channels 
than  the  usual  one  of  the  ear.  If  the  two  hands  are  bent  into 
a  sort  of  auricle,  and  placed  in  front  of  the  ears,  the  back  of  the 
hand  being  in  front,  the  sense  of  direction,  as  well  as  of  distance, 
is  confused.  Thus,  sounds  really  travelling  from  a  point  in 
front  of  the  head  will  appear  to  come  from  behind  it.  Objects 
appear  smaller  and  at  a  greater  distance  when  one  eye  is  used 
than  when  both  are  used.  Illusions  of  movement  occur  owing 
to  our  eyes  moving  without  our  knowing  it.  Perception  of  an 
object's  movement  depends  upon  the  sense  of  movement  in  our 
own  eyes.  James  regards  the  original  visual  feeling  of  move- 
ment as  produced  by  an  image  passing  over  the  retina.  He 
says,  '"This  sensation  is  definitely  referred  neither  to  the  object 
nor  to  the  eyes.  Such  definite  reference  grows  up  later,  and 
obeys  certain  simple  laws.  We  believe  objects  to  move  (1) 
whenever  we  get  the  retinal  movement  feeling,  but  think  our 
eyes  are  still ;  and  (2)  whenever  we  think  that  our  eyes  move, 
but  fail  to  o-et  the  retinal  movement  feelino-.  We  believe 
objects  to  be  still,  on  the  contrary,  (1)  whenever  we  get  the 
retinal  movement  feeling,  but  think  our  eyes  are  moving ;  and 
(2)  whenever  we  neither  think  our  eyes  are  moving,  nor  get  the 
retinal  movement  feeling." 


232  SENSORY  PERVERSIONS. 

3.  Illusions  of  art. — Pictorial  art  aims  at  stereoscopic  effects, 
and  seeks  to  give  to  flat  surfaces  the  illusory  effect  of  depth, 
relief,  and  solidity.  By  means  of  colour  in  various  qualitative 
and  quantitative  degrees,  an  imitation  of  natiiral  objects  is 
sought.  This  imitation  suggests  to  the  mind  the  habitual 
interpretation  of  natural  sense-impressions,  and  hence  the 
imitative  art  is  a  source  of  complete  illusory  effects.  The 
illusion  that  the  eye  in  a  portrait  seems  to  follow  the  spectator 
is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  surface  of  the  portrait  is  flat,  so  that 
the  profile  of  the  object  is  never  seen. 

4.  Misinterpretation  of  form  and  local  a^rrancjement. — This  is 
clearly  allied  to  the  foregoing  illusions  of  art.  An  object 
appears  smaller  on  the  lateral  portions  of  the  retina  than  it 
does  on  the  fovea.  The  intensity  of  the  nerve-excitation 
sometimes  increases  the  volume  of  the  sensation  as  well  as  its 
vividness.  Professor  James*  gives  the  following  instances  of 
these  illusions  :  "If  we  raise  and  lower  the  gas  alternately, 
the  whole  room,  and  all  the  objects  in  it,  seem  alternately  to 
enlarge  and  contract.  If  we  cover  half  a  page  of  small  print 
with  grey  glass,  the  print  seen  through  the  glass  appears 
decidedl}^  smaller  than  that  seen  outside  of  it,  and  the  darker 
the  glass  the  greater  the  difference.  When  a  circumscribed 
opacity  in  front  of  the  retina  keeps  off  part  of  the  light  from 
the  portion  which  it  covers,  objects  projected  on  that  portion 
may  seem  but  half  as  large  as  when  their  image  falls  outside 
of  it  (Classen).  The  inverse  effect  seems  produced  by  certain 
drugs  and  anaesthetics — morphine,  atropine,  daturine,  and 
cold,  blunt  the  sensibility  of  the  skin,  so  that  distances  upon  it 
seem  less.  Haschish  produces  strange  perversions  of  the 
general  sensibility.  Under  its  influence  one's  body  maj^  seem 
either  enormously  enlarged  or  strangely  contracted.  Some- 
times a  single  member  will  alter  its  proportion  to  the  rest ;  or 
one's  back,  for  instance,  will  appear  entirely  absent,  as  if  one 
were  hollow  behind.  Objects  comparatively  near  will  recede  to 
a  vast  distance  ;  a  short  street  assumes  to  the  eye  an  immeasur- 
able perspective.  Ether  and  chloroform  occasion  all}:-  produce 
not  M^holly  dissimilar  results." 

To   attempt  to   give   an   account  of  all  the  ambiguities  of 
*  "  Principles  of  Psycliology,"  vol.  ii.  p.  142. 


EXONEURAL  CAUSES.  233 

retinal  impressions,  and  the  part  they  play  in  misinterpreta- 
tions of  the  form  and  arrangement  of  external  objects,  would 
involve  too  much  time  and  space.  Xor  can  "vve  enter  upon 
the  question  of  the  ambiguous  import  of  eye-movements, 
"and  the  interpretations  of  the  feelings  of  convergence  and 
accommodation.  For  an  account  of  the  ambiguities  which 
result  from  the  perception  of  lines  meeting  and  crossing 
each  other  on  a  plane,  the  student  must  refer  to  the  various 
text-books  on  physiological  psychology.  Here  we  can  onlj^ 
present  a  brief  summary  of  the  phenomena.  The  law  of  habit 
has  most  to  do  with  the  illusions  in  connection  with  diagrams 
on  planes.  We  are  apt  to  view  the  object  in  its  habitual  form 
— i.e.,  when  we  look  at  a  portrait  our  imagination  suggests  that 
the  object  occupies  space  in  its  three  dimensions.  The  actual 
retinal  image  suggests  the  memory  of  the  image  in  its  stereo- 
typed form.  The  vividness  of  the  reproductive  processes  is 
regarded  as  greatest  when  the  visual  sense  is  involved. 

The  movements  of  the  eye  aid  in  the  education  of  our 
perceptual  power;  but  every  spatial  determination  is  primarily 
given  in  the  shape  of  a  sensation  of  the  retinal  elements  of  the 
eye.  The  remarks  which  apply  to  space-perception  apply 
equally  well  to  colour-perception.  Professor  James  believes, 
that  present  excitements  and  after  effects  of  former  excitements 
may  alter  the  result  of  processes  occurring  simultaneously  at  a 
distance  from  them  in  the  retina  or  other  portions  of  the  appa- 
ratus for  optical  sensation,  and  that  the  spurious  account  of 
these  ilhisions  is  that  they  are  intellectual,  not  sensational ; 
that  they  are  secondary,  not  primarj^,  mental  facts.  That  is 
to  say,  the  various  illusions  as  to  form  and  arrangement  are 
mental  facts  suggested  by  present  objective  facts  ;  but,  in  their 
fully  developed  states,  they  are  due  to  an  imaginary  repro- 
duction of  habitual  and  real  forms,  suggested  by  the  present 
objective  facts. 

5.  Illusions  arising  throtir/h  simikmfi/  in  objects.  —  Every 
one  is  familiar  with  the  fact  that  he  is  apt  to  make  mistakes  in 
identifying  persons  and  things.  The  process  is  similar  to  that 
just  described.  The  suggestion  of  a  familiar  object,  made  from 
withoxit,  involves  the  reproduction  of  an  old  and  habitual 
perceptual  process.      The   familiar  interpretation  acquired  by 


234  SENSOKY  PERVERSIONS. 

practice  becomes  superimposed,  iipoii  the  present  percept,  with 
a  vividness  which  tends  to  obliterate  or  submerge  the  subject- 
ive perception  of  the  actual  object  as  it  exists.  In  dream- 
states,  and  in  the  insane,  one  finds  innumerable  examples. 
Some  insane  persons  perceive  objects  or  persons  so  imperfectly 
that  the  actual  presentation  at  the  time  is  immediately  sub- 
merged by  the  vividness  of  the  image  of  recalled  familiar 
objects  or  friends,  and  they  are  immediately  imagined  to  be 
those  familiar  objects  or  friends.  The  process  is  a  mental  one. 
From  a  physiological  point  of  view  it  may  be  urged  that  the 
actual  and  immediate  perception  is  distorted  by  a  disordered 
nerve-tract,  and  that  the  misinterpretation  is  the  primary 
result  of  such  distoi-tion.  The  answer  to  this  is  simple.  We 
have  already  seen  that  the  element  of  association  is  involved  in 
every  percept,  and  that  the  interpretation  of  a  sense-presenta- 
tion is  to  a  large  extent  dependent  upon  comparison  with 
former  presentations.  A  typical  illusion  is  a  secondary 
product;  the  initial  stimulation  by  a  sense-presentation  sug- 
gests to  the  mind  a  representation  of  more  definite  organisa- 
tion, which  takes  the  place  of  the  initial  presentation. 

6.  Reverse  illusions  of  orientation  have  been  fully  described 
by  Binet.*  These  illusions  may  arise  spontaneously,  either 
when  we  awaken  in  the  darkness  of  night,  or  during  the  day 
when  awake.  They  consist  in  any  illusory  experience  that  a 
wrong  direction  is  being  taken;  that  objects  are  reversed  from 
side  to  side ;  or  that  the  individual  is  turned  round.  Beaunis, 
Passy,  Henri,  Philippe,  Courtier,  Thelohan,  and  others,  have 
described  these  illusions  as  part  of  their  own  experiences.  The 
author  of  this  work  invariably  fails  to  orientate  himself  on 
arrival  at  a  certain  railway  station,  and  this  although  he  has 
visited  the  station  weekly  for  more  than  six  years.  Binet  dis- 
tinguishes three  kinds  of  cases :  (1)  Normal  orientation,  in 
which  the  points  of  reference  recognised  confirm  the  former 
sense  of  direction  ;  (2)  disorientation,  in  which  there  is  no  sense 
of  direction  at  all,  and  if  a  familiar  point  of  reference  is  met 
with,  it  is  accepted,  and  the  individual  orientates  himself  pro- 
perly; (3)  inexact  orientation,  in  which  an  individual  meets 
a  point  of  reference,  but  finds  it  in  contradiction  with  his 
*  "  Le  Renversement  de  I'Orientatior." 


LIMITS  or  SENSIBILITY.  235 

earlier  system  ;  the  false  system  persists,  even  though  it  is 
known  to  be  false,  just  as  an  illusion  persists.  Binet  suggests 
that  possibly  the  illusion  may  be  produced  by  a  particular 
derangement  of  the  semicircular'  canal  of  the  inner  ear.*  This, 
however,   is  a  possibility  A\'e  are  un\\'illing  to  admit. 

Passive  Illusions  determined  by  the  Organism — 

1 .  i>//  the  limits  of  sensihilitii  : 

(ct)  Beijree  of  stimulus. — We  have  already  discussed  the 
various  limitations  in  discriminative  power  of  the  different 
senses,  and  we  have  seen,  that  below  the  point  of  liminal 
intensity,  and  bej'ond  the  point  of  maximum  intensity,  our 
perception  of  stimuli  is  imperfect  or  non-existent.  This  per- 
ception of  degree  also  is  altered  considerably  in  mental 
diseases.  Thus,  there  niay  be  defect  of  discriminative  power 
when  the  attention  of  the  individual  is  focussed  upon  some 
mental  idea  or  hallucination  ;  or,  as  in  some  cases  of  stupor,  the 
senses  are  abnormally  slow  m  their  action.  In  some  maniacal 
conditions,  on  the  other  hand,  there  may  be  an  unusually  line 
degree  and  rapidity  of  discrimination.  Again,  among  stimuli 
arising  from  without  there  is  alwaj'S  a  struggle  for  supremacy 
within.  There  is  a  survival  of  the  fittest  and  most  interesting 
within  the  focus  of  attention ;  the  remainder  lie  within  the 
field  of  diffuse  consciousness  or  outside  it  altogether. 

(h)  Number  of  stimuli.  —  The  difficulties  met  with  in  the 
interpretation  of  local  signs  have  already  been  considered.  The 
case  of  two  points  recognised  as  one  only,  owing  to  character 
and  amount  of  the  interval  between  them,  has  also  been 
alluded  to. 

(c)  Fusion  of  stimuli.  —  The  retinas  are  acted  upon  sepa- 
rately, and  the  resulting  impressions  become  fused  into  one. 
How  the  mind  perceives  but  one  object,  or  how  the  coalescence 
occurs,  we  do  not  know.  Illusions  may  result  from  imperfect 
coalescence  of  images.  When  double  images  are  seen,  although 
there  may  be  sets  of  retinal  fibres  so  organised  as  to  give  an 
impression  of  two  separate  spots,  yet  the  excitement  of  other 
retinal  fibres  may  inhibit  the  effect  of  the  first  excitement,  and 

*  M.  Vignier,  "  The  Sense  of  Orientation  and  its  Organ  in  Animals  and 
Men,"  Kev.  Phil.,  July,  1882.  Binet,  "Vertigo  of  Direction,"  Mind,  1884. 
M.  i'lournoy,  "  Les  Synopsies,"  p.  188. 


236  SENSORY  PERVERSIONS. 

prevent  tis  from  actiially  making  the  discrimination  (Volk- 
mann).  Still  further,  retinal  processes  may  bring  the  doubleness 
to  the  eye  of  attention;  and,  once  there,  it  is  as  genuine  a  sensa- 
tion as  any  that  our  life  affords-  (James). 

(d)  After  sensations. — When  a  clock  strikes  we  sometimes 
experience  the  illusion  that  a  stroke  has  occurred  after  the  sounds 
have  actually  ceased.  Discontinuous  stimulations  rapidly  fol- 
lowing one  another  appear  to  be  continuous.  After  a  bandage 
has  been  removed  from  the  head  the  sensation  is  still  continued. 
The  tasting  of  sherry  and  port  alternately,  results  in  inability 
to  distinguish  between  them.  The  sensations  of  the  rolling  of 
a  ship  may  remain  for  days.  The  sensations  of  movement 
after  a  bicycle  ride  may  continue  to  assert  themselves  even 
during  sleep. 

(e)  Specific  energy  of  nerves.  ■ —  The  perception  of  light 
(phosphenes) ,  when  the  eyeball  is  pressed,  is  illusory,  inasmuch 
as  we  refer  the  presentation  to  light.  In  the  insane  we  occa- 
sionally see  morbid  instances  of  this  nature.  Thus,  stimulation 
of  the  various  nerves,  having  their  characteristic  local  colour- 
ings, is  followed  by  misinterpretations  of  the  actual  phj^sical 
agencies  at  work  which  cause  the  presentations ;  the  direction 
of  the  attention  being  determined  hj  the  character  of  the 
stimulus  and  the  local  specific  and  suggestive  energy  of  the 
nerves.  The  interpretation  afforded  by  the  mind,  when  the 
attention  is  focussed  upon  the  presentation,  is  determined  by 
reference  to  former  presentations,  and  by  the  mental  complexion 
of  the  moment — that  is  to  say,  the  imagination  is  an  important 
factor.  The  actual  presentation,  as  determined  hj  the  imme- 
diate stimulus,  is  vague  and  ill-defined  ;  whereas,  the  secondary 
product,  derived  thi'ough  association  or  expectancy,  is  often 
vivid  and  apparently  real.  A  patient  now  in  Bethlem  Hospital 
has  only  to  press  his  eyeball  with  the  "stone  of  life"  in 
order  to  open  up  to  him  a  vision  of  "  green  fields  and  objects 
of  wondrous  beauty."  In  this  case  the  primary  presentation 
derived  from  pressure  was  that  of  light  only ;  imagination  did 
the  rest.  He  now  expects  the  vision,  and  associates  its  origin 
with  mechanical  means.  The  interpretation  is  fallacious,  and 
he  locates  the  apparent  reality  within  the  "  stone  of  life " 
itself.     In  order  to  test  the  accuracy  of  this  view,  the  stone 


LIMITS  OF  SENSIBILITY.  237 

was  applied  to  the  ear,  \\'itli  the  result  that  simple  "  sea-shell " 
sounds  were  first  experienced ;  then  followed  the  element  of 
expectanc}^  and  imagination  supplied  in  turn,  sounds  of 
whisperings,  voices,  hummings,  -music,  etc.  No^^'  the  "  stone 
of  life  "  provides  him  with  the  enjoyments  of  other  associative 
phenomena.*  The  patient  himself  gives  the  following  account 
of  the  phenomenon  : — "  When  the  stone  is  placed  over  the  eye 
and  kept  there  for  some  considerable  time,  the  first  impression 
of  sparks  of  light  gradually  resolves  itself,  by  a  shimmering 
process,  into  a  more  definite  representation  of  a  luminous 
field  with  a  more  or  less  definite  coast  line,  or  sometimes  a 
mountain  line.  Sometimes  1  see  distinct  trees,  and  figures  of 
fantastic  shapes  moving  about.  The  stone  possesses  this 
propei'ty  within  itself,  because,  without  it,  I  see  nothing.  On 
placing  it  over  the  ear,  the  impressions  previously  produced  by 
the  eye  become  more  clearly  defined,  and  even  when  I  press  it 
on  my  forehead  I  see  all  the  scenes  just  as  vividly.  I  have  at 
other  times  seen  flowers  and  fruit  trees,  and  on  applying  the 
stone  to  the  nostrils,  I  have  smelt  the  odours  of  the  flowers ; 
and,  when  the  tongue  was  touched,  the  taste  of  the  different 
kinds  of  fruit.  In  the  case  of  my  sight,  I  apply  the  stone  first, 
and  all  the  scenes  appear  to  me  ;  with  the  other  senses,  how- 
ever, I  see  what  the  things  are  first,  and  the  stone  supplies  me 
with  the  knowledge  of  their  various  qualities." 

(/)  Eccentric  inrojectioit.  —  Bj-  the  "  law  of  eccentricity  " 
physiologists  affirm  that  we  refer  our  sensations  to  the  peri- 
pheral endings  of  the  nerves  concerned.  In  the  case  of  the 
senses  of  smell,  hearing,  and  sight,  we  are  apt  to  overlook  the 
bodily  seat  of  the  sensation  and  project  the  cause  to  some 
external  object.  In  abnormal  conditions  of  nerve-activity, 
stimulation  of  any  other  point  than  the  peripheral  termina- 
tions is  followed  by  subjective  sensations,  which  are  referred 
to  the  peripheral  end-organs  associated  with  the  nerve-point 
stimulated.  Similarly,  disorders  of  the  cerebral  structures  may 
give  rise  to  sensations  which  closelj^  resemble  hallucinations 
in' their  after  effects.  As  an  example,  we  may  give  the  instance 
of  ilkisions  of  feeling  apparently  arising  from  sensations  in 
toes  after  the  limb  has  been  amputated.  The  exact  seat  of  the 
*  The  case  is  of  long  duration,  and  incurable. 


238  SENSOKY  PERVERSIONS. 

stimulus  or  morbid  process  is  difficult  to  determine.  In  the 
insane,  ordinary  presentations  may  be  wrongly  interpreted. 
Thus,  gustatorj^  sensations  assume,  with  the  mental  complexion 
of  the  individual,  the  objective  significance  of  poisons ;  sub- 
jective tactual  sensations  of  electricity,  numbness,  feeling  of 
wool,  shrinking,  expansion,  dragging,  tingling,  pain,  etc.,  are 
all  projected  externally  in  accordance  with  the  customary 
interpretations  of  local  signs  ;  but,  in  addition,  the  mental  com- 
plexion determines  wrongly  the  relative  import  of  the  causal 
stimuli,  and  hence  sometimes  gives  rise  to  the  wildest  illusions 
of  torture  and  persecution. 

2.  Determined  hy  variations  in  sensibility : 

(1.)  Momentary  or  transient.  —  Every  one  is  subject  to 
momentary  illusions,  due  to  exhaustion  of  the  various  organs 
of  sense.  The  condition  may  arise  from  direct  strain,  or 
through  malnutrition,  or,  more  commonly  still,  through  the 
administration  of  toxic  agents.  Variations  in  the  organic 
state  cause  alterations  in  the  strength  and  quality  of  the 
sense  presentations. 

(2.)  Comixiratively  permanent  conditions. — The  sense-organ 
may  be  unusually  sensitive,  so  that  the  sense-impressions  gain 
in  intensity  of  effect.  There  n\Q.j  be  variations  in  the  excita- 
bility of  the  retina,  so  that  colours  are  raised  from  violet  to  red, 
etc.,  or  vice-versa  as  in  the  colour  blind.  In  conditions  of 
hypergesthesia  ordinary  stimuli  become  intensified.  In  anaes- 
thesia they  become  less  intense.  In  parsesthesia  there  is  a 
qualitative  change  in  the  effects  of  stimuli.  In  the  insane 
every  variety  of  these  quantitative  and  qualitative  changes  in 
the  presentations  of  sense  may  be  observed. 

Sully  points  out,  that  all  these  groups  of  illusions  have  one 
feature  in  common;  they  depend  on  the  general  mental  laAv, 
that  when  we  have  to  do  with  the  infrequent,  the  unimportant, 
and  therefore  unattended  to,  and  the  unexceptional,  we  employ 
the  ordinary,  the  familiar,  and  the  well-known,  as  our  standard. 
"  Thus,  whether  we  are  dealing  with  sensations  that  fall  below 
the  ordinary  limits  of  our  mental  experience,  or  with  those 
which  arise  in  some  exceptional  state  of  the  organism,  we  carry 
the  habits  formed  in  the  much  wider  region  of  average  every- 
day perception  with  us.     In  a  word,  illusion  in  these  cases 


ACTIVE  ILLUSIONS.  239 

always  arises  through  what  may,  figuratively  at  least,  he 
desci'ibed  as  the  application  of  a  rule,  valid  for  the  majority 
of  cases,  to  an  exceptional  case."  In  the  next  group  which  we 
have  to  consider,  the  mental  element  is  predisposed  to  the  for- 
mation of  sense-illusions  ;  imagination  and  expectant  attention 
play  an  important  part. 


ACTIVE    ILLUSIONS. 

In  active  illusions  there  is  a  mental  preparedness  or  antici- 
pation for  presentations.  The  mind  acts  independently  of 
immediate  external  sense-impressions,  and  by  a  process  of 
imagination  conjures  up  various  combinations  of  representa- 
tions ;  the  preponderance  of  the  mental  element  thus  tends  to 
colour,  modify,  or  submerge  the  actual  determining  presen- 
tation when  it  arrives  in  consciousness.  Expectant  attention 
may  even  lead  to  the  illusory  belief  that  an  event  takes  place 
before  it  actually  does.  In  the  sane,  the  independent  activity 
of  the  imagination  may  conjure  up  the  image  of  a  friend,  and 
this  very  mental  preparedness  may  result  in  illusions  of  identity. 
Iia  other  words,  a  vivid  representation  may  favour  a  partial  dis- 
tortion of  a  presentation ;  or  rather,  a  vivid  representation, 
super-imposed  upon  an  imperfectly  discriminated  presentation, 
may  result  in  an  illusory  perception.  Wundt  found  by  experi- 
m.ent,  that  the  exact  moment  at  which  a  sense-impression  is 
perceived  depends  on  the  amount  of  preparatory  self-accommo- 
dation of  attention. 

Romanes  *  says,  "  If  a  sportsman,  while  shooting  woodcock  in  cover, 
sees  a  bird  about  the  size  and  colour  of  a  woodcock  get  up  and  fly 
through  the  foliage,  not  having  time  to  see  more  than  that  it  is  a  bird 
of  such  a  size  and  colour,  he  immediately  supplies  by  inference  the  other 
qualities  of  a  woodcock,  and  is  afterwards  disgusted  to  find  that  he  has 
shot  a  thrush.  I  have  done  so  myself,  and  could  hardly  believe  that  the 
thrush  was  the  bird  I  had  fired  at,  so  complete  was  my  mental  supple- 
ment to  my  visual  perception." 

"  As  with  game,"  says  James,  "  so  with  enemies,  ghosts,  and  the  like. 
Anyone  waiting  in  a  dark  place  and  expecting  or  fearing  strongly  a 
certain  object  will  interpret  any  abrupt  sensation  to  mean  that  object's 

*  " Mental  Evolution  in  Animals." 


240  SENSOKY  PERVERSIONS. 

presence.  The  boy  playing  'I  spy,'  the  criminal  skulking  from  his 
pursuers,  the  superstitious  person  hurrying  through  the  woods  or  past 
the  churchyard  at  midnight,  the  man  lost  in  the  woods,  the  girl  who 
tremulously  has  made  an  evening  appointment  with  her  swain,  all  are 
subject  to  illusions  of  sight  and  sound  which  make  their  hearts  beat  till 
they  are  dispelled.  Twenty  times  a  day  the  lover,  perambulating  the 
streets  with  his  pre-occupied  fancy,  will  think  he  perceives  his  idol's 
bonnet  before  him." 

At  seances,  full  scope  is  given  to  the  imagination  ;  the  mind 
is  prepared  and  expectant.  In  states  of  hypnotism  and  trance, 
suggestion  plays  a  most  important  part.  "  This  suggestibility 
is  greater  in  the  lower  senses  than  in  the  higher"  (Meyer). 
Helmholtz  doubts  this  power  of  imagination  to  falsify  present 
impressions  of  sense.  In  some  cases  among  the  insane,  the  pre- 
occiipation  of  the  mind  by  dominant  beliefs,  fears,  persecutions, 
and  morbid  anticipations,  gives  such  a  powerful  mental  com- 
plexion or  colouring  to  all  immediate  impressions  of  sense,  that 
the  process  may  be  compared  to  the  addition  of  one  drop  of 
clear  fluid  to  the  blackest  of  inks,  the  one  drop  of  clear  fluid 
representing  the  present  impression,  and  the  blackest  of  inks  the 
mental  saturation  by  morbid  thought.  The  writer  experienced 
the  effects  of  anticipation  some  years  ago.  Having  to  give  a 
hypodermic  injection  of  morphia  every  three  hours  during  the 
night  for  nearly  a  fortnight,  the  expectancy  and  mental  pre- 
paredness to  hear  the  night-bell,  even  during  sleep,  became  so 
powerful,  that  after  the  patient  had  recovered  and  there  was  no 
occasion  to  administer  the  drug  regularly,  at  the  appointed 
intervals  the  illusion  became  so  vivid  that  several  journeys  were 
made  under  the  belief  that  the  bell  had  actually  sounded.  Every 
one  is  familiar  with  what  Dr.  Savage  calls  the  "  lost  button " 
condition  of  thought.  The  absence  of  a  button  is  sufficient  to 
occupy  our  attention  so  completely,  that  sooner  or  later  we 
imagine  all  eyes  are  upon  the  defective  spot.  The  individual 
who  imagines  he  is  suffering  the  tortures  of  Hell  and  is  eternally 
damned,  may  see  a  devil  in  every  one  who  enters  his  room. 
Similarly,  the  exalted  general  paralytic,  whose  horizon  is  bounded 
by  untold  wealth  and  beauty,  sees  in  every  object  around  him 
some  marvellous  charm  or  property.  In  the  maniac  who  is 
persecuted,  every  trivial  occurrence,  insignificant  in  itself,  is 
distorted  into  some  sign  bearing  the  stamp  of  the  mental  com 


ACTIVE  ILLUSIONS. 


241 


plexion  of  the  moment.  The  h}-pochondriac  colours  every 
sensory  impression  with  his  mental  fear  of  dissolution.  The 
maniac  and  the  melancholiac  alike  view  all  incoming  impres- 
sions through  their  mentally-coloured  glasses.  To  the  former 
all  is  bright  and  fanciful ;  whilst  to  the  latter  all  is  dark  and 
dismal. 

1.  Voluntary  Selection  of  Interpretation.  —  It   is 
possible,  by  a  purely  mental  act    of  creative  imagination,  to 

f 


\ 

\ 

A 

h 

\ 

\ 

Fig.  14. 


superimpose  at  will  the  image  of  the  object  imagined,  upon 
some  other  actual  objective  image  present.  Thus,  we  can 
picture  forms   and  images  in  clouds,   etc. 

In  the  diagram,  either  of  the  two  large  surfaces  (a,  b.  c,  d, 
or  e,f,g,h,)  may  appear  to  be  nearer  than  the  other;  or  one 
surface  may  appear  to  face  a  point  to  our  left  and  upwards,  or 
to  our  right  and  downwards.  Thus  the  two  surfaces,  far  and 
near,  may  be  transposed  at  will ;  or  each  may  be  regarded  as 
facing  two  directions. 

2.  Involuntary   Mental    Pre -adjustment.  —  In   the 

percipient  mind,  which  is  pre-adjusted  to  act  in  certain  definite 
directions,  this  predisposition  may  evidence  itself  as  a  temporary 
state  of  expectation,  or  as  a  comparatively  permanent  condition, 
(a)  Temporary  expectation  or  preparedness. — Action  of  sub- 
expectation.  —  Every  one  has  experienced  various  illusory 
beliefs  about  objects  and  things.  A  certain  amount  of  pre- 
paredness is  necessary  before  witnessing  a  play.  The  imagina- 
tion supplies  the  preliminar}-  data  or  predisposition  to  accept 
the  events  of  the  stage  as  more  or  less  real.  Without  such  pre- 
paration the  mind  is  apt  to  construe  the  performance  as  either 
utterh'  stupid  and  void  of  sense,  or  as  an  actual  reality.  The 
artist  copies  the  results  of  his  imagination  or  mental  perception 


242  SENSORY  PERVERSIONS. 

upon  a  plane  surface.  A  similar  mental  preparedness  or 
imagination  is  essential  to  those  who  view  the  picture.  A  cow, 
having  no  imagination  or  mental  process,  preceding  the  actual 
presentation  of  a  picture,  would  view  it  rightly  as  a  plane 
surface.  A  dog,  unaccustomed  to  seeing  himself,  barks  at  his 
reflection  in  a  looking-glass. 

Vivid  expectation  may  arise  or  be  brought  about  (1)  by 
means  of  present  objective  facts — e.g.,  the  illusions  of  the 
conjuror;  (2)  by  verbal  suggestion — e.g.,  at  seances,  and  in  the 
h57"pnotic  state ;  and  (3)  imagination,  internal  and  spontaneous 
— e.g.,  the  picturing  of  the  various  diseases  described  in  text 
books,  is  apt  in  many  students  to  be  followed  by  feelings  that 
the  diseases  are  present  as  they  are  considered  in  turn. 

Comparatively  permanent  disposition. — In  the  various  tem- 
peraments there  is  a  tendency  to  reflect  the  characteristics 
of  the  mental  life  upon  all  sense  impressions.  That  is  to  say, 
every  presentation  is  toned  by  the  pre-adjustments  of  the 
individual's  mind.  The  evolution  of  conceit  in  the  adolescent 
is  attended  by  self-exaltation  and  an  illusory  interpretation,  or 
deviation  from  the  common  or  collective  estimation  of  the  indivi- 
dual's own  powers  or  attributes.  The  bilious  person  perceives 
his  presentations  with  an  accompanying  tone  of  melancholj^, 
and  interprets  from  his  mental  standard.  The  sanguine  and 
full-bodied  muscular  individual  interprets  everything  with  a 
halo  of  hope  and  well-being.  Such  a  type  provides  us  with 
the  characteristic  euphoria  of  general  paralysis.  A  general 
paralytic  of  the  nervous  type  exhibits  acute  maniacal  ravings, 
whilst  one  of  the  bilious  type  is  apt  to  be  melancholic  with  the 
onset  of  the  disease.  Instances  must  occur  to  every  mental 
pathologist  where  the  disease  has  been  attended  by  the  illusory 
belief  by  the  patient  that  at  last  the  former  dreams  and  castles 
in  the  air  are  realised.  Such  instances  are  common.  Poverty 
suggests  dreams  of  wealth.  Inability  to  help  our  friends 
suggests  dreams  of  benevolent  gifts  and  magnificent  schemes 
for  the  welfare  of  mankind  in  general.  The  onset  of  a 
process  of  degeneration,  such  as  general  paralysis,  is  often 
characterised  by  such  mental  colouring,  which  is  to  be 
explained'  only  by  the  comparatively  permanent  disposition 
of  the  mind  to  imagine  the  unreal.     Present  subjective  realities 


SECONDARY  SENSATIONS.  243 

receive    their    tone    or    colouring    from    a    mind    more  or  less 
saturated  with  probabilities  and  imaginary  possibilities. 

Secondary  Sensations.  —  Let  us  now  briefly  consider 
some  of  those  conditions  of  perception  which  have  been  termed 
"  secondari/.''  Some  individuals  never  have  a  presentation  of 
a  certain  sense  without  the  occurrence  of  a  presentation  of 
another  sense.  Thus,  some  experience  a  sensation  of  light 
with  every  sensation  of  sound.  Others  observe  colours  with 
every  sound.  When  the  two  presentations  occur  together  the 
condition  may  be  termed  one  of  a  dual  presentation  to  dis- 
tinguish it  from  a  secondari/  presentation,  in  which  case  the 
primary  suggestion  of  one  presentation  is  follo^^'ed  by  or 
associated  with  a  secondary  and  different  sensation.  Bleuler* 
has  divided  these  secondary  sensations  into  : — 

1.  So2md  pJiotisms.  —  Sensations  of  colour  acompanying 
sensations  of  sound. 

2.  Lkiht  j^hoiiisms. — Sensations  of  sound  from  perception 
through  light. 

3.  Taste  pJiotisms. — Sensations  of  colour  from  perception 
through  taste. 

4.  Odour  photisms. — Sensations  of  colour  from  perception 
through  smell. 

5.  Pain  photisms .■ — Sensations  of  colour  from  perception 
of  pain,  temperature,  and  touch. 

Blettler  and  Lehmann  found  that  secondary  sensations 
occurred  in  seventy-six  persons  out  of  59G  (12^  per  cent.). 
According  to  the  former,  secondary  sensations  are  transmis- 
sible by  heredity.  Entire  families  of  colour-hearers  are  known. 
Their  connection  with  nervous  and  mental  disease  is  unproved. 
Lepsius,  the  Egyptologist,  connected  colour  with  sounds,  and 
used  those  colours  as  a  guide  in  his  philological  inquiries. 
Galton  relates  the  case  of  a  lady,  in  which  the  tendency 
was  hereditary,  but  not  the  details  :  thus  one  member  of  the 
family  might  say  that  a  word  was  blue,  and  another  strongly 
dissent  and  say  it  was  green,  and  some  little  domestic  friction 
occasionally    arose     in   consequence.      GrtilDert    has    tabulated 

*  "Tuke's  Dictionarj'  of  Psych.  Med.,''  p.  1125. 

t  "L'audition  coloree  et  les  phenomenes  similaires."     International  Con- 
gress of  E.xperimental  Psychology.     London.  1S92. 


244 


SENSORY  PERVERSIONS. 


the    various 
follows  * : — 

f 


chromatisms    and    photisms     of   the    senses    as 


Chromatisms 


Superior 

Senses  ^ 


Sight.. 


Photisms 


f  Forms 
I  Movements 
^  Elements  of 
I      writing 
I  Numbers 
/  Musical 
sounds 
Instruments 
and  voice 
Vowels 
Diphthongs 
Consonants 
Syllables 
Common 
names 
Proper 
names 
Hearing  {  p^ys  of  the 
week 
Seasons 
Months  of 
the  year 
Elements, 
geogra- 
phical 
Homonyms 
Abstract 
names 
,  i^  Numbers 

...fT™'}Heari„g...Xoises... 


■  Coloured  vision. 


^ 


Chromatisms, 
Phonetic 


^  Coloured 
hearing. 


Chromatisms, 
Psychic 


.Audition  illumin^e. 


Chromatisms 
(Photisms) 


( 


Inferior 

senses 


Taste  ...■{ 


Smell  ■ 


Touch . 


)■     Coloured  taste. 


{  Bitter 
Sweet 
Acid 
Salt 

Coloured  smell. 
(^  Touch  proper    Coloured  touch. 
( Very  hot    \ 
I  Warm         I  Coloured 
Temperature  \  Tepid         ;.     tempera- 


l 


I 


ture. 


Cool 
\  Very  cold 
Muscular     \  Movements  . . .  Coloured  movement, 
sensation  J  Eesistances  ...  Coloured  resistance. 


*  He  reserves  the  term  j^hot ism,  introduced  by  Bleuler  and  Lehmann,  for 
"  rauditio7i  illumineer  and  includes  under  the  term  chroviatism  "  les  taches 
subjectives  color^e,  qui  sont  evoquees  par  I'excitation  des  divers  autres  sens." 


SECONDARY  SENSATIONS.  245 

In   addition  to  these    chromatisms   and  photisms  we  have 
various  phonisms,  which  may  be  tabulated  as  follows  : — 


Taste 
Smell 
Phonisms  \  Tactual 


f  Sight       . .  . .         . .         . .     sight  hearing. 

. .  taste  hearing. 
. .  smell  hearing, 
. .     touch  hearing. 

movement  hearing. 
. .     temperature  hearing, 
resistance  hearing. 


Movement 

Temperature 

Resistance 


For  the  inferior  senses  we  have  gustatisms — viz.,  sight,  sound, 
and  smell-tasting;  also  olfadisms — viz.,  sight-smelling,  sound- 
smelling,  etc.  Tactual  and  temperature  sensations  may  be 
provoked  by  the  other  senses.  Thus,  we  have  sight  hearing, 
and  taste,  giving  rise  to  tactual  sensations  ;  also  sight  or  hear- 
ing giving  rise  to  temperature  sensations.  We  cannot, 
however,  enter  into  the  details  of  all  these  secondary  sen- 
sations. 

Many  theories  have  been  offered  to  explain  their  occurrence. 
Bleuler  believes  the  explanation  commonly  offered — that  colour- 
hearing  is  due  to  a  simple  association  of  ideas  which  constantly 
occur  together — to  be  false.     The  regularity  \\'ith  which  light 
colours  predominate  for  high  notes,  etc.,  does  certainly,  on  this 
theory,  appear  to  be  unexplainable.     Bleuler  has  pointed  out 
that  the  colours  appearing  in  photisms  differ  but  slightly  from 
the  ordinary  colours  perceived  by  the  eye.     The  photism  colours 
usually  appear  as  pure  colour  sensations,  separated  from  all  ideas 
of  matter  which  are  associated  with  every  colour  surface.     They 
can  best  be  compared  with  coloured  flames,  or  with  evening  red 
in    a   coloured    sky.       Photism    colours    have   been    observed, 
although  very  rarely,  which,  optically,  have  never  been  per- 
ceived, and  which  are,  indeed,  optically  inconceivable.     Bleuler 
himself  experienced  a  photism  for  the  German  modified  u  (li)  as 
a  mixture  of  light-red  and  yellow,  and  a  little  blue  without  a 
trace  of  green.     This  observer  found  that  the  surroundings  of 
photisms — ^that   is,  the    field   on  which  they  appear — are  not 
black,    but    a   neutral    ground    free    from    eveiy   colour.     The 
transitions  from  one  photism  to  another  frequently  correspond 
to  similar  changes  in  common  colours  ;  thus,  for  a  colour-hearer, 
a  (in  ''father'")  may  be  blue,  o  (in  "bone")   yellow,  and  the 


246  SEXSORY  PERVERSIONS. 

sound  between  these  two,  oa  (a  in  "water"),  green.  Mixtures 
of  colours  frequently  occur,  and  follow  the  ordinarj^  laws  which 
govern  the  mixing  of  pigments ;  for  example,  the  simple 
photism  of  a  word  of  two  sj^lables  may  be  orange,  because  the 
vowel  of  the  first  syllable  appears  red,  and  that  of  the  second 
yellow.  The  same  author  gives  the  folloA\'ing  laws  concerning 
secondary  sensations  *  : — 

1.  Photisms  light  in  colour  are  produced  by  sounds  of  high 
qualitj^,  intense  pain,  sharply-defined  sensations  of  touch,  small 
forms,  pointed  forms  ;  dark  photisms  from  opposite  conditions. 

2.  High  phonisms  are  produced  by  bright  light,  well- 
defined  outlines,  small  forms,  pointed  forms  ;  low  phonisms 
from  opposite  conditions. 

3.  Photisms  with  well-defined  forms,  small  photisms.  and 
pointed  photisms,  are  produced  by  sounds  of  high  pitch. 

4.  Ked,  yellow,  and  brown  are  frequent  photism  colours, 
violet  and  green  are  rare,  while  blue  stands  between  these 
extremes. 

The  observations  of  Lussana,  the  brothers  Nussbaumer, 
Bleuler  and  Lehmann,  Lauret  and  Duchaussoy,  Ferdinand 
Saurez  de  Mendoza,  etc.,  have  demonstrated  the  influence  of 
heredity  in  the  production  of  secondary  sensations ;  but,  as 
pointed  out  by  Griiber,  all  these  observations  have  been  made 
on  intellectual  and  cultivated  individuals.  It  would,  therefore, 
be  interesting  to  ascertain  whether  these  phenomena  occur 
among  the  illiterate.  We  do  not  know  how  much  is  hereditarj^ 
and  how  much  is  acquired  through  cultivation.  A  second 
question  to  ask  would  be,  Do  these  phenomena  fall  within  the 
domain  of  cerebral  pathology,  or  within  that  of  normal  phy- 
siology?    Neiglick  and  Steinbriigge  believe  that  the  phenomena 

*  Griiber  says : — "  Mais  auparavant  il  faut  ranger  les  individus  qui  posse- 
dent  des  sensations  doubles  (le  terme  n'est  pas  assez  correct)  en  deux  grandes 
classes  :  (1)  les  individus  qui  presentent  des  chromatismes,  qui  chromatisent 
leur  audition,  qui  associent  une  sensation  secondaire  de  couleur  a  Fetat 
hallucinatoire ;  nous  appellerons  cet  etat  ''letat  sensationel ;'  (2)  les  indi- 
vidus qui  associent  constamment  et  fatalement  les  memes  idees  de  coleur 
aux  memes  sons,  etc.,  qui  presentent  cette  liaison  a  Tetat  purement  intellec- 
tuel  6tat  2Jsychirjue.  Entre  ces  deux  classes,  entre  le  type  le  mieux  done  et 
ceux  qui  n'ont  ces  plienomenes  qu'a  un  degre  tres  faible  et  tres  partiel  il  y  a 
toutes  les  transitions  possibles." 


SECONDARY  SENSATIONS.  247 

are  abnormal  and  symptomatic  of  a  degenerative  process. 
Fere  and  others  regard  them  as  the  outcome  of  "  une  tonallte 
jjarticuUere  de  Vor<jcimsme."  On  the  other  hand,  Perroud,- 
Chabalier,  Baratoux,  Mendoza,  Urbantschitsch,  and  others  have 
supported  the  view  that  all  the  phenomena  are  normal.  Others, 
again,  believe  that  these  secondary  sensations  fall  under  the 
category  of  psychical  phenomena  (such  as  hypnotism,  dreams, 
hallucinations,  genius,  etc.),  which,  although  not  exactly  normal 
psychical  states,  nevertheless,  cannot  be  considered  as  morbid. 
They  argue  that  psychical  exceptions  are  not  necessarily  patho- 
loaical. 


248 


CHAPTEE   IX. 

Hallucinations. 

Distinction  between  Illusion  and  Hallucination — The  Transition  from 
Illusion  to  Hallucination — Relation  of  Imagination  to  Hallucina- 
tion—  The  Neural  Process  in  Hallucinations  —  The  "Bucket 
Theory  " — Anatomical  Regions  for  Hallucinations  and  Sensations 
— Varieties  of  Hallucinations — Classifications. 

Clinical  Considerations. 

Statistics  of  1,000  Cases — Perversions  of  Taste — -Hypergeusia — Hypo- 
geusia  —  Ageusia  —  Parageusia  —  Perversions  of  Smell — Hyper- 
osmia — Hyposmia — Anosmia — Parosmia — Perversions  of  Sight — 
Entoptical  Causes — After  Images — Perversions  of  Hearing — 
Hyperakusis  —  Hypakusis  —  Akusis — Parakusis — Perversions  of 
Tactual  Perception — Hypersesthesia— Anaesthesia — Pselaphesia 
— Algia — Perversions  of  the  Muscular  Sense — Kinsesthesia — 
Illusions  and  Hallucinations  in  Dreams — Hypnagogic  Illusions — 
— Dreams  in  the  Insane. 

HALLUCINATIONS. 

It  is  often  difficult  to  distinguish  between  active  illusions  and 
hallucinations.  This  is  more  particularly  the  case  when  the 
psychic  element  of  expectancy  is  present  to  any  great  extent. 
Esquirol  distinguishes  an  illusion  from  an  hallucination  by  the 
assumption  that  the  former  is  a  false  interpretation  of  a  sensa- 
tion actually  present  and  perceived.  In  some  instances  this 
distinction  must  be  a  very  line  one.  Hack  Tuke,  however, 
regards  the  cjuestion  as  not  altogether  unimportant,  because 
while  men  easily,  even  in  a  perfectly  sane  state,  convert  a  real 
object  into  something  other  than  itself,  they  rarely  perceive  one 
externally  projected,  in  the  entire  absence  of  a  corresponding 
reality,  without  a  more  or  less  grave  disturbance  of  the  nervous 
sj^stem.  It  must  be  remembered  that  an  insane  hallucina- 
tion, as  well  as  an  illusion,  may  involve  a  false  interpretation. 


HALLUCINATIONS.  249 

Both  may  appear  to  be  piirely  psychical  processes,  and,  un- 
doubtedly, it  is  from  the  psychical  side  only  that  we  can  as  yet 
seek  their  explanation. 

We  shall,  however,  endeavour  to  understand  how  far  we  may 
attribute  their  existence  to  correlated  ph5^siological  states. 
Professor  Ball  believes  that  even  an  illusion  involves  an  hal- 
lucination, and  that  there  is  no  fundamental  difference  between 
the  two. 

In  hallucinations  various  sensations  may  be  experienced, 
although  no  external  objects  act  upon  the  peripheral  sensory 
nerves.  According  to  Hack  Tuke,  such  sensations  do  not 
constitute  insanity,  unless  they  are  credited  by  an  individual 
to  be  realities  under  conditions  in  which  reason  and  experience 
ought  to  forbid  such  belief.  It  must  be  remembered,  however, 
that  although  an  hallucination  is  regarded  as  the  perception  of 
an  apparent  external  object  which  has  no  external  reality,  but 
which  is  credited  as  having  an  external  reality,  the  genesis  may 
be  almost  identical  with  a  centrifugal  causal  operation.  Science 
can  seek  to  demonstrate  the  physical  factors  which  act  upon 
our  peripheral  nervous  mechanism,  but  it  cannot  entirely 
eliminate  all  peripheral  excitants  as  possible  causal  factors  of 
what  we  term  esoneural  phenomena.  That  is  to  say,  even  the 
so-called  internal  or  imaginative  processes,  although  apparently 
esoneural  in  origin,  may  depend  upon  peripherally  initiated 
factors. 

In  the  transition  from  illusion  to  hallucination  the  processes 
of  imagination  come  into  play  without  the  aid  of  direct  and 
immediate  sensation.  It  must  not  be  forgotten,  however,  that 
the  imagination  itself  is  the  result  of  unusual  combinations 
of  revived  sensations.  Were  the  transition  capable  of  exact 
demonstration,  it  would  occiir  at  the  point  \\'here  the  exoneural 
factors  could  be  entirely  eliminated.  How  far  we  are  able  to 
determine  what  perversions  are  due  to  the  direct  implication 
of  sensory  tracts,  and  how  far  other  nervous  substances  are 
involved,  we  shall  venture  to  inquire,  but  we  shall  see  that, 
from  a  physiological  point  of  view,  we  are  unacquainted  with 
the  mode  whereby  there  arises  that  internal  facility  of  increased 
development  or  increased  production  of  abnormal  images  so 
commonly  met  with  in  the  insane. 


250  HALLUCINATIONS. 

Eveiy  perception  is  somehow  dependent  npon  correlated 
physically-determined  activities.  The  mental  "  complexion " 
gained  by  the  mind's  habitual  interpretation  of  presentations, 
is  the  psychical  complex  upon  which  the  incoming  impressions 
assert  themselves.  To  estimate  the  natm^e  of  this  mental 
complexion  it  is  necessary  that  we  should  take  account  of  other 
psychical  factors  than  mere  present  sensory  presentations, 
physically  or  physiologicallj^  determined.  We  can,  to  a 
certain  extent,  eliminate  external  or  exoneural  stimuli  as  the 
initial  factors  in  a  sensor}^  presentation ;  we  cannot,  however, 
eliminate  from  consideration  the  esoneural  factors  with  which 
complex  mental  states  are  associated.  That  is  to  say,  in  dealing 
with  the  factors  A^diich  determine  an  immediate  presentation  to 
the  mind,  and  those  which  determine  a  complex  mental  state, 
we  must  in  each  instance  grant  the  dependence  of  the  psychic 
facts  upon  esoneural  phenomena. 

Many  authors  believe  that  there  is  little  or  no  difference 
between  imagined  and  felt  objects,  and  that  the  cortical  pro- 
cesses which  underlie  them  are  essentially  similar.  There 
seems  to  be  no  doubt  that  genuine  sensations  may  depend  upon 
the  activity  of  the  cerebral  apparatus  alone.  Professor  James 
believes  that  the  imagination  process  differs  from  the  sensation 
process  by  its  intensity  rather  than  b}^  its  locality.  He  also 
believes  that  the  imagination  process  can  pass  over  into  the 
sensation  process,  but  that  normally  the  two  processes  do  not 
pass  over  into  each  other;  therefore,  either  sensation  processes 
occupy  a  different  locality  from  imagination  processes ;  or, 
occupying  the  same  locality,  they  have  an  intensity  which, 
under  normal  circumstances,  currents  from  other  cortical 
regions  ai^e  incapable  of-  arousing,  and  to  produce  which 
involves  the  operation  of  the  peripheral  apparatus. 

Before  we  can  admit  that  sensation  processes  and  imagina- 
tion processes  involve  the  activities  of  the  same  centres,  we 
require  much  further  information  with  regard  to  the  relative 
functions  of  the  structural  contents  of  the  various  sensor}^ 
areas.  We  know,  in  a  rough  kind  of  way,  that  injury,  disease, 
or  extirpation  of  certain  sensory  areas,  serves  to  prevent 
ingoing  sensory  stimuli  from  reaching  consciousness  ;  but,  at 
the    same   time,   we    cannot    sa}''   that    this    interference    with 


HALLUCINATIONS.  251 

the  transmission  of  ingoing  stimuli  necessarih",  also,  interrupts 
the  neiiral  activities  with  which  representations  are  correlated. 
The  fact  that  these  centres  may  be  partiallj^  injured  without 
obvious  impairment  of  the  activities  of  their  representative 
processes  is  significant,  and  leads  us  to  the  belief  that  we  may 
yet  establish  some  more  definite  facts  with  regard  to  the 
structures  contained  Avithin  the  sensorv  areas,  and,  thereby, 
possibly  throw  some  light  upon  the  physiological  relation 
between  presentations  and  representations. 

The  human  nervous  system  resembles  in  some  respects  the 
complicated  system  of  wires  in  a  piano.  When  a  wire  in  a 
piano  is  destroyed  in  any  part  of  its  course  no  ingoing 
activities  can  be  transmitted  along  that  wire.  Similarly, 
when  a  nerve  is  cut  or  destroj-ed  the  ingoing  currents  are 
necessarily  interrupted.  We  cannot  push  the  analogy  too  far, 
however,  for  in  the  case  of  the  nervous  system,  although  the 
end-organ  of  sense  is  cut  off  from  its  centre,  that  centre  can 
still  exhibit  activities  upon  which  the  revival  of  past  acquire- 
ments would  appear  to  depend.  That  is  to  say,  although  the 
development  of  the  brain  depends  upon  the  functional  integrity 
of  its  connections  with  the  peripher}-,  nevertheless,  the  sum 
total  of  the  acquirements  would  appear  to  be  capable  of  repre- 
sentation centrally  in  spite  of  the  nei've  discontinuity. 

Later,  we  shall  see  that  the  modus  operandi  whereby  a 
presentation  is  recalled  or  re-presented  is  a  subject  about 
which,  as  yet,  we  can  only  conjecture.  We  cannot  assume 
that  there  is  activity  of  the  representative  elements  involved 
in  imagination  apart  from  the  instrumentality  of  its  organ, 
the  brain.  We  can  only  assume,  that  the  representative 
element  is  determined  in  some  way  or  another  by  some  present 
and  immediate  activity,  and  that  the  mental  state  is,  or  is  not, 
independent  of  exoneural  forces.  The  belief  in  the  external  or 
objective  reality  of  the  representation  is  in  part  determined 
by  the  character  and  intensity  of  the  representation  itself. 

In  the  ordinar}^  images  which  are  conjured  up  by  memory, 
association,  or  imaeination,  ^we  have  a  certain  feelins;  of  mental 
activity,  and  we  are  aware  of  the  want  of  objective  reality  of 
the  things  perceived.  In  hallucinations,  however,  this  feeling 
of  activity  is  not  appreciated.     The  presentations  are  more  or 


252  HALLUCINATIONS. 

less  spontaneous,  sndclen,  and  abrupt,  and  in  their  vividness 
they  tend  to  gain  the  import  of  objective  realities.  Ordinary 
images  can  be  revived  with  more  or  less  distinctness  at  will; 
hallucinations,  which  are  altogether  more  vivid,  seldom  or  never. 
In  the  former  the  mind  is  active  and  determining ;  in  the  latter 
it  is  passive  and  recipient.  The  instances  met  with  in  asylums 
where  the  sense  presentations  are  viewed  by  the  individual  as 
having  some  internal  objective  reality  are  very  numerous. 

Sometimes  "mental  voices"  may  possess  such  a  degree  of 
vividness  that  there  arises  the  belief  that  they  are  spiritually 
superimposed,  and  that  they  are  not  the  outcome  of  ordinary 
psycho-physical  factors.  The  mind  may  be  regarded  as  the 
passive  recipient  of  the  presentations,  and  without  any  con- 
sciotis  mental  preparedness  favouring  the  occurrence  of  such 
presentations.  In  some  instances  the  hallucination  may  super- 
impose itself  with  such  vividness  that  it  submerges  all 
voluntary  direction  of  thought,  and  succeeds  in  asserting 
itself  to  the  exclusion  of  all  other  incoming  sensory  or 
associative  processes.  Sane  individuals  are  also  subject  to 
such  experiences.  At  some  time  or  another  we  have  all  felt 
the  influence  of  a  dominant  idea  which  returns  and  asserts 
itself  in  spite  of  all  our  efforts  to  drive  it  from  us.  In  every- 
day life  our  minds  are  subjected  to  all  sorts  and  conditions  of 
representations  of  the  senses.  Thus,  some  unpleasant  contre- 
temiDs,  some  act  of  folly,  some  painful  sight,  some  hackneyed  tune, 
or  sickening  odour,  will  reassert  itself,  and  in  its  very  vividness 
distract  the  mind  from  its  immediate  surroundings.  "Punch 
brothers.  Punch  with  care ;  Punch  in  the  presence  of  a 
Passengare "  is  an  instance  known  to  every  reader  of  Mark 
Twain.  For  the  present,  however,  we  have  to  do  rather  with 
the  abnormal  interpretation  of  the  presentations  than  with 
their  various  modes  of  asserting  themselves  in  the  individual. 

Those  forms  of  hallucinations  in  regard  to  which  the  indi- 
vidual recognises  a  subjective  significance,  and  that  they  have 
no  objective  reality,  but  which  he,  at  the  same  time,  believes 
to  be  superimposed  upon  his  mental  being,  either  by  some 
other  influence,  or  by  some  system  of  persecution,  are  termed 
pseudo-hallucinations :  that  is  to  say,  they  do  not  possess  the 
character  of  objective  reality  which  pertains  to  an  hallucination. 


HALLUCINATIONS.  253 

One  patient  in  Bethleni  Hospital  used  to  see  words  in  clearly 
cut  characters  (sometimes  Inrainous  on  a  grey  background,  at 
other  times  dark  upon  a  luminous  background)  pass  across  his 
brain.  The  words  themselves  were  quite  distinct,  and  the 
sentences  presented  to  his  mind  were  full  of  reproach  and 
sometimes  even  blasphemy.  The  interpretation  was  at  fault, 
inasmuch  as  he  regarded  his  subjective  experiences  to  be  due 
to  some  system  of  persecution  brought  about  by  spiritual 
powers.*  This  variety  of  internal  reference  of  the  sensory 
presentation  differs  from  that  variety  in  which,  for  instance, 
a  voice  is  thought  to  proceed  from  some  other  jDart  of  the 
organism.  Thus,  one  patient  heard  a  voice  which  appeared  to 
come  from  her  own  throat ;  another,  heard  a  voice,  full  of  con- 
demnation, which  seemed  to  come  from  the  left  side  of  her  bodv. 
Another,  at  present  in  Bethlem,  hears  the  voice  of  "  Ethel " 
calling  to  her  from  her  womb.  A  more  interesting  instance 
still  was  seen  at  Wakefield.  The  patient,  a  music  teacher, 
suffering  from  epilepsy,  had  an  aura  preceding  each  epileptic 
attack  ;  each  aura  consisted  in,  firstly,  distant  sounds  of  music 
which  seemed  to  proceed  from  her  abdomen,  and  as  the  sounds 
increased  in  intensit}'  and  distinctness  they  appeared  to  rise 
gradually  from  the  abdomen  to  the  thorax,  neck,  and  head, 
until  they  reached  the  vertex,  when  she  lost  all  consciousness. 
Dr.  Savage  mentions  a  case  in  which  an  individual  developed 
the  idea  that  he  had  a  spiritual  wife  within  him  who  communed 
constantly  with  him,  and  who  had  prophetic,  spiritualistic,  and 
mesmeric  powers.  In  each  of  these  instances  some  ^^art  of  the 
bodily  organism  was  referred  to  as  the  source  from  ■\\diich  the 
sensor}^  impression  was  derived.  Such  inner  voices  are  common 
among  the  insane.  Their  subjective  nature  is  not  recognised, 
and  their  causation  is  not  attributed  to  the  workings  of  brain 
or  to  the  activities  of  the  mind  itself. 

It  is  often  extremely  difficult  to  distinguish  between  illu- 
sions, pseudo-hallucinations,  and  true  hallucinations.     In  some 

*  In  stating  that  the  interpretation  was  at  fault,  I  am  keenly  aware  of 
the  fact  that  we  have  no  proof  against  any  spiritual  interpretation.  We 
know  not  the  cause  of  physical,  physiological,  or  mental  manifestations.  In 
mentioning  such  cases  as  instances  of  perversion,  I,  at  the  same  time,  allow 
that  some  speculations  are  not  incompatihle  with  sanity. 


254  •  HALLUCINATIONS. 

fornas  of  acute  maniacal  delirium  there  may  be  a  combination 
of  all  three.  The  hallucinations  which  arise  in  connection  with 
opium,  haschisch,  and  belladonna,  are  said  to  resemble  those  of 
acute  fever  delirium  in  this  respect. 

The  Neural  Process  in  Hallucination. — The  point 

upon  which  authors  differ  is  in  respect  to  the  tracts  affected  in 
hallucinations.  Some  would  have  it,  that  the  same  parts  of  the 
nervous  apparatus  which  are  concerned  with  normal  sense 
presentations  are  also  concerned  with  the  abnormal  or  hallucina- 
tory presentations.  They  believe  that  the  neural  process  in  an 
hallucination  must  consist  of  an  excitement  from  within  of  those 
centres  which  are  active  in  normal  perception,  identical  in  kind 
and  degree  with  that  which  real  external  objects  are  usually 
needed  to  induce.  Professor  James  holds,  that  the  particular 
process  which  currents  from  the  sense  organs  arouse  would 
seem,  under  normal  circumstances,  to  be  arousable  in  no  other 
way.  The  supposition  of  several  authors,  that  the  vividness 
of  the  hallucination  bears  a  relative  proportion  to  the  intensity 
of  the  activities  arousing  that  process,  need  not  detain  us  here, 
inasmuch  as  our  knowledge  does  not  as  yet  warrant  any  definite 
conclusion. 

An  ingenious  theory  has  been  given  by  Professor  James  to 
account  for  the  neural  process  in  hallucination.  He  assumes, 
that  when  cells  in  the  cortex  are  excited  by  impulses  passing 
through  associative  paths,  there  is  a  free  discharge  of  functional 
activity  from  these  cells  to  others,  and  that  this  diffusion 
prevents  a  maximum  of  intensity  being  reached  at  any  one  point. 
This  "  leakage  forward  "  is  too  rapid  for  the  inner  tension  in  any 
centre  to  accumulate  to  the  maximal  explosion  point,  unless  the 
exciting  currents  are  greater  than  those  which  the  various 
portions  of  the  cortex  supply  to  each  other.  He  also  assumes, 
that  "  currents  from  the  periphery  are  the  only  currents  whose 
enero-y  can  vanquish  the  supra-ideational  resistance  of  the  cells, 
and  cause  the  peculiarly  intense  sort  of  disintegration  with 
which  the  sensational  quality  is  linked.  If,  however,  the  leakage 
forward  were  to  stop,  the  tension  inside  certain  cells  might 
reach  the  explosion  point,  even  though  the  influence  which 
excited  them  came  only  from  neighbouring  cortical  parts."  To 
illustrate  his  theory,  he  says  : — 


THE  NEURAL  PliOCESS.  255 

"Let  aa  empty  pail,  with  a  leak  in  its  bottom,  tipped  up  against  a 
support,  so  that  if  it  ever  became  full  of  water  it  would  upset,  represent 
the  resting  condition  of  the  centre  for  a  cei'tain  sort  of  feeling.  Let 
water  poured  into  it  stand  for  the  currents,  which  are  its  natural 
stimulus ;  then  the  hole  in  its  bottom  will,  of  course,  represent  the 
*  paths  '  by  which  it  transmits  its  excitement  to  other  association  cells. 
Now,  let  two  other  vessels  have  the  function  of  supplying  it  with  water. 
One  of  these  vessels  stands  for  the  neighbouring  cortical  cells,  and  can 
pour  in  hardly  any  more  water  than  goes  out  by  the  leak.  The  pail 
consequently  never  upsets,  in  consequence  of  the  supply  from  this 
source.  A  current  of  water  passes  through  it,  and  does  work  elsewhere  ; 
but  in  the  pail  itself  nothing  but  what  stands  for  ideational  activity  is 
aroused.  The  other  vessel,  however,  stands  for  the  peripheral  sense- 
organs,  and  supplies  a  stream  of  water  so  copious  that  the  pail  promptly 
fills  up  in  spite  of  the  leak,  and  presently  upsets ;  in  other  words, 
sensational  activity  is  aroused.  But  it  is  obvious  that  if  the  leak  were 
plugged,  the  slower  stream  of  supply  would  also  end  by  uj)setting  the 
pail. 

"  To  apply  this  to  the  brain  and  to  thought — if  we  take  a  series  of 
processes  (A,  B,  C,  D,  E)  associated  together  in  that  order — and  suppose 
that  the  current  through  them  is  very  fluent,  there  will  be  little  intensity 
anywhere  until,  perha^DS,  a  pause  occurs  at  E.  But  the  moment  the 
current  is  blocked  anywhere — say,  between  C  and  D — the  process  in  C 
must  grow  more  intense,  and  might  even  be  conceived  to  explode,  so  as 
to  produce  a  sensation  in  the  mind  instead  of  an  idea. 

"  Ii  would  seem  that  some  hallucinations  are  best  to  be  exj)lained  in 
this  way.  "We  have,  in  fact,  a  regular  series  of  facts,  which  can  all  be 
formulated  under  the  single  law  that  the  substantive  strength  of  a  state 
of  consciou-mess  bears  an  inverse  jjroportion  to  its  suf/f/estiveness.  It  is  the 
halting-places  of  our  thought  which  are  occupied  with  distinct  imagery. 
Most  of  the  words  we  utter  have  no  time  to  awaken  images  at  all ;  they 
simply  awaken  the  following  words.  But  when  the  sentence  stops,  an 
image  dwells  for  awhile  before  the  mental  eye.  Again,  whenever  the 
associative  processes  are  reduced  and  impeded  b}'  the  approach  of  un- 
consciousness —  as  in  falling  asleep,  or  growing  faint,  or  becoming 
narcotised,  we  find  a  concomitant  increase  in  the  intensity  of  whatever 
partial  consciousness  may  survive.  In  some  people,  what  M.  Maury  has 
called  '  hypnagogic '  hallucinations  are  the  regular  concomitant  of  the 
process  of  falling  asleep.  Trains  of  faces,  landscapes,  etc.,  pass  before 
the  mental  eye — first  as  fancies,  then  as  pseudo-hallucinations  ;  finally, 
as  full-fledged  hallucinations  forming  dreams.  If  we  regard  association- 
paths  as  paths  of  drainage,  then  the  shuttiug-off  of  one  after  another  of 
them  as  the  encroaching  cerebral  paralysis  advances  ought  to  act  like 
the  plugging  of  the  hole  in  the  bottom  of  the  pail,  and  make  the  activity 
more  intense  in  those  systems  of  cells  that  retain  any  activity  at  all. 
The  level  rises  because  the  currents  are  not  drained  away,  until  at  last 
the  full  sensational  explosion  may  occur. 


256  HALLUCIXATIONS. 

"  The  usual  explanation  of  hypnagogic  hallucinations  is  that  they  are 
ideas  deprived  of  their  ordinary  reductives.  In  somnolescence,  sensations 
being  extinct,  the  mind,  it  is  said,  then  having  no  stronger  things  to 
compare  its  ideas  with,  ascribes  to  these  the  fulness  of  reality.  At 
ordinary  times,  the  objects  of  our  imagination  are  reduced  to  the  status 
of  subjective  facts  by  the  ever-present  contrast  of  our  sensations  with 
them.  Eliminate  the  sensations,  however,  this  view  supposes,  and  the 
'  images  '  are  forthwith  '  projected  '  into  the  outer  world  and  appear  as 
realities.  Thus  is  the  illusion  of  dreams  also  explained.  This,  indeed, 
after  a  fashion,  gives  an  account  of  the  facts ;  and  yet,  it  certainly  fails 
to  explain  the  extraordinary  vivacity  and  completeness  of  so  many  of  our 
dream-fantasms.  The  process  of  '  imaginating  '  must  (in  these  cases  at 
least)  be  not  merely  relatively,  but  absolutely,  and,  in  itself,  more  intense 
than  at  other  times.  The  fact  is,  it  is  not  a  process  of  imagining,  but  a 
genuine  sensational  process,  and  the  theory  in  question  is  therefore  false 
as  far  as  that  point  is  concerned." 

The  main  objection  to  this  "  bucket  theory"  is,  that  it  will 
not  hold  water  !  As  yet  we  do  not  know  which  elements  of  the 
sensory  areas  are  active  in  normal  perception.  From  the 
physiological  standpoint  it  would  appear  warrantable  to  speak 
of  "discharge"  and  "  resistance"  in  cells;  but  to  extend  the 
possible  physiological  explanation  to  uninvestigable  psychical 
causes  is  unwarrantable.  The  "  accumulation  of  inner  tension 
to  the  maximal  explosion  point "  is  a  purely  hypothetical  notion 
in  so  far  as  causes  or  even  effects  are  concerned.  With  each 
physiological  "  explosion"  the  process  would  become  easier,  and, 
according  to  many  writers,  the  mental  result  would  diminish 
correspondingly.  Psychologically,  however,  each  revival  of  the 
hallucination  tends  to  make  it  quite  eqiiall}^  vivid,  or  more  so, 
according  to  the  predisposing  physiological  condition  and  the 
intensity  of  the  cause. 

Again,  in  the  insane,  hallucinations  occur  ver}?-  readil}^,  and 
appear  to  occupy  the  whole  of  the  special  sensory  apparatus. 
Now,  were  these  hallucinations  due  to  increased  tension  in  the 
nerve-cells  (pathological  or  othei-wise),  how  could  we  account 
for  the  fact  that,  if  these  sensory  regions  concerned  are  working 
abnormally  owing  to  " tension,"  "resistance,"  "explosion,"  etc., 
they,  nevertheless,  are  able  to  transmit  normal  ingoing  impres- 
sions which  in  themselves  have  nothing  unusual  or  peculiarly 
intense.  It  is  difficult  to  imagine  a  pathological  process  which 
can  involve  certain  cells  and  lead  to  explosive  conditions  and 


THE  NEUIJAL   PHOCESS.  257 

their  sequels,  and  yet  at  the  same  time  permit  them  to  transmit 
ordinary  currents  in  a  normal  manner.  If  we  assume,  that  the 
imaginary  or  haUucinatory  process  is  due  to  some  degree  of 
"  inward  molecular  cohesion  "  in  our  brain-cells,  and  that  these 
brain-cells  ai'e  concerned  with  revived  images  as  well  as  new  or 
immediate  ingoing  peripheral  images,  and  that  a  sudden  inrush 
of  destructive  energy  is  the  determining  agent  which  liberates 
the  accumulation,  how  are  we  to  accoi^nt  for  the  fact,  that  nor- 
mal stimulation  of  the  said  areas  b}"  ingoing  peripheral  currents 
is  not  attended  by  any  of  the  hallucinatory  phenomena  ?  That 
is  to  say,  why  is  it  that  the  addition  of  a  sudden  current  from 
the  periphery  does  not  tend  to  overflow  the  level  of  tension  in 
the  cells  and  give  rise  to  an  explosion  in  the  form  of  an  illusion  ? 
We  must  assume,  either  that  no  such  tension  occurs,  or,  if  it 
does  occur,  that  the  cells  which  have  to  do  with  revived  images 
are  separate  from  those  which  have  to  do  with  direct  sense- 
impressions.  We  cannot  imagine  a  cell  having  a  tendency  to 
explode  and  yet  able  to  carry  on  its  direct  and  immediate 
functions  unimpaired. 

Let  us  not,  however,  for  a  moment  imagine  that,  were  we 
able  to  demonstrate  a  distinct  structural  arrangement  for  revived 
images  and  another  for  direct  perceptions,  our  difficulties  would 
be  overcome.  Perception  is  a  presentative-representative  pro- 
cess, and  involves  association  of  some  sort  with  previously- 
acquired  perceptions  or  memory-images.  This,  obviously,  also 
involves  the  coincidental  activities  of  the  structui*al  arrange- 
ments for  memory-images  with  every  act  of  perception.  Hence, 
we  may  fairly  assume  that,  if  hallucinations  are  due  to  patho- 
logical conditions  affecting  the  memory-image  regions,  then 
there  ought  to  be  some  evidence  of  their  abnormal  activities 
with  every  act  of  perception,  inasmuch  as  the  complete  percept 
would  depend  upon  their  aid. 

Ward*  distinguishes  four  forms  of  presentation — viz.,  (1) 
The  sensory  impression;  (2)  the  so-called  '"revived  impression," 
which  is  said  to  fuse  with  this  in  perception ;  (3)  the  true 
memor5"-image  of  mediate  recognition  ;  and  (4)  general  images, 
the  representative  element  in  conception.  When  we  study  the 
anniesic  defects    associated  with    disorders   of  speech  we  shall 

*  "Assimilation  and  Association "— "ilind,"'  Oct.,  1894. 

17 


258  HALLUCINATIONS. 

see,  that  any  one  of  these  four  may  he  affected  without  obvious 
affection  of  any  of  the  others.  Moreover,  it  is  within  the 
bounds  of  possibility  that  we  may  yet,  within  certain  areas,  be 
able  to  obtain  anatomical  evidences  that  demonstrate  this  differ- 
entiation of  function.* 

There  appears  to  me  nothing  in  the  arguments  of  those 
authors,  who  maintain  that  hallucinations  and  sensations  occupy 
different  brain-elements,  that  tends  to  conflict  with  the  general 
conception  of  the  continuity  of  imagination  and  sensation.  It 
seems  hardly  necessary,  therefore,  to  seek  to  demonstrate 
mechanical  discontinuity  between  the  ideational  and  the 
sensational  kinds  of  process.  Indeed,  it  seems  but  natural  to 
assume,  that  just  as  there  may  be  a  psychical  seriality  of 
ideational  and  sensational  processes,  so  there  may  also  be  a 
correlative  propagation  of  physical  activity  from  the  ideational 
to  the  sensational  structures. 

Professor  James  says,  "  There  is  a  degree  of  inward  molecu- 
lar cohesion  in  our  brain-cells  which  it  probably  takes  a  sudden 
inrush  of  destructive  energy  to  spring  apart.  Incoming  peri- 
pheral currents  possess  this  energy  from  the  outset.  Currents 
from  neighboiiring  cortical  regions  might  attain  to  it  if  they 
could  accumulate  within  the  centre  which  we  are  supposed  to 
be  considering.  But  since  during  waking  hours  every  centre 
communicates  with  others  by  association-paths,  no  such  accu- 
mulation can  take  place.  The  cortical  currents  which  run  in 
run  right  out  again,  awakening  the  next  ideas  ;  the  level  of 
tension  in  the  cells  does  not  rise  to  the  higher  explosion- 
point  ;  and  the  latter  must  be  gained  by  a  sudden  current  from 
the  periphery  or  not  at  all." 

From  this  we  might  imagine,  that  during  waking  hours  the 
explosion-point  is  not  reached  owing  to  an  overflow  along  the 
association-paths.  To  criticise  these  views  seems  hardly  neces- 
sarj^,  inasmuch  as  they  are  so  wide  of  what  we  actually  con- 
ceive to  occur.  We  cannot  imagine  "  molecular  cohesions," 
"tensions,"  "explosions,"  etc.,  only  occurring  during  sleep, 
and   roused  by  sudden    currents    from  the   periphery.      It  is 

*  See  Miiller,  "Archiv.  fiir  Psychiatrie,"  Bd.  xxiv.  pp.  856 — 917;  also 
Vialet,  "  Les  centres  c6rebraiix  de  la  vision  at  1'  appareil  nerveux  visuel 
intra-cerebral." 


THE  NEURAL  PEOCESS.  259 

during  the  waking  moments  that  most  of  the  so-called  explo- 
sions are  revealed  in  conscioiisness  as  hallucinations,  and  not 
only  during  sleep.  AYhen  dreams  are  suggested  by  ingoing 
currents  they  are  of  the  nature  of  illusions  ;  when  determined 
b}'  activities  through  the  association-paths,  independently  of 
stimulation  through  the  special  channels  of  perception,  they 
are  hallucinatory;  and  the  "explosion"  is  not  necessarily 
determined  by  currents  from  the  periphery.  James  gives  as 
a  general  law  that  "whenever  the  normal  forward  irradiation 
of  intra  -  cortical  excitement  through  association  -  paths  is 
checked,  any  accidental  spontaneous  activity,  or  any  peripheral 
stimulation  (however  inadequate  at  other  times)  by  which  a 
brain-centre  may  be  visited,  sets  up  a  process  of  full  sensational 
intensity  therein."  We  know  that  during  sleep  the  character  of 
a  dream  is  frequently  determined  by  a  slight  peripheral  irrita- 
tion, in  which  case  the  dream  is  more  truly  an  illusion  than  an 
hallucination.  Also,  in  hypnotic  states,  we  know  that  peripheral 
stimulation  is  generally  necessary  to  induce  illusionar}^  phe- 
nomena ;  but  it  is  a  mistake  to  assert  that  ordinary  hallucina- 
tions are  started  by  peripheral  currents.  In  a  word,  we  are 
unable  to  say  what  the  actual  physiological  cause  is.  Binet 
believes  that  ingoing  currents  from  the  peripheral  nerves 
determine  the  actual  sensations  not  only  in  normal  perception, 
but  also  in  illusionary  and  hallucinatory  states.  If  by  this  is 
meant,  however,  that  all  hallucinations  and  illusions  of  sense 
are  the  results  of  previous  centrifugal  stimuli,  we  are  in  accord, 
although  we  are  unable  to  demonstrate  the  physiological  mode 
of  their  revival. 

When  we  are  satisfied  as  to  what  localities  are  concerned 
with  the  direct  presentations  of  sense  to  the  mind,  then  we 
may  offer  some  explanation  upon  the  cjuestion  as  to  whether 
peripheral  currents  are  essential  or  not.  Unfortunately,  we 
cannot  eliminate  the  whole  of  the  ingoing  paths  from  our  con- 
siderations. "We  know  that  after  loss  of  the  eyes,  after  section 
of  the  optic  tracts,  or  even  removal  of  parts  of  the  visual 
centres,  the  mind  still  receives  representations  of  sight;  but 
these  facts  do  not  enable  us  to  exclude  all  the  length  of  the 
ingoing  visual  path.  That  is  to  say,  we  can  cut  off  all  supplies, 
or  possibilities   of  stimulating  the  mind  through  that  special 


260  HALLrOINATIONS. 

sensoiy  tract  as  high  up  as  the  so-called  visual  centre,  but 
beyond  that  centre  there  may  be  a  gap  of  an  unknown  phj- 
siological  nature,  which  has  to  be  traversed  before  the  actual 
presentation  in  consciousness  occurs.  By  this  we  do  not  wish 
to  negative  the  theory  that  every  representation  is  in  ixirt 
determined  by  some  ingoing  stimulus ;  we  merely  wish  to 
point  out  that  we  do  not  know  the  extent  of  the  paths  which 
lead  from  the  periphery  to  the  actual  region  concerned  with 
mental  presentations. 

All  our  knowledge  arises  from  (1)  internal  perception,  or 
introspection  of  the  mind's  own  feelings  ;  (2)  external  percep- 
tion, or  perception  of  things  conducted  to  the  mind  by  way  of 
the  senses  direct ;  (3)  memory,  or  the  storing  up  of  presenta- 
tions which  can  be  recalled  and  represented  to  the  mind  afresh  ; 
(4)  belief  in  the  reality  of  the  new  or  recalled  sense-impression. 
Departures  from  the  normal  psychological  or  right  path  of  any 
one  of  these  will  bring  aboiit  abnormal  thought,  as  surely  as 
any  departure  of  the  physical  organism  from  its  laws  of  health. 
The  conditions  of  defective  and  hazy  memory,  and  the  innumer- 
able influences  which  go  to  determine  belief,  must  occupy  our 
attention  later. 

As  examples  of  the  actual  causes  or  conditions  of  hallucina- 
tions, Griesinger  gives  (1)  local  disease  of  the  organ  of  sense ; 
(2)  a  state  of  deep  exhaustion,  either  of  mind  or  of  body ;  (3) 
morbid  emotional  states,  such  as  fear  ;  (4)  outward  calm  and 
stillness  between  sleeping  and  waking ;  and  (5)  the  action  of 
certain  poisons,  as  haschisch,  opium,  and  belladonna. 

Varieties    of  Hallucination.  —  The  transition   from 

illusions  to  hallucinations  in  the  insane  is  very  gradual,  and 
some  of  the  grosser  illusi&ns  shade  almost  imperceptibly  into 
hallucinations.  An  hallucination  may  assume  one  of  two 
fairly  distinct  forms.  Thus  (1)  it  may  be  a  semblance  of  an 
external  impression  with  a  minimum  amount  of  interpretation  : 
this  variety  is  rudimentary  and  common  to  all  of  us  ;  or  (2)  it 
may  be  a  counterfeit  of  a  completely  developed  percept. 

Fournie*  believes  that  an  hallucination  is  merely  a  process 
in  which  a  definite  stimulus  of  this  kind  originates  involuntarily 

*  "Physiologie  Pathologique  des  Hallucinations,"  Internat.  Congress, 
London, 1881. 


VARIETIES.  261 

and  unconsciously  in  the  cortex,  and  is  sufficiently  powerful  to 
induce  a  belief  of  its  external  reality.  Hallucinations  would 
thus  appear  to  differ  from  ordinary  acts  of  memorj^  by  their 
unconscious  origin,  and  by  their  unusual  force.  Fournie  con- 
siders that  the  sources  from  which  the  stimuli  are  derived  form 
the  basis  for  a  classification  of  hallucinations.  These  sources 
are  (1)  the  sensations  of  organic  life ;  (2)  the  sensations  con- 
nected wdth  reiDroduction  ;  (3)  the  sensations  of  the  special 
senses  ;  (4)  the  sensations  produced  by  the  voluntary  activity 
of  our  organs.  The  last  head  including  all  the  higher  psychical 
functions,  and  speech  in  particular. 

Baillarger  has  also  given  the  following  classification  :  (1) 
Hallucinations  which  are  peripherally  determined — i.e.,  by 
ingoing  sensory  currents :  these  have  also  been  termed 
psycho-sensorial ;  (2)  Hallucinations  which  are  centrally 
determined  —  i.e.,  determined  by  activities  within  the  sen- 
sorium  (automatic  excitation  of  the  central  structures),  termed 
psychical. 

Any  classification  must  of  necessit}^  be  mainly  ps3^cho- 
logical ;  but  at  the  same  time  we  may  be  allowed  to  take 
account  of  the  possible  starting  point  of  the  physiological  or 
esoneural  correlate.  Psychologically  considered,  hallucinations 
may  be  faint  or  vivid,  rudimentary  or  complete ;  physio- 
logically considered,  they  may  be  associated  with  processes, 
which  are  centrally  or  peripherally  determined. 

We  have  already  noted  the  importance  of  the  whole  mental 
complexion  of  the  moment  in  determining  the  actual  colouring 
of  an  hallucination.  Griesinger  believes  that  the  imagination 
plays  an  important  part  in  determining  the  character  of  the 
hallucination.  In  the  insane  the  hallucinations  are  mainly  due 
to  a  projection  of  mental  images  which  have  gained  preter- 
natural vividness  and  persistence.  The  rats  seen  in  delirium 
tremens  may  be  classed  more  truly  as  illusions  than  as  hallu- 
cinations, inasmuch  as  they  are  due  to  peripheral  impressions 
(musc8e  volitantes),  I'lus  emotional  disturbances  of  central 
origin.  Ziehen  believes  that  in  hallucinations  of  the  insane 
the  process  of  sensation,  which  normall}^  always  proceeds  from 
the  sensory  elements  to  the  memory  elements,  now  takes  the 
reverse  course  from  the  latter  to  the  former.     He  says  :  "  It  is 


262  HALLUCINATIONS. 

only  when  the  sensory  cells  are  morbidly  irritable  that  they 
react  upon  a  stimulation  from  the  memory-cells,  which,  under 
normal  conditions,  would  have  no  effect  upon  them,  but  which 
has  been  pathologically  intensified.  The  sensation-cells  are 
sympathetically  excited,  as  it  were.  It  is  obvious  that  but  two 
chief  cases  are  to  be  distinguished.  The  ideas  that  sympathetic- 
ally excite  the  sensorj^  cells  are  either  the  ideas  actually  present 
in  consciousness  at  the  time,  or  the  ideas  that  are  psychically 
latent — i.e.,  more  accurately  expressed,  the  material  disposi- 
tions that  still  lie  below  the  threshold  of  consciousness.  In  the 
first  case  the  hallucinations  correspond  to  the  momentary 
content  of  consciousness ;  in  the  second  case  they  emerge  from 
among  the  latent  ideas  very  suddenly,  surprising  even  the 
individual  himself.  It  is  evident  that  in  general  hallucinations 
of  the  second  class  occur  only  when  very  considerable  changes 
in  the  excitability  of  the  sensation-cells  have  taken  place,  while 
the  actual  conscious  ideas  produce  hallucinations  even  when 
the  excitability  of  the  sensation-cells  has  but  very  slightly 
increased.  For  this  reason  hallucinations  of  the  second  class 
are  generally  much  more  vividly  perceived  than  those  of  the 
first  class,  since  in  the  former  class  the  sensation-cells  are  more 
affected  by  the  morbid  phenomena  than  in  the  latter." 

If  we  assume  that  the  sensation-cells  are  those  cells  which 
form  the  ultimate  receptacle  for  ingoing  impressions  we  must 
make  them  responsible  for  the  direct  transmission  of  physio- 
logical activities  into  presentations  in  consciousness.  It  would 
seem,  from  the  remarks  of  Ziehen,  that  even  though  currents 
may  pass  through  these  cells,  by  wa}^  of  association-paths  to 
other  regions  ("  memory-cells  "),  yet,  in  order  that  these  cur- 
rents may  ultimately  manifest  themselves  in  consciousness, 
they  would  have  to  return  from  the  said  memory-areas  to  the 
sensation-cells.  If  backward  currents  proceed  to  sensory  cells, 
which  are  morbidly  affected  and  irritable,  and  which  intensify 
or  pervert  the  functional  activities  propagated  to  them,  we  may 
reasonably  assume  that,  if  the  same  sensory  cells  are  concerned 
with  the  transmission  of  stimuli  which  pass  forward,  and  the 
reception  of  stimuli  which  are  supposed  to  pass  backward,  then 
these  same  sensory  cells  must  be  affected  in  a  way  that  allows 
perfectly  normal  processes  to  go  on  in  one  direction  but  not  in 


CLINICAL  CONSIDERATIONS.  263 

another.  Hitherto,  it  has  not  been  demonstrated  that  sensory 
cells  are  morbidly  irritable  in  hallucinatory  states,  and  we  do 
not  believe  that  hallucinations  necessarily  depend  upon  any 
hyperemia  of  the  sensory  cells.  Let  us,  however,  further 
illustrate  our  position  by  a  simple  diagram.  The  sensation- 
cell  is  thought  to  be  morbidly  affected,  so  that  currents  passing 
from  M  are  morbidly  intensified — that  is  to  say,  the  currents 

(  •  ^Presentation 


ensation-Cell 


Periphery 

Fig.  15. 

transmitted  backwards  from  the  "  memory-cells,"  through  the 
association-path  M  S,  become  intensified  owing  to  the  patho- 
logical state  of  S  ;  in  reality,  however,  we  know  that,  even 
with  the  most  gross  hallucinations  of  the  insane,  normal 
currents  can  be  transmitted  along  the  line  P  S  and  thence 
along  S  M,  or  they  may  arrive  intact  in  their  normal  operative- 
ness  at  the  region  apposite  to  the  mental  occurrence. 

Clinical  Considerations.  —  Baillarger  pointed  out  that 

visual  hallucinations  are  more  frequent  than  auditory  in 
healthy  life,  but  that  in  disease  the  auditory  are  the  more 
frequent.  The  comparative  frequency  of  the  occurrence  of 
sensory  perversions  is  of  interest,  but  we  cannot  devote  much 
space  to  it  here.  Esquirol  found  that  80  out  of  100  insane 
patients  had  hallucinations.  Brierre  de  Boismont  found  38 
out  of  62  patients.  The  following  table  is  constructed 
from  the  records  of  the  last  1,000  cases  admitted  to 
Bethlem.  In  manj?^  of  the  cases  it  was  difficult  to  determine 
whether  the  perversion  was  mainly  illusory  or  hallucinatory,  so 
that  the  numbers  may  be  regarded  merely  as  indicating  sensory 
perversions. 


264  HALLUCINATIONS. 

From  an  analysis  of  the  said  1,000  cases  admitted  to  Bethlem 
Hospital,  it  was  found  that  sensory  perversions  were  present 
in  the  following  order  : — 

Hearing  _         _         _         _         506 

Sight     -----         359 

Common  Sensation  -         -         221 

Smell     -         -         -         -         -         194 

Taste      -         -         -         -         -         161 

From  the  previous  history  of  the  patients,  it  was  ascertained 

that  during  the  earlier  periods  of  the  attacks  the  perversions 

were  as  follows  : — 

Hearing  -         -         -         -         567 

Sight  -  -  -  -  -  510 
Taste  -  -  '  -  -  -  254 
Common  Sensation  -         -         243 

Smell     -----         191 
It  was  also  found  that  before  admission 

159  had  had  no  sensory  perversion. 
303    ,,      ,,     one  sense  affected. 
299    ,,      ,,     two  senses       ,, 
150     ,,      ,,     three     ,,  ,, 

62     „      „     four 
^7    „      „     five        „  „     . 

On  admission  and  during  their  stay  in  the  hospital 
292  had  no  sensory  perversion. 
297     ,,    one  sense  affected. 
219    ,,    two  senses       ,, 
100    „    three    „ 
57     ,,    four      ,,  ,, 

35    ,,    five   ■    ,,  ,, 

Of  those  who  had  two  senses  affected,  the  commonest  com- 
binations were  those  of  sight  and  hearing,  and  smell  and  taste. 
When  three  senses  were  affected,  the  combinations  were  com- 
monly sight,  hearing,  and  common  sensation,  or  smell,  taste, 
and  common  sensation. 

In  order  that  we  may  more  fully  appreciate  the  influence  of 
the  various  senses  and  their  perversions  of  function  in  the  pro- 
duction of  morbid  perceptual  processes,  we  must  now  devote  our 
attention  more  particularly  to  the  consideration  of' the  special 


PERVERSIONS  OF  TASTE.  265 

senses  themselves  in  their  morbid  aspects ;  and,  first  of  all.  we 
discuss  the  varioiTs  perversions  of  taste. 

Perversions  of  Taste. — We  have  already  considered  the 
different  gustatory  qualities  and  their  relation  to  after-tastes  and 
secondar}'  olfactory  sensations.  The  subjective  gustatory  im- 
pressions amongst  the  insane  are  very  frequently  due  tO' 
pathological  causes,  arising  either  peripherally  or  centrally. 
Thus,  diseases  of  the  tongue,  as  well  as  dryness  of  the  mouth, 
caused  by  interference  with  the  salivary  secretion,  ma}' interfere 
with  the  sense  of  taste.  The  administration  of  morphia  hypo- 
dermically  is  sometimes  attended  by  bitter  or  acid  tastes. 
Briefly,  the  various  perversions  may  be  described  as  occurring  in 
the  form  of  (1)  Iii/pergeusia — exaltation  of  the  sense  of  taste,. 
i.e.,  there  is  a  morbid  exaggeration  of  all  gustatory  sensations,- 
as  seen  in  some  forms  of  neurasthenia,  extreme  nervousness.. 
and  sometimes  even  in  conditions  of  mania  or  melancholia.  (2) 
Hypogeusia — diminution  of  the  sense  of  taste.  After  ice  has 
been  sucked,  there  is  often  a  diminution ;  as  also  in  acute 
maniacal  or  melancholic  states,  in  cases  of  stupor  with  general 
blunting  of  the  sensibility,  and  in  general  paralysis  of  the  insane, 
where  there  is  often  a  marked  loss  of  perception  of  flavours  and 
tastes.  (3)  Ageusia — absence  of  sense  of  taste,  as  seen  in 
various  forms  of  paralj^sis ;  either  manifested  as  a  progressive 
loss,  as  in  general  paralysis,  or  as  a  sudden  loss  in  some  forms  of 
apoplexj^,  or  other  organic  conditions.  (4)  Parageusia — per- 
version of  the  sense  of  taste,  as  seen  in  nearly  every  form  of  in-^ 
sanity :  thus,  one  patient  tastes  sulj)har,  another  complains  of 
vile  filth  in  her  food.  Dr.  Savage  says  illusions  associated  with 
ideas  of  poison  are  more  common  than  true  hallucinations.  "In 
many  cases,  young  women  with  ovarian  disturbances,  and, 
perhaps,  sickness,  refuse  food,  complaining  of  bad  smells  and 
tastes  of  poison.  I  have  seen  the  same  refusal  of  food  due  to 
the  same  hallucinations  in  a  woman  who  had  had  children,  and 
was,  therefore,  used  to  the  vomiting  of  pregnancy ;  yet,  when 
insane,  she  explained  her  sickness  as  due  to  metallic  poisoning. 
In  phthisis,  again,  patients  frequentl}^  refuse  their  food,  believ- 
ing they  are  being  poisoned.  Insane  patients  may  complain  of 
poisoning,  or  of  acid  tastes  allied  to  that  produced  by  electricity, 
but  ver}-  commonly  the  complaint  is  either  that  drugs  are  put 


266  .     HALLUCINATIONS. 

into  the  food,  with  the  intention  of  producing  insanity  or  in- 
sensibility ;  or  that  filth  of  some  kind,  most  commonly  feecal,  is 
administered  with  drink  or  meat.  Others  fancy  human  flesh  or 
"blood  is  given  them ".  .  .  .  "  Hallucinations  of  taste 
may  occur  with  ordinary  mania,  but  are  more  common  in  melan- 
cholia, and  in  conditions  of  weak-mindedness."  *  It  is  not 
uncommon  to  be  able  to  trace  the  origin  of  such  sense- 
perversions  to  the  element  of  expectancy.  One  patient 
now  in  Bethlem  first  experienced  a  feeling  of  onalcdse  and 
weakness.  Subsequently,  he  misinterpreted  his  sensations,  and 
attributed  their  occurrence  to  external  agencies.  Later,  he 
thought  of  poison,  and  prepared  his  mind  to  analyse  all  his  taste- 
sensations,  with  the  result,  that  soon  all  ingoing  gustator}^ 
impressions  became  coloured  with  his  mental  complexion,  and 
definite  illusions  of  taste  prevailed.  This  would  appear  to  be 
the  true  explanation  of  the  majority  of  such  perversions.  It  is 
■comparatively  rare  to  find  a  pure  parageusic  condition  untem- 
pered  by  mental  preparedness. 

Perversions  of  Smell. — The  statement  of  Bidder,  that 
odorous  bodies  taken  into  the  mouth  and  then  exhaled  through 
the  posterior  nares  are  not  smelt,  is  certainly  not  true.  Our 
perception  of  flavour  depends  in  great  part  upon  the  sense  of 
.smell.  The  various  perversions  of  smell  may  be  divided  into  : 
(1)  Hi/iJerosmia—a  morbidly  acute  sense  of  smell ;  a  term  also 
applied  erroneously  to  olfactory  illusions  or  hallucinations.  It 
is  not  uncommon  in  certain  forms  of  hysteria,  and  allied 
neuroses,  especially  when  associated  with  disorders  of  the 
reproductive  organs.  (2)  Hyposmia — a  blunting  of  the  sense 
of  smell,  as  seen  in  cases  of  stupor,  acute  mania,  dementia, 
idiocy,  and  general  paralysis.  (3)  Anosinia — absence  of  smell, 
as  in  the  various  organic  paralytic  afiections  of  the  insane.  In 
hypnotic  states  by  suggestion,  the  sense  of  smell  is  soon  blunted, 
or  even  paralysed.  Lichtenfels  and  Frohlich  found  that  morphia, 
when  mixed  with  a  little  sugar  and  taken  as  snuff,  para- 
lyses the  olfactory  apparatus,  while  strychnine  makes  it  more 
sensitive.  (4)  Parosmia — perversion  of  smell.  In  the  insane 
this  variety  is  much  more  frequent,  and  it  arises  very  similarly 
to  that  of  taste.  In  any  acute  form  of  mental  disorder  there 
*  Savage,  "  Insanity,"  p.  243. 


PERVERSIOXS  OF  SIGHT.  267 

is  a  liability  to  misinterpret  actual  olfactory  stimuli.  Dr. 
Savage  points  ont,  that  ■'  occasionally  in  the  excitement  of  mania 
and  of  general  paralysis,  there  are  pleasant  hallucinations  of 
:smell ;  but  that  in  many  cases  of  mental  depression,  especially 
those  associated  with  ovarian  and  uterine  trouble,  the  smells  are 
■of  an  unpleasant  kind  :  one  woman  complaining  of  dead  bodies 
near  her.  while  another  thinks  a  smell  of  dung  pervades  the 
room,  or  emanates  from  her  own  body.  A  few  complain  of  a 
pungent  odour,  like  that  of  ammonia,  and  certain  "  miserable 
.sinners  '  complain  of  a  foretaste  of  hell  in  the  shape  of  smells  of 
brimstone."'  In  melancholic  cases,  it  is  not  uncommon  to  find,  that 
the  mind  misinterprets  an  actual  olfactory  stimulation  proceeding 
from  a  disordered  stomach,  and  that  the  illusion  takes  the  form 
•of  offensive  and  foul  odours,  to  which  are  given  false  objective 
significance.     It  would  be  easy  to  multiply  such  instances. 

Perversions  of  Sight. — The  various  entoptical  pheno- 
mena, which  depend  upon  the  perception  of  objects  present 
within  the  eyeball  itself,  briefly  enumerated  are :  (1)  Shadows 
formed  upon  the  retina  by  ppacjue  bodies.  These  are  («)  the 
■Spectrum  muco-lacriraale ;  (b)  wrinkled  shadows,  due  to  folds  in  the 
cornea ;  (c)  lens  shado^\'S  ;  (r/)  muscfB  volitantes.  (2)  Purkinj&s 
figure,  due  to  a  shadow  of  the  blood-vessels  within  the  retina 
cast  upon  the  most  external  layer  of  the  retina.  (3)  Movements 
■of  the  hlood-corimsdes  in  the  retinal  capillaries.  (4)  The  entoptical 
pulse,  due  to  mechanical  irritation  of  the  rods  lying  outside  the 
pulsating  arteries.  (5)  Pressure  phosphenes.  (6)  The  riiKj, 
observed  when  the  eyes  are  moved  rapidlj^  backwards  and 
inwards,  and  which  corresponds  to  the  entrance  of  the  optic- 
nerve.  (7)  The  accommodation  spot.  (8)  Media  ideal  optical 
stimulation,  division  of  optic-nerve  causes  flash  of  light,  etc. 
(9)  The  accommodation  phosphenes.  (10)  Electric  plienornena. 
.(11)  The  yellow  spot :  "  Lowe's  ring"  and  "  Haidinger's  Brushes." 
(12)  Spectra,  arising  from  internal  causes,  such  as  increased 
blood-pressure  through  retina,  etc. 

McDowall*  believes  that  more  colour-blindness  exists  among 

the  insane  than   is   to  be  found   among   ordinary   individuals. 

Of  324  women  he  found  that  nine  were  evidently  more  or  less 

-colour-blind  ;  whilst,  of  207  males,  thirteen  were  more  or  less 

*  "  West  Riding  Asylum  Reports,"  vol.  iii.  p.  129. 


268  HALLUCINATIONS. 

unable  to  distinguish  colours.  Of  these  latter,  five  were' 
dements,  five  general  paralytics,  and  three  were  epileptics. 
An  analysis  of  his  results,  however,  does  not  lead  us  to  the- 
same  conclusion.  Undoubtedly  among  idiots  and  imbeciles,, 
the  discriminative  power  of  detecting  colours  is  often  deficient; 
but  we  attribute  this  more  particularly  to  deficiency  in  the 
mental  development.  Batty  Tuke  has  observed  local  colour- 
blindness in  the  second  stage  of  general  paralysis. 

The  phenomena  of  after-images,  and  the  numerous  false 
estimates  of  size  and  direction  have  already  been  discussed ;  it 
only  remains,  therefore,,  for  us  to  speak  of  the  perversions, 
met  with  among  the  insane.  Faces  are  very  commonly 
seen  by  the  insane.  Frequently  the  face  seen  is  a  familiar- 
one  superimposed  iipon  some  actual  existing  object.  One 
patient,  now  in  Bethlem,  sees  and  recognises  those  around 
him,  but  detects  sneers  and  horrible  expressions,  which  he- 
believes  are  superimposed  upon  the  actual  expressions  by  some 
spiritual  influence  which  is  specially  designed  to  affect  his  sub- 
jective appreciation  of  the  external  objects.  Hallucinations  of 
sight  are  common  in  delirious  states.  In  other  forms  of  in- 
sanity the  mental  state  often  determines  the  character  of  the 
hallucination.  In  epileptic  states  the  aura  is  commonly  a. 
visual  one.  A  certain  amount  of  expectant  attention  deter- 
mines the  character  or  ideational  intensity  of  hallucinations, 
in  a  number  of  individuals. 

Collective  hallucinations  are  supposed  to  have  a  common 
origin  for  all  percipients.  Their  origin  is  thought  to  be- 
(1)  telepatldc — i.e.,  some  other  mind  affects  them  similarly  and 
simultaneously ;  or  it  may  be  by  (2)  ijliysical  suggestion,  by 
which  is  meant,  some  real  external  cause  starts,  by  suggestion,, 
similar  perversions  in  all.  The  evidence  that  an  hallucination 
is  ever  thus  produced  is  questionable,  and  it  is  sometimes  difficult 
to  account  for  the  occasional  agreement  of  the  two  senses  other- 
wise than  by  the  aid  of  self-suggestion  operating  during  aii 
hallucination.  (3)  A  third  explanation  of  collective  hallucina- 
tions is,  that  A.  sees  an  hallucination  first  and  then  conveys  it 
by  word  or  gesture  to  B.  In  this  explanation  there  are  many 
difficulties,  but  a  supposition  is  feasible,  that  the  likeness  of  the 
hallucination  may  be  the  result  of  pseudo-memory  and  the  after- 


PERVERSIONS  OF  SIGHT.  269 

•comparison  of  details,  (4)  A  fourth  hypothesis — viz.,  that  the 
halhicination  of  one  percipient  is  caused  by  mental  suggestion 
or  thought-transference  from  others — is  inexplicable.* 

Some  persons  fail  to  perceive  an  hallucination  when  the  eyes 
are  closed ;  others  perceive  the  imaginary  object  equally  well 
whether  the  eyes  are  open  or  shut.  Dr.  Hack  Tuke  holds,  that 
when  lateral  pressure  is  made  upon  the  eyeball  of  one  eye  a 
subjective  image  is  never  doubled,  and  that  doubling  never 
occurs  Avithout  an  external  object  being  seen.  "Further,"  he  says, 
"the  after-image  of  a  luminous  object  obscures,  or  entirely  con- 
ceals, real  objects,  moves  with  the  motion  of  the  eye,  and  is 
'  projected '  when  the  observer  looks  on  a  dark  ground.  All 
this  may  be  true  of  visual  hallucinations,  and,  when  the  prin- 
ciple is  applicable,  we  must  regard  them  as  involving  the 
retina.  If,  however,  these  conditions  are  not  observed,  we  infer 
that  the  visual  hallucinations  do  not  involve  the  retina,  but  are 
confined  to  the  cortical  sensory  centres,  or  possibly  they  extend 
to  the  sensorium.  Certain  it  is  that  hallucinations  of  sight  may 
occur  when  the  optic-nerves  are  atrophied,  and  therefore  the 
retina  is  not  the  seat  of  vision." 

Ritti  and  Christian  believe  that  hallucinations  have  their 
seat  in  the  optic  thalami,  "  from  whence  peripheral  impressions 
irradiate  to  the  various  regions  of  the  cerebral  cortex.  The 
cells  of  the  latter  respond  to  the  false  indications  conveyed  to 
them  as  if  they  were  real."t  Sometimes  visual  hallucinations 
occur  in  one  of  the  lateral  halves  of  the  visual  field,  and  they 
are  found  usually,  but  not  invariably,  associated  with  a  cor- 
responding hemianopia.  These  have  been  observed  in  the  sane, 
as  well  as  in  those  subject  to  epilepsy,  migraine,  anaemia,  and 
delusional  insanity.  When  coincident  with  hemianopia,  such 
hallucinations  probably  originate  in  a  cortical  irritation  or  mal- 
nutrition limited  to  the  occipital  lobes. 

Spitzka  believes  that  visual  hallucinations  are  next  in 
frequency  to  those  of  hearing.  They  vaxy  from  blurs,  clouds, 
or  haloes,  to  flashes  of  light,  bright  colour-perceptions,  faces  and 
figures  of  persons,  animals,  etc.  Shaw  sums  up  their  occurrence 
as  follows  : — Especially  frequent  in  acute  delirium,  and  delirium 

*  "  Census  of  Hallucinations,"  Psychical  Kesearch  Society, 
t  "Tuke's  Dictionary,"  p.  568. 


270  HALLUCINATIONS. 

tremens ;  in  the  latter  disease  tliey  are  painful,  mobile,  noc- 
turnal ;  in  the  former  terrifying ;  occur  also  in  alcoholic  pseudo- 
general  paralysis ;  monomania,  especially  the  religious  form  ; 
chronic  alcoholic  insanity,  painful,  mobile,  nocturnal ;  early 
stages  of  terminal  dementia  ;  acute  and  chronic  mania  ;  puer- 
peral insanity ;  lactational  insanit}^  •  general  paralysis ;  pain- 
ful and  terrifying  in  chronic  insanity,  acute  and  sub-acute 
rheumatic  insanity;  and  in  melancholic  form  of  delirious 
saturnine  insanity  ;  worse  at  night  in  insanity  of  cyanosis  from 
bronchitis,  etc. ;  in  pneumonic  consecutive  insanity ;  saturnine 
pseudo-general  paralysis  ;  sometimes  in  consecutive  post-febrile 
consecutive  insanity ;  insanity  of  myxoedema ;  insanity  of 
abdominal  disorders  ;  frightful  in  some  cases  of  delirium  of 
young  children ;  in  epileptic,  and  hysterical  insanity. 

In  general  paralysis  hallucinations  and  illusions  of  sight  are 
not  infrequent  during  the  early  stages  ;  biit  of  a  total  (100)  of 
general  paralytics,  Mickle*  found  that  visual  hallucinations 
were  present  in  forty-one.  He  concludes  that  the  relative  pro- 
portion of  the  visual  to  the  auditory  hallucinations  is  much 
higher  in  general  paralysis  than  in  the  other  forms  of  insanity,, 
taken  collectively,  as  found  in  our  asylums.  Excluding  idiocy 
and  imbecility  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other,  general 
paralysis,  he  says,  it  is  probable  that  auditory  are  more  frequent 
than  visual  hallucinations  in  a  given  asylum  population  in  thi& 
country.  This  he  attributes  to  be  partly  due  to  the  chronicity 
of  most  of  the  cases,  for  in  the  acute  forms  of  insanity  visual 
hallucinations  are  relatively  far  more  frequent  than  in  the  chronic. 

Perversions  of  Hearing. — It  would  be  impossible  to 

discuss  here  all  the  pathological  states  which  give  rise  to  entotic 
sensations.  The  "  damping -apparatus  "  of  the  tympanic  mem- 
brane may  be  working  ineffectively  so  that  "  sympathetic "' 
vibrations  or  after-vibrations  occur  more  readily;  or  thickenings 
or  inequalities  of  the  membrane  may  interfere  with  the  acute- 
ness  of  hearing,  owing  to  the  diminished  capacity  for  vibrations 
thereb}^  produced.  A  similar  result  is  produced  when  there 
are  holes  in,  or  loss  of,  its  substance.  Increased  tension  also 
renders  it  less  sensitive  to  sound-waves. 

When  the  auditory  ossicles  are  rendered  immobile  by  adhesions 

*  "  General  Paralysis,"  p.  Q7. 


PERVERSIONS  OF  HEARING.  271 

or  anchylosis  there  is  diminution  of  vibrations,  and  hearing  is 
interfered  with  ;  similar  results  occur  when  the  stapes  is  firmly 
anchylosed  into  the  fenestra  ovalis.  The  Eustachian  tube  may 
be  occluded  o^^'ing■  to  chronic  catari'h  and  narrowing  from 
cicatrices,  hypertrophy  of  the  mucous  membrane,  or  the 
presence  of  tumours  ;  similarlj!-,  effusions  into,  or  suppuration 
^^'ithin  the  tympanum  interfere  with  the  conduction  of  sounds. 
Koppe*  found  that  out  of  thirty-one  insane  patients  who  had 
disease  of  the  ear,  seven  had  a  chronic  hj^perasmia  of  the  vessels 
of  the  handle  of  the  malleus,  and,  besides  the  subjective  aural 
sensations,  aural  illusions,  and  hallucinations,  Galtonf  found 
that  when  changes  in  the  vascularity  {e.g.,  hj^pergemia  of  parts 
both  within  and  without  the  head)  are  simultaneously  brought 
about  b}^  the  action  of  a  certain  drug,  similar  changes  may  be 
recognised,  but  not  invariably,  in  the  vascularity  of  the  tym- 
panic membrane  ;  also,  that  with  certain  cerebral  disorders — 
e.g.,  epilepsy,  such  as  would  tend  towards,  or  be  produced  by.  a 
hypertemic  condition  of  parts  at  the  base  of  the  cranium — there 
is  sometimes,  but  by  no  means  invariably,  correlated  a  hyper- 
cemic  condition  of  the  vessels  of  the  tympanic  membrane.  These 
results,  however,  have  not  been  confirmed  by  others,  and  we 
still  lack  more  complete  information  upon  the  conditions  in 
general  paralysis  and  other  forms  of  mental  disease. 

Of  the  influence  of  intra-lahj/rinthine  pressure  we  know  verv 
little.  We  believe  that  with  diminution  of  the  pressure  of  the 
air  in  the  tympanum  there  is  a  corresponding  diminution  of 
the  intra-labyrinthine  pressure,  while  conversely,  everj^  increase 
of  pressure  is  accompanied  by  increase  of  the  lymph-pressure 
(Bezold).  According  to  Nasse,  the  endolymph  flows  through 
the  arachnoid  sheath  of  acoustic  nerve  into  the  subarachnoidal 
space.  The  perihimph  of  the  inner  ear  flows  away  chieflr 
through  the  aqueductus  cochleae,  in  the  circumference  of  the 
foramen  jugulare,  into  the  peripheral  lymphatic  S3^stem,  which 
also  takes  up  the  cerebro-spinal  fluid  of  the  subarachnoidal 
space,  while  a  small  part  drains  away  to  the  sub-dural  space, 
through  the  internal  auditory  meatus.:!:     That  modifications  of" 

*  "  Von  Triiltsch,"  American  Translation,  2nd  edit.     Xew  York,  1869.. 
t  "West  Eiding  Asylum  Reports,"  vol.  iii.  p.  259. 
X  Landois  and  Stirling,  p.  811. 


'272  IL^LLUCINATIONS. 

the  pressure  of  cerebro-spinal  fluid  may  interfere  with  the 
intra-labyrinthine  pressure  may  be  readily  conceived,  and 
possibly  it  may  be  to  some  source  such  as  this  that  many  of  the 
acoustic  perversions  in  the  insane  may  be  traced. 

The  mechanical  relation  between  the  vascular  wave  and  the 
removal  of  the  lymph-current  during  sleeping  or  waking 
moments  is  of  great  importance.  In  excited  brain-states  the 
effects  of  the  vascular  wave  may  be  interrupted  or  irregular. 
In  sleep,  regular  peristaltic  vascular  movements  are  absolutely 
essential  to  complete  chemical  restitution,  and  to  the  abstrac- 
tion of  waste  products.  Thus,  we  can  conceive,  that  variations 
in  the  pressure  and  quality  of  the  lymph-fluids  may  act  as 
direct  stimulants  upon  the  acoustic  apparatus  and  set  up  in- 
going currents  which  are  misinterpreted  by  the  mind. 

The  after-vihrations  caused  by  intense  and  continued  musi- 
cal tones  may  be  attended  by  subjective  auditory  sensations. 
Mechanical  stimulation  of  the  auditory  fibres  by  abnormal 
movements  of  the  blood  in  the  ear  may  give  rise  to  tinnitus 
auriwn.  Meniere's  disease,  and  vertigo  generally,  cannot  be 
entered  into  here.  The  condition  known  as  agoraioliohia,  how- 
ever, ought  to  be  briefly  mentioned.  In  this  disorder  the 
patient  can  walk  quite  well  in  a  narrow  lane  or  street,  but 
when  he  attempts  to  cross  a  wide  square  he  experiences  a  feeling 
somewhat  like  giddiness. 

Variations  in  the  excitability  of  the  auditory  apparatus,  to- 
gether with  the  resulting  subjective  sensations,  may  be  classed 
as  : — (1)  tiypercbkusis,  in  which  there  is  increased  sensibility. 
This  may  be  due  to  ansemic  or  hypersemic  states.  Kirchner 
has  pointed  out  that  the  vaso-motor  efiects  of  certain  drugs 
(quinine  or  salicine)  upon  the  vessels  of  the  labyrinth  produce 
tinnitus.  When  the  stimulation  is  excessive,  it  may  give  rise 
to  painful  impressions,  which  condition  is  known  as  acoustic 
hyperalgia  (Eulenberg).  In  delirious  conditions  the  excitability 
is  often  so  well  marked  that  ordinary  stimuli  are  morbidly 
intensified.  In  some  hysterical  and  highly-nervous  persons  all 
ingoing  sensations  are  greatly  exaggerated.  The  so-called 
"  paradoxical  reaction"  is  produced  when  a  galvanic  current  is 
applied  to  one  ear,  and  there  is,  in  addition  to  the  reaction 
in    this    ear,   the   opposite    result    in    the  non-stimulated   ear. 


PERVERSIONS  OF  IIEAEIXG.  273 

(2)  Hypakusis — diiiiiuTitioii  of  sense  of  hearing,  seen  in  various 
forms  of  insanity — e.'/..  anergic  stnpor.  paralytic  insanity,  general 
paralysis,  etc.  (3)  Al-usis — deafness ;  congenital,  as  in  some 
forms  of  idiocy ;  or  acquired,  as  in  forms  of  idiocy  or  imbecility 
where  the  deafness  and  mental  defect  follow  some  acute  fever  or 
injury.  (4)  ParaJiasls — perversion  of  sense  of  hearing,  as  in 
the  ordinary  illusions  and  hallucinations.  In  the  insane  the 
forms  the}'  take  are  endless.  Any  of  the  entotical  conditions 
already  mentioned  may  give  rise  to  sensations  which  are  mis- 
interpreted and  projected  externally. 

(1)  The  insane  person  may  receive  stimuli  from  without  in 
a  normal  manner,  but  the  mental  complexion  submerges  the 
actual  external  object,  and  an  illusion  results ;  (2)  the  physical 
au^ditory  apparatus  may  distort  an  ordinary  stimulus  and  pre- 
sent an  illusory  result  to  the  mind,  by  which  it  is  perceived  as 
such  or  not ;  (3)  entotical  conditions  may  determine  ingoing 
currents,  which  are  perceived  as  illusory,  or  they  ma}'  be  misin- 
terpreted ;  (4)  stimulation  of  the  auditory  centre  itself  may 
give  rise  to  hallucinations  ;  (5)  hallucination  may  occur  in  deaf 
people ;  (6)  the  mind  itself  may  become  so  saturated  with  an 
auditory  idea,  that  it  preperceives  the  looked-for  stimulus  ;  (7) 
hallucinations  of  hearing  may  be  unilateral. 

Voices  are  by  far  the  most  common  forms  of  aiiditory  hal- 
lucinations, and  frequently  they  cause  the  patient  to  become 
homicidal  or  suicidal.  Some  patients  think  they  have  "  loud 
thoughts."  and  that  everyone  can  ascertain  what  they  are  think- 
ing about.  One  case  of  interest  is  recorded  by  Dr.  Savage.  The 
patient  thought  the  voices  came  through  a  telephone.  One 
night  he  was  told  by  a  voice  that  it  was  due  to  the  pxilsation 
of  the  brain  ;  but  he  thought  that  it  might  also  be  due  to  the 
imperceptible  action  of  his  own  organs  of  speech,  for  he  found 
that,  when  he  thought  intensely,  the  tongue  moved  slightly. 
According  to  Haslam  and  others,  insane  patients  become  deaf 
more  frequently  than  blind,  and  the  deaf  are  more  liable  to 
insanity  than  the  blind.  In  intra-cranial  disease  (e.g.  tumour) 
it  is  much  more  common  to  have  optic  neuritis  and  affections  of 
sight  than  deafness  or  perversions  of  hearing.  Bastian  believes 
the  explanation  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact,  that  the  impairment 
of  hearing  due  to  intra-cranial  disease  is  less  apt  to  be  bilateral 

18 


274  IIALLUCINATIOXS. 

than  impairment  of  sight  from  the  same  causes.  To  test 
whether  the  deafness  is  entotical  in  origin  or  due  to  primary 
nervous  disease,  a  vibrating  tuning-fork  is  applied  to  the  scalp 
either  in  the  middle  line  or  towards  one  or  other  ear.  In  the 
former  affection  the  vibrations  are  heard  more  distinctly  on  the 
affected  than  on  the  non-affected  side,  while  in  the  latter  they 
are  heard  less  distinctly.  This  test,  however,  does  not  answer 
invariably,  and  when  applied  to  discovei*  entotical  causes  of 
perversion  in  the  insane  there  is  no  result,  inasmuch  as  the 
mental  element,  or  preparedness,  is,  by  the  nature  of  the  experi- 
ment, eliminated  also. 

The  various  pathological  affections  of  the  auditory  nerves 
may  occur  (1)  at  their  terminal  expansions  within  the  temporal 
bone.  Exostoses,  tumours,  syphilis,  or  other  diseases  may  cause 
unilateral  affections  by  involving  the  cochlea  or  the  nerve 
itself;  similarly  the  auditorjr  nerve  within  the  intenial  audi- 
tory canal  may  be  damaged  by  injury  or  disease.  (2)  The 
auditory  nerves  between  the  surface  of  the  medulla  and  the 
internal  meatus  may  become  implicated  by  basal  meningitis 
of  a  specific  or  non-specific  character;  their  sheaths  may  be 
thickened,  or  may  become  the  seat  of  new  growths,  or  they  may 
be  pressed  upon  by  new  growths  originating  in  other  parts,  as 
in  the  under  and  inner  part  of  the  lateral  lobe  of  the  cerebellum, 
or  of  its  flocculus.  Possibly,  affections  of  the  basilar  arteiy,  from 
which  minute  vessels  are  given  off  to  supply  the  auditoiy  nerves 
and  the  internal  ear,  may  cause  perversions  of  the  functions  of 
the  aiiditory  apparatus.  (3)  Ansemia,  hypersemia,  haemorrhages, 
or  softening,  tumours,  or  other  pathological  conditions  affecting 
either  the  niTcleus  of  origin,  or  of  the  root-fibres  of  the  auditory 
nerve  within  the  medulla,  would  be  apt  to  cause  sensory  per- 
versions. According  to  Bastian,  the  diagnosis  of  these  cases 
would  have  to  include  other  co-existing  signs  of  disease  of  the 
medulla.  Small  focal  lesions  or  tumours  would  be  apt,  also,  to 
affect  the  nucleus  and  root-fibres  of  the  facial.  In  disseminated 
sclerosis  the  nucleus  or  root-fibres  of  the  auditory  nerve  may  be 
involved  on  one,  or  even  on  both  sides,  without  any  impli- 
cation of  the  facial  nerves.* 

Of  the  various  affections  of  the  cortex-cerebri  which  give  rise 
*  Bastian,  op.  cit.,  p.  458. 


I'Eia  EIISIUXS  OF  IIEAEIXG.  275 

to  disordered  action  we  shall  speak  later.  Blandford  *  believes, 
that  halhiciuations  of  hearing  are  not  so  common  in  very  acute 
forms  of  insanity,  such  as  acute  delirium  and  delirium  tremens, 
and  that  in  the  fevers  and  delirium  of  ordinary  disease  they 
are  found  far  less  frequently  than  those  of  sight.  He  says : 
'■  Where  we  notice  them  in  the  insane,  they  are  for  the  most 
part  chronic,  and  the  acute  stage,  whatever  it  may  have 
been,  has  passed  away.  And  j^et,  judging  by  the  few  cases 
I  have  seen,  in  which  I  have  been  able  to  watch  the  progress 
of  the  disorder  almost  from  the  commencement,  I  am  in- 
clined to  think  that  there  is  a  transient-acute  or  sub-acute 
stage  at  the  commencement  of  every  such  insanity."  He  also 
points  out  that,  whereas  hallucinations  of  sight  are  commonly 
associated  with  a  condition  of  deep  exhaustion,  whether  of  mind 
or  body,  hallucinations  of  hearing  certainly  do  not  merit  the 
name  of  asthenic.  The  ••central"  patliologj^  of  auditory  hal- 
lucinations is  quite  unknown  to  us.  We  refer  to  various  affec- 
tions of  the  so-called  auditory  centres,  and  think  that  by  so 
doing  we  satisfy  our  minds  as  to  what  actually  happens.  When, 
however,  we  reflect  that  a  pathological  state  which  would 
account  for  morbid  influences  determined  centrally  fails  to  alter, 
modify,  or  pervert  in  any  way  the  normal  functions  determined 
from  the  periphery  by  external  agents,  we  feel  confused,  and 
must  confess  that  such  patholog-y  is  for  the  present  incompre- 
hensible. It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  return  to  this  subject,  so 
we  conclude  with  a  brief  summary  of  the  kinds  of  insanity  in 
which  hallucinations  of  hearing  occur. 

According  to  Blandford,  patients  of  fifty  or  sixty  years  of 
age  are  not  generally  afflicted  with  voices,  unless  they  have 
retained  them  from  an  earlier  period.  In  cases  of  melancholia 
at  the  climacteric  period  they  are  comparatively  rare.  Hallu- 
cinations of  hearing  are  more  common  under  the  age  of  thirty. 
At  the  period  of  pubescence  they  are  not  common ;  when  the 
patients  are  past  childhood  and  have  reached  the  state  of  man- 
hood and  womanhood  the}'  seem  especially  prone  to  them. 
In  the  hereditary  insanity  of  adolescence,  and  in  the  insanity 
of  masturbation  they  are  especially  frequent.  On  the  other 
hand,  they  are  rare  in  hypochondriacal,  senile,  phthisical, 
*  ••  Joum.  Ment.  Science,"  vol.  xix.  p.  507. 


276  HALLUCINATIONS. 

metastatic,  traumatic,  rheumatic,  podagrous.  and  s}^liilitic 
insanities.  "  In  short,"  says  Blandford,  "  insanity,  complicated 
with  other  diseases,  seems  to  be  free  from  hallucinations  of 
hearing,  which  are  chiefly  to  be  found  in  the  idiopathic  and 
hereditary  disorder,  which  comes  on  from  some  mental  cause, 
or  even  without  any  assignable  cause  whatever."  Voices  are 
more  common  in  chronic  female  patients  than  in  male  (Bland- 
ford).  Savage  confirms  the  observations  of  Blandford  in  regard 
to  the  age  of  the  patients,  and  believes  that  hallucinations  of 
hearing  are  most  common  in  youth,  and  from  that  to  middle 
life,  and  that  they  are  oftener  met  with  in  women  than  in 
men.  Auditory  hallucinations  are  very  common  in  delusional 
insanitj'',  and  more  especially  in  the  persecutory  and  ambi- 
tious forms.  Griesinger  says  they  are  specially  frequent  in 
connection  with  diseases  of  the  abdomen  and  genital  organs  ; 
mania,  acute,  chronic,  and  delusional ;  melancholia,  acute  and 
delusional  ;  delirium  tremens ;  chronic  alcoholic  insanity ; 
puerperal  insanity ;  climacteric  insanity ;  general  paralysis ; 
earl}'^  stage  of  terminal  dementia ;  post-febrile  consecutive 
insanity ;  pneumonic  consecutive  insanit}^ ;  choreic  insanity  ; 
of  a  disagreeable  character  in  melancholic  uterine  insanity  ; 
insanity  from  deprivation  of  senses ;  insanity  of  myxcedema  ; 
and  lactational  insanity. 

The  question  has  been  asked,  How  far  are  hallucinations 
compatible  with  sanity?  If  the  mind  is  able  to  correct  and 
appreciate  the  phenomena  as  hallucinatory,  then  they  are 
compatible  with  sanity ;  inability  to  recognise  that  fact,  how- 
ever, constitutes  insanit}^.  From  this  point  of  view,  therefore, 
hallucinations  of  hearing  may  be  grouped  into  two  great  divi- 
sions :  in  the  one  the  reason  is  not  lost,  and  self-control 
remains ;  whilst  in  the  other,  in  addition  to  the  actual  hallu- 
cination, there  is  belief  or  delusion  as  to  the  objective  reality 
of  the  thing  heard,  and  the  actions  of  the  individual  are 
affected  in  consequence.  The  belief  in  their  objective  reality 
does  not  necessarily,  however,  constitute  loss  of  reason;  but 
the  presence  of  "false"  belief  or  perception  which  the  reason 
may  deal  with. 

Before  leaving  this   subject,  we  must  briefly  mention  that 
some  patients   are  not  only  subject  to  psycho-auditory  hallu- 


PERVERSIOXS  OF  TACTUAL  PERCEPTION.  277 

cinations,  but  tliey  may  also  be  troubled  by  hallucinations 
which  are  psycho-motor  in  origin.  Such  patients  are  c-on- 
scious  of  internal  voices  which  are  really  due  to  the  formation 
of  psycho-motor  word  images.  Seglas*  gives  several  inte- 
resting examples  of  these  psvcho-motor  hallucinations.  He 
believes  that  they  follow  closely  upon  the  psycho-sensory  forms, 
and  that  the^^  indicate  a  more  advanced  disorder  of  brain- 
function.  It  is  not  uncommon  to  meet  with  patients  who 
complain  that  words  are  put  into  their  months,  and  that  they 
are  forced  to  articulate  them  andibly.  Sometimes  they  imagine 
that  their  innermost  thoughts  are  made  public  in  this  way. 

Perversions   of  Tactual    Perception. — Among   the 

insane,  illusions  and  hallucinations  of  the  tactual  sense  are  very 
common.  Following  the  plan  adopted  with  the  other  senses, 
we  may  classify  the  various  conditions  met  with  as  follows : — 

1.  Hyjjercesthesia,  in  which  there  is  an  excessive  or  exalted 
sensibility  depending  upon  a  too  great  sensitiveness  to  impres- 
sions of  the  sensory-nerves,  or  a  too  acute  perception  by  the 
nerve-centres  of  these  impressions.  By  some  it  is  limited  to 
the  more  acute  perception  of  painful  sensations.  It  may  be 
purely  functional  as  well  as  organic  in  its  origin  (Tuke). 
Hypersesthesia  occurs  after  unilateral  section  of  the  cord,  or 
even  only  of  the  posterior  or  lateral  columns.  That  the 
excitability  of  the  cord  is  intimately  dependent  on  the  clia- 
racter  of  the  circiilation  was  pointed  out  more  than  two  hundred 
years  ago.  In  insanity  it  is  met  with  in  some  forms  of 
hysteria,  and,  as  a  temporary  condition,  in  the  early  stages  of 
general  paralysis.  According  to  Shaw  it  is  also  met  with  in 
some  cases  of  senile  dementia  and  traumatic  insanity  ;  and  it 
m.ay  be  prodromal  of  apyretic  delirium  tremens,  and  of 
alcoholic  pseudo-general  paralysis.  We  know  little  about  the 
normal  physiology  of  tactual  sensation  so  far  as  the  mind  is 
concerned,  so  that  we  are  unable  to  hazard  an}'  conjectures  as 
to  the  ultimate  and  actual  pathological  conditions  which  would 
give  rise  to  its  perversions.  We  can  gain  some  idea,  from 
general  text-books  on  medicine,  how  ingoing  currents  may  be 
stopped,  but  the  condition  which  ultimately  determines  exalta- 
tion of  function  or  mental  hypersensitiveness  is  not  known. 
*  "Les  Troubles  du  Langage  chez  les  Alienes,"  1892. 


278  HALLUCIIsATIO:s.S. 

2.  Anresthesia — diminution  of  sensibility.  In  the  insane, 
cutaneous  anasstliesia  is  found  in  hysterical  conditions ;  in 
organic  brain  diseases  ;  in  alcoholic  pseudo-general  paralysis  ; 
and  in  traumatic  insanity  ;  in  some  forms  of  stupor ;  in  patches 
in  some  forms  of  chronic  mania  oi*  delusional  insanities  due  to 
alcohol,  etc.  There  may  also  be  partial  or  complete  loss  of 
sensation  in  one  half  of  the  body  in  hysterical  patients. 
When  the  hemiancesiliesia  is  complete,  ordinary  tactile  sensa- 
tion, sensations  of  cold,  heat,  and  pain  are  all  in  abej^ance ;  the 
skin  may  even  be  destroyed  without  causing  pain.  The  loss 
of  sensation  extends,  as  a  rule,  up  to  the  median  line  of  the 
body,  and  includes  the  mucous  membranes  and  deeper  struc- 
tures, such  as  bone  and  muscle.  The  means  of  distinguishing- 
it  from  paralytic  hemianassthesia  are  as  follows :  — Ovarian 
tenderness  persists  on  the  affected  side ;  in  fact,  is  frequently 
intensified ;  reflex  actions  remain  unchanged,  and  the  pupils 
dilate  when  the  skin  is  irritated.  Moreover,  the  fingers  of  the 
affected  side  can  still  be  used  in  performing  various  delicate 
operations,  even  when  the  eyes  are  closed  or  directed  away  from 
them.  When  partial .  sensation  may  be  lost  to  either  pain  or  touch, 
rarely  to  temperature  alone.  The  affection  is  more  common 
on  the  left  side,  and  may  be  permanenth'  confined  to  one  side, 
or  shift  from  one  side  to  the  other.  The  transfer  of  the 
anfesthesia  may  also  be  "induced"  by  agents  which  stimulate 
the  skin  and  cause  capillary  dilatation,  b}'^  the  application  of 
metals  or  magnets.  These  agents  have  no  special  power  over 
the  angesthesia,  the  action  being  apparently  due  to  autosugges- 
tion, since  the  transference  is  not  affected  during  sleep,  or  when 
the  patient  is  under  an  anaesthetic.  The  hemiansesthesia  may 
come  on  after  a  hysterical  seizure  or  quite  spontaneoush^,  and 
drawing  attention  to  the  affected  side  appears  to  increase  the 
intensity  of  the  anaesthesia  (Gowers).*  De  Crozantf  tried  to 
prove  that  anaesthesia  is  almost  invariably  one  of  the  pro- 
dromal symptoms  of  general  j)aralysis  ;  this,  however,  has  been 
discredited  by  Guislain  and  others.  Mickle  believes  that  it  is  a 
not  unusual  symptom  during  the  first  stages  of  general  paralysis. 

We  have  already  seen  that  diminution  of  sensibility  may  be 

*  Quoted  from  "  Tuke's  Dictionary,"  p.  581. 
t  "  Societe  de  M^d.  de  Paris,"  Fev.  26,  1846. 


PERVERSIONS  OF  TACTUAL  PERCEPTION.  279 

due  to  (1)  the  mimber  of  tactile  nerves  in  the  part  touched; 
(2)  the  degree  of  mobility  of  the  part ;  (3)  the  modes  of 
application  of  the  stimulus ;  and  (4)  the  condition  of  the 
mind  in  regard  to  attention  and  preparedness  when  the 
stimulus  is  applied.  In  addition  to  these  influences  (5) 
aniBmia,  produced  by  elevating  the  limbs,  or  venous  hyper- 
aemia,  by  compressing  the  veins,  blunts  the  sense  ;  (6)  cold 
acts  similarh' ;  (7)  previous  exertion  of  the  muscles  under  the 
part  of  the  skin  tested  sometimes  diminishes  the  sensibility  ; 
(8)  some  poisons — e.<j..  atropin,  daturin,  morphin,  strychnin, 
alcohol,  bromide  of  potassium,  cannabin,  and  chloral 
hydrate,  etc. 

Before  discussing  the  various  forms  of  paraesthesia  we  must 
mention  that  the  terms  ••  hijperpselapJiesia"  '' hypopselapliesia," 
and  "  apselaphesia,''  have  been  employed  to  signify  increase, 
diminution,  and  loss  of  tactile  sensibility,  respectively.  Landois 
found  that  in  himself,  pricking  the  skin  of  the  sternum  over  the 
angle  of  Ludovicus  was  always  accompanied  by  a  sensation  in 
the  knee.  Obersteiner  records  the  case  of  a  patient,  with  de- 
generation of  the  posterior  columns  of  the  cord,  who  was 
unable  to  say  whether  his  right  or  his  left  side  was  touched 
('•  Allochiria  ").*  Variations  in  the  excitability  of  the  nerves 
to  pain  have  been  classified  as  hi/percdgia,  hypalijia,  analgia,  and 
Ijarahjia,  to  denote  exaltation,  diminution,  absence,  and  perver- 
sion, respectively.  The  term  netcralgia  is  employed  to  indicate 
severe  paroxysmal  shooting  pains,  etc.  Undoubtedly  the 
various  forms  of  paralgia  are  most  frequently  met  with 
among  the  insane.  The  sensations  of  flushing,  itching, 
creeping,  formication,  cold,  burning,  etc.,  referred  to  the  skin 
in  a  sane  individual,  are  sometimes  interpreted  by  the  insane 
as  due  to  external  agencies,  such  as  electricity  and  various 
methods  of  persecution.  Such  conditions  are  common  in 
climacteric  insanity.  Savage  saj's  :  "Where  we  have  ovarian 
troubles  A^e  may  expect  to  have  hallucinations  of  smell  and 
touch."  Regis  denominates  those  hallucinations  genital  which 
cause  different  kinds  of  voliTptuous  or  painful  sensations  in 
the  genital  organs.  It  is  not  uncommon  to  meet  with  various 
insane  interpretations  of  painful  sensations.  In  melan- 
*  Landois  and  Stirling,  p.  838. 


280  HALLUCINATIONS. 

choliacs  a  painful  impression  from  the  periphery  may  give 
rise  to  delusions  that  they  are  being  magnetised,  or  that  the 
skin  is  fall  of  vermin.  One  melancholic  patient  in  Bethlem 
believed  his  legs  were  full  of  water,  and  no  arguments  would 
suffice  to  prove  that  such  Avas  not  the  case.  Sometimes 
in  the  insanity  of  puberty  and  adolescence  there  are  morbid 
sensations  of  the  skin,  which  are  attended  by  a  delusional  inter- 
pretation. In  chronic  alcoholism  we  sometimes  meet  with 
patches  of  cutaneous  paralgia.  One  individual  believed  that 
his  leg  was  being  continually  bitten  by  fishes.  It  is,  however, 
in  the  various  forms  of  persecutive  delusional  ^  insanity  that 
such  phenomena  are  most  prevalent.  Every  person  who  has  to 
do  with  the  insane  can  multiply  instances  of  cutaneous  sensa- 
tions of  a  painful  nature  being  misinterpreted  as  evidences  of 
persecution.  A  good  instance  of  this  form  of  persecution  is  to 
be  found  in  the  following  case.     The  patient  himself  writes  : — 

"  How  much  longer  do  you  consider  my  head  will  stand  the  knock- 
ing about  and  drilling  through  of  your  needle-fork,  and  switchback 
blackleg  confederation  administered  from  the  fourth  gallery  P  Last 
night  I  was  too  tired  and  weary  to  prevent  them  wrenching  two 
successful  helios  through  my  eyeballs.  Those  who  are  guilty  of  this 
continual  treatment  and  attacks,  would,  if  outside,  in  some  places  be 
publicly  executed  or  lynched,  and  I  should  be  only  too  satisfied  to  take 
a  leading  part  in  their  chastisement.  My  body  and  person  are  also 
seriously  and  indecently  interfered  with.  I  would  only  be  too  pleased 
to  retaliate  if  I  had  an  opportunity.  Your  repeatedly  ignoring  this 
state  of  things  only  aggravates  the  evil  and  stimulates  those  feeding 
the  winders  to  greater  encroachments.  After  bath  this  day  I  had  hoped 
that  the  overhead  forking  and  needling  would  have  ceased.  However, 
operations  were  commenced  with  a  thong  through  my  temple  and  the 
needle  in  my  head,  which  all  went  off  with  a  smash  at  5.45  p.m.  Last 
night  and  all  to-day  the  nuisance  and  cruelty  has  continued  as  usual. 
Another  patient  had  a  sad  experience  of  the  general  blackguardism, 
to-day,  and  it  appears  that  there  are  several  victims  being  worked  up  to 
keep  this  needle-form  business  going,  hence  their  irrational  conversa- 
tion. So  far  as  I  can  understand,  each  oificer  has  a  mock  duplicate  to 
check  the  form  before  its  final  delivery." 

"  P.S. — Since  writing  the  enclosed  my  head  has  been  knocked  about, 
and  balls  of  a  sulphurous  taste  injected  into  my  thi'oat  with  a  view  to 
making  a  helio.  To  save  further  misunderstanding  I  will  prevent  all 
this  business,  even  at  the  risk  of  losing  my  sight,  or  the  breaking  up  of 
my  head  altogether." 


PERVERSIONS  OF  TACTUAL  PERCEPTIOX.      281 

The  disturbances  of  sensation  with  reference  to  the  pain  of 
visceral  disease  is  a  subject  which  lias  found  an  able  exponent  in 
Dr.  H.  Head.  He  believes  that  there  is  an  intimate  connection 
between  the  central  connections  for  the  sensoiy  nerves  of  the 
viscera  and  the  nerves  which  supply  the  sensation  of  pain,  heat, 
and  cold,  and  also  those  which  exert  a  trophic  influence  on  the 
skin.  From  his  well-known  researches,  he  concludes  that  the 
central  connections  of  the  pain  fibres  from  the  skin  and  viscera 
are  closel}^  connected  with  one  another.  The  central  connec- 
tions of  the  nerves  for  heat  and  cold,  and  for  trophic  disturb- 
ances in  the  skin,  must  also  be  in  somewhat  close  association, 
though  probably  not  actually  connected.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  nerves  for  touch  from  the  skin  are  widely  separated 
centrally  from  those  of  pain.*  He  has  pointed  out.  that  visceral 
disturbances  produce  pain  at  certain  points  on  the  surface  of 
the  body,  and  that  this  pain  is  frequently  accompanied  by  more 
or  less  definite  areas  of  superficial  tenderness.  In  the  case  of 
the  head,  each  oroaii  is  regarded  as  standino-  in  relation  with 
one  or  more  areas  on  the  surface ;  to  these  areas  pain  is 
referred,  and  over  them  the  skin  may  become  tender,  when  the 
normal  condition  of  that  organ  is  disturbed.  He  concludes 
that  the  tender  areas  on  the  body  do  not  represent  the  supply  of 
posterior  nerve-roots,  but  that  they  correspond  to  the  distribu- 
tion of  segments  of  the  spinal  cord  ;  whilst  those  on  the  head 
represent  neither  the  posterior  roots  of  the  cervical  nerves  nor 
the  three  branches  of  the  trioemiual.  "  One  mio-ht  then 
suppose,"  he  says,  "  that  the  analogous  areas  on  the  head  and 
neck  also  represent  cephalic  segments.  But  so  much  shifting 
has  taken  place  in  the  head,  that  we  cannot  say  whether  each 
area  on  the  head  is  to  be  considered  the  equivalent  of  a  whole 
zone  from  dorsum  to  venter  on  the  body,  or  only  to  a  portion 
of  such  a  zone.  Thus,  we  are  unable  to  say.  whether  the 
temporal  area  on  the  scalp  represents  the  supply  of  a  segment 
in  the  cephalic  nervous  system  equivalent  to  the  seventh  dorsal 
area  on  the  body  ;  or  whether  the  temporal  maxillary  and  naso- 
labial must  be  combined  to  produce  the  homologue  of  a 
complete  sensory  band  on  the  body."  The  import  of  these 
valuable  researches  has  yet  to  be  determined  in  reference  to 
"^  "Brain,"'  1893,  1894. 


282  HALLUCINATIONS. 

the  insane,  and  possibly  such  an  investigation  may  be  attended 
by  unforeseen  results. 

Perversions    of    the    Muscular   Sense.  —  Cramer  * 

divides  lialkicinations  of  the  muscnlar  sense  into  three  cate- 
gories according  as  they  occur  in  connection  with  the 
locomotor  apparatus,  the  apparatus  of  speech,  or  the  muscles 
of  the  eye.  He  assumes  the  existence  of  a  muscular  sense, 
■through  which  the  impressions  of  accomplished  muscular 
movements  are  conveyed  to  the  brain.  As  regards  the  first 
of  these  categories,  the  fact,  that  a  false  or  deficient  impression 
of  the  position  of  the  bod}^  or  limbs  may  cause  the  patient  tO' 
assume  strange  positions  in  order  to  redress  or  obviate  them,. 
is  insufficient,  for  we  know  that  deranged  sensations,  which 
have  no  connection  with  the  muscular  sense,  may  give  rise- 
to  the  same  conditions.  Cramer  believes,  with  others,  that  the 
acquisition  and  realisation  of  speech  is  made  through  the 
muscular  sense.  Thinking  is  speaking  without  voice.  When 
thought  is  lively,  there  is  a  slight  nervous  impulse  trans- 
mitted to  the  muscles  of  the  motor  apparatus,  which  causes 
involuntary  muttering  or  an  irresistible  desire  to  emit  words. 
In  considering  hallucination.s  of  the  muscular  sense  in  the- 
oculo-motor  muscles  he  endeavours  to  show  how  our  ideas- 
of  size  and  direction,  and  our  conception  of  motions,  are 
connected  with  movements  of  the  eyes,  of  whose  nature  and 
quickness  we  are  informed  through  the  muscular  sense.  These- 
sensations  are  thought  to  be  blended  with  those  of  touch  and 
the  movements  of  the  body  to  form  the  essential  outcome  of  a 
single  act  of  perception.  The  theory  that  involuntary  motions, 
constrained  positions,  involuntary  actions,  and  impulsive  utter- 
ances, and,  perhaps,  some  forms  of  hallucinations  or  illusions 
of  sight,  are  all  owing  to  hallucinations  of  the  muscular  sense, 
is  by  no  means  proved,  nor  does  Cramer  always  make  it  clear 
that  these  symptoms  can  be  so  explained.  Irelandf  has 
pointed  out  that  the  impulse  to  speak  or  mutter  may  arise- 
from  a  central,  instead  of  a  peripheral  irritation,  and  in  cases 
where  people  hear  different  voices  in  the  right  and  left  ear,  one 

*  "  Die  Hallucinationen  in  Muskelsinn  bei  Greisles  Kranken,"  Freiburg- 
(Baden),  1889. 

t  "  Journ.  Ment.  Science,"  1891,  i>.  610. 


PERVERSIONS  OF  THE  MUSCULAR  SENSE.  283 

would  be  disposed  to  think  that  the  starting  point  was  irrita- 
tion of  the  aiiditory  nerves  or  auditory  centres.  He  believes, 
however,  that  it  may  be  admitted,  that  in  the  acute  form  of 
paranoia  the  whole  nervous  system  is  in  a  state  of  extreme 
excitement,  and  that  there  may  be  hallucinations  both  of  the 
muscular  sense  and  of  other  sensory  nerves,  as  well  as  motor 
incitations  to  the  muscles  of  the  voice. 

Klinke  *  agrees  with  Cramers  explanation,  and  believes 
that  abnormal  sensations  in  the  tongue  and  throat  may  arouse 
delusive  fancies  leading  to  derangements  of  speech.  Sometimes 
these  take  the  form  of  babbling  and  childish  sounds,  or  the 
patient  complains  of  distress  and  difficulty  in  speaking,  accom- 
panied by  a  feeling  of  constriction  in  the  tongue  or  throat.  The 
muscular  sense  is  said  to  be  increased  in  somnambulistic  and 
hypnotic  states.  The  condition  known  as  anxietas  Hhiarum.  in 
which  there  is  a  painful  condition  of  uni-est  leading  to  continued 
change  in  position  of  the  limbs,  is  considered  to  be  due  to 
abnormal  increase  of  the  muscular  sense.  Dlmimdion  occurs  in 
some  choreic  and  ataxic  persons. 

The  serine  of  moireinent  (h-iiuesthesis)  has  received  so  mixch 
attention,  and  there  are  so  many  differences  of  opinion  with 
regard  to  it.  that  we  must,  before  concluding  this  chapter, 
review  in  brief  some  of  the  leading  discussions.  Bastian  be- 
lieves, that  impressions  of  various  kinds  combine  for  the  per- 
fection of  this  sense  of  movement,  and  that  in  part  its  cerebral 
seat  coincides  with  that  of  the  sense  of  touch.  He  includes 
under  this  "  sense  of  movement.'"  as  its  several  components,  (a) 
a  set  of  conscioiTS  impressions  of  various  degrees  of  definiteness — ■ 
viz.,  cutaneous  impressions,  impressions  from  muscles  and  other 
deep  textures  of  the  limbs  (such  as  fasciae,  tendons,  and  articular 
surfaces)  ;  and.  in  addition.  (J))  a  set  of  '•unfelt"'  impressions, 
which  guide  the  motor  activity  of  the  brain  by  the  information 
(unconscious)  which  they  afford  as  to  the  different  degrees  of 
contraction  of  all  the  muscles  concerned  in  the  production  of 
any  given  movement.  "  The  occurrence  of  movement  is  for  the 
kinjesthetic  sense  what  the  j^resentation  of  an  external  object  is 
to  the  visual  sense  ;  and  the  inability  to  cognise  the  impressions 
occasioned  by  movement  (either  those  that  are  conscious,  or 
*  "  AUgemeine  Zeitsclirift  f iir  Psychiatrie, "  xlviii.  Band,  1  and  2  Heft. 


284  HALLUCINATIONS. 

those  that  are  unconscious,  or  both),  which  is  sometimes 
produced  by  certain  morbid  conditions  of  the  spinal  cord 
or  of  the  brain,  is  a  defect  of  the  kinaesthetic  sense 
altogether  analogous  to  amblyopia  or  blindness  in  relation  to 
the  visual  sense."  *  The  relation  of  the  kinassthetic  sense  to 
volition  will  be  discussed  later.  Here  we  have  to  consider  only 
those  elements  which  go  to  make  up  the  so-called  kinsesthetic 
sensations,  and  the  first  question  we  have  to  ask  is,  Do 
cutaneous  impressions — impressions  from  muscles  and  other  deep 
textiires  of  the  limb  (fasciee,  tendons,  etc.) — actually  exist;  and, 
if  so,  are  they  all  essential  to  the  formation  of  a  kingesthetic  per- 
cept ?  That  cutaneous  impressions  and  impressions  from  articu- 
lar surfaces  do  exist  there  can  be  no  doubt.  Duchennef  has 
pointed  out,  that  in  patients  with  cutaneous  aneesthesia  of  a 
limb,  the  muscles  of  which  are  not  sensitive  to  faradic  stimu- 
lation, there  may  still  be  preserved  a  very  accurate  sense  of  the 
way  in  which  the  limb  may  be  flexed  or  extended  by  the  hand 
of  another.  Eulenberg  |  assumes  that  the  articular  surfaces  are 
the  seat  of  the  perception  of  movement.  The  sense  of  move- 
ment maj  be  impaired  when  the  tactile  sensibility  is  preserved. 
James  points  out,  that  the  pretended  feeling  of  outgoing  inner- 
vation obviously  plays  no  part  in  these  cases,  from  the  fact  that 
the  movements  by  which  the  limb  changes  its  position  are 
passive  ones,  imprinted  on  it  by  the  experimenting  physician. 
That  the  joint  surfaces  are  sensitive  appears  evident,  according 
to  James,  from  the  fact,  that  in  inflammation  they  become  the 
seat  of  excruciating  pains,  and  from  the  perception  by  everyone 
who  lifts  weights  or  presses  against  resistance,  that  every  in- 
crease of  force  opposing  him  betrays  itself  to  his  consciousness 
principally  hy  the  starting-Out  of  new  feelings  or  the  increase 
of  old  ones  in  or  about  the  joint. §  Lewinski  ||  records  the 
instance  of  a  patient,  the  inner  half  of  whose  leg  was  ansesthetic. 
On  standing  up  the  patient  had  a  curious  illusion  that  he  was 
knock-kneed,    which    disappeai'ed   the    moment   he    lay    down 

*  "  Paralyses  :  Cerebral,  Bulbar,  and  Spinal,"  p.  108. 

t  "Electrisation  Localisee,"  pp.727,  770,  Ley  den  ;  Virchow's   "  ArchiT," 
1869,  Bd.  xlvii. 

X  "Lehrb.  d.  Nervenkrankheiten "'  (Berlin),  1878,  1,  3. 

§  "  Principles  of  Psychology,"  vol.  ii.  p.  191. 

II  "  Ueber  den  Kraftsinn."' — "  Virchow's  Archiv,"  Bd.  Ixxvii.  134. 


PERVERSIONS  OF  THE  JklUSCULAR   SENSE.  285 

again.  In  this  case  the  inner  lialf  of  the  joint  probably  shared 
the  insensibility  of  the  corresponding  pai^t  of  the  skin,  and  the 
feeling  was  just  what  he  would  get  were  his  legs  forced  into  a 
knock-kneed  attitude — i.e.Ahe  outer-joint  surfaces  would  be  more 
strongly  pressed  together  than  the  inner.  Lewinski  also  found 
in  every  instance  that,  when  the  toes  of  certain  ataxic  patients 
with  imperfect  sense  of  position  Avere  flexed  and  drmcn  ujjon 
simultaneously  with  the  separation  of  the  joint  surfaces,  all 
sense  of  the  amount  of  flexion  disappeared.  On  the  contrary, 
when  he  pressed  a  toe  in  whilst  flexing  it,  the  patient's  appreci- 
ation of  the  amount  of  flexion  was  much  improved,  evidently 
because  the  artificial  increase  of  articiilar  pressure  made  up  for 
the  pathological  insensibility  of  the  parts.*  Goldscheider  f  has 
proved  by  a  series  of  experiments,  that  the  joint  surfaces,  and 
these  alone,  are  the  starting  point  of  the  impressions  by  which 
the  movements  of  our  members  are  immediately  perceived. 

Goldscheider  caused  his  fingers,  arms,  and  legs  to  be  pas- 
sively rotated  upon  their  various  joints  in  a  mechanical  apparatus 
which  registered  both  the  velocity  of  movement  impressed  and 
the  amount  of  angular  rotation.  •  No  active  muscular  contrac- 
tion took  place.  The  minimal  amounts  of  rotation  felt  were  in 
all  cases  surprisingly  small,  being  much  less  than  a  single 
angular  degree  in  all  the  joints,  except  those  of  the  fingers. 
The  point  of  application  of  the  force  which  rotated  the  limb 
made  no  difierence  in  the  result.  Rotations  round  the  hip- 
joint,  for  example,  were  as  delicately  felt  when  the  leg  was 
hung  by  the  heel  as  when  it  ^^-as  hung  by  the  thigh  whilst  the 
movements  were  performed.  Anaesthesia  of  the  skin,  produced 
by  induction-currents,  also  had  no  disturbing  effect  on  the  per- 
ception ;  nor  did  the  various  degrees  of  pressure  of  the  moving- 
force  upon  the  skin  affect  it.  It  became,  in  fact,  all  the  more 
distinct  in  proportion  as  the  concomitant  pressure-feelings  were 
eliminated  by  artificial  ansesthesia.  When  the  joints  them- 
selves, however,  v/ere  made  artificially  anaesthetic,  the  perception 
of  the  movement  grew  obtuse,  and  the  angular  I'otations  had 
to  be  much  increased  before  they  were  perceptible.  X 

*  Quoted  from  .James,  "Principles  of  Psychology,"  p.  192. 
t  "  Archiv.  f.  Anat.  u.  Physiologie,"  1889,  pp.  369,  540. 
X  James,  "Principles  of  Psychology,"  p.  192. 


286  HALLUCINATIONS. 

The  disorders  of"  the  sense  of  movement,  as  met  with  in  the 
insane,  are  possibly  to  be  explained  as  originating  from  the  con- 
ditions of  the  general  sensibility,  and  more  particularly  of  the 
articular  surfaces.  Thus,  general  paralytics  who  say  they  have 
walked  millions  of  miles  (hyperkingesthesia),  or  w^ho  feel  that 
they  are  treading  on  air,  have  probably  some  change  in  the  sensi- 
bility of  the  articular  surfaces,  which  act  in  reality  as  predispos- 
ing factors  of  illusory  states.  The  sensations  of  flying  through 
the  air,  of  extreme  buoyancy,  or  of  having  leaden  limbs,  difiicult 
movements,  etc.,  may  all  be  explained  from  this  point  of  view. 
Those  abnormal  subjective  sensations,  however,  in  which  the 
body  or  limbs  appear  to  shrink  or  expand,  would  be  better  ex- 
plained as  modifications  of  the  cutaneous  and  general  sensibility. 
The  considerations  of  the  "  unfelt  "  impressions,  which  are  said 
to  guide  the  motor  activity  of  the  brain,  we  leave  to  a  subse- 
■quent  chapter.  It  only  remains  for  us  now  to  add  that, 
in  accepting  the  term  kinsesthesis,  we  simply  accept  it  as 
designating  the  sense  of  movement,  and  we  do  not  attribute  to 
the  muscular  elements  themselves  any  part  in  the  production  of 
that  kinsesthesis,  except  in  so  far  as  they  by  their  action  aflect 
the  articular  surfaces. 

Illusions  and  Hallucinations  in  Dreams. — The  con- 
dition known  as  the  HyionagogiG  state  occurs  when  an  individual 
is  neither  awake  nor  fully  asleep.  During  this  period  the 
senses  become  more  or  less  inactive,  except  the  sense  of  hearing, 
which  is  the  most  persistent.  The  reflex  activity  of  the  spinal 
■cord  is  at  first  somewhat  exalted,  owing  to  its  being  released  in 
considerable  measure  from  the  control  of  the  brain.  As  sleep 
becom.es  more  profound  the  reflex  functions  of  the  cord  are  also 
weakened.*  It  is  thought  that,  as  the  sensory  organs  retire 
from  action,  the  intellectual  faculties  lose  their  equilibrium. 
First  the  power  of  volition  ceases,  then  the  logical  association 
of  ideas  comes  to  an  end,  the  reasoning  faculty  disappears, 
and  judgment  is  suspended.  We  become,  therefore,  no  longer 
capable  of  surprise  or  astonishment  at  the  vagaries  of  memory 
and  of  imagination — the  only  faculties  that  remain  in  action. 
To  their  more  or  less  unfettered  activity  we  owe  the  presence 
in  consciousness  of  those  disorderly  pictures  which,  occurring  in 

*  Rosenbach,  "  Zeitschr.  f.  Klin.  Med.,"'  1881.     "  Brain,"'  vol.  iv.  p.  138. 


IIYPXA({(HtIC   illusions   and   HALLICINATIONS.     287 


this  stage  of  imperfect  sleep,  liave  been  termed  liypnagugic 
hallncinatiuus.*  The  following  diagram,  borrowed  by  L^mian 
from  the  "  Dietionnaire  Encyclopedique  des  Sciences  Medicales," 
gives  some  idea  of  the  successive  phases  during  sleep  : — 


£ 
3 

o 

1 

O 

S 
'S 

3 
o 

.2 
t 

S 

a 
6 
o 

.§1 

—  C 

«  s 

1      ^^-,111  lllj^ 

Normal  life. 

^^^^^ 

1                1 

First  stafce  of  sleep— Hypnagogic  hallucina- 
tions. 

1                1 

1 

Second  stage  of  sleep— Dreaming. 

1 

Tliird  stage  of  sleep. 

^■^^1  ^H 

■ 

Profound  sleep. 

First  stage  of  waking. 

^^^^H  ^H 

Second  stage  of  waking — Dreams. 

1 

^^^^^^ 

1 

Third   stage   of  waking — Hypnagogic    hal- 
lucinations. 

1                           1 

1                           1 

Complet«  awakening. 

1                           1 

Fig.  16. 

Hypnagogic  Illusions  and  Hallucinations. — During 
sleep,  when  the  subject  matter  supplied  for  the  exercise  of  the 
facilities  of  perception  and  judgment,  and  the  operations  of 
the  will,  are  withdrawn,  the  ideas  that  still  arise  are  chiefly 
dependent  for  their  origin  and  association  upon  the  automatic 
and  endogenous  activities  of  the  brain.  Undisturbed  by  im- 
pulses from  the  external  world,  the  brain  seems  then  to  become 
more  sensitive  to  impressions  having  their  origin  within  the 
body.  An  overloaded  stomach,  an  enfeebled  heart,  a  turgid 
sexual   apparatus,   or  an   irritable  nervous  ganglion,  may  be- 

*  Alfred  Maurj',  "  Le  Sommeil  et  les  Reves,"  chap.  IV.    Quoted  from 
Lyman,  "  Insomnia,"  p.  3. 


288  HALLUCINATIONS. 

come  the   source    of  irregular    and  uncompensated  impulses 
which,  without  disturbing   the   organs   of  special   sense,   may 
invade   the    cerebral    cortex,    and    may    there    set   in    motion 
a  whole  battery    of   mechanisms,    whose  influence    upon   con- 
sciousness  would   remain   quite   unnoticed    were  the   external 
senses  in  full  operation.*     The  same  author  defines  a  dream  as 
"  the  occupation  of  the  field  of  consciousness  during  sleep  by 
a  succession  of  ideas  more  or  less  completely  withdrawn  from 
the  guidance  of  the  senses  and  from  the   control   of  the   will." 
The  possibility  of  suggesting  to   an  individual  who  is  in  the 
hypnagogic  state  the  nature  of  a  dream  has  been  often  demon- 
strated.    Thus,  through  the  rustling  of   a  newspaper  an  in- 
dividual has  dreamt  of  the  sounds  of  waves   on  the  sea  shore, 
and  conjured  up  with  vivid  intensity  the  visual  picture  and 
accompaniments.     Sometimes  the  impression  produced  b}^  the 
dream  is  so  vivid  that  a  belief  in  its  reality  exists  even  some 
time  after  waking.    Baillarger  dreamed  one  night,  that  a  certain 
person   had   been    appointed    editor   of   a  newspaper ;    in  the 
morning  he  believed  it  to  be  true,  and  mentioned  it  to  several 
persons,   who    were     interested   to    hear  it ;    the   effect  of  the 
dream  persisted  all  the  forenoon,  as  strongly  as   that  of  a  real 
sensation  ;  at  last,  about  three  o'clock,  as  he  was  stepping  into 
his  carriage,  the  illusion  passed  off";  he  comprehended  that  he 
had  been  dreaming.! 

The  step  between  the  phenomena  of  dreams  and  those  of 
insanity  is  but  a  very  short  one ;  in  fact,  many  of  these  pheno- 
mena are  identical  in  every  respect.  There  is  in  both  a  partial 
displacement  of  the  ego  ;  by  which  the  "  I "  which  perceives 
the  abnormal  is  not  the  "  I "  which  was  wont  to  perceive  the 
normal.  In  artificially  induced  states  of  unconsciousness  {e.g., 
by  chloroform)  the  writer  has  seen  an  insane  patient  who,  whilst 
under  the  ansesthetic,  gave  vent  by  speech  to  the  same  delu- 
sions and  the  same  train  of  ideas  as  when  in  his  ordinary 
state  of  insanity.  This  fact  alone  was  significant  that  the  ego 
bore  a  corresponding  relationship  to  the  actual  cerebral  activi- 
ties in  both  states.  According  to  Lyman,  most  dreams  are 
composed  of  visual  images.     The  dreamer  looks  upon  a  picture 

*  Lyman,  op.  cit.,  p.  118. 

t  Taine,  "  On  Intelligence,"  p.  61.    Quoted  from  Lyman,  op.  cit.,  p.  126. 


HYPXAGOGIC  ILLUSIONS  AND  HALLUCINATIONS.     280 

which  changes  silently  before  his  eyes,  without  appealing 
to  any  other  sense  than  that  of  sight.  But  in  certain  cases 
any  other  sense  may  become  excited,  producing  illusions  or 
hallucinations  as  perfect  as  the  images  of  health}'  vision.  They 
may  be  suggested  by  external  impressions,  or  they  may,  at 
least  apparently,  find  their  starting  point  in  accidental  states 
of  the  bodily  organisation.  All  unusual  modes  of  dreaming, 
and  all  extraordinary  vividness  of  dream-impressions  can  be  con- 
nected with  some  departure  from  the  physiological  conditions 
of  quiet  sleep.  Either  disease,  or  exhaustion,  or  emotional  dis- 
turbance, or  narcotic  intoxication  of  the  brain  may  be  noted  as 
the  immediate  cause  of  such  derangement  of  the  cerebral 
functions.*  Maury f  states  that  the  ease  with  Avhich  dreams 
are  recollected  varies  inversely  with  the  depth  of  the  sleep  in 
which  they  occur.  That  the  mind  can  solve  problems,  and 
perform  various  intellectual  operations  in  its  dream-states  is 
a  matter  of  common  observation.  The  writer  has  on  several 
occasions  drawn  upon  his  hypnagogic  hallucinations  for  melo- 
dies and  other  musical  ideas.  The  question  of  foresight,  or 
actual  clairvoyance,  cannot  be  discussed  here. 

The  physiological  basis  of  sleep  is  still  a  matter  of  uncer- 
tainty. It  is  assumed  by  most  observers  that  there  is  at  least 
a  partial  anaemia,  of  the  cerebral  cortex.  Ziehen  believes  that 
in  sleep  the  initial  element  of  the  psychical  process — the  sensa- 
tion— is  produced  by  "ideational  stimulation;"  and  that  the  final 
element — the  motor  idea  or  the  action — is  almost  entirely  omitted. 
"  The  muscular  system  seems  to  be  lamed ;  even  in  the  deepest 
sleep  the  phenomena  accompanying  the  activity  of  the  tendons, 
otherwise  so  accurate  an  index  of  the  existing  muscular  tone, 
have  disappeared."  That  motor  ideas  do  occur  in  our  dreams 
must  be  manifest  to  every  one. 

In   the    fulh^-awake   person   the    judgment    percei\'es   the 

nature   of  the   events   which  are  manifested  to  the  mind ;   in 

sleep,   and   in  insanity,  on  the  other  hand,   the  judgment   is 

weak,   and  there   is  inability  to    perceive    the   absurdity  and 

impossibility   of   the    events    which    appear   to   happen.     One 

point  in  which  the  dream-state  differs  from  the  insane  state  is 

to  be  found  in  the  fact  that,  in  the  former  a  large  part  of  the 

*  Lyman,  op.  cit.,  p.  131.  t  Op.  cit.,  p.  219,  d  seq. 

19 


290  HALLUCINATIONS. 

memory  is  blotted  out,  and  the  mind  is  nnable  to  compare 
present  facts  with  the  experiences  of  the  past ;  whilst  in  the 
insane  the  memory  for  remote  events  is  often  unimpaired. 
Hack  Tuke*  points  out  a  striking  characteristic  of  the  dreamer's 
mental  attitude — he  is  usually  free  from  the  nervousness,  or 
lack  of  courage,  or  dread  of  the  opinion  of  others  from  which 
he  maj  suffer  during  the  waking-state.  "  There  is  an  extra- 
ordinary change  in  the  personality  of  the  dreamer,  to  whom 
the  loss  of  personal  identity  ceases  to  be  strange,  and  he  passes 
into  the  mind  and  body  of  the  most  opposite  and  improbable 
characters,  without  anj  sense  of  surprise  or  embarrassment." 

In  the  insane  the  dreams  are  often  morbid  exaggerations 
of  the  waking-thoughts.  The  writer  has  observed  many 
instances  in  which  insane  persons  have  dreamt  that  they  had 
the  usual  forms  of  sensory  persecution  during  sleep  as  during 
the  wide-awake  state.  Hack  Tuke  records  the  case  of  a  lady, 
the  subject  of  melancholia,  who  was  entirely  free  from  her 
troubles  during  the  night.  It  is  not  uncommon  to  meet  with 
cases  of  insanity  which  have  been  an  actual  continuation  of  the 
hypnagogic  state.  Thus,  in  puerperal  insanity  we  sometimes 
find  that  the  attack  has  commenced  with  a  particularly  vivid 
dream  occurring  in  the  early  morning.  In  a  similar  manner  an 
insane  hallucinatory  condition  may  be  detei'mined  by  the 
administration  of  an  anaesthetic,  such  as  ether  or  chloroform. 

*  "  Dictionary  of  Psychological  Medicine,"  p.  413. 


291 


CHAPTER   X. 

MENTAL  PROCESSES. 

Attention. 
Definition — Psycho-Physical  Process  of  Attention — Psychical  Theory  of 
Attention — The  Neural  Processes  in  Attention — Monoideism — 
Polyideism  —  Retiex  Attention — Volutitary  Attention  —  Adjust- 
ment of  Attention — Attention  and  Genius — Morbid  Conditions — 
Hyper-attention — Inattention — la  Mental  Disorders. 

Conception. 

Definition— Concept — Psychological  View — Psycho-Physical  Theories  of 
Conception — Physiological  Theories — Association — Double  Nature 
of  Brain — Consciousness  the  Accompaniment  of  Nerve  Action — 
The  Theories  of  Discharge  and  Resistance. 

Judgment. 

Definition — -Degree  of  Perfection  of  Judgments — False  Inductions — 
False  Deduction — The  Perception  of  Reality — Belief — The  In- 
sanity of  Doubt. 

Imagination. 

Definition — Differences  between  After-images  and  Imagination-Images 
— The  Neural  Process  of  Imagination — Morbid  Conditions — 
Simple  Delusional  States — Sensory  Types — Emotional  or  Affec- 
tive Types— Clinical  Considerations. 

ATTENTION. 

Before  taking  up  the  stibjects  of  "  conception  "  and  "  asso- 
ciation "  it  is  advisable  that  we  should  understand  a  little 
more  clearly  what  is  meant  by  attention.  Attention  is  one  of 
the  most  important  of  our  mental  activities,  since  a  mental  fact 
only  exists  for  us  in  so  far  as  we  attend  to  it.  Sully  defines  it 
as  '■  the  active  self-direction  of  the  mind  to  any  object  which 
presents  itself  to  it  at  the  moment."  In  accepting  this  defini- 
tion it  is  necessary,  however,  that  the  student  should  recognise 


292  MENTAL  PROCESSES. 

that  the  mind's  consciousness  of  what  is  presented  to  it  is  not 
always  the  result  of  active  self-direction.  When  we  attend  to 
a  thing  we  intensify  our  consciousness  by  narrowing  or  con- 
centrating it  on  some  definite  and  restricted  area ;  but  were 
all  our  impressions  determined  only  by  the  active  self-direction 
of  attention  the  mind  would  no  longer  be  the  passive  recipient 
of  impressions  from  without,  and  all  our  mental  states  would 
be  determined  by  the  primary  and  voluntary  activity  of  the 
mind.  When  we  force  our  minds  in  a  particular  direction,  so 
as  to  make  the  objects  as  distinct  as  possible,  the  action 
involves  a  sense  of  effort  self-determined  ;  but  an  unusual  or 
novel  stimulus  may  affect  our  consciousness  quite  apart  from 
any  voluntary  effort  of  attention.  In  the  latter  condition  the 
attention  is  termed  reflex,  and  it  may  even  necessitate  a  strong 
effort  of  will  on  our  part  to  disengage  it  from  the  object  which 
holds  it.  In  the  struggle  for  existence  among  stimuli  the 
attention  (or  the  result)  is  determined  by  the  intensity  or  the 
distinctness  of  the  sensations  derived  from  the  stimuli.  It  is 
assumed  that  the  more  intense  material  processes  accom- 
panying the  stronger  sensations  possess  a  far  greater  capability 
for  awakening  the  images  of  memory,  and  determining  the 
course  of  ideation,  than  those  which  are  indistinct,  confused, 
and  wanting  in  intensity.  Ziehen  believes  that  this  also 
explains  why  only  the  object  situated  in  the  centre  of  the  field 
of  vision  generally  determines  the  association  of  ideas,  and 
it  is  just  this  object  that  produces  the  most  intense  and 
distinct  sensation.  "  No  apperception  exercises  any  arbitrary 
control  over  the  process  whatever."  Outside  the  regions  of 
central  focus  of  the  attention  there  is  alwaj^s  a  realm  of 
obscure  or  sub-conscious '  mental  phenomena.  How  far  this 
region  extends  in  relation  to  the  organism  and  its  processes 
we  are  not  prepared  to  say ;  nor  do  we  know  to  what  extent 
it  is  modified  by  j)ast  psj^chical  activities.  With  every  mental 
act  there  is  a  zone  or  halo  of  obscure  and  transitory  phe- 
nomena surrounding  the  object  which  calls  forth  that  act. 
Wundt  says  the  whole  mental  region  (conscious  or  sub- 
conscious) answers  to  the  total  field  of  view  present  to  the 
eye  in  varying  degrees  of  distinctness  at  any  moment  when 
the  organ  is  fixed  in  a  certain  direction;  the  latter  region — 


ATTENTION.  293 

that  of  attention  or  clear  consciousness — corresponds  to  that 
narrow  area  of  "perfect  vision"  on  which  the  glance  is 
fixed. 

Every  sense-impression  (external  or  internal),  and  every 
content  of  consciousness,  when  viewed  by  the  "  mental  eye,"  is 
an  object  of  attention.  Thus  all  the  phenomena  of  cognition, 
emotion,  or  volition  may  become  the  objects  of  attention. 

The  Psycho-Physical  Process  in  Attention.— The 
majority  of  neurologists  believe  that  our  sensations  are  deter- 
mined, not  only  by  peripheral  processes  of  stimulation,  but  also 
by  a  reflex  central  reaction,  which  in  turn  becomes  a  deter- 
mining cause  of  peripheral  ingoing  currents.  That  is  to  say, 
not  only  is  every  psycho-physical  process  sensory,  but  also 
motor.  The  ego  is  regarded  as  entirely  dependent  on  the 
sensations  which  are  presented  to  it,  primarily  through  the 
senses,  or  secondarily  through  the  sensations  of  movement  or 
reaction.  To  Fechner,  Bain,  Wundt,  Ferrier,  Sully,  Bastian, 
and  others,  we  are  indebted  for  many  observations  upon  this 
subject. 

The  psychical  theories  of  attention  are,  that  (1)  the  sensory 
pi'esentation,  or  its  ideational  equivalent,  is  followed  and  rein- 
forced by  a  distinctively  active  element  of  attention,  a  third 
element  of  feeling  being  commonly,  if  not  in  all  cases,  inter- 
posed between  them — i.e.,  the  factors  are,  sensation  and  reaction 
mid  feeling.  The  reaction  is  regarded  by  psychologists  as  being 
essentially  active,  and  involving  a  certain  degree  of  voluntary 
attention.*  (2)  Attention  involves  detention  in  consciousness 
and  a  corresponding  rise  in  vividness,  distinctness,  or  intensity.f 
(3)  Attention  is  the  pure  reflex  of  some  sensory  presentative 
process.  (4)  The  direction  of  the  attention  involves  the  residua 
of  previous  experience  and  habitual  forms  of  mental  activity 
(Sully).  (5)  Attention  involves  a  voluntary  or  consciously- 
selective  process,  which  is  attended  by  feelings  of  mental  effort, 
and  the  sense  of  resistance.  Wundt  has  tried  to  determine  the 
duration  of  the  discrimination  time  and  the  volition  time  in 
attention  ("  apperception  ").  Miinsterberg,  on  the  other  hand, 
contends  that  the  whole  process  is  mostly  unconscious  or  sub- 

*  Sully,  "Brain,"  1890,  p.  148. 

t  Ribot,  "  La  Psychologie  de  I'Attention." 


294  MENTAL  PliOCESSES. 

conscious,  and  that  there  is  no  room  for  the  discriminative  and 
volitional  period.*  Sully  regards  the  result  of  the  experiments 
made  in  Germany  as  being  the  effects  of  pre-adjustment,  and 
the  quasi-unconscious  nature  of  the  phenomena  as  due  to  the 
circumstance  that  the  M^ork  of  attention  had  been  done  in 
advance.  Fouilleef  also  objects  to  Miinsterberg's  explanation 
as  inadequate,  inasmuch  as  it  is  not  enough  that  a  representa- 
tion pre-exists  in  this  obscure  form  to  its  clear  apprehension  to 
generate  in  us  the  feeling  of  activity.  He  points  out,  that  just 
as  a  very  distant  and  feeble  light  can  approach  and  increase  in 
intensity  without  producing  that  feeling,  so  a  reminiscence, 
confused  at  first,  can  suddenly  grow  clear  without  any  seeking 
or  effort  on  our  part.  "  Whenever  attention  is  present  we  have 
a  feeling  of  mental  ivorlc ;  of  expenditure  of  energy."  With 
this  latter  statement  we  do  not  agree.  That  attention  to  the 
contents  of  consciousness  always  involves  a  sense  of  effort 
implies  the  invariable  presence  of  a  volitionary  force  in- 
dependent of  the  intrinsic  attractiveness  or  intensity  of  the 
sensations.  Were  we  to  assume  that  the  imperative  ideas  of 
the  insane,  which  thrust  themselves  upon  the  individual's  atten- 
tion, involve  a  distinct  feeling  of  expenditure  of  energy,  we 
should  make  an  assumption  which  would  be  in  direct  opposition 
to  our  experience.  Foiiillee  also  believes  that  attention  is 
always  called  foi'th  hj  an  emotion  or  an  interest,  by  pleasure 
or  pain — i.e.,  the  feeling  is  the  first  stage,  or,  rather,  "the  very 
ground  of  attention." 

The  Neural  Process  Theories  of  Attention. — Fechner, 

Bain,  Lewes,  and  others,  support  the  hypothesis  that  the  motor 
apparatus  would  account  for  the  whole  process  of  thought- 
control.  Bain  believes  that  every  idea  is  composed  of  an 
element  of  passive  and  of  muscular  sensation.  Wundt  and 
Ward  both  recognise  the  affinity  between  muscular  and  mental 
exertion.  Ferrier  believes  that  attention  specially  involves  the 
frontal  lobes  which  contain  some  of  the  centres  for  movements 
of  the  head  and  eyes.  Wundt  postulates,  that  a  centrifugal 
impulse  from  the  centre  of  attention,  or  apperception,  passes  to 
the    sensorium,    and   that   this    impulse    is    simultaneous    and 

*  "  Beitrage  zur  Experimentellen  Psychologie." 
t  "Brain,"  1890,  p.  351. 


ATTENTION.  295 

organically  conjoined  with  another  centrifugal  process  of  motor 
innervation  issuing  from  the  same  region.  According  to 
Ziehen  *  the  feeling  of  attention  is  merely  a  concomitant 
phenomenon.  The  essential  objective  characteristic  of  atten- 
tive or  active  sensation,  in  distinction  from  the  merely  passive 
sensation,  is  the  infliTence  which  the  former  exerts  in  deter- 
mining the  choice  and  order  of  ideas  by  which  it  is  followed. 
In  order  to  simplify  this  complicated  subject  w^e  may  iise  a 
simple  diagram.  I  may  be  held  to  represent  the  subjective 
aspect  of  attention  as  viewed  by  the  ego  within  consciousness  ; 
P  is  the  sensory  surface  of  the  cortex  which  presents  sensations 
to  I ;  M  is  the  motor  area,  from  which  efferent  nerves  pass  to 
the  motor  apparatus. 


Fig.  17. 

(1)  Some  psychologists  hold,  that  all  the  phenomena  of 
attention  may  be  determined  by  the  activity  of  I ;  (2)  others 
say  that  P  and  I  are  all-sufficient ;  (3)  others  that  P,I,M,  is  the 
order  of  events ;  (4)  others  that  M,P,I,  occurs;  (5)  others, 
again,  that  M,I,P,  is  the  only  sokition;  while  (6)  yet  others 
maintain  that  P.M,  or  M.P,  precede  and  determine  I;  lastly 
(7)  others  find  the  solution  of  the  difficulty  in  the  accom- 
panying tone  of  feeling,  or  motive  which  manifests  itself 
at  I,  and  in  turn  regulates  P  or  M.  There  wall  be  found  room, 
no  doubt,  for  other  modifications  and  combinations  of  these 
theories. 

When  there  is  temporary  predominance  of  an  intellectual 
state,  or  of  a  group  of  states,  the  condition  is  said  to  be  one  of 
intellectual  mono'ideism.     This  condition  may  arise  in  a  spon- 

*  Op.  cit.,  p.  209. 


296  MENTAL  PROCESSES. 

taneotis,  natairal,  inv^oliTiitaiy,  reflex,  or  instinctive  manner;  or 
it  nia}^  be  volnntar}^,  active,  and  artificial.  From  a  popular 
standpoint,  the  normal  state  of  the  mind  is  one  of  polyideism. 
Attention  is  the  momentary  inhibition  (to  the  exclusive 
benefit  of  a  simple  state)  of  this  perpetual  progression:  it  is 
monoi'deism.  The  sub-conscious  states  lying-  outside  the  limit 
of  attention  are  regarded  as  the  contents  of  a  diffuse  conscious- 
ness ;  and,  just  as  too  great  a  bulk  of  mere  retentions  will  often 
impair  the  process  of  abstract  thought,  so  diffuse  consciousness 
will  tend  to  impair  the  process  of  concentration.  We  might 
formulate  the  law,  that  the  intensity  of  a  state  of  concentration 
varies  inversely  with  the  diflfuseness  of  consciousness.  An 
over  active  mind  in  acute  states  of  mental  disorder  fails  to 
concentrate  its  attention  in  any  one  given  direction,  owing  to 
the  rapid  seriality  and  the  diflfuseness  of  its  consciousness. 
Concentration  presupposes  an  abstraction  from  other  and 
external  objects  of  consciousness,  as  is  evidenced  by  intel- 
lectual monoi'deism.  We  are  unable  to  attend  to  more  than 
one  thing  at  a  time,  otherwise  the  two  objects  tend  to  pass 
into  the  region  of  diffuse  consciousness.  "  When  an  ecjual 
effort  is  made,  the  effective  force  of  an  act  of  attention  varies 
inversely  as  the  extent  of  object  attended  to."  "  The  more 
we  comprehend  or  embrace  in  the  act  of  attention  the  less 
penetrating  will  it  be "  (SuUj^).  The  degree  of  attention 
depends  on  the  quantity  of  active  energy  disposable  at  the 
time,  and  the  strength  of  the  stimulus,  or  force  which  excites 
the  attention  or  rouses  it  to  action.  Stimuli  which  arouse  the 
attention  are  divided  into  external  and  internal.  The  external 
relates  ,to  the  striking  characteristic  or  attribute  of  the  object 
which  engages  the  attention;  whilst  the  internal  means  the 
motive  v^hich  prompts  the  mind  to  exert  its  power  of 
attention. 

In  the  insane,  the  preoccupation  of  the  attention  by  morbid 
stimuli  often  renders  the  eflfects  of  the  ordinary  internal  and 
external  stimuli  weak  and  inefficient.  Thus,  in  the  attempt  to 
induce  hypnotism  where  attention  is  an  important  factor,  failure 
may  be  due  to  one  of  three  causes — viz. :  (a)  In  states  of  diffuse 
consciousness  (acute  mania,  etc.)  great  difficulty  is  experienced 
in  the  attempt  to  reduce  the  mental  states  from  their  considera- 


EEFLEX  ATTEXTIOX.  297 

tion  of  the  general  to  the  particular  :  (7>)  in  states  of  limited 
consciousness,  or  nionoideism,  the  consciousness  is  already  so 
far  reduced  from  the  general  to  the  particular,  that  the  reduc- 
tion itself  acts  as  a  deterrent  to  the  alteration  of  the  nature  of 
that  particular ;  (c)  in  states  of  anergia  or  defective  energisa- 
tion (stupor,  exhaustion,  etc.)  the  active  or  volitional  aspect  is 
impaired,  and  there  is  failure  in  the  transmission  of  outward 
motor  and  inward  sensory  currents. 

Keflex  Attention. — The  mere  force  of  the  characteristics 
of  the  object  presented  to  consciousness  is  enough  to  determine 
the  direction  of  the  attention.  In  the  struggle  for  existence 
among  stimuli,  the  greatest,  the  most  interesting,  and  the  most 
novel  tend  to  survive.  As  a  rule,  each  survival  is  momentary, 
and  it  is  characteristic  of  reflex  attention  that  new  stimuli  can 
easily  divert  it.  In  conditions  of  morbid  excitability  the  im- 
pressions are  often  of  morbid  intensity;  while,  in  exhaustive 
states,  there  may  be  lessened  activity  of  the  will  in  determining 
the  direction  of  the  attention. 

The  lau's  of  reflex  attention  are.  according  to  Sully,  determined 
by  :— 

1.  The  quantity  of  stimulus.  The  attractive  force  of  a 
stimulus  will  vary  as  its  quantity,  and  more  particularly  as 
its  degree. 

2.  The  qualiti/  of  stimulus.  The  attractive  force  of  a  stimulus 
depends  also  upon  its  quality — i.e.,  as  it  is  agreeable,  disagree- 
able, or  indifferent. 

3.  The  i/«./e?'es/ taken  in  the  object,  determined  by  particular 
sensibilities,  tastes,  habits,  etc. 

4.  The  absolute  and  relative  impressiveness.  The  absolute 
impressiveness  is  determined  by  the  quantity  or  quality  of  the 
object ;  whilst  the  relative  impressiveness  is  the  force  which  the 
object  owes  to  its  relation  to  other  objects  which  have  preceded 
it,  and  to  the  pre-existing  condition  of  the  attention. 

5.  The  change  of  stimulus.  All  changes,  contrasts,  or  tran- 
sitions act  as  exciting  agents  to  the  attention.  We  are  only 
conscious  of  an  impression  when  we  pass  to  it  from  an  unlike 
impression.  A  certain  frequency  of  transition  is,  therefore, 
essential  to  a  state  of  mental  wakefulness. 

6.  The  eflects  of  novelty.     Those  objects  which  are  familiar 


298  MENTAL  PROCESSES. 

to  us,  and  often  recur  to  consciousness,  do  not  succeed  in  rous- 
ing the  attention  with  the  same  degree  of  force  as  objects  which 
are  novel. 

7.  Familiarity  or  interest  often  succeeds  in  arresting  the 
attention.  Thus,  for  example,  in  visiting  a  foreign  country, 
familiarity  with  the  events  of  its  history,  or  knowledge,  pre- 
viously acquired,  of  its  politics  or  customs,  will  render  every 
object  of  more  interest.  The  interest  displayed  is  often  ail 
indication  of  the  character  of  the  knowledge  of  an  individual. 
Volkmann  says  the  absolutely  new  does  not  chain  the  attention. 
The  amount  of  expectancy  or  pre-adjustnient  of  the  attention 
often  causes  a  shortening  of  the  process  of  reception  and 
recognition. 

Voluntary  Attention. — Voluntary  attention  has  been 
compared  to  the  process  of  artificial  selection,  and  reflex  atten- 
tion to  that  of  natural  selection.  The  will  is  regarded  as 
supplying  the  internal  motives,  which  may  counteract  the 
effects  of  external  stimuli.  In  this  way  it  supplements  the 
forces  of  reflex  attention.  According  to  Sully,  the  mind, 
through  an  exertion  of  will,  is  able  to  choose  the  quarter  to  which 
to  direct  its  glance,  and  is  no  longer  at  the  mercy  of  the  most 
powerful  external  forces.  Just  as  we  can  lead  a  horse  to  the 
water,  but  cannot  make  it  drink,  so  we  may  force  the  mind  to 
look  at  an  object,  but  we  cannot  compel  its  fixation  upon  that 
object  unless  there  be  something  of  prevailing  interest  about  it, 
which,  by  its  intrinsic  attractiveness,  succeeds  in  furthering  our 
efforts.  It  is  utterly  impossible  to  continue  to  concentrate 
attention  upon  any  object  for  more  than  a  few  seconds  at  a  time. 
We  can  focus  our  thought  for  a  moment,  and  adjust  our 
apparatus  to  further  or  facilitate  the  process  of  concentration ; 
but,  in  order  to  keep  the  object  within  the  field  of  distinct  con- 
sciousness, we  have  to  perform  a  succession  of  distinct  efforts  of 
recall.  Let  the  student  focus  his  attention  upon  some  object 
near  at  hand.  He  will  find,  that  when  he  first  looks  intently  at 
the  object  he  notes  its  character  and  dimensions  ;  then  almost 
immediately  he  becomes  conscious  of  objects  which  occupy  the 
zone  of  diffuse  consciousness  outside  the  field  of  distinct  vision ; 
next  he  reflects  upon  the  character  of  the  act  he  is  performing, 
and  realises  that  he  himself  is  subjectively  contemplating  an 


VOLUNTARY  ATTENTION.  299 

external  object;  and,  finally,  he  discovers  that  his  mind  has 
wandered  from  its  original  object,  and  to  correct  this  he  again, 
by  voluntary  eifort,  re-adjusts  his  attention.  James  points  out 
that  it  is  not  an  identical  object  in  the  psychological  sense,  but 
a  succession  of  mutually-related  objects  forming  an  identical 
topic  only,  upon  whicli  the  attention  is  fixed.  "  No  one  can 
possibly  attend  continuously  to  an  object  that  does  not  change." 
Helmholtz  agrees  with  this  view,  and  believes  that  we  cannot 
keep  our  attention  steadily  fixed  upon  a  certain  object  when 
our  interest  in  the  object  is  exhausted  ;  but  that  we  can  set  our- 
selves new  questions  about  the  object,  so  that  a  new  interest  in 
it  arises,  and  then  the  attention  will  remain  riveted.  That  this 
is  true  of  sensory  states  is  apparently  evident,  and  we  shall  find 
it  to  be  equally  true  of  intellectual  states.  Thus,  we  see  that 
with  every  voluntary  act  of  attention  there  is  involved  a  distinct 
sense  of  effort,  and  this  more  especially  in  its  early  stages  before 
the  habit  has  been  acquired.  When  there  is  any  falling-oflf  in 
vigour,  through  fatigue  or  disease,  the  effort  is  greater,  and 
attended  by  a  greater  expenditure  of  energy.  The  available 
quantity  of  energy  determines  the  extent  to  which  mental 
exertions  may  be  carried.  Beyond  this  point,  protraction  of 
effort  involves  tension,  and,  later,  strain.  Several  wi'iters  have 
stated  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  over-strain,  but  very  little 
experience  justifies  the  conclusion  that  the  over-use  of  the 
faculty  of  voluntary  direction  of  effort  is  productive  of  certain 
forms  of  insanity,  and  that  the  mind,  just  as  the  body,  may  be 
iiupaired  b}^  excessive  use  of  its  functions. 

The  adjustment  of  attention  depends  upon  (1)  the  characters 
of  the  object  itself.  Impressions  of  moderate  intensity  are,  in 
general,  more  easily  attended  to  than  those  of  very  great  or  very 
little  intensity.  Very  powerful  impressions  in  general  require  a 
greater  effort  of  adjustment  than  moderate  ones.  Very  feeble 
ones  require  a  greater  effort  also,  but  for  a  different  reason — 
namely,  in  order  to  raise  them  above  the  limit  of  distinct  con- 
sciousness (Sully);  (2)  it  depends  upon  the  preceding  state  and 
direction  of  activity  of  the  attention — e.g.,  in  preoccupied 
states ;  and  (3)  upon  the  ability  to  arouse  the  attention  by  an 
internal  or  volitional  act — e.g.,  in  conditions  of  somnolescence, 
where  there  is  lethargy  or  inattentiveness,  there  is  also  impaired 


300  MENTAL  PROCESSES. 

power,  or  complete  inactivity.  Exercise  strengtliens  the  power 
of  attention,  and  the  gTo^^'th  of  volnntary  attention  is  to  be 
acquired  by  practice.  Often  we  can  gain  an  insight  into  the 
will-power  of  an  individual  by  observing  the  effects  of  the 
solicitations  of  powerful  stimuli  as  opposed  to  his  power  of 
attention.  Thus,  one  has  only  to  observe  the  respective  attitudes 
of  students  who  are  attending  a  clinical  lecture  on  insanity  to 
satisfy  oneself  as  to  which  individuals  are  possessed  with  a 
desire  to  learn,  and  have  the  power  of  resisting  the  solicitations 
of  unusual  stimuli  emanating  from  the  patients  near  at  hand. 
In  general,  the  junior  student  pays  less  attention  to  the  lecturer 
than  to  the  extraneous  influences  around  him;  whilst  the  adult, 
or  post-graduate,  is  all-attention,  and  concentrates  his  thoughts 
upon  the  subject-matter  of  the  lecture.  This  power,  however, 
has  its  limits,  and  it  is  often  impossible  to  resist  the  solicitations 
of  powerful  stimuli.  In  maniacal  states  there  is  little  or  no 
resistance  to  the  various  stimuli,  and  it  is  dif&cult  to  gain  the 
attention.  The  growth  of  voluntary  attention  means  a  continual 
reduction  of  the  difficulty  of  attending  to  objects.  According 
to  Sully,  when  an  intellectual  impulse  of  curiosity  is  ^^'ide  and 
impartial,  embracing  all  kinds  of  subject-matter,  we  have  the 
versatile  mind,  ever  ready  to  turn  its  attention  in  a  new  and 
unexplored  quarter. 

Attention  and  Genius. — Genius,  according  to  Sully,  is| 
nothing  but  a  continued  attention,  and  great  intellectual  power 
turns  on  the  ability  to  concentrate  the  attention.  James  * 
says  it  is  genius  which  makes  men  attentive,  and  not  their 
attention  which  makes  geniuses  of  them.  Helvetius  regarded 
genius  as  nothing  but  a  continued  attention  ;  Bufibn  as  onl}^  a 
protracted  patience ;  Cuvier  as  the  patience  of  a  sound  intellect ; 
Chesterfield  as  the  power  of  applying  an  attention,  steady  and 
undissipated,  to  a  single  object.  Macaulay  regarded  genius  as 
subject  to  the  same  laws  which  regulate  the  production  of  cotton 
and  molasses ;  whilst  Hogarth  said  he  knew  no  such  thing  as 
genius — "  Genius  is  nothing  but  labour  and  diligence."  These 
views  contain  something  of  novelty,  but  continued  attention 
more  often  enables  genius  to  manifest  itself  than  to  create 
itself.     Moreover,  it  is  just  this  power  of  continued  attention 

*  "Principles  of  Psychology,'"  vol.  i.  p.  423. 


MORBID  ATTENTION.  301 

Avhicli  genius  often  lacks.  Subsequent!}^  we  sliall  see  that 
attention  is  a  most  important  factor  in  the  formation  of  all 
our  conceptions,  and  in  the  assimilation  of  impressions  which 
can  be  recalled  by  memory-.  We  can  conceive,  that  forms  of 
attention  which  involve  no  voluntary  effort,  but  are  apparently 
derived  from  the  initiative  of  the  object,  may  be  results  rather 
than  causes  ;  but  when  we  attempt  to  reduce  voluntary  efforts 
to  the  same  platform,  we  get  beyond  our  depth,  and  enter  upon 
the  discussion  of  matters  which  are  not  to  be  decided  arbitrarily 
by  us,  either  as  physiologists  or  psychologists.  Whichever  way 
we  look  at  this  subject  we  cannot  but  realise  the  fact  that, 
until  we  are  able  to  determine  what  the  agent  is  which  sustains 
the  phenomena  of  consciousness,  we  are  groping  in  pitchy  darlv- 
ness.  We  offer  no  theories,  nor  abstruse  philosophical  doc- 
trines of  the  existence  of  an  immaterial  agent  which  determines 
the  order  of  events  by  its  own  inherent  laws.  In  fact,  we 
cannot  conceive  the  existence  of  such  a  substantive  factor 
independent  of  its  neural  agency.  All  that  we  can  conceive  is, 
that  the  vera  causa  of  mind  is  to  us  unknowable. 

Morbid  Conditions  of  Attention. — From  the  preceding 
considerations  upon  the  conditions  of  attention,  it  will  be  readily 
understood  how  variations  may  arise  in  the  sane.  In  the 
insane  we  see  the  more  stronglj^  marked  or  diminished  forms  of 
attention.  The  term  "  hypertrophy "  (Ribot)  has  been  em- 
ployed to  signify  an  exaggerated  form,  but  we  prefer  to  use  the 
term  "  hj^erattention." 

Hyperattentioii. — By  this  is  meant  morbid  exaggeration  or 
excessive  concentration  of  the  attention  ;  or,  in  other  words, 
reduction  of  the  general  with  exaltation  of  the  particular.  Nor- 
mal mind  is  polyideational.  When  there  is  a  predominance  of 
an  intellectual  state,  or  group  of  states,  to  the  exclusion  or 
defection  of  other  states,  the  individual  is  in  the  condition 
generally  known  as  being  "  mad  on  a  subject."  Hyperattentive 
states  are  thus  meant  to  signify  states  of  monoi'deism,  or  states 
in  which  the  reduction  has  lapsed  from  general  intellectual 
activity  to  concentration  upon  a  fixed  idea.  As  an  intensifica- 
tion or  combination  of  such  a  condition,  we  have  delusional 
states,  as  seen  in  the  insane. 

Hyperattention    may   be    regarded    as    invariably   tending 


302  MENTAL  PROCESSES. 

towards  the  insane  state.     Clinically,  we  may  classify  the  results 
of  hyperattention  as  follows  : — 

1.  Simple  fixed  ideas — purely  intellectual. 

(tt)  Ideas  of  greatness. 
(&)  Unfounded  suspicions, 
(c)  Unseen  agencies. 

2.  Fixed  ideas  accompanied  by  emotion. 

(a)  States  of  depression. 

(b)  States  of  exaltation. 

(c)  States  of  ecstasy. 

3.  Fixed  ideas,  with  motor  activity. 

(a)  Irresistible  tendencies  which  manifest 
themselves  in  violence  or  criminal 
acts. 

4.  Fixed  ideas,  or  oft-recurring  imperative  ideas. 

We  shall  speak  more  particularly  of  all  these  forms  later,  so 
we  now  pass  to  the  condition  known  as  "  inattention." 

Inattention. — In  the  sum  total  of  our  conscious  existence 
there  are  numberless  dim,  ill-defined,  sub-conscious  impressions, 
which  have  never  been  illuminated  by  the  mind's  attention. 
Helmholtz  has  formulated  the  law,  that  we  leave  all  impressions 
unnoticed  which  are  valueless  to  us  as  signs  by  which  to 
discriminate  things.  Were  this  otherwise,  no  continuity 
of  thought  woiild  be  possible*  the  mind  would  act  like  a 
weather-cock,  which  turns  with  every  breath  of  wind.  Some- 
times the  determined  effort  to  concentrate  the  attention  upon 
an  object  only  results  in  fixation  of  the  apparatus ;  the  mind 
itself  pays  more  attention  to  the  adjiistment  than  the  object 
itself.  Some  individuals,  on  the  other  hand,  can  only  resist 
extraneous  stimuli  by  keeping  the  motor  apparatus  in  action 
— e.g.,  as  in  pacing  the  room.  This  fact  has  suggested  to 
James,  that  the  activity  drains  away  nerve-currents,  which,  if 
pent  up  within  the  thought-centres,  would  very  likely  make 
the  confusion  there  worse.  He  offers  the  suggestion  that 
it  may  also  be  a  means  of  drafting  off"  all  the  irrelevant 
sensations  of  the  moment,  and  so  keeping  the  attention  more 
exclusively  concentrated  upon  its  inner  task.  Every  individual 
has  some  characteristic  and  habitual  activity  of  this  sort.     One 


INATTENTION.  303 

writer  is  unable  to  work  without  the  presence  of  a  pipe  in  his 
mouth  ;  that  there  is  no  tobacco  in  it  is  immaterial.  James  also 
suggests,  that  a  downward  nerve-path  is  thus  kept  constantly 
open  during  concentrated  thought ;  that  incidental  stimuli 
tend  to  discharge  through  paths  that  are  already  discharging, 
rather  than  through  others ;  and  that  the  whole  arrangement 
might  protect  the  thought-centres  from  interference  from 
without. 

In  the  insane,  inattention  is  frequently  seen  in  the  indi- 
vidual who  has  abnormal  rapidity  and  exuberance  of  ideas,  so 
that  no  particular  state  of  consciousness  lasts  even  for  a 
moment,  as  in  the  case  of  delirium  or  of  acute  maniacal  states. 
In  another  class  of  cases  there  is  absence  or  diminution  of  the 
power  of  inhibiting  the  solicitations  of  other  stimuli — e.(j.,  in 
hysteria,  irritable  weakness,  convalescence,  intoxication,  ex- 
treme states  of  bodily  and  mental  fatigue,  and  in  apathetic  and 
insensible  individuals. 

From  what  we  have  already  said  about  conditions  of  hyper- 
attention  the  student  will  be  able  to  appreciate  the  general  law, 
that  when  the  attention  is  engaged  with  the  contemplation  of 
the  mind's  owii  contents  or  ideas  there  is  a  corresponding 
diminution  in  its  reactionary  power  to  extraneous  influences — 
i.e.,  present-mindedness  varies  inversely  with  so-called  absent- 
mindedness.  Thus,  in  the  melancholiac,  the  hypochondriac,  the 
"  faddist,"  or  the  deluded  maniac,  the  presence  of  a  dominant 
idea  is  sufficient  to  give  rise  to  various  degrees  of  inattention  to 
stimuli  from  without. 

To  those  who  work  among  idiots  or  imbeciles  the  element  of 
attention  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  questions  with  which  to 
grapple,  and  it  is  to  such  workers  that  the  importance  of 
attention  in  the  development  of  mind  becomes  most  clearly 
evident. 

In  insanity,  we  may  say,  that  in  states  of  depression  there  is  a 
tendency  to  subjective  hj^perattention,  with  a  corresponding 
ratio  of  inattention  to  objective  stimuli.  In  states  of  mental 
exaltation  there  is  subjective  inattention  and  a  corresponding- 
variation  in  objective  attention,  or  hyperattention  ;  in  states  of 
mental  enfeeblement  there  may  be  absence  of  the  power  of 
attention  to  events  both  within  and   without ;  whilst  in  delu- 


304  MENTAL  PROCESSES. 

sional  states  there  may  be  hyperattention  to  events  within  or 
without,  with  or  without  a  corresponding  amount  of  inattention 
to  events  without  or  within  respectively. 

The  power  of  transition  of  the  attention  is  a  feature  worthy 
of  careful  observation  in  the  melancholiac  and  the  maniac.  In 
the  former,  it  is  held  by  some  dominant  idea,  and  before  we 
can  divert  it  to  external  events  we  may  have  to  resort  to  other 
stimuli.  Thus,  in  some  cases  it  is  impossible  to  gain  even  a 
reply  to  ia  simple  question  without  the  aid  of  an  additional 
stimulus — e.g.,  a  pull  on  the  hand  or  arm  ;  whereas,  in  the 
maniac,  the  transition  from  one  external  object  to  another  is  so 
rapid  that  the  speech  is  incoherent  in  its  inability  to  follow 
and  give  expression  to  what  the  mind  attends  to,  and  the  very 
rapidity  of  the  reaction  to  external  stimuli  prevents  the  forma- 
tion of  any  subjective  idea  other  than  what  is  merely  transitory. 
In  other  words,  we  may  say  that  in  maniacal  states  the  con- 
sciousness is  diffuse  ;  in  melancholia,  there  is  a  tendency  to 
internal  concentration,  or  to  reduction  from  the  general  to 
the  particular;  in  delusional  states  the  reduction  is  still 
greater ;  while  in  degenerative  states  the  consciousness  is 
confused.  In  maniacal  states  the  attention  is  essentiall}?-  reflex 
and  fleeting ;  while  in  melancholic  and  delusional  states  it  is 
more  concentrated  and  of  longer  duration,  and  in  the  latter 
more  liable  to  be  fixed. 


COXCEPTION. 

The  possession  of  a  conscious  intellect,  and  the  power  of 
reasoning  by  general  notions  raises  man  above  every  other 
creature  on  the  earth.  Everything  great  in  science,  art,  or 
literature  is  the  work  of  intellect.  Of  the  threefold  division  of 
mental  operations  adopted  by  mental  science — knowing,  feeling, 
and  willing — that  of  knowing  includes,  the  operations  by  which 
we  recognise  what  is  present  to  the  senses,  the  act  of  recalling 
former  cognitions,  and  the  processes  of  reasoning.  The  psy- 
chologist differs  from  the  logician,  in  that  the  former  has  to  do 
with  the  usual  modes  of  thought,  whilst  the  latter  has  to  do 
with  the  rirjM  modes  of  thoiight. 


CONCEPTION.  305 

A  concept,  notion,  or  general  idea,  is  the  representation  in 
our  minds  answering  to  a  general  name — e.(j.,  soldier,  man, 
animal.  All  thinking  implies  comparison  of  one  object  with 
another.  We  recall,  group,  and  arrange  the  cognitions  gained 
by  former  perceptive  processes,  and  retained  by  memory.  The 
stages  of  thinking  are :  (1)  The  formation  of  general  concepts, 
which  constitute  the  elements  of  thought — e.g.,  the  recognition 
of  a  body  as  material ;  (2)  the  combination  of  two  concepts  in 
the  form  of  a  statement  =  judgment — e.g..  material  bodies  have 
weight ;  (3)  the  process  of  drawing  an  inference  or  conclusion  = 
reasoning — e.g.,  gases  are  material  substances,  therefore  gases 
have  ^\'eig•ht.*  Concepts  are  formed  (1)  by  comparuon  of  the 
objects  presented,  or  of  those  called  up  by  the  representative 
imagination ;  (2)  by  abstraction,  ^^'hieh  implies  the  action  of 
attention  (a  passive  reception  of  impressions  with  a  compara- 
tivel}^  feeble  action  of  abstraction  results  in  a  want  of  clearness, 
or  an  imperfection  in  the  concept) ;  (3)  by  generalising  the 
objects  compared. 

Concepts  may  be  wanting  in  distinctness  when  their 
elements  are  not  distinctly  represented. 

The  concept  must  also  be  distinct  from  a  somewhat  similar 
concept.  other\A'ise  it  tends  to  become  indistinct.  Thus,  there 
is  a  vast  difference  between  the  conception  of  a  "form  of 
epilepsy "  and  an  "  epileptiform "  condition.  A  lish  may 
perform  whaliform  movements  without  being  a  kind  of  a  A\'hale. 
Our  notions  can  only  be  clear  when  we  recognise  the  things 
which  correspond  to  them  ;  when  we  do  not  do  this  they  are 
necessarily  obscui-e  and  ill-defined.  A  notion  is  distinct  when 
its  several  parts  are  distinctly  represented ;  otherwise  it  is 
indistinct  or  confused. f  The  tendency  in  mental  disease  is 
for  notions  to  become  indistinct  from  the  lapse  of  memory ;  and 
the  organic  unity  of  a  concept  is  thus  apt  to  be  weakened.  Its 
associations  are  dissolved  or  disintegrated.  The  common 
characters  of  the  representation  become  hazy  and  indistinct. 
In  this  manner,  says  Sully,  the  concept  tends  b}^  lapse  of  time 
to  return  to  its  early  crude  state  of  a  string  of  images,  or  an 
imperfectly  combined  mass  of  images.     Inaccurac}^  of  concep- 

*  "  Sully,  "  Outlines  of  Psychology,"  p.  339. 
t  Hamilton,  "  Lectures  on  Logic.'' 

20 


306  MENTAL  PROCESSES. 

tions  may  arise  in  the  same  way  as  mere  indistinctness.  When 
we  take  too  narrow,  or  too  wide  a  view  of  things,  the  result  is 
imperfect  abstraction  and  a  resulting  inaccuracy  of  the  notions. 

Defective  conception,  at  the  outset,  often  leads  to  greater 
inaccuracy  through  imperfect  revision.  In  this  way  crude  or 
imperfect  concepts  frequently  evolve  into  false  notions  b}^ 
revision.  In  many  individuals  there  is  a  constant  tendency  to 
widening  of  the  notions,  so  that  ultimately  they  embrace  too 
much ;  whilst  in  others  there  is  a  tendency  to  specialise,  or 
reduce  too  much  to  the  special — e.r/.,  as  seen  in  the  growth  of 
monoideistic  states.  Frequentl}^,  as  the  result  of  specialisation, 
there  is  developed  a  tendency  to  individualise  or  to  appl}^ 
notions  to  the  personality — e.g.,  in  the  various  writers  who 
have  "  fads  "  and  endeavour  to  assert  their  individuality  synony- 
mously with  the  fad.  We  all  vary  in  our  conceptual  power 
and  in  the  power  of  abstraction.  Some  individuals  are  facile  in 
the  detection  of  similarity  and  diversity,  others  gather  and 
retain  a  great  bulk  of  conceptions  but  are  unable  to  abstract 
from  them.  In  the  uneducated  classes,  generally,  the  power  of 
retaining  concrete  conceptions  is  often  greater  than  in  the 
educated,  who  deal  largelj'  Avith  the  abstract.  Some  individuals 
can  only  form  abstract  notions  in  connection  with  their  special 
line  of  thought.  The  mental  physiologist  may  be  deficient  in 
framing  wide  concepts  as  to  phj^sical  formulge,  or  ideal  notions 
of  the  mathematics  of  mind;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  he  may 
lack  the  philosophic  power  of  abstracting  and  thinking  about 
the  subjective  side  of  mental  phenomena.  It  is  not  uncommon 
to  meet  with  a  logician  m^Iio  has  at  his  finger  tips,  as  it  were, 
all  the  foi'mulee  of  how  we  ought  to  think,  but  who  professes 
utter  ignorance  and  incredulity  about  the  ways  we  do  think. 

In  the  true  economic  management  of  brain-power  a  certain 
amount  of  attention  to  the  concrete  must  always  precede 
abstraction — i.e.,  we  must  proceed  from  the  consideration  of  the 
particular  to  the  general.  The  abstract  notion  must  be  fed,  so 
to  speak,  by  the  concrete  perceptions,  by  memory,  and  by  the 
reproductive  imagination. 

From  a  psychological  point  of  view,  therefore,  we  see  that 
morbid  conditions  may  arise  as  individuals  vary  (1)  in  their 
sensory  discrimination,   perceptual   power,   and  in   their    con- 


CONCEPTION.  307 

ceptual  power  and  assimilation  :  (2)  in  their  power  of  attention 
and  abstraction  (some  individuals  possess  very  high  theological 
views  derived  from  tradition,  who,  nevertheless,  have  defective 
power  of  introspection,  or  of  forming  abstract  notions  for  them- 
selves) ;  (3)  in  the  amount  of  attention  given  to  the  concrete 
(in  the  uneducated  and  in  the  weakminded  attention  to  the 
trivial  events  of  life  gives  the  sum  total  of  their  mental  being ; 
similarly,  some  plodders  ^^'ho  devote  all  their  energies  to  the 
contemplation  of  the  concrete  neither  see  nor  think  beyond 
their  microscopic  region  of  central  focus).  In  acute  mental 
disorders  the  rapidity  of  formation  of  notions,  the  defective 
conditions  of  the  memory,  and  the  pranks  played  by  the 
imagination  are  predominant  factors.  In  subjective  and  intr-o- 
spective  states  the  slowness  of  the  processes,  and  the  persistence 
of  the  direction  of  the  attention  to  the  false  conceptual  series, 
aid,  in  great  measure,  in  the  formation  of  the  narrow  egoistic 
states,  or  the  delusional  series. 

The  arguments  of  some  psychologists,  that  conceptions 
develop  themselves,  and  that  a  "judgment"  is  due  to  the  self- 
massing  of  present  and  previously  acquired  notions,  are  incom- 
prehensible. The  original  conception  remains  what  it  always 
was.  The  mind  can  form  a  new  conception  which  it  can  com- 
pare with  the  old,  but  it  cannot  modify  the  old  so  as  at  the 
same  time  to  obliterate  it.  Every  conceptiial  act  is  either  a  new 
combination  formed  by  the  mind  itself,  or  rather  a  new  com- 
bination viewed  b}^  the  mind  as  such ;  or  it  is  a  reproduction 
of  a  former  conception  in  its  perfect  form,  or  in  its  somewhat 
indistinct  state  owing  to  the  lapse  of  memory. 

Conceptions  are  unchangeable.  The  new  cannot  displace 
the  old — i.e.,  every  conception  must  always  remain  in  the  sum 
what  it  was  originally.  They  wdll  ever  remain  as  distinct, 
and  as  definitely  apart  from  each  other,  as  the  first  and  the  sub- 
secjuent  enlarged  or  revised  editions  of  a  book.  To  the  student 
who  thinks  of  hoiu  we  think  and  what  our  thought  comprises, 
the  conviction  must  force  itself  upon  him  that  the  pou'er  of 
abstraction  is  a  function  of  the  mind  which  w^ill  never  come 
within  the  province  of  logical  or  physical  explanation.  The 
fact  that  we  do  think  about  and  abstract  from  ^^•llat  our 
organism  presents  to  us,  requires  no  proof.     James  has  proved 


308  MENTAL  PROCESSES. 

that  nothing  can  be  conceived  twice  over  without  being  con- 
ceived in  entirely  different  states  of  mind.  When  we  look 
upon  a  familiar  face  the  present  view  is  not  an  exact  copy  of 
the  former  views.  When  we  read  a  book  several  times,  each 
time  we  read  it  the  mind  sees  something  new^  No  idea  which 
is  conjured  up  by  the  context  is  the  exact  counterpart  of  the 
former  ideas.  To  continue  alonp'  one  line  of  thouoiit.  or  to 
make  the  mind  dwell  upon  one  conception  is  impossible ;  we 
can  revert  to  it,  possibly  at  will,  but  each  time  we  do  so  the 
thought  is  in  itself  a  neAv  conception  bearing  a  resemblance 
to  the  old. 

The  Psycho-Physical  Theories  of  Conception. — It 

is  supposed  that,  with  the  first  transmission  of  the  physiological 
force,  whereby  the  impression  of  an  extei'nal  object  is  presented 
to  consciousness,  a  trace  of  the  cortical  excitation  that  has 
taken  place  is  left  in  the  cerebral  cortex.  This  conclusion  is 
arrived  at  from  the  fact  that  former  presentations  can  be  repro- 
duced by  memory.  These  images  of  memory  or  mental  images 
which  are  deposited  by  each  sensation  are  designated  as  ideas.* 
The  images  of  memory  or  ideas  are  held  to  be  quite  different 
qualitatively  from  the  actual  sensations  themselves.  The 
process  which  takes  place  when  a  sensation  disappears  and  its 
image  is  deposited  in  memory,  is  supposed  to  be  some  sort  of 
material  change  which  remains  as  a  trace  or  sign,  the  cerebral 
cortex  never  fully  returning  to  its  previous  condition.  With 
the  deposition  of  the  imiage  there  is  no  concomitant  psychical 
process  whatever.  According  to  Ziehen  this  is  accomplished 
latently,  without  our  being  conscious  of  it.  "  Tliere  is  no 
psychical  element  left  of  the  sensory  excitation  corresponding 
to  the  sensation,  but  only  a  permanent  material  change  .... 
the  remanent  material  trace  has  no  psychical  correlate  what- 
ever." He  further  conceives  that  this  material  trace  is  a 
definite  arrangement  and  constitution  of  the  molecules  com- 
posing the  ganglion-cells,  and  that  it  only  becomes  psychically 
active  as  an  image  of  memory  or  an  idea  when  the  object  of  the 
primary  presentation  again  asserts  itself,  or  when,  by  means  of 
the  association  of  ideas  or  the  play  of  fantasy,  some  related  idea 
occurs.  "  In  order  that  the  dormant  image  of  memory,  which 
*  "  Yorstelluiig,"  Hegel,  Lotze,  Ziehen,  etc. 


CONCEPTION.  309 

is  as  vet  only  potential,  may  be  aroused,  therefore,  the  ganglion- 
cell  having  the  disposition  El  (latent  excitation),  must  first 
receive  a  new  impulse  from  a  new  and  similar  sensation,  or 
from  some  related  idea  with  which  it  is  associated — that  is, 
the  El  must  be  still  further  changed  in  some  definite  way, 
becoming  an  ideational  excitation.  Hence  the  ganglion-cell 
is  trained  to  a  certain  extent  for  a  definite  idea." 

Let  us  now  assume  with  Ziehen,  that  the  ganglion-cell  has 
this  greatness  thrust  upon  it.  We  do  not  know  for  certain 
whether  the  cells  or  only  their  processes  are  concerned  with 
conscious  events,  nor  do  we  know  which  groups  of  cells  are  the 
seats  of  mnemonic  images.  This,  however,  need  not  detain 
us.  What  we  have  to  understand  is  the  power  or  property  of 
each  cell  which  would  correspond  to  all  emergencies.  Let  us 
imagine  the  "  seat  of  memory  "  to  be  the  library  of  the  British 
Museum.  Every  new  work  or  idea  is  relegated  to  its  proper 
department  and  deposited  on  a  shelf,  where  it  remains  inert. 
It  is,  so  far  as  itself  is  concerned,  a  material  object  only,  but 
contains  a  large  amount  of  latent  thought.  In  order  to  set  free 
this  latent  thought,  so  that  it  may  be  perceived  by,  say  the 
librarian,  the  deposit  of  another  somewhat  similar  book  by  its 
side  is  supposed  to  be  all-sufficient.  But,  the  student  will  say, 
in  the  first  instance  a  knowledge  of  the  contents  of  the  first  book 
is  pre-supposed  to  the  librarian,  and  the  addition  of  another 
somewhat  like  it  recalls  all  the  contents  of  the  former.  Precisely; 
the  librarian  represents  the  mind,  he  reads  the  book ;  the  one 
book  does  not  jostle  its  contents  into  the  vacuum  of  an  inert 
mind.  The  activity  rests  in  the  librarian.  The  one  inert 
mass  of  latent  thought  (the  book)  does  not  combine  with 
another  inert  mass  so  that  the  t\\'o  hy  their  own  inherent 
properties  evolve  a '  mind  in  the  librarian.  The  mental 
activity  of  the  man  who  shelves  the  books  is  all-important; 
and  so  is  the  activity  of  the  mind  which  reads  the  sensations 
and  forms  associations  between  the  gleanings  derived  from 
physiological  factors  of  which  we  know  nothing.  How  the 
books  arrive  at  their  shelves,  and  how  they  are  classified,  is 
known  to  the  librarian;  but  the  mind  cannot,  as  yet,  grasp 
how  the  so-called  cortical  traces  are  determined,  nor  can  it 
form  any  conception  as  to  their  mode  of  classification. 


310  MENTAL  PEOCESSES. 

When  I  look  at  the  book-shelves  of  my  study,  and  see  in 
each  closed  volume  the  idea  of  their  contents,  their  action  is 
merely  by  suggestion,  my  mind  does  the  rest.  So  it  is  with  the 
mind  and  oiir  cortical  structures.  Each  book  may  represent  a 
cortical  trace,  or  latent  excitation,  but  it  is  the  mind  which 
realises  that  excitation,  and  which  turns  and  contemplates  the 
appeal  from  each  individual  book.  As  with  minds,  so  with 
librarians.  Some  appeal  incessantly  to  their  cortical  traces 
or  books  for  knowledge,  while  others  are  appealed  to  by  those 
traces  or  books  for  the  independent  siimmations  of  an  intellect 
which  transcends  their  contents.  To  enter  upon  the  question 
of  how  far  the  mind  is  dependent  upon  molecular  changes  for 
its  knowledge  of  ethical  and  philosophical  systems  is  not  part  of 
our  object.  All  we  desire  to  point  out  is,  that  the  psycho- 
physiological theor}^,  as  depending  upon  a  purely  cellular  basis 
of  memory,  is  insiifficient. 

The  physiological  theory  fares  no  better  than  the 
psycho-physical  one.  The  supposition,  that  in  the  case  of 
the  visual  sense  the  relations  of  the  retina  are  to  a  certain 
extent  reproduced  in  the  visual  centre,  so  that  the  superior 
margin  of  the  former  corresponds  to  the  anterior  margin  of  the 
latter,  is  absolutely  withoiit  vei-ification.  Ziehen  states  :  "To 
this  excitation  of  numerous  ganglion-cells  corresponds  the 
visual  sensation."  We  have  already  discussed  the  question  as 
to  whether  sensations  and  ideas  involve  the  same  cortical 
elements,  and  we  have  seen  that,  from  our  present  knowledge 
of  physiology  and  pathology,  we  are  justified  in  the  assumption 
that  different  cortical  elements  are  involved.  It  is  commonly 
assumed  that  the  ganglion-cells  of  the  sensory  areas  transmit 
their  excitation  to  another  ganglion-cell  (the  "memory-cell") 
where  the  molecular  counterpart  of  the  visual  idea,  or  proper 
image  of  memory,  is  stored.  In  order  to  explain  the  storing  of 
sensations  derived  through  the  different  senses  whose  centres 
are  situated  in  different  parts  of  the  cerebral  cortex  the 
following  theory  is  advanced. 

From  the  fact,  that  disease,  injury,  or  extirpation  of  certain 
areas  of  the  cortex  is  followed  by  partial  defects  in  the 
memory,  it  is  assumed  that  the  "images"  of  memory  are 
deposited   in  immediate  association    with  these    regions.      An 


CONCEPTION.  311 

idea  is  regarded  as  a  complex  psychical  state,  deriving  its  com- 
ponent parts  from  the  images  deposited  in  different  areas  of 
the  brain.  Thus,  assuming  that  visual,  auditory,  olfactory, 
and  motor  images  are  stored  in  their  respective  regions,  and 
that  they  have  often  been  called  into  activity  simultaneously, 
an  idea  is  supposed  to  be  due  to  the  summation  of  activities 
Avithin  these  regions.  That  is  to  say,  the  component  sensory 
elements  are  deposited  in  different  parts  of  the  brain,  and  are 
connected  with  each  other  by  associative  fibres,  so  that  when 
one  of  these  areas  is  excited  the  others  are  called  into  action  by 
association.  The  idea,  therefore,  would  appear  to  depend  upon 
the  functional  integrity  of  the  structures  from  which  the. 
physiological  equivalents  of  its    component  parts  are  derived. 

In  favour  of  this  view  we  have  the  facts  derived  mainly 
from  the  study  of  the  various  forms  of  amnesic  aphasia.  With 
the  absence  of  certain  areas,  through  injury  or  disease,  the 
corresponding  representative  element  is  also  absent  in  the  idea. 
Moreover,  the  other  physiological  elements,  which  are  assumed 
to  be  functionally  competent,  are  nevertheless  unable  to  com- 
pensate for  the  loss  by  their  own  activity.  That  is  to  say,  they 
are  unable  to  supply  the  mental  deficiency.  Experimental 
evidences  are  abundant  to  prove  that  certain  sensory  areas  may 
be  eliminated  (so  far  as  we  know  them  anatomically) ;  and  with 
their  removal,  there  is  also  interference  with  the  material  dis- 
positions through  which  their  representations  in  consciousness 
would  appear  to  depend. 

The  seat  of  transition  between  sensory  stimuli  and  their 
mental  ecjuivalents,  and  the  seat  of  the  material  dispositions 
which  are  immediately  concerned  with  the  reproduction  of  these 
mental  equivalents  would  appear  to  lie  somewhere  within  the  so- 
called  sensory  areas.  There  is  scarcely  any  need  for  a  physical 
explanation  of  the  summation  of  the  material  dispositions  which 
would  correspond  to  the  elements  derived  from  the  regions  of 
the  different  senses.  Nor  do  we  deem  it  necessary  to  surmise 
that  a  combination  of  these  material  processes  occurs  in  one 
supreme  centre.  When  once  we  have  grasped  the  notion  that 
any  one  percept  is  the  result  of  a  serial  analysis  of  the  presen- 
tative  and  representative  processes  derived  from  the  anatomi- 
call}'  distinct  sensory  areas,  and  that  this  psychical  associative 


312  MENTAL  PROCESSES. 

or  serial  process  is  correlated  to  the  plij^sical  associative  process, 
the  greater  part  of  our  difficulties  will  be  surmounted.  When 
Ave  discuss  language  with  its  ideas  of  articulation,  and  the 
pathological  evidences  brought  to  bear  upon  the  question  of 
the  acoustic  mernor}'  cells,  and  their  relation  to  the  acoustic 
sensory  cells,  in  those  mentallj^  deaf  to  words,  the  full  signifi- 
cance of  this  view  will  become  more  evident. 

Double  Brain. — Let  us  now  consider  the  significance  of 
the  double  nature  of  the  brain,  and  the  relation  Avhich  each 
hemisphere  has  to  the  formation  of  an  idea.  It  is  supposed, 
upon  the  evidence  of  pathology,  that  every  component  of  an 
idea  exists  twice  in  the  brain.  If  there  is  entitjr  of  mental 
action,  how  are  we  to  combine  the  simultaneous  processes 
which  go  on  within  the  two  hemispheres  ?  An  explanation 
has  been  sought  from  the  analogy  of  what  happens  in  the  case 
of  the  eye  when  there  is  hemianopia.  In  this  case  we  know 
that  destruction  of  both  the  visual  regions  is  necessary  to 
produce  complete  blindness.  The  prevailing  theory  is,  that  the 
impressions  of  the  two  objects  are  combined  by  the  mind  into 
one  image,  which  is  a  compound  of  both.  Brown-Sequard 
believes  that  one  hemisphere  of  the  brain  is  enough  for  all  the 
processes  which  initiate  mental  functions.  Most  observers, 
however,  believe  that  the  representations  on  each  side  of  the 
brain  are  unequal.  Goltz  removed  one  hemisphere  in  the  dog 
and  found  that  the  ordinar}^  actions  and  habits  of  the  animal 
^^'ere  little  affected  ;  but  A^'hen,  on  the  other  hand,  parts  of  both 
hemispheres  were  removed,  the  intelligence  was  markedl}^ 
affected.  Ireland  assumes  from  this,  that  both  halves  of  the  brain 
have  functions  closely  corresponding ;  but  in  man  the  specialisa- 
tion of  function  in  one  hemisphere  has  begun.  Hughlings- 
Jackson  believes  that  the  right  half  of  the  brain  is  the  auto- 
matic half,  and  the  left  is  the  half  in  which  automatic  action 
passes  into  what  we  call  voluntarj^  action.  He  also  believes 
that  when  an  aphasic  patient  utters  a  few  words  or  exclama- 
tions it  is  owing  to  the  action  of  the  uninjured  right  side  of 
the  brain.  The  estimation  of  the  difference  in  temperature  of 
the  two  sides  of  the  head  associated  with  use  of  one  side  of  the 
body,  has,  in  the  hands  of  Broca  and  Fasola,  proved  that 
frequentl}'-  there  is  a  rise  in  temperature  which  corresponds 


CONCEPTION.  313 

with  the  half  of  the  brain  affected.  The  phenomena  of  sensa- 
tions referred  from  one  side  to  the  other,  and  of  bilateral 
reflexes,  are  suggestive,  but  they  are  so  rare,  and  so  many  other 
possibilities  enter  into  their  explanation,  that  for  the  present 
they  cannot  help  us.  The  explanation  of  the  phenomenon  of 
mirror  writing  is  that,  in  the  cases  of  paralysis  of  the  right 
arm,  the  image,  or  impression,  or  change  in  the  brain  tissue, 
from  which  the  letters  are  produced  b}^  the  hand,  was  destroyed, 
and  that  in  trjdng  to  write  with  the  left  hand  the  patient 
wrote  from  an  image  on  the  right  side  of  the  brain  in  every 
way  corresponding,  save  that  it  was  reversed.  Thus,  the 
motions  in  each  case  would  be  centrifugal  and  corresponding; 
in  the  one  case  the  characters  would  be  formed  from  an  image 
on  the  left  side  ;  in  the  other  from  the  right  side  of  the  brain.* 
Ireland  believes  that  one  side  of  the  brain  is  sufiicient  for  all 
the  usvial  functions  of  the  mind  and  body  in  daily  life.  From 
an  examination  of  a  considerable  number  of  instances,  in  which 
there  was  disease  or  destruction  of  one  or  other  hemisphere, 
he  concludes  that  both  sides  of  the  brain  are  functionally 
active,  and,  as  far  as  we  know,  save  in  a  few  instances,  both 
sides  have  the  same  work  to  do.  Ireland's  remarks  upon  this 
subject  are  so  comprehensive  that  we  quote  them  in  his  own 
words  : — 

"  We  may  hold  from  analogy  that,  as  long  as  corresponding,  or  com- 
plementary, or  congruous  impressions  are  produced  in  each  hemisphere, 
no  disparity  of  thought  or  affection  will  be  noticed,  just  as  the  same  or 
complementary  impressions  from  both  retinae  are  fused  into  one  mental 
image.  Double  action  of  the  brain  is  only  displayed  in  health  by  the 
capacity  of  attending  to  several  mental  processes  at  once.  It  is  in 
diseased  action  where  one  side  of  the  brain  is  affected,  and  not  the 
other,  that  we  may  expect  to  find  a  derangement  of  the  harmonious 
action  of  both  hemispheres.  In  cases  of  wounds  or  injuries  of  one  side 
of  the  brain,  the  following  symptoms  have  been  observed  :  The  patient 
is  quite  sensible,  though  perhaps  exhibiting  signs  of  distress  or  restless- 
ness, or  twitching  of  the  muscles.  When  spoken  to  he  will  answer  for 
a  time  composedly ;  but  conversation  soon  fatigues  him,  he  begins  to  be 
anxious,  then  distressed,  and  further  conversation  becomes  painful  au'l 
exhausting.  Nevertheless,  to  outward  appearance  he  is  composed  and 
reasonable.  The  explanation  of  this  is,  that  one  side  of  the  brain  being 
still  healthy,  it  acts  in  a  normal  manner,  but  in  the  exertion  to  carry  on 

*  Ireland,  "Tuke's  Dictionary,"  p.  399. 


314  MENTAL  PEOCESSES. 

a  conversation  the  diseased  hemisphere  has  to  carry  on  parallel  actions. 
The  result  is  the  feelings  of  distress  which  oblige  him  to  shun  or  arrest 
any  unusual  mental  exertion.  In  such  cases  it  sometimes  hapi^ens  that 
lying  on  the  diseased  side  causes  a  painful  feeling,  and  when  the  patient 
during  sleep  turns  upon  the  affected  side  he  awakes  in  a  fearful  dream. 
Inflammatory  processes,  implicating  the  surface  of  the  hemispheres,  are 
liable  to  spread  by  means  of  the  Inembranes  which  are  united  at  the 
middle  line.  We  may  also  suppose  that  irritation  of  particular  parts  of 
the  brain  has  an  effect  upon  the  opposite  side,  in  the  same  way  as 
inflammations  of  one  eye  have  an  irritating  effect  upon  the  sight  of  the 
other  eye." 

The  same  author  believes  that  the  disparity  between  the 
weights  of  the  hemispheres  in  the  insane  (especially  in  epilep- 
tics and  general  paralytics)  is  a  proof  of  the  existence  of  un- 
equal disease  of  the  brain.  He  endeavours  to  furnish  an 
explanation  of  many  symptoms  in  insanity  by  the  assumption 
that  there  is  one-sided  or  uneqiial  disease  of  the  hemispheres. 
Such  symptoms  he  describes  as  (1)  la  folie  lucide,  in  which, 
though  struggling  with  delusions  and  hallucinations,  the 
patient  still  retains  a  considerable  measure  of  intellectual 
clearness  and  self-control ;  (2)  cases  of  melancholia,  with  dis- 
like to  being  disturbed  and  intense  feelings  of  misery,  but  it  is 
found  afterwards  that  he  has  noted  and  understood  everything 
round  about  him  ;  (3)  cases  in  which  the  patient  has  struggled 
with  some  dominant  idea  with  more  or  less  success ;  (4)  cases 
in  which  the  patient  asserts,  that  he  has  become  a  new  person, 
that  spirits  or  some  other  beings  introduce  new  thoughts  into 
his  mind  and  incite  him  to  perform  motions  which  he  never 
willed,  and  of  which  he  disapproved ;  (5)  cases  of  conflicting 
volition  where  the  person  is  at  a  loss  whether  to  commence  a 
motion  on  one  or  other  side,  or  in  which  he  alternately  uses  tne 
one  or  the  other  hand ;  (6)  cases  in  which  the  hallucinations 
differ  on  the  two  sides  ;  (7)  cases  in  which  the  patient  feels  the 
intrusive  force  of  a  second  personality  ;  (8)  cases  in  which  the 
patient  seems  to  obey  or  receive  a  delusion,  but  at  the  same 
time  disbelieves  it,  as  in  those  dreams  where  a  person  retaining 
the  belief  in  his  own  identity  witnesses  his  own  death  and 
burial;  (9)  cases  of  double-thinking;  the  subject  hears  his 
thoughts  repeated  into  his  ear  by  some  strange  voices  im- 
mediately  after   conception   (supposed  by  some  to  be  due  to 


CONCEPTION.  315 

retardation  of  one  hemisphere)  ;  (10)  cases  of  double-conscious- 
ness, double-memory,  in  somnambulism  or  induced  hypnotism 
(supposed  to  be  due  to  alternate  activity  of  the  hemispheres). 

The  comprehension  of  the  relative  functional  activities  of 
the  two  hemispheres  is  as  yet,  however,  in  its  infancy,  and  we 
hope  that  time  and  research  will  do  much  to  throw  light  upon 
this  intricate  subject.  Before  returning  to  the  psychological 
side  of  thought,  let  us  look  briefly  at  another  theory  as  to  its 
material  side. 

Consciousness  the  Accompaniment  of  Nerve- 
Action. — With  constant  repetitions  of  a  material  process 
the  corresponding  currents  which  accompany  it  are  believed 
to  establish,  as  it  were,  a  right-of-way,  or  clear  line,  on  which 
little  resistance  is  experienced.  With  the  establishment  of 
new  currents,  however,  new  channels  are  opened  up,  and  the 
nerve-elements  become  iinited  by  new  bonds.  It  is  held  by 
Mercier,  that  the  newer  the  nerve-action,  the  more  vivid  the 
conscious  accompaniments  ;  hence,  he  says,  it  is  to  this  new 
formation  of  channels  that  we  have  to  look  for  the_physical 
condition  of  the  occurrence  of  consciousness.  He  further 
states,  that  in  a  region  which  has  not  yet  completed  its  organi- 
sation, we  find  that  the  cells  are  less  definitely  constituted,  and 
that  the  fibres  are  far  less  sharply  demarcated  from  the  matter 
in  Avhich  they  are  embedded.  So  little,  indeed,  are  they 
differentiated  from  this  substance,  that  it  is  often  a  work  of 
difficulty,  of  delicacy,  and  of  much  laboiir  to  establish  the 
difference  between  them ;  and  the  difficulty  becomes  greater 
the  further  the  fibres  are  pursued.  This  anatomico-physio- 
logical  hypothesis,  that  the  richness  of  the  cellular  association 
furnishes  the  explanation  of  the  characteristics  of  intellect,  is 
very  general,  and  has  lately  been  urged  chiefly  by  Eamon  y  Cajal. 
If  we  accept  this  hypothesis,  however,  we  are  really  no  nearer 
the  solution  of  the  main  cjuestion,  What  is  the  relation  of  s^ 
consciousness  to  these  anatomical  tubes  or  structures?  ^ 

Whichever  way  we  look  at  the  subject,  a  thoroughgoing- 
materialistic  formula  must  provide  a  material  accompaniment 
for  every  apparent  activity  of  the  mind.  If  one  region,  above 
all  others,  is  to  be  the  ultimate  substratum  of  conscious  life, 
then  the  elements  of  this  substratum  must,  by  their  exquisite 


316  MENTAL  PROCESSES. 

refinement  of  structure  and  incomprehensible  versatility  of 
function,  provide  the  mind  with  all  its  states,  and  hold  within 
its  material  disposition  the  power  of  formulating  for  the  mind 
the  infinitesimal  number  of  variations  which  have  been  acquired 
by  the  experience  of  a  life  time.  It  is  held  that  where  a  nerve- 
current  passes  easily,  there  is  no  conscious  accompaniment. 
When  the  channel  is  narrowed,  however,  and  the  current  is 
unable  to  pass  freely,  consciousness  appears.  Mercier  has 
therefore  formulated  the  law  that,  "  the  intensity  of  consciousness 
varies  as  the  difficulty  which  the  nerve-current  experiences  in 
passing  the  narrow  portion  of  its  channel."  Further,  he  says, 
"  consciousness  is  an  epiphenomenon,  and  has  no  community  of 
nature  with  the  nerve-current,  whose  passage  it  accompanies." 
According  to  this,  consciousness  would  appear  to  be  determined 
by  conditions  of  mechanical  resistance  to  the  flow  of  currents. 
If  we  assume  that  this  is  the  explanation  of  consciousness,  then 
we  must  also  assume  that  consciousness  ought  to  accompany 
nervous  current  everywhere ;  and,  unless  we  can  prove  that  the 
cerebral  cortical  currents  differ  from  the  peripheral  currents,  we 
must  locate  consciousness  everywhere  where  there  is  nervous 
resistance  to  be  overcome  and  tubes  to  have  their  calibre 
enlarged.  We  know  of  no  specific  mode  of  cerebral  'action 
which  would  correspond  more  particularly  to  states  of  con- 
sciousness than  the  ordinary  peripheral  currents. 

To  speak  of  "waves  offeree  that  pass  through  the  grey  matter 
of  the  cerebrum,"  "the  constitution  of  the  molecules,"  "their 
discharge  and  resistance,"  "  the  directions  of  the  poles  of  the 
molecules,"  "the  shifting  of  molecules  so  as  to  bring  their  poles 
nearer  to  parallelism,"  "  the  permeabilitjr  of  tracts,"  and  the 
"  accession  or  decompounding  of  the  molecules,"  conveys  in 
reality  no  more  meaning  to  us  in  regard  to  the  cerebrum  than 
it  does  in  regard  to  any  nerve  of  the  body.  Moreover,  were  these 
hypotheses  verified  in  the  department  of  phj^sics,  they  would 
remain  as  facts  belonging  to  that  department,  and  would 
have  no  community  with  the  facts  of  mind.  If  the  "epipheno- 
menon "  of  mind  is  in  intimate  relation  to  the  actual  area  of 
obstruction,  then  mind  must  needs  be  everywhere ;  if,  however, 
the  mind  only  becomes  aware  of  these  sensations  of  discharge 
and  resistance  from  a   distance,  then  its  ultimate  substratum 


JUDGMENT.  317 

must  either  be  a  mechanical  force,  which  is  central!}^  sensitive  to 
every  distant  oscillation  of  molecules  directly  through  its  wave 
of  force,  or  it  miist  become  cognisant  of  the  interhappenings  of 
the  molecules  at  a  distance  through  some  other  channel,  in 
which  case  another  substratum  would  have  to  be  devised, 
whereby  the  knowledge  could  be  transmitted.  If  we  are  told 
to  believe  that  the  mind  in  some  mysterious  way  perceives  the 
internal  current,  and  witnesses  its  dilating  effects  upon  the 
small  nervous  tubes  of  the  cerebrum,  in  much  the  same  manner 
as  our  fingers  feel  a  pulse,  then  we  have  to  construct  a  material 
counterpart  of  mind  which  shall  correspond  to  our  fingers. 
"  Of  what  avail  are  all  these  objections?"  the  student  will  say; 
'■  the  theories  of  discharge  and  resistance  are  plausible,  and  serve 
our  imagination  better  than  any  others."  So  long  as  they 
serve  the  imagination  only,  and  do  not  incorporate  themselves 
as  truths  known  to  science ;  and  so  long  as  they  do  not  form 
traditions  which  lead  to  beliefs,  no  harm  is  done.  Whether  the 
completely  differentiated  physiological  disposition  of  molecules 
will  ever  become  a  matter  of  knowledge  is  a  question  which  we 
leave  to  be  answered  by  science.  That  the  acquisition  of  such 
knowledge  will  ever  lead  to  any  explanation  of  the  phenomenon 
of  mind  itself  in  its  subjective  aspects,  we  do  not  deem  possible. 
On  the  subject  of  abstract  conceptions,  physiological  psychology 
has  little  to  say.  We  cannot  reduce  them  either  to  sensations 
or  to  their  mental  images.  When  we  speak  of  imagination,  we 
shall  take  into  account  the  nature  of  the  so-called  reflective  ideas, 
and  we  shall  see  how  far  they  may  be  designated  as  abstract. 

JUDGMENT. 

Judgment  is  the  act  of  connecting  two  representations 
under  the  form  of  a  statement.  We  keep  the  two  repre- 
sentations apart  from  one  another,  but  at  the  same  time 
we  connect  them.  Without  the  element  of  belief,  however, 
the  mere  connecting  of  two  representations  does  not  constitute 
an  act  of  judgment.  Bec&pts  are  spoken  of  as  the  first  and 
simplest  inferences  following  continuously  upon  a  concept — e.g., 
one  dog  scents  another  dog.*  Eomanes  termed  these  generic 
*  James,  "  Principles  of  Psychology,"  vol.  ii.  p.  327. 


318  MENTAL  PEOOESSES. 

ideas,  to  distinguish  tliem  from  concepts  and  general  ideas. 
When  we  reason,  we  select  the  essential  qualities  and  sub- 
stitute them  and  their  implications  for  wholes.  Thus,  in 
reasoning,  the  character  or  quality  which  has  been  extracted 
is  taken  as  equivalent  to  the  entire  data  from  which  it  comes ; 
hence  the  extracted  character  is  more  general  than  that  of  any 
individual  datum,  and  its  connections  are  more  suggestive  and 
familiar  to  iis.  Reasoning,  therefore,  implies  the  ability  to 
extract  characters  from  given  data.  It  is  held  hj  some,  that  the 
most  elementary  simple  difference  between  the  human  mind 
and  that  of  brutes  lies  in  the  deficiency  on  the  brutes'  part  to 
associate  ideas  by  similarity,  and  to  abstract  or  reason  there- 
from. In  a  genius  this  power  is  often  manifested  in  an  extreme 
degree. 

The  degree  of  perfection  of  judgments  depends  on 

1.  Its  demoness,  and  this  is  interfered  with  b}" 

(a)  Imperfect  observation. 

(h)  Defective  conditions  of  memory. 

(c)  Imperfect  use  and  conception  of  words. 

(d)  The  presence  of  emotional  disturbances. 

(e)  Traditions — attending  to  the  notions  of  others. 

2,  Its  accuracy — interfered  with  b}^ 

(a)  Imperfect  understanding  of  propositions. 
(h)  Imperfect  observation. 

(c)  Imperfect  recall. 

(d)  Emotional  states — strong  feelings. 

(e)  Instability  of  mental  action. 

(/)  Rapidity  of  formation  of  judgments. 
Judgments  may  be  correct  or  otherwise  in  respect  of  their 
mode  of  formation,  but,  if  when  formed  they  are  persistent, 
they  may  become  advantageous  or  the  reverse.  Thus,  in  every 
branch  of  science  and  literature,  we  note  the  obstinacy  with 
which  erroneous  judgments  are  adhered  to,  and  the  obstacles 
which  they  thus  present  to  the  advance  of  knowledge.  A 
distinction  has  been  made  between  instinctive  and  reasoned 
judgments.  "  A  savage,"  says  James,  "  is  often  as  tactful  and 
astute  socially  as  a  trained,  diplomatist.  Women's  intuitions, 
so  fine  in  the  sphere  of  social  or  personal  relations,  are  seldom 
good  in  mechanics.     Most  boys  teach  themselves  how  a  clock 


BELIEF.  319 

goes ;  few  girls.  Whately  says  woman  is  the  unreasoning- 
animal,  and  pokes  the  fire  from  on  top." 

In  diseased  states,  the  delusions  of  women,  arrived  at  b}- 
intuitional  processes,  are  seldom  capable  of  correction  by  logical 
reasoning.  The  evolution  of  the  mind  in  man  differs  essentially 
from  that  in  ^^'oman.  The  \\'oman  at  twenty  has  often  formed 
her  mental  character  in  nearly  all  its  essentials,  and  this  re- 
mains through  life,  or,  perchance,  begins  to  develop  from  the 
reasoning  side  at  the  close  of  the  reproductive  period ;  whereas, 
in  the  youth  of  twenty  the  reasoning  faculty  is  undergoing 
active  evolution,  the  mind  is  developing  and  endeavouring  to 
assume  a  shape,  is  easily  moulded,  and  deals  little  with 
intuitions  as  compared  with  reasoning. 

Morbid  developments  of  the  reasoning  process  may  arise  by 

(1)  inductive  processes,  as  seen  in  the  ideas  of  self-importance 
which  have  arisen  gradually  from  the  false  interpretations  of 
concrete  signs,  or  the  morbid  intensification  and  distortion  of 
concrete  facts  from   imperfect  or  diseased  abstraction ;  or,  by 

(2)  deductive  processes,  whereby  an  invalid  conclusion  has 
become  evident  in  consciousness,  and  through  confusion,  want 
of  discriminative  power,  haste,  or  emotion,  the  data  cannot  be 
analysed  correctl}^ 

The  Perception  of  Reality,  Belief. — It  is  unnecessary 

for  us  to  point  out  the  difference  between  imagination  and 
belief  in  the  objective  reality  of  an  image.  Belief,  or  the  sense 
of  reality,  is  regarded  in  its  subjective  aspects  as  a  sort  of 
feeling  or  emotion.  The  condition  of  doubt  is  the  true  opposite 
of  belief;  disbelief  is  as  positive  a  state  as  belief.  Both  con- 
ditions of  belief  and  doubt  may  be  pathologically  exalted. 
James  has  it  that  one  of  the  charms  of  drunkenness  lies  in 
the  deepening  of  the  sense  of  reality,  and  that  this  goes  to  an 
extreme  in  nitrous  oxide  intoxication,  in  which  "  a  man's  soul 
will  sweat  with  conviction."  In  various  pathological  states 
there  is  inability  to  rest  in  any  belief  without  having  it  con- 
firmed or  explained  constantly.  This  condition  ma}^  be  par- 
oxysmal or  chronic.  Among  the  insane  we  meet  with  every 
variety  of  belief  and  doubt.  We  are  all  apt  to  believe  things 
real  until  they  have  been  contradicted.  Our  beliefs  and  doubts 
depend  on  the  fact  that  different  minds  vary  in  their  way  of 


320 


MENTAL  PEOCESSES. 


looking  at  things,  and  that  olDJects  do  not  appear  the  same  to 
all.  To  attempt  to  explain  belief  from  a  physiological  point  of 
view  is  a  task  which  we  cannot  undertake  ;  nor  can  we  describe 
the  apparatus  which  determines  the  direction  of  onr  thoughts  and 
enables  us  to  adhere  to,  or  disregard  the  objects  of,  belief  or  doubt. 

The  insanity  of  doubt  has  received  considerable  attention 
at  the  hands  of  Falret,  Esquirol,  Baillarger,  Legrand  du  Saulle, 
Oscar  Berger,  Griesinger,  Ball,  and  others.  Professor  Ball 
compares  the  condition  to  a  sort  of  incorrigible  "  cerebral 
pruritus."  The  cause  of  the  disease  is  uncertain.  Some  ^Titers 
believe  that  it  is  one  of  the  forms  of  an  hereditaiy  neurosis. 
Undoubtedly  stress  and  strain,  as  in  those  who  are  guilty  of 
sexual  excesses,  or  in  those  who  are  overworked  or  worried, 
may  be  sufficient  to  determine  the  condition.  It  occurs  most 
frequently  among  the  educated  classes,  and  is  commoner  in 
women  than  in  men.  Professor  Ball  believes  that  it  often 
declares  itself  at  the  age  of  puberty.  The  disease  is  not  un- 
common as  a  sequel  to  febrile  states,  and  has  been  met  with  in 
the  puerperal  state.  Moral  shocks,  sudden  frights,  and  strong 
emotions  are  also  said  to  cause  it. 

The  varieties  of  doubt  met  with  in  the  insane  may  be 
tabulated  as  follows  : — * 


f 


Insanity 

of         < 
doubt. 


Intellectual 


Subjective  J    Emotional 


Yolitional 


r 
I 

Objective   <J 


Metaphysical 

Scientific. 

The  Supernatural. 

The  Ordinary 


(   Terceptire. 

Mnemonic. 
\   logical. 
I    Moral. 
■     Religious. 
1   Scrupulous. 
{  Present  actions. 

Past  actions. 
\  Right  or  xcrong  actions. 
I    Natural  laics. 
I   Religious. 

]    The  body  and.  its  functions. 
I    The  physical  environment. 


*  Professor  James  says  that  every  object  we  tliink  of  is  referred  to  one 
"world  or  another  in  our  ego.  These  worlds,  in  which  doubts  may  arise, 
are  :  the  world  (1)  of  sense  (of  j^hysical  things);  (2)  of  science  ;  (3)  of  ideal 
relations  ;  (4)  of  idols  of  the  tribe ;  (.5)  of  the  supernatural ;  (6)  of  individual 
opinion  :  and  (7;  of  sheer  madness  and  vagarj-. 


BELIEF.  321 

Roughly  speaking,  our  doubts  may  refer  to  the  mind's  own 
states,  or  to  the  objects  which  are  the  external  counterpart  of 
the  mind's  states.  In  the  intellectual  sphere  of  mind,  doubts, 
may  arise  as  to  the  accuracy  of  our  perceptions — i.e.,  every  pre- 
sentation of  sense  may  be  regarded  as  natural  and  correct,  but 
there  is  a  doubt  about  the  accuracy  of  the  interpretation.  This 
variety  is  met  with  in  those  who  dwell  in  the  world  of  scientific 
inquiry.  The  doubt  relates  to  the  subjective  interpretation 
alone.  Some  individuals  •  distrust  their  owai  and  others' 
memory,  and  spend  the  greater  part  of  their  time  in  attempting 
to  verify  the  accuracy  of  recall  of  former  conditions  and  events. 
This  distrust  or  doubt  is  seen  in  every  grade,  from  the  indivi- 
dual who  knots  his  handkerchief  in  anticipation,  to  the  feverish 
revision  of  work  by  the  student  who  is  going  in  for  an  examina- 
tion. The  various  forms  of  paramnesia  may  be  associated  with 
doubt,  and  there  may  be  a  great  difficulty  in  making  a  dis- 
tinction between  the  memory  of  a  fantasy  and  a  reality.  The 
logician  is  almost  constantly  in  a  world  of  doubt,  and  sometimes 
distrusts  his  own  ratiocinative  powers,  apart  from  the  question 
of  the  validity  of  the  data  presented  to  him. 

Among  those  who  possess  highly  emotional  temperaments, 
the  conditions  of  doubt  play  the  greatest  pranks.  Some  indi- 
viduals continually  engage  themselves  in  the  contemplation  of 
their  own  moral  welfare.  Conflicting  emotions  of  right  and  wrong 
influence  them  at  every  turn.  The  struggle  of  the  attempt  to 
know  themselves  and  to  save  their  souls  is  pursued  with  morbid 
intensity.  Of  the  ordinary  doubts  which  arise  in  connection 
with  religion  we  need  not  speak.  The  over-conscientious  and 
the  scrupulous  reproach  themselves  on  every  occasion.  They  live 
in  a  world  of  conscience,  and  refer  every  trivial  circumstance 
to  its  test.  Professor  Ball  states,  that  such  patients  bore  their 
hearers  from  the  habit  they  have  of  being  over-precise  in 
expressing  themselves,  this  over-precision  being  actuated  by 
the  dread  of  not  telling  the  exact  truth.  This  variety  of  doubt 
is  seen  in  every  grade  from  the  individual  who  dwells  upon  the 
adjustment  of  his  outer  person,  to  the  philosopher  who,  throiigh 
fear  of  misinterpretation,  constructs  a  sentence  replete  with 
interpolations  or  parentheses. 

Some  individuals  think  twice  before  doing  a  thing.     Others 

21 


322  MENTAL  PEOOESSES. 

think  offcener.  As  a  rule,  the  offcener  they  think,  the  greater 
the  hesitancy  and  doubt.  With  some  the  p7'os  and  cons  weigh 
evenly,  and  the  condition  remains  stationary.  The  play  of 
motives  and  the  fear  of  results  determine  much  of  the  inactivity 
of  the  insane.  Over-cavitiousness  deters  from  action.  Anger 
and  maniacal  states  further  action.  The  doubt  as  to  whether 
we  have  performed  actions  or  not  is  seen  in  every  grade,  from 
the  condition  of  the  ]3araninesic  liar,  who,  through  oft  telling 
his  tale,  at  last  doubts  whether  he  was  the  hero  or  not,  to  the 
condition  in  which  we  get  out  of  bed  to  bolt  the  door,  or  put 
out  the  gas  in  our  studies.  Some  people  perform  actions  in  a 
normal  manner  during  the  day,  but  reflect  upon  them  during 
the  night,  and  suffer  agonies  of  mind  as  to  whether  they  have 
done  the  right  thing.  Such  states  vary  from  the  dreads  ot 
heavy  financial  speculations,  to  the  doubts  of  the  effects  of  a 
tempting  piece  of  pie-crust. 

The  mind  of  the  medico-psychologist  is  apt  to  be  influenced 
and  determined  this  way  and  that  by  the  conflicting  doctrines 
of  the  materialists  and  spiritualists,  until  disbelief  is  succeeded 
by  doubt,  or  doubt  by  disbelief.  There  are  some  individuals 
who  doiibt  the  identity  of  others  until  they  have  closely 
inspected  them  and  have  reassured  themselves  upon  the  point. 
Others  possess  the  feeling  that  objects  are  illusor}^  or  even 
hallucinatory,  and  proceed,  by  touching  or  other  means,  to 
verify  the  reality  of  the  object.  Those  who  speculate  about  the 
supernatural  are  apt  to  superimpose  the  imaginary  upon  the 
real,  and  thus  to  create  difficulty  in  distinguishing  what  is 
fantasy  and  what  is  reality.  The  ordinary  objective  conditions, 
upon  the  nature  of  which  doubts  are  entertained,  have  already 
been  discussed  under  sensory  perversions. 

The  insanity  of  doubt  is  generally  regarded  as  unfavourable 
as  to  curability,  although  it  seldom  or  never  ends  in  dementia. 
Sometimes  remissions  occur.  Professor  Ball  believes  that  those 
in  whom  the  disease  declares  itself  at  the  age  of  puberty  have 
a  better  chance  of  recovering  than  others,  the  progressive 
evolution  of  the  organism  appearing  to  exercise  some  power  in 
ridding  them  of  this  psychological  disorder. 

In  the  insane  the  duration  of  the  belief  state  is  generally 
prolonged    through     contemplation    of    the    object   of    belief. 


IMAGINATIOX.  323 

Sometimes  the  feeling-colour  of  belief  is  clearly  marked,  at 
other  times  vague  or  conflicting.  Thus  in  some  cases  the 
feeling  of  belief  is  distincth'  pleasurable,  as  in  the  general 
paralytic  or  delusional  monomaniac ;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
may  be  more  disagreeable  than  the  state  of  doubt.  The  law 
that  repetition  of  a  sequence  tends  to  make  it  a  belief-gene- 
rator, and  that  the  intensity  of  the  belief  bears  a  relation  to 
the  frequency  of  repetition,  holds  good  with  the  sane  and  the 
insane.  The  firm  and  inevitable  beliefs  of  the  insane  result 
from  the  uniformit}^  of  the  sequence.  The  feeling-colour  of  a 
state  of  doubt  is,  according  to  Newbold,  usually  disagreeable, 
but  is  largely  dependent  upon  the  relation  existing  between 
the  feelings  attached  to  its  component  beliefs.  Thus,  the 
feelings  which  accompany  both  belief  and  doubt  may  vary 
from  "bliss"  to  "agony"  respectively. 


IMAGIXATIOK 

When  we  imagine  a  thing,  the  image  which  is  imagined  is 
in  reality  composed  of  factors  recalled  to  memory,  either  in 
their  former  or  perverted  form.  Imagination  also  implies  that 
the  images  of  memory  are  combined  or  modified  in  some  new 
way.  Hence  the  process  has  been  termed  constructive.  Thus, 
the  factors  of  the  primary  images  may  be  present,  but  the 
secondary  process  of  grouping  these  factors  into  a  new  form  is 
essentially  derivative.  In  the  sane  the  factors  are  to  a  great 
extent  recognised  by  the  individual  in  whom  they  occur ;  their 
source  is  appreciated,  and  their  nature  correcth^  interpreted. 
In  dream  states  the  nature  of  the  factors  is  not  appreciated  or 
recognised  at  the  time,  but  afterwards ;  whereas,  in  the  half- 
way conditions  between  sanity  and  insanity  the  element  of 
primary  memory  is  unrecognised  or  misinterpreted,  and  to  the 
new  combination  a  belief  in  its  objective  reality  is  added.  In 
the  insane  there  is  not  only  belief  in  the  actuality  of  the  new 
combination,  but  there  is,  with  the  fallacy  based  upon  false 
premises,  a  tendency  to  act  upon  the  belief.  We  all  tend  to 
form  false  combinations  in  this  way.  On  the  one  hand,  our 
memories  of  distant  percepts  or  combinations  of  such  percepts 


324  MENTAL  PROCESSES. 

ai^e  apt  to  become  liazy,  and  undergo  clianges  or  modifications ; 
whilst,  on  the  other  hand,  our  environmental,  our  physical  and 
mental  disposition  at  the  time  of  the  present  construction  maj 
furnish  the  chief  detei-mining  factors  in  the  new  process. 
This  is  exemplified  in  the  condition  of  nightmare,  and  in  the 
insane.  When  we  read  or  learn  a  thing  the  imagination  is 
nearly  always  in  play  :  we  present  a  visual  image  of  nearly  all 
our  acquisitions.  In  order  to  grasp  the  full  meaning  of  new 
mental  states  in  others,  and  the  factors  which  take  part  in 
their  production,  we  have  to  consider  (1)  the  data  upon  which 
the  new  fact  is  built,  and  (2)  the  nature  of  the  new  construc- 
tion, and  its  import  in  relation  to  belief  and  conduct.  This 
involves  (1)  the  representation  to  us  (by  memory  of  analogous 
states  in  ourselves)  of  the  data  suggested  by  the  object ;  and 
(2)  the  formation  of  a  new  construction,  if  possible,  in  harmony 
with  the  construction  of  the  individual  we  study.  Upon  these 
factors  depend  the  amount  of  insight  and  clearness  of  con- 
ception ^^^e  form  as  to  the  true  nature  of  the  imaginary  process 
in  others.  When  we  speak  of  sympathy  we  shall  see  how 
important  are  these  factors. 

The  constructive  process  has  been  described  as  passive  or 
active.  In  conditions  of  memory,  where  there  is  revival  by 
suggestion  or  similarity,  an  amalgamation  is  sometimes  made 
by  the  imagination.  In  dream-states  unusual  combinations 
sometimes  take  place  by  suggestion  from  without  (e.g.,  as  in 
the  hypnagogic  states  already  referred  to),  or  the  state  may  be 
determined  by  some  physical  suggestion  from  the  body.  In 
hypnotic  states  there  is,  according  to  some  authors,  a  certain 
amount  of  activity  displayed,  whereby  the  new  combination  is 
built  upon  suggestions  from  without.  Others  deny  the  pre- 
sence of  such  activity,  and  state  that  the  mind  is  passive.  In 
the  insane  (e.g.,  in  acute  maniacal  states)  there  is  little  or  no 
active  self-direction  of  the  mind  to  the  construction  of  new 
images.  According  to  the  more  generally  accepted  theories 
the  process  may  be  regarded  as  passive.  The  perceptive  power 
is  sometimes  so  abnormally  sensitive,  and  the  suggestions  by 
memory  and  from  without  are  so  rapid  and  at  times  so  intensi- 
fied that,  within  the  regions  of  consciousness,  a  number  of  suc- 
cessive images  are  conjured  up  almost  automatically,  without 


IMAdlXATIOX.  325 

active  effort.  As  an  example  of  active  imagination,  we  may 
mention  the  mental  physiologist  who  conjures  up  scenes  of 
molecules  and  forces  acting  upon  them,  etc.,  and  describes 
them  systematically.  It  implies  an  effort  of  the  will  which 
later  involves  strain.  It  is,  nevertheless,  the  active  con- 
structive process  which  benefits  our  minds  most.  We  must 
recognise  that  there  are  limits  to  the  imagination.  We  can 
only  combine  varieties  of  retentions  in  new  proportions.  We 
see  a  varied  series  of  such  new  combinations  ranging  from 
fairy  tales  and  scriptural  beliefs  in  the  concrete  to  the  fanciful 
and  absurd  delusions  of  the  insane.  We  may  acquire  know- 
ledge by  means  of  books,  and  our  cognitive  imagination  may  be 
stimulated  from  the  receptive  side  or  aspect ;  or  the  creative 
side  of  our  cognitive  imagination  may  lead  to  discovery,  and 
new  facts  may  be  revealed  in  great  part  by  anticipation.  The 
receptive  side  of  the  imagination  is  also  brought  into  play  in 
the  process  knovvm  as  imitative  construction.  Thus,  one  finds 
that  hallucinations  and  delusions  from  the  mental  side,  and 
movements  from  the  physical  side,  are  propagated  from  one  to 
the  other.  This  imitative  process  is  well  exemplified  amongst 
idiots  and  imbeciles  ;  in  every  day  life,  also,  we  see  the  more 
or  less  unconscious  imitations  of  actions  and  modes  of  thought. 
By  the  grouping  of  the  different  acquisitions  we  gain  the 
power  of  invention.  In  all  imaginative  activity  there  is  some 
accompaniment  of  feeling  or  emotion. 

The  imagination  is  a  function  of  mind  which  requires 
most  careful  watching.  In  the  "  day  dreamers  "  you  have  an 
example  of  the  result  of  excessive  indulgence  of  the  imagina- 
tion. Such  an  individual  is  generally  purposeless.  With  too 
diffuse  a  consciousness  there  is  apt  to  evolve  an  unhealthy 
conceit,  especially  in  adolescents.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is 
a  danger  in  not  gi\ing  sufficient  exercise  to  the  imagination. 
One  meets  with  numbers  of  persons  who  have  a  large  reten- 
tion of  acquisitions  ^ith  but  little  originality  of  mind.  Too 
much  attention  to  the  concrete  is  thus  often  an  obstruction  to 
mental  development. 

There  is  great  variation  in  the  imaginative  power  possessed 
hy  the  special  senses.  Some  individuals  are  deficient  in  visual 
imagery.     In  others,  visual  imagery  is  enormously  developed, 


326 


MENTAL  PROCESSES. 


and  there  is  a  tendency  to  ilhisoiy  phenomena.  Binet  believes 
that  the  aiiditoiy  type  is  rarer  than  the  visual,  and  that 
persons  with  auditory  hallucinations,  or  those  afiflicted  with 
mania  with  ideas  of  persecution,  may  all  belong  to  the  audi- 
tory type.  He  also  believes  that  the  predominance  of  a  certain 
kind  of  imagination  may  predispose  to  a  certain  order  of 
hallucinations  and  perhaps  of  delirium. 

Fechner  has  tried  to  differentiate  between  after-images  and 
images  of  imagination  as  follows  : — 

Imagination  Images. 

Feel  subject  to  our  spontaneity. 
!  Have,  as  it  were,  more  body. 
,  Are  blurred. 

Are  darker  than  even  the  darkest 


After-images . 

Feel  coercive. 

Seem  unsubstantial,  vaporous, 

Are  sharp  in  outline. 

Are  bright. 


Are  almost  colourless. 
Are  continuously  enduring. 


Cannot  be  voluntarily  changed. 
Are  exact  copies  of  originals. 


Are  more  easily  got  with  shut 
than  with  open  eyes. 

Seem  to  move  when  the  head  or 
eyes  move. 

The  field  within  which  they  appear 
(with  closed  eyes)  is  dark,  con- 
tracted, flat,  close  to  the  eyes, 
in  front,  and  the  images  have 
no  perspective. 

The  attention  seems  directed,  for- 
wards towards  the  sense-organ, 
in  observing  after-images. 


black  of  the  after-images. 

Have  lively  coloration. 

Incessantly  disappear,  and  have  to 
be  renewed  by  an  effort  of  will ; 
at  last  even  this  fails  to  revive 
them. 

Can  be  changed  at  will  for  others. 

Cannot  violate  the  necessary  laws 
of  appearance  of  their  originals 
— e.g.,  a  man  cannot  be  im- 
agined from  in  front  and  behind 
at  once.  The  imagination  must 
walk  round  him,  so  to  speak. 

Are  more  easily  had  with  open 
than  with  shut  eyes. 

Need  not  follow  movements  of 
head  or  eyes. 

The  field  is  extensive  in  three 
dimensions,  and  objects  can  be 
imagined  in  it  above  or  behind 
almost  as  easily  as  in  front. 

In  imagination,  the  attention  feels 
as  if  drawn  backwards  towards 
the  brain. 


The  Neural  Process  of  Imagination. — Bain  believes, 
that  it  is  only  a  milder  form  of  the  same  process  which  occurs 
in  perception,  and  that  the  renewed  feeling  occupies  the  very 
same  parts,  and  in  the  same  manner  as  the 


original  feeling. 


IMAGINATIOX.  327 

'J'lie  question  as  to  whether  nerve-currents  can  run  backwards 
requires  consideration.  Some  authors  hold  that  peripheral 
sense-organs  can  be  excited  from  above,  others  say  they  can 
only  be  excited  from  without.  Braid,  writing  on  hypnotism, 
believes  that  a  nerve-current  can  be  made  to  Mow  to  the  peri- 
phery mimicking  the  influences  from  without  in  sensation. 
The  imaginative  process  must  be  initiated  in  the  first  place  by 
some  material  condition  in  the  bi'ain  itself,  or  in  the  structures 
which  subserve  the  mind.  It  is  held  by  some  that  currents 
do  flow  backwards  down  the  optic  nerve  in  Meyer's  and 
Fere's  negative  after-images,  and  fi'om  this  it  is  assumed  that 
in  all  imagination  there  is  possibly  some  slight  degree  of 
backward  flow.  If  a  suggestion  is  made  to  a  person  in  an 
hypnotised  state  that  a  sheet  of  paper  has  a  red  cross  upon  it, 
and  a  pretence  is  made  to  remove  the  imaginary  cross  whilst 
the  subject  is  told  to  look  fixedly  at  a  dot  upon  the  paper,  he 
will  presently  tell  you  that  he  sees  a  bluish-green  cross. 
Binet  believed  the  optical  brain  centres,  and  not  the  retina, 
to  be  the  seat  of  ordinary  negative  after-images. 

Undoubtedly  the  negative  after-images  of  Meyer  and  Fere 
are  difiicult  to  explain,  and  they  appear  to  be  paradoxical  to 
all  we  know  of  the  direction  of  nerve-currents.  Our  know- 
ledge upon  this  subject,  however,  is  so  meagre  that  we  are  not 
in  a  position  to  negative  or  support  either  view. 

Our  knowledge  of  the  physical  processes  which  underlie 
attention,  conception,  judgment,  belief,  and  imagination  is,  as 
yet,  of  little  jjractical  value.  We  do  not  know  how  or  whei'e  the 
brain  facts  come  into  apposition  with  the  mental  facts. 

Pathology  has  taught  us  that  disease  of  a  nerve  will  some- 
times give  rise  to  morbid  ingoing  stimuli.  Morbid  conditions  of 
the  various  sensory  centres  in  the  cortex  have  been  demonstrated 
as  producing  similar  results.  Hallucinations  are  said  to  be  due 
to  disease  of  cortical  centres,  and  yet  we  have  seen  that  these 
very  centres  which  are  said  to  be  diseased  transmit  ordinary 
sensory  stimuli  without  the  slightest  indication  of  illusory 
accompaniments.  When  we  eliminate  the  sensory  areas  we  are 
no  better  off".  We  only  throw  the  responsibility  for  the 
.  production  of  the  morbid  ideas  upon  the  material  substratum 
which  is  believed  to  give  rise  to  ordinary  mental  states.     Here 


328  MEIS'TAL  PROCESSES. 

again  we  meet  with  the  same  difficulty.  What  is  the  patho- 
logical state  which  will  determine  the  growth  and  develoj)- 
ment  of  morbid  ideas,  and  an  insane  course  of  reasoning,  and 
yet  leave  the  patient  in  every  sense  a  philosopher,  and,  in  some 
cases,  more  brilliant  intellectually  than  before  ?  A  tran- 
scendental pathology  would  seek  the  explanation  in  the 
arrangement  of  molecules,  and  in  the  unequal  distribution  of 
•force  and  the  resistance  which  it  overcomes. 

Within  the  minute  ramifications  of  the  nerve-fibres  of  the 
morbid  area  there  would  be  at  least  some  molecular  activity  or 
disposition  which  constantly  tried  to  overcome  resistance,  and 
in  so  doing  stimulated  consciousness  in  a  specific  and  morbid 
manner.  If  we  assume  that  the  area  afiected  is  a  small  one, 
then  we  must  also  assume  that  by  its  activities  alone  the 
judgment  of  the  ego  is  overcome,  and  since  a  thorough-going 
materialistic  theory  grants  nothing  to  the  mind  itself,  it  must 
explain  how  the  material  disposition  can  affect  the  totality  of 
the  mind  at  one  time,  and  yet  fails  to  influence  it  at  another. 

If  the  mind  is  to  be  located  in  the  cortex  as  a  complex 
epiphenomenon,  having  as  the  basis  of  its  component  parts 
some  one  specific  material  substratum,  then  it  is  also  reasonable 
to  assume  that,  in  order  that  these  component  parts  may  be 
gathered  into  one  disposition  which  would  be  the  material 
unit  upon  whose  functional  activity  our  complex  ideas  would 
depend,  there  must  be  corresponding  material  movements 
^^^hich  ultimately  combine  and  present  the  complex  result  to 
the  mind.  We  cannot  conceive  the  location  of  mind  in  any 
supreme  cell ;  nor,  in  fact,  can  we  locate  it  in  any  cells  or  pro- 
cesses. For  us  such  conceptions  are  idle ;  we  can  only  view  the 
niind  as  an  epiphenomenon  having  no  community  with  any 
structures  of  which  we  know  the  essence.  That  mind  is  fixed 
iipon  one  definite  and  ultimate  substratum  we  cannot  therefore 
conceive ;  nor  can  we  conceive  that  it  flits  from  one  region  to 
another  as  a  movable  quantity  having  a  physical  mode  of 
motion. 

■  The  physiological  theory  of  mind  must  of  necessity 
transcend  all  we  know  of  matter  and  force,  and  this  encourages 
us  in  the  belief  that  the  arguments  of  the  would-be  scientific 
exponents  of  mental  events  in  terms  of  physical  force  are  more 


MORBID  CONDITIONS  OF  IMAGINATION.  329 

truly  conjectural  and  specu.lative  than  those  of  the  individuals 
who  recognise  that  they  have  a  mind  to  think  with  and  a 
body  to  serve  it. 

Morbid  Conditions. — As  we  have  already  seen,  delusional 
states  are  often  associated  with  illusions  and  hallucinations: 
and  the  presence  of  delusions  does  not  necessarily  imply  a 
condition  of  mental  weakness.  Such  patients  are  often  shrewd 
and  intelligent,  their  memory  is  good,  their  volition  strong, 
and  they  are  able  to  keep  their  emotions  well  under  control. 
Delusions  may  be  grouped  according  to  their  occurrence  in  the 
sane,  in  half-way  conditions  between  sanity  and  insanity,  and 
in  insanity.  In  the  sane  we  see  every  variety  of  delusion, 
arising  in  some  cases  from  false  sense-impressions  or  illusory 
phenomena,  in  others  from  the  propagation  of  false  intellectual 
beliefs,  as  in  the  various  psychopathic  epidemics,  and  as  the 
result  of  ignorance.  In  the  half-way  conditions,  delusions  arise 
in  the  hypnagogic  state,  and  we  see  every  variety  between  the 
effects  of  dreaming  and  those  of  nightmare.  Among  supersti- 
tious and  hysterical  people  false  beliefs  find  as  suitable  a  soil 
for  growth  as  in  the  imbecile  or  weak-minded.  We  are  also 
subject  to  temporary  delusions  which  are  the  outcome  of 
emotions  or  loss  of  control.  An  insane  delusion  is  defined 
by  Clouston  as  "  a  belief  in  something  that  would  be  incredible 
to  sane  people  of  the  same  class,  education,  or  race,  as  the 
person  Avho  expresses  it,  this  resulting  from  diseased  working 
of  the  brain-convolutions."  An  insane  delusion  affects  the 
conduct  of  life,  and  is  not  due  to  ignorance.  It  is  com- 
paratively rare  to  find  instances  of  pure  monomania,  or  the 
presence  of  one  simple  delusion  only.  Clouston  has  pointed 
out  that  the  ordinary  form  of  delusional  insanity  is  for  the 
delusions  of  the  patient  to  refer  to  one  particular  subject  or  set 
of  subjects,  or  for  him  to  be  morbid  in  a  particular  direction  of 
intellect  or  feeling,  Avhile  he  is  sound  in  most  directions. 

There    are    two    ways    of    grouping     cases     of    delusional 
insanity  : — 

1,  Simple  delusional  sta.tes. 

(a)  Gradually  developed  from  birth  (idiots,  etc.). 
{b)   Evolved  at  some  other  period  of  life   (as  in  the 
evolution  of  conceit  in  adolescents). 


380  MENTAL  PROCESSES. 

(c)   Temporaiy  conditions — acute  delusional  states — 
due   to    some   physical  disease  or    disorder,  or 
determined  by  mental  stress  or  strain. 
Sensory  types. 

(a)  Illusory  states,  determined  hy  tlie  environment  or 

by  tbe  organism. 
(&)  Hallucinatory,  due  to  physical  or  mental  causes. 
Emotional  or  affective  types 

Determined  by  some  active  emotion. 
2.  Some  writers  have  classified  the  delusional  states  from 
a  clinical  point  of  view,  as  follows  : — 

(a)  General  —  total    upset   of  reasoning   powers,    of 

temporary  duration  and  general  character. 
(&)   Partial — sensory     types,    in     which    there     are 

illusions  and  hallucinations, 
(c)   Monomanias. 

(1)  Of  unreal  greatness,  as  seen  in  the  conceited 
in  religious  imposters,  and  in  the  maniaca 
and  chronic  forms  of  insanity. 

(2)  Of  unfounded  suspicions,  due  to  sensory 
disturbances  or  other  causes. 

(3)  Of  unseen  agencies,  in  which  there  are 
ideas  of  persecution  by  means  of  electricity, 
machines,  etc.,  and  sometimes  having  bodily 
causes  of  disturbance  which  are  misinter- 
preted. 

((Z)  States  of  defective  intellect 

Includes  the  delusions  of  imbeciles,  idiots,  the 
morally  insane,  liars,  and  beasts. 
Delusions  may  arise  (1)  in  regard  to  an  individual's  self- 
consciousness.  He  may  become  exalted,  or  depressed,  or  he 
may  have  an  alteration  of  consciousness  and  believe  that  he  is 
some  one  else.  (2)  They  may  relate  to  the  individual's  physical 
organism,  as  the  outcome  of  sensory  disturbances.  (3)  They 
may  relate  to  any  part  of  the  physical  or  social  environment. 
(4)  Not  only  may  a  man  feel  that  he  has  lost  himself  and  is 
some  one  else,  but  there  may  be  an  alternating  condition,  in 
which  he  believes  he  is  at  one  time  one  individual,  and  at  other 
times  another ;  or  he  may  believe  that  he  is  two  persons  at  once. 


DELUSIONAL  STATES.  831 

In  the  insane,  delusions  may  precede  an  attack  of  excite- 
ment, depression,  or  other  form  of  disorder ;  or  they  may  arise 
secondarily  to  an  emotional  state  of  depression  or  excitement ; 
or  as  the  result  of  sensory  troubles,  or  as  a  sequel  to  an  acute 
attack  of  mental  disorder 

From  a  clinical  j^oint  of  view  the  causes  of  delusional  states 
may  be  grouped  as  predisposing-  and  exciting.  Predisposimi 
causes  are  : — Inheritance,  causes  acting  at  birth,  previous  attacks, 
excessive  emotionalism,  periods  of  life  (puberty,  adolescence, 
climacterium,  senility),  only  childhood,  sexual  excitement,  etc. 
Exciting  causes  are  : — Ordinary  conditions  of  shock,  stress  or 
strain,  bodily  disease  or  weakness,  gross  lesions  of  the  brain 
(apoplexy,  syphilis,  etc.),  local  diseases  of  sense-organs,  poisons 
(haschisch,  alcohol,  etc.).  The  cerebral  pathology  of  a  delusive 
idea  is  unknown  to  us.  From  a  psychological  point  of  view, 
we  can  explain  how  errors  arise  in  many  instances,  but,  when 
we  try  to  superimpose  this  explanation  upon  the  facts  of 
cerebral  pathology  at  our  command,  we  find  that  the  task 
is,  as  yet,  hopeless. 

It  is  held  by  some,  that  in  patients  who  are  suffering  from 
delusions  or  compulsory  ideas,  the  regulative  influence  of  the 
sensations  or  of  the  external  stimuli  upon  ideation  has  either 
been  removed  or  has  lost  the  persistency  of  its  action.  Hence, 
according  to  Ziehen,  the  associatioii  of  ideas  produces  judg- 
ments that  are  completely  contradictory  to  the  processes  of  the 
external  world.  No  doubt  this  is  a  view  which  might,  to  a 
certain  extent,  serve  to  explain  what  does  occur;  but  it  does 
not  cover  those  delusional  forms  of  insanity  in  which  the 
individual's  sensory  apparatus  is  working  as  efficiently,  and  the 
intellectual  interpretation  of  the  presentations  is  as  correct  as 
in  the  sanest  of  the  sane.  We  believe  that  the  association  of 
ideas  influences  the  sensations  to  a  certain  extent,  and  we  can 
understand,  in  a  psychological  sense,  how  the  ideational  life  can 
be  removed  from  the  control  of  the  sentient  life,  but  we  cannot 
form  any  notion  as  to  the  brain-state  which  separates  the 
ideational  from  the  sentient  life  and  yet  allows  free  play  of  both 
intellectual  and  sensory  functions  when  the  mind  is  engage 
\\ith  the  contemplation  of  states  other  than  the  delusive. 


CHAPTER   XI. 

Memoky. 

Elementary  Memory — Memory  Proper — Secondary  3Iemory — Relation 
of  Memory  to  Belief — The  Process  of  Ptecollection — ^Tirst  Im- 
pressions—  Suggestion — Contiguity,  Similarity,  and  Contrast — 
Associative  Force — Complex,  CouTergent,  Divergent,  Obstructive 
— Methods  of  Cultivating  Memory — Psycho-Physical  Theory  of 
Memory — Latent  Mental  Images — Piclation  of  Primary  Image  to 
Hevived  Image. 

DlSOBDEBS   OF  MfiMORY. 

Forgetfulness — ^Amnesic  States — Congenital  Defects — Temporar}^  Loss 
— Periodic  Amnesia  in  Hypnotic   States — Progressive  Amnesia 

—  Partial    Amnesia  —  Agraphia,     Aphasia,    Aphemia,    etc.  — 
Hypermnesic  States — Congenital — Temporary — Periodic — Partial 

—  Paramnesic    States  —  Simple    States  —  By    Association     or 
Suggestion — By  Identification. 

MEMORY. 

In  order  that  a  mental  state  may  survive  or  be  capable  of 
being  reproduced  in  memory  it  is  essential  that  the  primary 
presentation  should  have  remained  in  consciousness  for  a  certain 
length  of  time.  States  of  mind  are,  as  a  rule,  of  little 
intellectual  value  to  us  unless  we  are  able  to  retain  them 
in  memory  and  can  recall  them  at  will.  The  term 
elementary  memory  has  been  employed  to  indicate  the 
memory  or  awareness  of  the  thing  just  past.  After-images 
differ  from  objects  of  elementary  memory,  in  that  the  former 
are  due  to  the  continuance  of  the  process  of  excitation  of  the 
nerve-centres  after  the  removal  of  the  object.  As  we  have 
already  seen,  the  after-images  niaj^  be  positive  or  negative. 
The  positive  are  like  percepts,  but  move  with  the  position 
of  the  eye.  When  we  recall  to  memory  an  object  which  has 
been  absent  from  consciousness,  but  which  now  revives,  the 
process  is  termed  ''•memory  p'oper"  or   ''secondary  meinory" 


MEMORY.  333 

In  addition  to  the  revival  of  a  former  presentation,  of  which, 
meantime,  we  have  not  been  thinking,  memory  proper  includes 
the  additional  consciousness  that  we  have  experienced  it  before 
— i.e.,  there  is  the  feeling  that  the  "I"  which  witnesses  the 
re-presentation  has  also  witnessed  the  presentation.  Many 
writers  make  the  assumption  that  the  revival  of  an  image 
is  all  that  is  needed  to  constitute  the  memory  of  the  original 
recurrence.  Several  psychologists,  however,  have  shown  that 
no  memory  is  involved  in  the  mere  fact  of  recurrence.  In 
order  that  the  recalled  image  may  stand  for  the  past  original, 
the  recalled  image  must  be  referred  to  the  past,  and  in  so-doing 
its  associates  and  conditions  of  occurrence  in  the  past  are  also 
referred  to.  Memory  requires  even  more  than  this.  The  fact 
which  occurred  in  the  past  must  be  a  fact  which  occurred  in 
my  past. 

The  elements  of  every  act  of  memor}^  are,  therefore,  (1) 
a  general  feeling  of  past  direction  in  time  ;  (2)  the  perception 
of  the  date  and  accompanying  conditions  of  the  fact  recalled  ; 
and  (3)  the  feeling  that  the  presentation  and  the  representation 
of  the  object  are  part  of  my  own  experience.  Exercise  of 
memory  presupposes  (1)  retention  of  a  remembered  fact,  and 
(2)  reminiscence,  recollection,  reproduction,  or  recall  of  the 
retained  fact. 

The  relation  of  belief  to  memory  has  received  a  considerable 
amount  of  attention.  An  object  of  memory  is  regarded  as  an 
object  imagined  in  the  past,  and  to  which  the  emotion  of  belief 
adheres.  The  consciousness  that  there  is  a  relationship  between 
the  facts  we  remember  and  ourselves  is  supposed  to  give  an 
object  the  characteristic  quality  of  reality.  A  merely  imagined 
past  event  is,  therefore,  regarded  by  some  authors  as  differing 
from  a  merely  recollected  one  only  in  the  absence  of  this 
peculiar  feeling  of  belief. 

Memory  has  been  described  as  -passive  or  active.  The  active 
form  of  memory  is  seen  in  the  process  of  recollection  or  act  of 
recall.  The  conditions  which  determine  the  efficiency  of  the 
act  of  recall  are  as  follows  : — 1.  The  depth  of  the  first  impres- 
sion :  this  depends  upon  (a)  the  amount  of  attention  paid  to  it ; 
(6)  the  number  of  times  the  impression  is  revived  in  the  mind  ; 
(c)  the  amount  of  retentive  power  possessed  by  the  individual. 


334  MEMORY. 

2.  The  force  of  suggestion :  this  depends  upon  (a)  the 
contiguity  of  the  presentations  or  impressions.  When  objects 
occur  together  or  in  s^iccession  they  tend  to  revive  together,  or 
they  may  recall  or  suggest  each  other.  This  is  the  "  law  of 
contiguity."  The  degree  of  associative  force  often  determines 
recall — e.g.,  the  term  hospital  suggests  patients.  The  train  of 
representations  may  be  symbolic,  motor,  or  verbal,  (b)  The 
similarity  of  the  objects  presented.  (Spencer  reduces  contiguity 
and  similarity  to  the  same  law.)  (c)  The  contrast  between 
objects  presented.  By  this  is  meant  that  one  fact  suggests  its 
exact  opposite — i.e.,  there  are  always  two  sides  to  a  question. 
Poverty  suggests  its  opposite  wealth.  A  statement  bearing 
upon  some  medical  qiiestion  suggests  facts  which  are  part  of 
our  experience,  and  which  are  in  direct  opposition  to  the 
statement  made. 

3.  The  associative  force  which  may  be  (a)  coTYiplex :  one 
simple  object  may  suggest  innumerable  associations,  (b)  Con- 
vergent :  several  threads  of  association  may  tend  to  further  the 
act  of  recall — i.e.,  one  series  of  associations  may  be  imperfect, 
but  the  others  make  up  for  the  deficiency  {e.g.,  in  reciting  a 
poem  the  associations  are  suggested  through  the  sense  of  sight, 
hearing,  motor  activities  of  speech-organs,  etc.).  (c)  Divergent  : 
too  many  associations  sometimes  tend  to  hinder  the  process  of 
recall  in  a  certain  direction.  This  form  has  been  sometimes 
termed  (d)  obstructive :  in  acutely  maniacal  states  the  ten- 
dency to  divergence  through  hyperactivity  of  associative 
suggestions  often  leads  to  complete  inability  to  recall  in  a 
certain  direction.* 

With  improvement  in  memory  it  is  found  that  there  is 
increased  facility  in  fixing  the  primary  impression  ;  there  is  less 
need  for  the  forcible  act  of  concentration  of  the  attention; 
impressions  are  retained  longer  and  more  perfectly ;  they  can  be 
more  easily  revived,  and  when  revived  they  are  in  a  more 
perfect  form.  The  growth  of  memory  and  its  skilful  manage- 
ment are  dependent  upon  oiu'  power  of  concentrating  our 
attention  upon  what  is  essential.  When  we  think  about 
things,  when  we  group  and  arrange  them  in  a  systematic  way, 
forming  diverse  and  numerous  associations  about  them,  we  lay 
*  Sully,  "  Outlines  of  Psychology." 


PSYCHO-PHYSICAL  THEORY.  335 

the  seeds  of  a  good  and  efficient  memory.  We  all  possess  a 
certain  amount  of  physiological  retentiveness  which  it  is  almost 
impossible  to  increase.  We  can  improve  it  by  carefully 
selecting  the  material  to  be  stored  in  it.  When  we  think  about 
a  thing  we"  increase  its  tendency  to  survive  in  memory.  The 
more  we  think  the  better  we  remember.  All  improvement  is 
to  be  sought  in  the  way  we  habitually  record  facts.  Kant 
gives  three  methods  of  cultivating  memory.  These  are  :— 
(1)  The  mechanical  method,  by  linking  together  the  symbols  in 
series ;  (2)  the  judicious  method,  whereby  the  logical  relations 
of  the  ideas  are  made  the  connecting  link  ;  and  (3)  the  ingenious 
method,  whereby  symbols  or  "  tips  "  are  employed.  Stewart 
gives  as  the  characteristics  of  a  good  memory  : — (1)  Quick 
acquisitive  skill ;  (2)  retentiveness  ;  and  (3)  facility  in  repro- 
duction. Drobisch  gives  four  factors — viz.  :  Facility,  trust- 
worthiness, lastingness,  and  serviceableness  of  acquisitions.  A 
person  may  have  a  good  general  memory  (Macaulay,  Pascal) 
or  it  may  be  good  only  in  special  directions — e.g.,  Mozart,  Dore. 
The  characteristic  differences  lie  in  the  various  degrees  of 
perfection  of  the  sense-organs  and  their  discriminative  capacity, 
the  amount  of  interest  and  attention  bestowed  upon  objects, 
also,  in  circumstances,  exercise,  and  education. 

PSYCHO-PHYSICAL  THEORY  OF  MEMORY. 

Memory  is  regarded  as  a  mode  of  consciousness,  which  is  one 
of  the  primary  elements  of  the  mind  ;  it  can  be  separated  from 
other  modes  of  consciou^sness  and  is  a  correlative  of  certain 
changes  which  take  place  in  the  brain.  Every  act  of  perception 
involves  an  element  of  memory,  so  that  in  the  acquisition  of 
new  modes  of  action  or  thought  memory  plays  an  important 
part.  As  a  rule,  actions  which  are  instinctive  are  little  guided 
b}^  memory.  Memory  belongs,  according  to  Ross,*  to  that  class 
of  physical  states  which  are  in  process  of  being  organised. 

Ribot  says,  "  It  is  only  when  a  resistance  is  oiSered  to  the  flow  of 
energy  from  the  impressions  made  on  the  surface  to  the  muscular 
excitations  necessary  to  effect  the  appropriate  bodily  adjustments,  or 


"Brain,"  1891,  p.  48. 


336  MEMOEY.       ! 

from  the  presented  impressions  to  the  nervous  changes  which  are  the 
co-relatives  of  the  represented  impressions,  that  the  psychical  state  is  a 
conscious  one,  and  can  afterwards  become  a  part  of  memory.  When  the 
nervous  connections  become  so  fully  organised  that  the  resistance  to  the 
flow  of  energy  ceases,  the  psychical  states  have  no  appreciable  duration,. 
and  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  part  of  memory.  The  more  complicated 
the  impressions  are  the  more  resistance  is  offered,  other  things  being 
equal,  to  the  onward  flow  of  energy  from  the  sensory  inlets  to  the  motor 
outlets,  and  the  more  are  the  corresponding  psychical  states  attended 
by  consciousness.  Many  of  these  complicated  impressions,  not  being 
repeated  again  in  experience,  fade  from  the  memory  ;  but  those  of 
them  which  are  so  profound  in  strength  that  they  are  attended  by  a 
strong  emotional  disturbance  become  permanently  stamped  upon  the 
organisation,  and  subsequently  recur  in  the  mind  as  memories.  And 
when  one  such  complex  experience  calls  up  other  experiences  which  are 
also  complex,  and  not  frequently  repeated,  the  cohesion  between  them 
is  feeble ;  and  the  transitions,  taking  an  appreciable  time,  the  answering 
psychical  states  become  part  of  memory." 

In  the  attempt  to  explain  memory  from  a  psycho-phj^sical 
point  of  view  much  attention  has  been  given  to  the  theory 
of  latent  mental  images,  and  to  the  material  processes  which 
are  supposed  to  bring  the  images  of  memory  into  consciousness* 
With  regard  to  the  latent  images  it  is  assumed  that,  with  the 
various  impressions,  derived  in  consciousness  through  the 
instrumentality  of  the  nervous  substance,  there  is  a  corre' 
sponding  deposition  of  the  mental  image  upon  the  material 
substratum,  and  that  this  image  can  be  renewed  in  conscious- 
ness by  a  material  process  or  disposition  initiated  by  suggestion 
from,  within  or  without. 

Let  us  now  try  to  understand  the  nature  of  this  deposition 
of  latent  mental  images,  and  let  us  endeavour  to  form  a 
working  hypothesis  as  to  the  nature  of  the  process  of  recall  or 
revival  in  consciousness.  Firstly,  we  are  told  that  impressions, 
presentations,  etc.,  arise  in  consciousness  when  there  is  some 
resistance  overcome,  or  some  new  passage  opened  out  in  the 
complicated  branching  structures  of  the  cortex.  With  this 
mechanical  condition  there  is  some  corresponding  state  of. 
feeling  which  becomes  a  registered  and  stored  substance, 
having  as  its  accompaniment  the  material  condition  which  is 
capable  of  reproducing,  with  some  approximation  to  the 
original  intensity,  the  quantitative  and  qualitative  phenomena 
of  the  impression.     The  feeling  of  resistance  must  of  necessity 


PSYCHO-PPIYSICAL  THEORY.  337 

accompany  qualitative  as  well  as  quantitative  conditions. 
Otherwise  we  grant  to  the  mind  a  power  of  discrimination 
dependent  upon  its  own  laws  and  not  upon  those  of  matter. 
The  so-called  latent  mental  image  is  thought  to  be  stored 
somewhere  in  the  cortex,  and  we  imagine  possiblv  in  the  nerve- 
cell  or  its  ramified  processes.  It  is  customary  to  speak  of  and 
imagine  the  physiological  substratum  of,  say  a  sensory  impres- 
sion, as  an  arrangement  of  molecules  upon  which  is  stamped  the 
equivalent  of  the  latent  image.  The  facts  derived  from  the 
study  of  partial  aphasias  seem  to  demonstrate  that  some  parts 
of  the  cortex  are  concerned  with  the  registration  of  images  of 
memory  ;  but  we  do  not,  as  yet,  know  what  elements  in  that 
cortex  are  intimately  concerned  with  the  process. 

If  we  look  at  the  nerve-cell  with  its  complicated  branching 
processes  we  cannot  point  to  any  part  of  its  structure  and  say, 
that  at  that  position  is  the  molecular  counterpart  of  a  stored 
image.  Nervous  tissues  are  subject  to  the  constant  changes 
brought  about  by  nutrition,  metabolism,  etc.,  and  it  is  difficult 
to  understand  the  permanence  of  the  material  counterpart  of 
the  mental  image  in  spite  of  the  changes  which  the  tissues 
undergo.  This  difficulty,  however,  is  of  little  importance  as  an 
argument  against  the  view  that  physiological  modifications  do 
remain  as  the  physical  equivalents  of  memory  images.  We  all 
know  how  a  scar  may  remain  through  life ;  and,  moreover,  just 
as  we  may  have  an  acquired  motor  act,  such  as  swimming, 
retained  through  a  long  period  of  life,  due  to  the  physiological 
disposition  of  the  motor  nerve-cells,  so  it  is  conceivable  we  may 
have  retention  of  the  higher  nervous  dispositions  which  have 
more  intimately  to  do  with  memory. 

Another  difficulty,  which  has  been  urged  by  some  authors, 
is  to  find  room  for  all  the  memories  of  a  lifetime.  Should  the 
student  desire  to  form  an  estimate  as  to  how  many  material 
dispositions  he  ought  to  provide  storage  for,  he  must  first 
recognise  that  no  one  mental  impression  is  the  exact  counter- 
part of  any  other,  and  that,  therefore,  each  impression  must 
have  its  own  material  basis  from  the  beginning  to  the  end.  No 
modification  of  a  former  impression,  by  a  new  impression  super- 
imposed upon  it,  can  interfere  with  that  first  impression,  which 
remains  as  it  was  in  the  first  instance,  and  can  be  reproduced 

22 


338  MEMORY. 

only  as  such.  Every  presentation  is  dependent  upon  a 
physiological  process,  and  every  representation  necessarily 
depends  upon  a  repetition  of  the  process  which  at  first  gave 
it  rise.  The  problem,  therefore,  becomes  to  find  room  for  the 
material  processes  upon  which  the  revival  of  the  entire  contents 
of  memory  would  appear  to  depend.  The  inability  on  our  part 
to  conceive  how  the  accommodation  is  affected  must  not,  how- 
ever, be  regarded  as  giving  support  to  the  argument  of  any 
metaphysicians  who  might  advocate  that  the  brain  is  unequal 
to  the  task.  The  connections  among  the  brain-elements  are 
infinite,  and  if  a  single  germ  possesses  the  organic  and  latent 
mental  characteristics  of  the  parents,  what  limits  are  there  to 
the  possibilities  among  the  millions  of  cells  of  the  brain  ? 

During  the  course  of  a  day  mental  images  succeed  each 
other  so  rapidly  that  the  task  of  estimating  their  number  would 
be  found  quite  impossible.  Some  authors  maintain  that  the 
recall  of  an  image  is  a  re-creation,  really  a  new  presentation, 
not  the  old  image.  Baldwin  says  that  we  never  have  the  same 
representation  twice.  This  would  lead  us  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  more  we  draw  from  the  stores  of  revivable  images,  the 
more  we  add  to  the  dispositions  which  are  capable  of  revival. 
That  is  to  say,  when  we  experience  the  revival  of  an  image  the 
material  disposition  upon  which  the  revival  depends  does  not 
alter  in  itself,  and,  inasmuch  as  no  reproduction  of  the  primarj^ 
image  is  the  exact  counterpart  of  that  primary  image,  each 
revived  image  must  have  an  equivalent  organic  state  which 
remains  as  the  latent  mental  image  of  a  revived  image. 

The  relation  of  the  primary  image  to  the  revived  image 
would  appear  to  be  as  follows  : — (1)  The  primary  image  is 
associated  with  a  physiological  impress  or  disposition  which 
may  be  regarded  as  substantially  persistent.  This  would  agree 
in  part  with  Aristotle's  doctrine  of  material  residues.  The 
revivabilit}^  would  appear  to  be  due  to  certain  onlj^  partly 
explained  laws  of  psychological  and  physiological  habits.  (2) 
Before  the  image  is  revived  it  entirely  disappears  from  the 
mind.  According  to  the  Herbartian  theory,  it  falls  below  the 
threshold  of  consciousness,  but  still  enters  as  a  factor  in  the 
complex  whole  of  consciousness.  This,  however,  is  a  meta- 
physical   assumption    which    is    not    susceptible    of  proof.     It 


PSYCHO-PHYSICAL  THEORY.  339 

appears  more  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  primary  image 
disappears  entirely,  and  is  revived  only  with  the  activities  of 
the  physiological  disposition  of  the  primary  image.  (3)  With 
everv  revival  of  an  image  the  conscious  accompaniments  of  the 
revived  image  differ  from  the  accompaniments  of  the  primary 
image :  hence  it  is  that  the  revived  image  appears  to  differ 
from  the  primary  image.  (4)  That  we  are  able  to  recall  a 
revived  image  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  we  are  able 
to  recall  the  conscious  accompaniments  of  the  revived  image — 
e.n..  I  see  figure  A  on  Mondav  and  recall  it  on  Tuesdav.  On 
Wednesday  T  am  able  to  recall  the  revived  image  of  Tuesday. 
The  image  of  Wednesday  would,  therefore,  consist  of  A  + 
Tuesday's  accompaniments.  Any  change  in  the  nature  of  the 
revived  A  would  only  be  one  of  degree  or  intensity :  the 
conscious  accompaniments  give  rise  to  the  appearance  of 
change.  Hence  it  is  that — apart  from  the  defects  of  memory, 
and  the  distortion  of  images  due  to  toxic  agents  or  disease — 
the  revived  image  per  se  is  more  or  less  the  counterpart  of 
the  primary  image.  The  form  of  the  primary  image  is  not 
necessarily  altered  when  revived.  Such  an  alteration  would  be 
possible  only  when  the  actual  object  that  occasioned  the  image 
is  represented — i.e.,  a  renewal  of  the  actual  impression  b}'  the 
presence  of  the  object  would  be  in  reality  a  new  presentation. 

In  the  various  accounts  of  the  pathology  of  amnesic  defects 
it  is  generally  assumed  that  the  material  dispositions  of  the 
images  of  memory  tend  to  become  effaced  or  rendered  inert. 
Many  theories  have  been  advanced  to  explain  how  the  images 
of  memory  gradually  lose  their  intensity.  Hitherto,  however, 
the  consideration  of  the  laws  of  association  of  ideas  has  Ijeen  the 
only  method  which  has  served  to  partially  explain  some  amnesic 
defects,  and  this  desiderates  a  psychological  rather  than  a 
physiological  explanation. 

Before  we  can  hope  to  arrive  at  definite  conclusions  as  to  the 
nature  of  memory  we  must  determine  (1)  whether  the  brain- 
tracts  excited  by  the  events  proper  and  those  excited  in  their 
recall  are  the  same  or  in  part  different  from  each  other:  and, 
first,  before  we  can  do  this,  we  must  ascertain  more  as  to  the 
nervous  structures  involved  by  the  events  proper;  (2)  how  far 
memory  is   conditioned  by  the  number  and  persistence  of  the 


340  DISORDERS  OF  MEMORY. 

v^arious  brain-paths  ;  (3)  what  structures  in  the  cortex  are  more 
intimately  concerned  with  the  registration  or  storing  of  the 
phj^sical  equivalents  of  mental  images.  When  we  have  obtained 
more  light  upon  these  subjects,  then,  possibly,  we  may  advance 
a  step  and  endeavour  to  offer  some  explanation  of  the  psycho- 
logical facts  of  suggestion,  association,  and  contrast. 

DISORDERS    OF    MEMORY. 

Forgetfulness  is  regarded  as  an  equally-important  func- 
tion with  remembering,  and  in  the  construction  of  a  good 
memory  the  art  of  forgetting  is  essential.  James  says,  that 
''^selection  is  the  very  keel  on  which  our  mental  ship  is  built." 
Undoubtedly  there  are  manjr  dangers  in  forming  too  many 
paths  of  recall.  Ebbinghaus  has  tried  to  establish  a  numerical 
relationship  between  the  amounts  remembered  and  those 
forgotten,  and  has  given  the  following  law  :  "  The  quotients  of 
the  amounts  retained  by  the  amounts  forgotten  are  to  each 
other  inversely  as  the  logarithms  of  the  various  periods  of  time 
that  have  elapsed." 

Just  as  memory  is  one  of  the  first  of  the  mental  faculties  to 
be  developed,  so  it  is  one  of  the  first  to  undergo  impairment  in 
old  age.  The  culminating  point  of  mental  development  is  held 
to  be  at  the  period  when  there  is  loss  of  the  power  to  build  up 
new  acquisitions.  The  decline  of  memory  has  been  divided 
into  different  stages.  The  most  recent,  and,  therefore,  the  least 
organised,  associations  are  the  first  to  give  way.  In  mental 
diseases,  just  as  in  disorders  which  involve  loss  of  memory  for 
words,  those  kinds  of  words  which  are  least  organised  are  the 
first  to  disappear. 

Locke  described  two  main  defects  in  memory — viz.,  oblivion 
or  want  of  tenacity  and  slowness,  or  want  of  readiness  in  repro- 
duction. From  a  psychological  point  of  view  disorders  of 
memory  may  be  classified  as  conditions  of  (1)  amnesia,  loss  of 
memory;  (2)  hypermnesia,  exaltation  of  memory;  (3)  para- 
mnesia, illusions  of  memory.  Of  these  classes  the  various  forms 
of  amnesia  are  the  most  important.  The  following  is  perhaps 
the  most  convenient  method  of  classification.* 

*  Ribot,  "  Diseases  of  Memory." 


AMNESIC  STATES.  341 

Amnesic  States: — 

1.  Congenital  defects, 

2.  Conditions  of  teinporarij  loss. 

(a)  In  epilepsy,  etc. 

{b)  Following  injury  or  shock. 

(c)  In  acute  mental  disorders. 

3.  Conditions  oi periodic  loss. 

(ft)  In  states  of  double  consciousness. 
(li)   In  somnambulistic  states. 

4.  Conditions  oi  progressive  loss. 

(a)  In  general  parah'sis  of  tlie  insane. 

(h)  Associated  with  various  brain  lesions. 

(c)  In  senile  dementia. 
5.  Conditions  o^  partial  loss. 

(As  seen  in  loss  of  memory  for  numbers,  music, 
sounds,  names,  agraphia,  aphasia,  aphemia,  word- 
blindness,  and  word-deafness,  etc.) 

Hypermnesic  States: — 

1.  Congenital. 

2.  Teniporaiy. 

3.  Periodic. 

4.  Partial. 

Paramnesic  States : — 

1.  Simple  states. 

2.  By  association  or  suggestion. 

3.  By  identification. 

Amnesic  States. — Congenital  defects  of  memory  are  met 
with  in  idiots,  imbeciles,  and  cretins.  The  memory  may  be 
deficient  generally,  and  the  individual  fails  to  register  impres- 
sions ;  hence  there  is  failure  in  intellectual  development. 
Ribot  is  inclined  to  the  belief  that  a  careful  study  of  the 
mental  symptoms  in  idiots  woiild  enable  us  to  determine  the 
anatomical  and  physiological  conditions  of  memory.  He  states 
that  memory  is  dependent  upon  the  constitution  of  the  brain, 
and  that  in  idiots  and  imbeciles  the  condition  is  abnormal. 
As  a  general  rule  the  memory  in  idiots  and  imbeciles  is 
unequally  developed,   and  it  is   not  uncommon  to  meet  with 


342  DISORDERS  OF  MEMORY. 

partial  developments  in  a  special  direction  associated  with 
absence  of  memory  in  other  directions. 

Tem])orary  loss  of  memory  is  found  in  every  grade,  in  both 
the  sane  and  the  insane.  The  amnesic  state  may  last  only  for 
a  few  minutes,  or  it  may  remain  for  several  years.  In  epileptic 
states  the  most  characteristic  instances  are  to  be  found.  Ribot 
regards  the  three  forms  of  epilepsy — viz.,  grand  nicd,  petit  mat, 
and  epileptic  vertigo,  as  different  degrees  of  the  same  morbid 
state ;  and  he  points  out  that  the  more  moderate  the  attack  in 
external  manifestations  the  more  fatal  it  is  to  the  mind.  Such 
states  have  been  designated  as  mentcd  automcdis^n  (Hughlings- 
Jackson).* 

Two  hypotheses  have  been  advanced  to  account  for  the 
period  of  mental  automatism — viz. :  (1)  The  period  is  not  accom- 
panied by  consciousness,  so  that  nothing  can  be  reproduced;! 
or  (2)  consciousness  does  exist,  but  in  so  weak  a  form  that 
amnesia  ensues.^  The  latter  view  finds  most  favour  with 
psychologists.  Certain  cases  of  mental  automatism  are  very 
closely  allied  to  dream-states,  in  Avhich  a  person  may  answer 
questions  rationally,  having,  however,  little  or  no  after-conscious- 
ness of  the  events.  The  explanation  of  the  loss  of  memory  for 
dreams  has  been  thought  to  rest  in  the  fact  that  the  states 
of  consciousness  during  dreams  are  extremely  weak.  Magnan  § 
has  recorded  the  case  of  an  epileptic  who  was  alcoholic.  The 
patient,  when  seized  during  the  day  with  an  epileptic  attack, 
broke  everj^hing  within  his  reach,  and  was  very  violent.  At 
night  time  he  had  alcoholic  delirium,  with  the  characteristic 
terrifying  visions.  The  following  day,  on  coming  to  himself, 
he  remembered  the  delirium  of  the  night,  but  had  no  recol- 
lection of  the  delirium  of  the  day.  Falret  has  pointed  out, 
as  a  very  important  characteristic  of  epileptic  mania,  that  the 
mental  condition  is  surprisingly  uniform  in  the  different 
attacks.  To  the  well-known  views  of  Hughlings- Jackson — 
that  mental  aiitomatism  results  from  over-action  of  low  nervous 
centres,  because  the  highest  or  controlling  centres  have  been 
put  out  of  use — we  shall  have  occasion  to  return,  so  we  now 

*  '-West  Riding  Asylum  Reports,"  vol.  v.  p.  116,  et  seq. 

t  Morel,  "  Traite  des  Maladies  Mentales,"  p.  695. 

X  Ribot,  "  Diseases  of  Memory,"  p.  73. 

§  "Clinique  de  Sainte-Anne,"  March  3,  1879. 


AMNESIC   STATES.  343 

pass  to  those  forms  of  temporary  amnesia  which  follow  upon  an 
injury  or  shock. 

After  an  injur}^  or  shock  the  amnesia  may  begin  imme- 
diately, and  continue  for  a  longer  or  shorter  period  ;  or  it  may 
extend  backwards,  and  include  recent  or  remote  events. 
According  to  Ribot,  it  more  commonly  extends  both  backwards 
and  forwards.  There  may  be,  or  there  may  not  be,  recovery 
from  the  loss.  Sometimes  re-education  is  required.  It  is 
assumed  that  either  the  registration  of  anterior  states  is 
interfered  with  or  effaced ;  or,  if  persisting,  their  po^\'er  of 
revivification  by  association  with  tlie  present  is  destroyed. 

Numerous  instances  are  recorded  in  M'hich,  through  injury 
or  shock,  the  immediate  antecedent  events  have  been  entirely 
effaced  from  memory.  A  blow  on  the  head,  a  fall,  a  fever,  or 
an  acute  illness  ma}^  produce  like  effects. 

There  is  a  considerable  amount  of  difference  of  opinion  as 
to  the  states  of  memor}^  in  acute  mental  disorders.  Clouston 
advises  us  to  be  careful  in  predicting  in  states  of  mental 
exaltation.  He  believes  that  the  memor}'"  of  events,  during  the 
disease,  is  regulated  by  the  degree  in  which  the  power  of 
attention  is  unaffected.  Unfortunately,  however,  it  is  often 
difficult  to  apply  the  principle  practically.  Some  patients 
appear  to  take  little  or  no  notice  of  their  surroundings,  or  of 
the  ordinarj^  occurrences  which  take  place  around  them  ;  but 
on  recovery  they  will  often  tell  you  that  they  noticed  every- 
thing, and,  moreover,  their  memoiy  may  be  exceedingly  good. 
More  commonh^  however,  they  are  apt  to  distort  and  exag- 
gerate what  has  happened  to  them  during  their  illness. 
Savage  believes  that  memory  begins  to  fail  naturally,  in 
certain  particulars,  at  about  middle  age ;  and  that  memory  of 
names,  of  persons  and  places,  and  the  like,  fails  in  most  busy 
men  soon  after  forty  years  of  age.  This  he  regards  as  physio- 
logical, and  as  due  to  two  causes — viz. :  (1)  The  middle-aged 
man  has  found  the  futility  of  collecting  matter  not  likely  to 
be  required  later  ;  he  has  not  the  same  special  interest,  and 
does  not  pay  the  same  attention  to  new  names  and  faces  that 
he  did  when  a  younger  man  ;  (2)  there  is  a  limit  to  the  storing 
capacity  of  the  human  brain  for  disjointed,  disconnected  facts. 
Frequently  the  question  arises  as  to  whether  a  person  ought  to 


344  DISORDERS  OF  MEMORY. 

be  detained  in  an  asylum  simply  on  account  of  defective 
memory.  Savage  believes  that  tliis  is  often  the  kindest  and 
best  treatment,  especially  with  old  people,  who  are  likely  to 
require  constant  attention  and  control.  Similarly,  a  person 
who  has  no  recollection,  but  has,  nevertheless,  desires  and 
appetites,  is  a  person  pretty  sure  (especially  if  a  woman)  to 
get  seriously  compromised,  and^  if  she  have  money,  to  be 
injuriously  influenced,  when  under  no  care  whatever.  In  cases 
of  stupor,  a  distinction  has  been  made  between  the  anergic  and 
the  melancholic,  in  that  the  former  is  attended  with  loss  of 
memory,  due  to  absence  of  consciousness ;  whereas,  the  latter 
variety  is  said  usually  to  imply  a  memorj^  little  affected. 
This  distinction,  however,  is  not  always  satisfactory,  and 
numerous  instances  occur  in  which  the  memory  is  unimpaired, 
even  in  what  have  been  described  as  typical  forms  of  anergic 
stupor.*  Bevan  Lewis  has  described  the  amnesic  form  of 
alcoholic  insanity,  in  which  there  has,  or  has  not,  been  delusional 
perversion.  He  regards  the  amnesia  as  the  earliest  evidence  of 
structural  change,  and  believes  that  absolute  recoverability  is 
rarely  (if  ever)  obtained  in  this  stage  of  alcoholism.  This, 
however,  is  not  quite  our  experience ;  from  which  we  have  been 
led  to  conclude  that  the  incurability  of  the  amnesic  form  of 
alcoholism  is  not  always  to  be  assumed.  But  if  some  do  not 
recover,  we  have,  on  the  other  hand,  seen  alcoholics  regain  their 
memory  in  a  most  remarkable  manner,  and  leave  Bethleni 
Hospital  with  little  or  no  trace  of  their  former  inability  to 
register  or  recall  impressions. 

Bevan  Lewis  states  that  the  revivability  of  a  former 
impression,  as  a  resultant,  depends  upon  (1)  the  intensity  of 
the  previous  impression ;  (2)  the  vigour  of  circulation  and 
nervous  energy ;  (3)  the  organisation  of  such  impressions  in  the 
establishment  of  associated  sense-impressions ;  (4)  the  vigour  of 
the  faculty  of  attention  ;  (5)  the  element  of  time.     He  says  : — 

"  The  intensity  of  the  previous  impression  appears  to  be  of  minor 
importance,  but  the  vigour  of  circulation,  and  of  nervous  energy,  is 
decidedly  at  fault.  .  .  The  conduction  along  the  nervous  circuit  is 
impeded  in  such  cases,  as  proved  by  the  retarded  response  made  to 
sensory  stimuli,  visual  and  auditory ;  and  this  we  have  more  reason  to 


*  Newington,  "Journ.  Ment.  Science,"'  Oct.,  1874. 


AMNESIC  STATES.  345 

attribute  to  delay  in  the  sensory  arc  than  in  the  motor  arc,  or  it  may  be 
due  to  delay  in  the  transference  Irom  the  one  to  the  other.  Such 
sluggish  transmission  can  only  be  regarded  as  resistance  in  the  nervous 
arc,  and  as  resulting  in  a  diminution  of  the  effective  force  of  the  original 
impact  at  the  periphery.  Hence  it  is  that  the  organisation  of  such 
impressions  by  the  establishment  of  associative  links — i.e.,  the  forcing  of 
new  nervous  tracts  into  adjacent  areas — becomes  greatly  impeded,  since 
this  greatly  depends  upon  the  vigour  of  the  nervous  current  and  the 

vascular  supply  of  the  part Such  organisation  is  greatly 

aided  by  the  faculty  of  attention,  which,  when  directed  toAvards  the 
impression  we  tend  to  revive,  fosters  the  growth  of  that  associative 
process  whereon  a  persistent  and  efficient  memory  is  based.  Thus  it  is 
that  slight  distraction  of  the  mind,  even  momentarily,  by  directing  the 
attention  to  any  other  line  of  thought,  will  abolish  the  feeble  tendency  to 
organisation  of  the  original  impressions  which  might  otherwise  occur."* 

In  all  explanations  of  this  kind,  one  can  well  understand 
the  employment  of  such  expressions  as  "  resistance  in  the 
nervous  arc,"  "  forcing  of  new  nervons  tracts,"  etc. ;  but  it  mnst 
be  remembered  that  such  expressions  are  merelj^  symbolical  of 
hypothetical  physiological  accompaniments  of  mental  events. 

According  to  Ribot,  this  form  of  temporarj^  amnesia  is 
characterised  psychologically  by  the  fact,  that  it  appears  only 
in  the  less  automatic  and  less  organised  phases  of  memory. 
He  believes  that  in  cases  belonging  to  this  morbid  group, 
neither  habits,  nor  aptitude  for  mechanical  work,  such  as  that 
of  sewing  or  embroidery,  nor  the  faculty  of  reading,  writing, 
or  speaking  a  native  or  foreign  language,  are  in  the  least 
affected;  in  a  word,  memory,  in  its  organised  and  semi- 
organised  form,  remains  intact.  It  is  commonly  assumed  that 
temporarj'  amnesia  affects  only  the  most  highly  developed  and 
recent  unstable  mental  attainments.  This,  however,  is  not 
invariably  the  case.  Thus,  for  example,  I  have  known  an 
individual  whose  memory  for  recent  events  was  comparatively 
good ;  he  nevertheless  was  unable  to  recall  his  own  name.  We 
are  all  familiar  with  such  an  experience,  and  can  no  doubt 
narrate  instances  in  which,  owing  to  some  slight  emotional  cause, 
such  as  shock,  or  nervousness,  the  memory  for  highly  organised 
events  has  disappeared  temporarily.  The  physiological  explana- 
tion of  this  psychical  fact  is  as  yet  unsatisfactorj^  The  temporary 
loss  of  the  most  recent  acquirements  is  thought  to  be  due  to 
*  "Text-Book  of  Mental  Diseases,"  p.  310. 


346  DISORDERS   OF  MEMOEY. 

loss  of  the  faculty  of  registering  the  latest  impressions.  This, 
however,  affords  no  explanation  as  to  the  obliteration  of  what 
may  be  regarded  as  long  assimilated  and  stable  acquisitions. 

In  some  instances  of  extreme  rapidity  of  re-education,  it 
has  been  thought  possible  that  the  memory  returns  because  the 
atrophied  nervous  elements  are  supplanted  hj  other  elements 
having  the  same  properties,  primitive  and  acquired,  as  those 
which  they  replace.  This  ma,y  possibly  account  for  the  re- 
education, but  it  cannot  account  for  the  rapidity  of  the  process. 
We  can  readily  conceive  that  new  elements  may  take  on  the 
functions  of  old;  but  the  re-education  often  means  the  recol- 
lection of  impressions  which  have  been  conserved  and  reproduced. 
This,  if  the  case,  would  involve  restitution  of  the  former  ac- 
qiiisitions,  revival  of  the  old  physiological  dispositions,  and  not 
necessarily  the  opening  oiit  of  new  tracts  to  displace  the  old. 

Periodic  loss  of  memory  is  a  subject  which  has  provided  us 
with  occurrences  of  extreme  interest  and  importance.  Under 
this  heading  may  be  included  the  phenomenon  of  "  double 
consciousness."  In  such  conditions  an  individual  may  have 
a  perfect  dual  existence,  so  far  as  the  continuity  of  conscious 
events  is  concerned.  The  instances  of  alternation  of  two 
personalities  may  for  convenience  be  divided  into  two  main 
groups  according  as  the  alternation  is  complete  or  incomplete. 

In  comijlete  alternation  the  personality  of  the  individual  is 
entirely  different  in  the  two  states ;  there  is  no  continuity  of 
thought,  and  the  memory  of  one  state  is  absent  during  the 
occurrence  of  the  other.  A  female  patient  admitted  to 
Bethlem  four  years  ago  had  such  complete  alternation  that  for  a 
period  of  twenty-four  hours-  she  was  depressed,  thought  she  was 
being  burnt,  and  failed  to  recognise  people  around  her.  Then 
during  the  next  twenty -four  hours  she  was  natural  and  bright 
mentally,  recognised  those  around  her,  but  had  no  memorj'-  of 
her  experiences  on  the  previous  day.  Another  patient  (a  male) 
for  several  weeks  had  alternating  conditions.  One  day  he  would 
say,  "  Now  then,  my  lads  !  bustle  up  and  get  me  a  good  breakfast, 
feel  as  if  I  hadn't  had  food  for  a  week."  When  asked  if  he  had 
ever  been  miserable,  he  would  say,  "  Never  known  a  moment's 
unhappiness  in  my  life  "  ;  and  when  questioned  as  to  his  present 
state   of  mind,  he  invariably  replied,  "  I'm  as  fit  as   a  fiddle, 


AMNESIC  STATES.  347 

hearty  as  a  buck,  and  as  jollj^  as  a  sand-boy."  During  the 
period  of  happiness  he  would  laugh,  converse  with  everybody, 
and  eat  ravenously.  The  next  day,  however,  a  change  would 
come  over  him:  he  would  lie  in  bed,  moaning  incessantly, 
grumble  at  everyone,  refuse  food,  and  say  that  he  had  never 
had  a  happy  moment  in  his  life,  and  always  suffered  the 
"tortures  of  the  eternallj"  damned."  In  this  case  the  alternation 
could  not  be  said  to  have  been  complete,  inasmuch  as  he,  in 
both  conditions,  recognised  and  called  by  name  the  attendants 
who  looked  after  him.  His  memory  of  the  two  states,  however, 
was  always  disconnected.  Azam  considers  that  in  dreaminf/,  the 
mind,  deprived  of  the  co-ordination  of  ideas  and  the  action  of  the 
senses,  represents  a  personality  different  from  the  same  in  the 
waking  state  ;  a  personality  which  is  often  considerable  though 
incomplete.  Similarly,  he  believes  that  the  drunkard  has  two 
lives ;  his  ordinary  state  and  the  state  of  drunkenness,  during 
which  latter  he  may  act  with  an  appearance  of  I'eason. 

An  intellectual  and  highl}^  cultivated  lady  was  recently 
admitted  to  Bethlem  suffering  from  melancholia  with  anergia. 
Her  father  was  alcoholic  ;  otherwise,  her  family  history  was 
good.  Three  years  previous  to  her  admission  she  became 
somnambulistic.  She  used  to  make  a  great  noise  during 
the  night  by  banging  at  her  door,  shifting  furniture,  etc.  At 
times  she  would  bump  her  head  on  the  floor,  but  never  really 
to  hurt  herself.  During  her  somnambulistic  state  she  would 
answer  questions  intelligently  and  to  the  point.  When  com- 
paratively free  from  somnambulism  she  suffered  in  other  ways 
— e.g.,  from  indigestion  and  symptoms  of  gastric  ulcer.  Under 
treatment  by  hypnotic  suggestion  she  improved  somewhat ; 
but  subsequently  relapsed  into  her  somnambulistic  habits. 
Two  years  from  the  onset  of  her  first  symptoms  she  began  to 
write  letters  during  the  night.  These  letters  were  badly 
written,  and  only  faintly  resembled  her  ordinary  hand- 
writing. Subsequently  she  would  do  and  say  things  during 
the  day  time,  of  which  she  had  no  recollection  when  in  her 
normal  state.  Again  hypnotic  suggestion  was  tried ;  but 
it  was  found  that  after  the  experiment  she  could  not  be 
roused  for  a  period  of  nearly  six  hours.  When  in  her  normal 
state  of  wakefulness  she  failed  to  recall  any  of  the  events 
of  her    somnambulistic    state.      During   the    latter    state,    on 


348  DISORDERS  OF  MEMORY. 

tlie  other  hand,  she  could  give  a  connected  account  of  her 
waking  state.  Subsequently  she  developed  a  third  state, 
somewhat  resembling  j.^efif  maZ,  during  which  she  would 
steal  and  hide  things  which  did  not  belong  to  her. 

Azam  has  advanced  the  hypothesis  that  dual  conscious- 
ness is  only  complete  somnambulism,  or  ambulatory  auto- 
matism. He  believes  that  the  successive  awakening  of  the 
faculties  and  of  the  senses  constitutes  a  gradation  from 
ordinary  sleep  to  complete  somnambulism,  which  gives  to  the 
person  studied  the  appearance  of  leading  a  dual  life.  "  We 
may  meet  persons  who  have  the  appearance  of  being  like 
everyone  else  and  who  yet,  being  in  the  second  condition,  are 
only  somnambulists,  who  on  awakening  will  have  forgotten 
everything."  Many  of  these  questions  are  clearly  outside 
our  subject,  so  that  we  are  unable  to  discuss  them  here. 
The  medico-legal  aspects  of  this  question,  however,  are  of 
such  importance  that  we  cannot  do  better  than  quote  the 
words  of  Azam,  who  says  : — 

"  We  do  not  hide  from  ourselves  the  disturbing  questions  which  this 
possibility  justly  raises,  especially  from  the  point  of  view  of  responsi- 
bility. But  it  is  not  the  business  of  science  to  inquire  into  the  conse- 
quences of  what  it  affirms.  Its  duty  is  at  the  same  time  a  grander  and 
a  more  narrow  one.  It  is  to  establish  the  truth,  basing  itself  on  certain 
well-established  facts.  Let  us  carry  ourselves  back  to  the  times  when 
they  burnt  hysterical  women  as  witches,  because,  being  ansesthetic 
under  the  lash,  they  were,  it  was  said,  in  league  with  the  Devil. 

"  To-day  we  shrug  our  shoulders.  Will  our  descendants  not  shrug 
theirs  in  their  turn  at  a  period  when,  considering  the  inevitable  law  of 
progress,  our  successors  will  be  able  to  give  explanations  which  we 
cannot  do  at  the  present  day,  and  when  that  which  astonishes  us  now 
will  astonish  nobody  ? 

"  Let  us  content  ourselves  with  registering  the  facts,  after  having 
carefully  observed  them :  others  will  draw  conclusions  from  them  better 
than  we  can. 

'*  Then,  perhaps,  magistrates  and  physicians  will  keep  pace  with  the 
progress  of  science ;  they  will  be  better  acquainted  with  the  singular 
states  that  may  render  criminals  irresponsible,  and  they  will  foil  the 
trickery  of  those  who,  knowing  that  these  states  exist,  will  simulate 
them  to  procure  a  verdict  of  '  Not  guilty,'  as  also  the  exaggerations  of 
the  lawyers,  who  will  make  the  most  of  them  for  their  purpose.  Then, 
perhaps,  there  will  be  compiled  for  all  physicians  a  forensic  medicine  in 
keeping  with  the  progress  of  physiology  and  psychology.  At  present 
this  does  not  exist."  * 

*  Azam,  "Tuke's  Dictionary,"  j).  406. 


MEMORY  IN  HYPNOTIC  STATES.  349 

In  connection  with  the  evolution  of  two  separate  personalities 
in  the  same  individual  the  very  important  question  arises, 
AVhat  is  the  mechanism  which  permits  of  the  evolution  of  two 
distinct  series  of  associations,  which  in  themselves  are  complete, 
but  which  have  no  community  with  each  other  ?  We  are  qviite 
unable  to  answer  this ;  we  can  only  make  vague  suggestions  as 
to  alternate  actions  of  the  two  hemispheres,  or  venture  upon 
h^-potheses  which,  in  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge,  it 
would  be  impossible  to  verify. 

Memory  in  Relationship  to  Hypnotic  States. — 
According  to  Professor  Beaunis,  of  Xancy.  the  following  laws 
regulate  the  hypnotic  memory : — (1)  The  memory  of  states  of  con- 
sciousness (sensations,  acts,  thoughts,  etc.)  of  the  h\-pnotic  sleep 
is  abolished  on  wakening ;  but  this  memory  can  be  revived  by 
suggestion,  either  temporarily  or  permanently.  (2)  The  memory 
of  states  of  consciousness  of  the  hypnotic  sleep  reapjoears  when 
hypnosis  is  again  induced ;  but  this  memory  can  be  abolished  hj 
suggestion,  either  temporarily  or  permanently.  (3)  The  memory 
of  states  of  consciousness,  of  the  waking  state  and  of  natural 
sleep,  persists  during  the  hypnotic  sleep ;  but  this  memorj'  can 
be  abolished  by  suggestion  either  temporarily  or  permanent!}'. 

These  laws  refer  to  cases  of  deep  hypnosis  only.  Memory  in 
relationship  to  hypnotic  states  varies  widely  in  accordance 
with  the  depth  of  the  hypnosis  and  the  varying  personality  of 
the  subject  operated  on.  In  slight  hypnosis  there  is  apparently 
little  or  no  alteration  in  memory ;  the  subject  remembers 
during  hj^nosis  the  events  of  waking  life,  and  on  passing  into 
the  normal  condition  easily  recalls  all  that  has  happened  during 
hypnosis.  In  somewhat  deeper  stages,  on  awakening  the 
memory  of  what  has  taken  place  during  these  stages  is  less 
distinct.  The  subject  will  then  frequently  state  that  he  can 
recall  all  that  has  been  said  to  him  and  that  he  heard  every- 
thing. On  questioning  him,  however,  it  will  generally  be 
found  that  he  remembers  very  little,  and  that  what  he  has  been 
able  to  recall  fades  rapidly. 

In  the  deepest  stages  the  subjects  can  recall  nothing  on 
awakening,  and  to  this  condition  the  term  somnambulism  is 
usually  applied.  The  proportion  of  hypnotised  persons  who 
pass  into  this  condition  may  be  roughly  stated  as  about  20  per 


350  DISORDERS  OF  MEMORY. 

cent.  AVlien  a  hypnotised  subject  is  unable  to  recall  on 
wakening  anything  that  has  passed  during  the  hypnotic  con- 
dition the  lost  memory  is  very  rarely  revived  spontaneously.  A 
few  instances  of  this  are  recorded,  however,  both  in  the  normal 
waking  state  and  in  dreams  during  natural  sleep.  This  amnesia 
after  hj'-pnosis  is  sometimes  reached  in  slight  hypnotic  con- 
ditions, when  alterations  in  the  voluntary  muscles  can  alone  be 
induced ;  in  other  instances  it  is  absent  in  the  deeper  stages, 
characterised  by  alterations  in  the  special  senses.  One  subject, 
for  example,  may  be  unable  to  recall  on  awakening  that  the 
muscles  of  his  arm  had  been  rendered  stiff  during  hypnosis, 
while  another  may  remember  distinctly  a  sensory  hallucination 
or  recall  perfectly  all  the  steps  of  a  painless  operation. 

The  hj^pnotic  memory  is  frequentl}^  more  precise  than  the 
ordinary  memorj^,  but  this  improvement  is  manifested,  as  a 
rule,  only  by  those  subjects  who  have  forgotten  on  aAvakening 
all  that  has  passed  during  the  hypnotic  state.  Many  instances 
are  recorded  of  marked  improvement  of  memor}^  during  Iwpnosis. 
Bramwell  has  found,  for  example,  that  subjects  who  are  unable 
to  recall  in  their  normal  condition  events  in  their  lives  which 
have  taken  place  at  an  earlier  age  than  seven  years  were  able 
during  hypnosis  to  vividly  recall  what  had  taken  place  at  the 
age  of  three.  One  j^'oung  girl,  imperfectly  educated,  who  could 
play  a  few  dance  tunes  upon  the  piano,  but  who  could  only  do 
so  in  the  normal  condition  when  she  had  her  music  before  her, 
was  able,  when  hypnotised  and  blindfolded,  to  play  the  same 
tunes  much  more  brilliantly.  Another  patient,  whose  natural 
memory  was  unusually  bad,  and  who  could  only  learn  a  piece 
of  poetry,  for  example,  with  much  difficult}^,  was  able  to  recall 
on  awakening,  after  suggestion  to  that  effect,  some  verses  with 
which  she  was  previously  unacquainted,  and  which  were  only 
read  over  to  her  twice  in  the  hypnotic  condition. 

Professor  Beaunis  draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  certain 
subjects  respond  to  suggestions  when  in  a  condition  which  in 
many  respects  resembles  the  normal  waking  state.  In  reference 
to  them  he  says: — 

"  One  can  determine  with  certain  subjects  a  particular  state  which  is 
neither  hj^notic  sleep  nor  the  waking  state.  The  subject  is  perfectly 
awake ;  he  has  his  eyes  open,  and  is  en  rapport  with  the  outer  world. 


MEMOKY  IN  HYPNOTIC  STATES.  351 

He  recalls  perfectly  all  that  is  said  or  done  around  him.  all  that  he  has 
said  or  done  himself,  the  memory  is  only  lost  upon  one  particular  point 
in  reference,  namely,  to  the  suggestion  which  he  has  just  fulfilled  ;  it  is 
by  that  and  by  obedience  to  suggestions  that  this  state  resembles 
somnambulism.  These  two  characteristics  are  the  only  ones  which  dis- 
tinguish it  from  the  ordinary  waking  state.  I  have  given  the  name 
'  veille  somnamhidiqiie '  to  this  condition." 

Bramwell  has  frequently  observed  the  condition  described 
by  Professor  Beaunis,  bnt  has  found  that  it  could  only  be 
induced  in  subjects  who  had  been  deeply  hypnotised  on  some 
previous  occasion.  AVith  some  of  these,  without  any  attempt 
to  reinduce  hypnosis,  he  could  induce  alterations  in  the  volun- 
tary muscles  or  special  senses  by  a  verbal  suggestion  given 
quietly  in  his  ordinary  tone  of  voice.  Sometimes  he  has  found 
that  these  suggestions  were  forgotten  immediately  they  were 
fulfilled,  but  in  many  other  instances  the  subjects  recalled  them 
perfectly  even  after  a  leng-thened  interval. 

Suggestion  plays  an  important  part  in  hypnotic  memory, 
and  it  is  difficult  to  be  absolutely  certain  whether  any  of  these 
alterations  just  refei-red  to  arise  quite  spontaneously,  without 
suggestion  from  the  operator,  or  auto-suggestion  on  the  part  of 
the  subject.  "With  some  subjects  the  first  Iwpnosis  is  followed 
by  complete  forgetfulness  of  what  has  taken  place  during  that 
condition,  even  when  the  operator  has  carefully  avoided  all 
suggestions  in  reference  to  the  memory,  but  in  such  instances 
one  can  never  be  absolutely  certain  that  the  subject  has  not 
made  auto-suggestions  as  the  result  of  his  preconceived  ideas 
in  reference  to  the  hypnotic  state. 

The  recollection  during  the  hypnotic  state  of  what  has 
occurred  in  waking  life  and  in  previous  hypnotic  condi- 
tions rarely  occurs  spontaneously ;  in  the  first  instance,  at  all 
events.  In  some  cases  frequent  suggestions  are  necessary 
in  order  to  obtain  this  revival  of  memory,  but  once  induced 
it  will  often  occur  spontaneously  in  subsecpient  h}-pnoses,  or, 
at  all  events,  it  will  then  be  capable  of  easy  production  hj 
suggestion. 

The  amnesia,  partial  or  complete,  which  frequently  follows 
the  termination  of  the  hypnotic  state  can  easily  be  prevented 
by  suggestion.     If  it  be  suggested  to  a  h}^notised  subject  that 


352  DISORDERS   OF  MEMORY, 

he  shall  be  able  to  recall  on  wakening  not  only  what  is  passing 
in  his  present  hypnotised  condition,  but  also  all  that  will  take 
place  during  snbseqnent  hypnoses,  it  will  be  found  that  the 
occurrence  of  this  amnesia  has  been  entirely  prevented,  and 
that  it  will  not  again  manifest  itself  tinless  suggestions  are 
made  with  the  object  of  creating  it  anew. 

According  to  Bramwell,  memory  in  hypnosis  may  be  : — (1) 
Unchanged ;  (2)  the  subject  may  remember  during  hypnosis 
the  events  of  waking  life,  Avith  a  clearness  corresponding  to 
his  powers  of  memor}'^  in  the  normal  state,  and  on  awakening 
have  a  more  or  less  indistinct  recollection  of  what  has  passed 
during  hj^pnosis  ;  (3)  he  may  recall  during  hypnosis  the  events 
of  waking  life  to  a  greater  extent  than  he  could  do  in  the  normal 
condition,  and,  on  awakening,  may  have  lost  all  recollection  of 
what  has  taken  place  during  hypnosis ;  (4)  he  may  be  unable, 
owing  to  suggestion,  to  recall  during  hypnosis  the  events 
of  waking  life  or  those  of  previous  hypnoses,  and,  on  awaken- 
ing, may  have  lost  all  recollection  of  what  has  taken  place 
during  hypnosis;  (5)  he  may  recall  during  hypnosis  the 
events  of  previous  hypnoses  and  those  of  waking  life,  the 
latter  to  a  greater  extent  than  he  could  do  in  the  normal 
condition,  and  by  suggestion  this  memory  may  be  retained 
on  awakening. 

In  this  latter  condition  amnesia  has  been  prevented  by 
suggestion,  and  there  is  now  no  break  in  the  memory  of  the 
hypnotised  subject.  The  only  alteration  is  one  of  improve- 
ment ;  the  subject  now  remembers  in  the  waking  state  past 
events  which  he  was  unable  voluntarily  to  recall  in  that 
condition,  but  the  memory  of  which  he  has  been  able  to  revive 
in  hypnosis.  He  also  recalls  in  the  waking  state  the  recent 
impressions  he  has  received  during  hypnosis  —  impressions 
which  he  would  not  have  been  able  to  recall  so  vividly  had  they 
been  made  in  the  waking  state.  He  remembers,  for  instance,  in 
the  waking  state,  the  piece  of  poetry  which  has  been  read  to 
him  twice  during  hypnosis,  and  which  he  would  have  required 
to  have  read  many  times  in  the  normal  state  in  order  to  retain 
an  equally  clear  recollection  of  it. 

It  has  been  attempted  during  hypnosis  to  revive  the 
memory  of  what   has    occurred    during   the    administration  of 


LAW    OF    REGRESSION.  353 

an  angesthetic,  such  as  ether  or  nitrous  oxide  gas,  but  in  the 
few  experiments  of  this  kind  with  which  Bramwell  was 
personall}'  acquainted  the  attempt  proved  a  failure.  The  same 
non-success  attended  his  attempts  to  revive  the  recollection  of 
what  had  taken  place  during  normal  sleep.  With  one  subject, 
whose  memory  during  hypnosis  of  the  events  of  waking  life 
was  exceptionally  good,  he  carried  out  the  following  experi- 
ment : — The  patient  was  in  the  habit  of  falling  asleep  every 
Sunday  afternoon  in  his  arm-chair,  and  it  was  arranged  that  on 
these  occasions  he  should  be  read  to  aloud,  and  that  the  same 
sentences  should  be  repeated  again  and  again.  Bramwell 
afterwards  hypnotised  him,  and  tried  to  make  him  recall  by 
suggestion  what  had  been  read  to  him.  The  experiment, 
though  frequently  repeated,  was  invariably  unsuccessful.* 

We  now  come  to  what  is  perhaps  the  most  important  of  the 
amnesic  conditions — namely,  the  conditions  of  j^^'O'jressive  loss. 
Eibot  has  postulated,  that  the  progressive  destruction  of 
memory  follows  a  certain  order.  His  Law  of  Regression 
is,  that  the  loss  advances  progressively  from  the  unstahle  to  the 
stahle.  In  cases  of  general  dissolution  of  the  memory,  an  in- 
variable path  is  followed — viz.,  memory  of  recent  events  goes 
first,  then  that  of  ideas  in  general,  next  feelings,  and  lastly  acts. 
In  instances  of  partial  dissolution  the  loss  also  follows  an 
invariable  path — viz.,  proper  names,  common  nouns,  adjectives 
and  verbs,  interjections,  gestures.  It  is  now  generally  held, 
that  in  brain-degenerations  the  nervous  elements  are  no  longer 
able  to  store  new  impressions,  nor  is  it  possible  to  form  new 
dynamical  associations.  Ribot  believes,  that  the  modifications 
established  for  years  in  the  nervous  elements  until  thej^  have 
become  organic  ("  dynamical  associations  and  groups  of  associa- 
tions called  into  activity  hundreds  and  thousands  of  times  ") 
remain  ;  and  that  they  have  a  great  power  of  resisting  destruc- 
tive agencies.  The  exactitude  of  the  law  of  regression  is  held 
to  be  verified  in  those  rare  cases  where  progressive  dissolution 
of  the  memory  is  followed  by  recovery,  because  recollections 
return  in  an  inverse  order  to  that  in  which  they  disappear.   That 

*  For  this  account  of  memorJ^  in  its  relationship  to  hypnotic  states,  the 
author  is  indebted  to  the  teaching  of  Dr.  J.  Milne  Bramwell,  who  has  not 
only  demonstrated  the  accuracy  of  his  statements,  but  has  also  sanctioned 
the  performance  of  control  experiments  upon  his  patients. 


354  DISORDEES  OF  MEMORY. 

the  old  groups  of  associations  are  organised  by  being  called  into 
activity  "hundreds  and  thousands  of  times''  we  can  imagine, 
but  we  do  not  understand  how  the  law  of  regression  is  to 
provide  us  with  an  explanation  of  the  extraordinary  revivifica- 
tion of  certain  recollections  Avhen  the  mind  turns  backwards  to 
conditions  of  existence  that  had  apparently  disappeared  for 
ever.  In  such  instances,  the  main  conditions  of  the  process 
of  organisation  (by  repetition)  are  wanting. 

E,ibot  describes  the  anatomical  cause  of  this  intellectual 
dissolution  as  "  an  atrophy  which,  first  invading  the  exterior 
cerebral  laj^ers,  penetrates  to  the  white  substance,  causing  a 
fatty  and  atheromatous  degeneration  of  the  cells,  tubes,  and 
capillaries  of  the  nervous  tissue."  He  quotes  a  physiologist 
who  says,  organic  life  is  analogous  to  what  occurs  in  a  great 
commercial  crisis:  "The  old  houses  resist  the  storm;  the 
new  houses,  less  solid,  go  down  on  every  side."  Such  an 
analogy  w^ould  appear  to  hold  good  in  a  psychical  sense ;  but, 
as  yet,  we  are  far  from  possessing  any  proof  that  one  layer  of 
the  cortex  more  than  another  is  concerned  with  the  recent  or 
remote  acquisitions.  We  agree  with  Hughlings-Jackson,  who 
was  the  first  to  demonstrate  that  the  higher  functions  disappear 
before  those  which  are  general  and  automatic ;  but  we  cannot, 
as  yet,  go  so  far  as  to  locate  the  structures  concerned  with  these 
grades  of  function  within  definite  layers  of  the  cortex. 

Before  leaving  this  part  of  the  subject,  it  may  be  well  to 
reconsider  some  of  the  conditions  on  which  conservation  and 
reproduction  depend;  and  this  involves  some  account  of  the 
relation  between  the  anatomical  seat  of  the  primitive  im- 
pressions and  the  nervous  .elements  which  are  active  when  the 
impressions  are  revived.     Ribot  says  : — 

"  Primitive  acquisitions — those  that  date  from  infancy — are  the  most 
simple  ;  they  include  the  formation  of  secondary  automatic  movements 
in  the  education  of  the  senses.  They  depend  principally  upon  the 
medulla  and  the  lower  centres  of  the  brain  ;  and  we  know  that  at  this 
period  of  life  the  exterior  cerebral  layers  are  imperfectly  developed. 
Apart  from  their  simplicity  there  is  every  reason  why  these  first  acqui- 
sitions should  be  stable.  In  the  first  place,  the  impressions  are  received 
in  virgin  elements.  Nutrition  is  very  active  ;  but  incessant  molecular 
repair  serves  only  to  fix  the  registered  perception  ;  the  new  molecules 
taking  the  exact  places  occupied  by  the  old,  the  acquired  state  finally 
becomes  organic.    Moreover,  the  dynamic  associations  formed  between 


LAW    OF    REGRESSION.  355 

the  different  elements  attain  after  a  time  to  a  condition  of  complete 
fusion,  thanks  to  continual  repetition.  It  is  inevitable,  then,  that  the 
earlier  acquisitions  should  be  better  conserved  and  more  easily  repro- 
duced than  any  others,  and  that  they  should  constitute  the  most  lasting 
form  of  memory. 

"  "While  the  adult  organism  is  in  a  healthy  state,  new  impressions 
and  associations,  although  of  a  much  more  complex  order  than  those 
of  infancy,  have  still  great  chances  of  stability.  The  causes  just 
enumerated  are  always  in  action,  although  with  modified  energy.  But 
if,  through  the  effects  of  old  age  or  disease,  the  conditions  change ;  if 
the  vital  processes,  particularly  nutrition,  begin  to  fail ;  if  waste  is  in 
excess  of  repair,  then  the  impressions  become  unstable  and  the 
associations  weak." 

How  incessant  moleculai'  repair  serves  to  fix  the  registered 
impression  is  a  speculation  which  we  do  not  attempt  to  make. 
Nor  do  we  venture  upon  any  hypothesis  as  to  the  physiological 
counterparts  of  the  primitive  acc[uisitions  and  the  sum  total  of 
their  revivals.  We  know  that,  in  a  psychical  sense,  first  im- 
pressions can  be  localised  in  the  past ;  but  we  also  know  that 
revived  impressions  can  be  referred  to  in  the  past.  Further, 
a  first  impression,  and  its  series  of  revivals,  can  be 
referred  to,  and  localised  in  time,  as  distinct  psychical  facts. 
This,  we  hold,  would  necessitate  an  additional  modification  or 
rearrangement  of  molecules,  which  would  admit  of  the  facts 
being  reviewed  and  compared  as  distinct  and  separate  events. 
How  we  are  to  explain  this  registration  of  every  revival,  as 
well  as  the  primitive  impression,  we  do  not  know.  We  have 
yet  to  invent  some  chronometrical  sj^stem  of  registration, 
whereby  the  brain-tracts,  excited  by  the  events  proper,  have 
it  within  their  power  to  retain,  not  only  the  effects  of  the  first 
excitation,  but  also  every  subsequent  re-excitation.  To  say 
that  the  first  impression  becomes  organised  by  repetition 
conveys  no  real  physiological  meaning.  If  we  assume  that 
the  structural  elements  become  slightly  modified  with  every 
revival,  we  have  to  explain  how  it  is  that  the  first  impression 
as  well  as  the  modified  revivals  can  still  be  referrred  to. 

Maudsley*  says : — 

"  When  an  idea  which  we  have  once  had  is  excited  again  there  is 
a  reproduction  of  the  same  nervous  current,  with  the  conscious  addition 

*  "Physiology  of  Mind,"'  1876,  p.  513. 


356  DISOKDERS  OF  MEMORY. 

that  it  is  a  reproduction  :  it  is  the  same  idea  plus  the  consciousness  that 
it  is  the  same.  The  question  then  suggests  itself,  What  is  the  physical 
condition  of  this  consciousness  ?  What  is  the  modification  of  the 
anatomical  substrata  of  fibres  and  cells,  or  of  their  physiological 
activity,  which  is  the  occasion  of  this  2)lus  element  in  the  reproduced 
idea  ?  It  may  be  supposed  that  the  first  activity  did  leave  behind  it, 
when  it  subsided,  some  after-effect,  some  modification  of  the  nerve- 
element,  whereby  the  nerve-circuit  was  disposed  to  fall  again  readily 
into  the  same  action :  such  disposition  appearing  in  consciousness  as 
recognition  or  memory.  Memory  is,  in  fact,  the  conscious  phase  of  this 
physiological  disposition  when  it  becomes  active  or  discharges  its 
functions  on  the  recurrence  of  the  particular  mental  experience.  To 
assist  our  conception  of  what  may  happen,  let  us  suppose  the  individual 
nerve-elements  to  be  endowed  with  their  own  consciousness,  and  let  us 
assume  them  to  be,  as  I  have  supposed,  modified  in  a  certain  way  by 
the  first  experience  ;  it  is  hard  to  conceive  that  when  they  fall  into  the 
same  action  on  another  occasion  they  should  not  recognise  or  remember 
it;  for  the  second  action  is  a  reproduction  of  the  first,  with  the  addition 
of  what  it  contains  from  the  after-effects  of  the  first.  As  we  have 
assumed  the  process  to  be  conscious,  this  reproduction  with  its  addition 
would  be  a  memory  or  remembrance." 

Professor  James  has  pointed  out  that  there  is  no  conceivable 
ground  for  supposing  that  with  the  mere  re-excitation  there 
should  arise  the  "  conscious  addition  "  that  it  is  a  re-excitation. 
"  The  two  excitations  are  simply  tv^^o  excitations,  their  con- 
sciousnesses are  two  consciousnesses — they  have  nothing  to 
do  with  each  other.  And  a  vague  '  modification  '  supposed  to 
be  left  behind  by  the  first  excitation,  helps  us  not  a  whit,  for, 
according  to  all  analogy,  such  a  modification  can  only  result  in 
making  the  next  excitation  more  smooth  and  rapid.  This 
might  make  it  less  conscious  perhaps,  but  could  not  endow 
it  with  any  reference  to  the -past.  The  gutter  is  worn  deeper 
by  each  successive  shower,  but  not  for  that  reason  brought  into 
contact  with  previoiis  showers." 

The  hypothesis,  that  the  brain-tracts  excited  by  the  event 
proper  and  those  excited  in  its  recall  are  in  part  different  from 
each  other,  is  maintained  by  some  observers  to  be  more  con- 
ceivable than  any  other  hypothesis.  This  conclusion,  however, 
requires  some  explanation.  We  have  already  assumed  that  the 
difference  between  a  revived  ima,ge  and  a  primary  image 
(psychologically  considered)  is  one  mainly  of  degree  or  intensity- 
The  appearance  of  change  in  the  nature  of  the  revived  image 


LAW    or    EEVIVAL.  357 

being  due  to  the  addition  of  conscious  accompaniments,  and  to  the 
mental  complexion  of  the  individual  at  the  time  of  the  revival. 
This  theory  involves  the  supposition  that  the  revived  image  per 
se  is  in  immediate  relation  \\ith  the  physiological  factors  v^^hich 
were  concerned  Avith  the  registration  of  the  primary  image. 
Further,  it  seems  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  conscious 
accompaniments  of  the  revivetl  image  occupy  new  tracts,  which 
in  some  inexplicable  way  become  associated  with,  and  hold  in 
their  midst,  as  it  were,  the  phj^siological  counterpart  of  the  re- 
vived image.  Thus  it  is,  that  the  organisation  of  the  event  proper 
woiild  appear  to  depend  upon  the  number  of  times  it  is  revived, 
and,  therefore,  upon  the  number  of  its  conscious  accompaniments. 

It  is  difficult  to  imagine  that  with  every  revival  of  an  image 
there  is  any  actual  modification  of  the  physiological  disposition 
of  the  primary  image.  All  change  depends  upon  the  addition 
of  new  associations  which  would  appear  to  have  their  separate 
and  distinct  functional  provinces.  Thus,  when  we  endeavour  to 
recall  an  incident  of  long  ago,  we  frequently  go  back  step  by  step 
recalling  the  accompaniments  of  the  revived  images  until  we  are 
able  to  localise  in  the  past  the  occurrence  of  the  initial  impression 
itself.  It  follows  as  a  consequence  from  this,  that  facility  in  the 
act  of  recall  depends  in  great  part,  not  only  upon  the  depth  of 
the  first  impression,  but  also  upon  the  nature  and  number  of 
the  various  accompaniments  of  the  revivals. 

One  point  to  be  learned  from  these  contentions  is,  that 
although  the  revival  of  an  impression  may  depend  upon  the 
re-excitation  of  a  formerly  acquired  physiological  disposition, 
the  re-excitation  does  not  necessarily  modify  the  primary 
disposition,  which  remains  as  it  was.  We  are  now,  therefore, 
in  a  position  to  say,  that  when  we  speak  of  organising  primitive 
impressions  by  the  process  of  revival  we  simply  mean,  that  the 
facility  for  revival  is  rendered  more  perfect  by  means  of  the 
additional  physiological  dispositions  which  have  been  associated 
with  each  revival.  Thus  it  is,  that  although  the  revived  image 
is  in  a  manner  born  from  the  initial  disposition,  in  speaking  'of 
this  process  of  revival  as  a  process  of  organisation,  we  really 
mean  no  more  than  we  should  do  were  \\q  to  characterise  every 
birth,  or  revival  in  the  image  of  man,  as  another  step  in  the 
organisation  of  Adam. 


358  DISOEDERS  OF  MEMOEY. 

The  inability  to  explain  the  physiological  mechanism  of 
memory  does  not,  however,  negative  the  law  of  regression  from 
a  purely  psychological  point  of  view.  Clinically,  it  is  important 
to  note  that  the  progressive  loss  of  memory  is  usually  patho- 
gnomonic of  cerebral  degeneration.  In  the  early  stages  of 
general  ■paTaltjsis,  the  impairment  of  memory  is  sometimes 
the  most  marked  symptom.  Mickle  has  pointed  out,  that  in 
some  cases  of  general  paralysis  the  impairment  of  memory 
undergoes  a  remission.  When  the  remission  is  very  marked, 
he  believes  that  the  impairment  of  memory  previously  existing 
has  usually  been  factitious  rather  than  real,  and  due  more  to  a 
confusion  of  thought  than  to  actual  amnesia.  Nevertheless,  we 
are  able  to  confirm  his  opinion  that  the  amnesia  may  undergo  a 
considerable  and  real  remission  independently  of  any  other  con- 
ditions. A  general  paralytic  (a  Frenchman)  came  to  Bethlem 
recently,  and  it  was  found  that,  although  formerly  he 
could  converse  fluently  in  English,  with  the  onset  of  the 
paralysis  he  could  not  recall  any  words  or  formulate  a  sentence 
in  English.  He  was,  however,  able  to  understand  what  was 
said  to  him  in  English. 

With  various  hrain  lesions  there  is  progressive  loss  of 
memory.  Thus,  in  syphilitic  diseases  of  the  brain  and  the 
meninges,  intracranial  tumours,  circumscribed  lesions  due  to 
foci  of  softening,  hsemorrhage,  embolism,  or  thrombosis  ;  in 
chronic  degeneration  of  the  brain,  due  to  idiopathic  morbid 
processes,  traumatisms,  toxic  agents,  etc.,  the  symptoms  of 
progressive  loss  of  memory  are  often  marked.  Sometimes  the 
loss  follows  upon  spinal  affections,  such  as  locomotor  ataxy  or 
multiple  sclerosis  ;  or  it  may  result  from  epilepsy,  hysteria, 
somnambulism,  choi'ea,  paralysis  agitans,  asthma,  exophthalmic 
goitre,  or  myxoedema.  It  may  be  determined  at  wnj  period  of 
life :  thus,  it  is  sometimes  seen  at  puberty,  adolescence, 
climacterium,  or  in  old  age.  Various  local  visceral  disorders 
determine  forms  of  insanity  in  which  the  memory  undergoes 
progressive  degeneration ;  and  lastly,  acute  fevers,  such  as 
smallpox,  typhoid,  cholera,  influenza,  etc. ;  or  chronic  diseases, 
such  as  rheumatism,  gout,  syphilis,  cancer,  pellagra,  tuberculosis, 
or  malaria,  may  be  attended  with  loss  of  memory  as  a  complica- 
tion or  sequel. 


SENILE    AMNESIA.  359 

111  senile  amnesia,  according  to  Be  van  Lewis,  the  latest 
impressions  reaching  the  sensorinm  may  be  so  imperfectly 
registered  as  to  be  rapidly  obliterated,  or  they  may  fail  to 
establish  the  organic  connections  whereby  they  become  more 
permanent  constituents  of  the  nervous  mechanism.  He  says : 
"  In  the  nexus  of  processes  connected  with,  and  extending 
around,  a  nerve-cell,  we  decipher  the  integration  of  sti'ucture 
upon  which  its  permanence  as  a  functional  unit  depends,  and 
the  more  free  such  channels  of  communication  become,  the 
more  fully  organised  is  the  structure,  and  the  more  stable  and 
resistant  to  the  encroachments  of  senile  dissolutions.  The 
latest  requirements,  however,  are  expressed  in  the  structural 
modifications  of  the  highest  nervous  arrangements  where 
integration  of  structure  is  least  advanced,  and,  unlike  those 
associations  which  have  been  called  into  activity  over  and 
over  again,  many  thousand  times,  they  fail  in  tliat  nexus  of 
communications  necessary  to  their  stability." 

There  will  always  be  great  difficulty  in  understanding  how 
a  nexus  of  processes  becomes  organised,  also  how  this  organisa- 
tion renders  it  more  stable  and  resistant  to  the  encroachments 
of  senile  dissolution.  At  present  we  are  unable  to  fix  the 
latest  acquirements  upon  definite  nervous  arrangements  where 
integration  of  structure  is  least  advanced.  If  new  routes  are 
opened  out,  and  new  nervous  associations  formed  with  the 
registration  of  every  mental  event,  then  we  can  readily  imagine 
that  in  the  senile  cases  there  is  merely  failure  in  the  establish- 
ment of  new  nexuses.  Clinically,  we  have  to  note  that  senile 
subjects  fail  to  register  the  most  ordinary  events  occurring  in 
their  immediate  presence. 

Andriezen  has  shown  that,  pff-n  jmssu  with  the  growth  and 
perfection  of  movement,  there  is  a  parallel  growth  of  proto- 
plasmic pi'ocesses  and  collaterals  of  the  nerve-cells  in  the 
Rolandic  cortex  ;  and  he  has  urged  that  the  same  qualitative 
elaboration  of  the  structure  of  the  special  sense-areas  is  the 
organic  basis  for  the  facts  of  psycho-genesis.  ''  Quality  (i.e., 
extent  and  complexity)  of  cerebral  organisation  is  the  real  basis 
of  intellectual  capacity,  and  thus  a  brain  small  in  size  (like  that 
of  Gambetta)  may,  from  its  high  intrinsic  elaboration,  be  able  to 
subserve  more  varied,  extensive,  and  multiform  activities  in  life 


360  DISOEDERS  OF  MEMORY. 

and  thought  than  others  of  greater  size  but  grosser  organisa- 
tion can."*  It  is  difficnlt  to  understand  how  the  quantitative 
elaboration  of  physical  structures  determines  the  quality  of  the 
intellect.  A  man  who  looks  at  a  Punch  and  Judy  show 
possesses  at  the  time  an  amount  of  psychical  activity,  M^hich 
quantitatively  might  compare  favourabty  with  that  of  an 
astronomer  when  he  beholds  a  comet.  Moreover,  an  illiterate 
gossamer  may  retain  the  memory  of  concrete  facts  (by  his 
method  of  elaborating  associations)  far  better  than  a  philosopher 
who  deals  entirely  with  abstract  thought  and  its  elaborations. 
Therefore,  if  memory  is  to  be  determined  quantitatively  in  this 
way,  we  raise  difficulties  which  are  insurmountable.  We 
cannot  reconcile  the  qualitative  ]plienomena  of  inind  ivith  the 
quantitative  phenomena  of  matter.  Were  the  intellectual 
capacity  dependent  upon  the  number  of  ramifications,  and 
these  in  turn  dependent  upon  the  number  of  psychical  activities, 
of  which  they  are  regarded  as  the  physical  counterpart,  then 
it  would  be  reasonable  to  assume  that  intellect  is  merely  a 
quantitative  phenomenon.  Otherwise,  we  must  raise  an 
hypothesis  that  ordinary  perceptions  and  associative  ideas  do 
not  rest  upon  such  greatly  elaborated  physical  processes  as  do 
those  mental  acts  which  are  classed  as  scientific  or  philosophical. 
That  is  to  say,  if  we  wish  the  physical  explanation  to  be  complete, 
we  must  give  a  clear  proof  that  thoughts  of  a  logical,  scientific, 
or  philosophical  order  have  more  ramifications  than  thoughts  of 
an  ordinary  psychological  nature. 

In  a  psychical  sense,  the  brain  of  the  illiterate  person  is  as 
active  as  that  of  the  philosopher.  It  is  not  a  question  of 
quantity.  We  are  unable  to  grasp  the  meaning  of  mental 
qualities  from  a  physiological  point  of  view.  From  a  psycho- 
logical point  of  view  we  can  understand  how  the  mind  may 
regulate  and  select,  as  it  were,  the  nature  of  its  retentions ;  but 
that  intellectual  operations,  or  the  ways  we  ought  to  think, 
possess  any  structural  advantages  over  the  ordinary  psychical 
activities,  or  ways  we  do  think,  is  a  question  vdiich  we  have  not 
been  able  to  determine.  As  yet,  however,  our  knowledge  of  the 
anatomy  and  dynamical  relations  of  the  nerve-cells  and  their 
processes,  is  so  meagre,  and  so  incompletely  representative  of 

*  "  Journ.  Ment.  Science,"  Oct.,  1894,  p.  678. 


PARTIAL  AMNESIAS.  361 

the  complex,  yet  clear  succession  of  mental  operations,  that  the 
subject  can  only  be  left  for  future  consideration. 

Partial  Amnesias. — ^It  is  commonly  assumed  that  every 
recollection  has  its  seat  in  a  definite  and  determinate  portion  of 
the  cerebral  hemispheres.  Each  portion  has  its  special  fimction 
to  perform,  but  is  in  intimate  relation  with  its  fellows.  Ribot 
compares  each  particular  form  of  memory  with  a  contingent  of 
clerks  charged  with  a  special  and  exclusive  service.  Any  one 
of  these  departments  might  be  abolished  without  serious  detri- 
ment to  the  rest  of  the  work,  and  that  is  what  happens  in 
partial  disorders  of  the  memory. 

It  seems  unnecessary  to  dwell  upon  the  fact,  that  no  one  is 
equally  perfect  in  all  departments  of  his  memory.  Some  are 
unable  to  recall  names,  places,  or  events ;  others  are  deficient  in 
their  memory  for  tones  or  colours.  Sometimes  this  deficiency 
is  fully  recognised  by  the  individual,  and  the  local  memory  for 
one  series  of  events  is  habitually  associated  with  that  of  another 
series  in  order  to  facilitate  the  process  of  recall.  The  forms 
of  partial  amnesia  may  be  divided  into  two  groups — viz. : 
(1)  Those  forms  in  Avhich  there  is  loss  of  memory  of  a  series 
of  mental  states,  without  any  obvious  interference  with  the 
activities  of  the  mind  as  a  whole;  (2)  those  forms  in  which 
the  loss  is  due  to  disease  or  injury  of  certain  nerve-elements. 
In  the  former  group  there  may  be  temporary  suspension  of 
some  of  the  mental  functions ;  whilst,  in  the  latter,  there  is 
destruction  of  some  of  them. 

In  a  work  of  this  description  it  would  be  out  of  place  to 
consider  fully  all  the  questions  involved  in  disorders  of  intellec- 
tual expression  by  speech  and  writing  as  met  with  in  aphemia, 
agraphia,  aphasia,  amnesia,  etc.  AVe  must,  however,  consider, 
together  with  those  conditions  in  which  there  is  aphasic  loss  or 
impairment  in  the  power  of  speaking,  with  amnesic  defects  in 
writing,  the  cases  in  which  there  is  aphasic  loss  of  power  of 
writing,  with  amnesic  defects  in  speaking ;  and  also  the  cases 
in  which  there  are  amnesic  defects  only  in  speech  or  writing,  or 
in  both.  In  amnesic  patients,  generally,  there  is  difiiculty  in 
finding  the  right  words,  or  wrong  words  are  substituted.  There 
is  seldom  any  difiiculty  in  repeating  a  word  after  it  has  been 
pronounced  by  some  other  person,  showing  that  there  is  no 
difficulty  in  articulation. 


362  DISORDERS  OF  MEMORY. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  localisation,  amnesic  defects  of 
speech  present  great  difficulties.  We  have  many  data  which 
help  "US  in  localising  aphasic  conditions,  whereas  fiiller  informa- 
tion is  required  for  the  localisation  of  different  amnesic  defects.* 
Bastianf  believes  that  lesions  about  the  posterior  extremity  of 
the  Sylvian  fissure  of  the  left  hemisphere  probably  cause  one 
or  other  variety  of  amnesia,  as  lesions  of  or  about  the  third  left 
frontal  cause  aphasia.  The  former  region  includes  the  angular 
gyrus,  the  supra-marginal  lobule,  and  the  posterior  half  of  the 
upper  temporal  convolution. 

*  Bastian  has  formulated,  the  following  comprehensive  scheme  for  the 
study  of  speech  defects : — 

Schone  for  the  JExainination  of  Aphasic  and  Amnesic  Persons. 
Auditory  Perceptive  Centre,  with  its  afferent  and  efferent  fibres — 

1.  Hearing— good  or  bad  ?  ^  m    i.    i.  ..u     £       ^-       ^      ..■   -^ 
^    „           1        ■        i           1,  To  test  the  functional  activity 

2.  Comprehension  of  speech.  v.      j?    .m        j.  Il^  j     £  j-tS 
„.^.,.         PI         •  fof  afferent  fibres  and  oi  the 

-    3.  Appreciation  or  vocal  music.  ^      -^    u; 

^^  .     .  ^  1         ■    J      centre  itself. 

„  „  instrumental  music  ^ 

((a)  Imitative.  \ 

(I))  Associational   (repeti-  functional  activitv 

.    o,         1      /  tion    of    numerals,  \        „.,  .  ,     j^  -^     i^ 

4.  Speech   <  ,  ,    ,    .^      ,  ^  >    of  the  centre  and  of  its  etter- 

'-  ^  alphabet,    days    of  /         ^  „, 

-,      ^    .  I     ent  fibres, 

week,  etc.).  I 

(c)  Spontaneous.  / 

Visual  Perceptive  Centre,  with  its  afferent  and  efferent  fibres — 

1.  Sight — good  or  bad?  ^ 

2.  Comprehension  of  printed  or  written 

words. 

3.  Recognition  of  numerals  or  letters    To  test  the  functional  activity 

(as    judged   by  ability  to   point  >•    of  afferent  fibres  and  of  the 
them  out).  centre  itself. 

4.  Recognition  of  common  objects. 

5.  Recognition  of  pictures  of  common 

objects.  ■  ' 

/{a)  Imitative  (copying  of  \ 
numerals  or  letters,  j 
or  "  transfer  copy-  /  To  test  the  functional  activity 

6.  Writing  </  ing "  of    letters  or  /     of  the  centre  and  of  its  effer- 
words).  \     ent  fibres. 

(6)  Associational.  i 

(c)  Spontaneous.  ' 

Commissures  between  the  auditory  and  the  visual  centres  (visuo-auditory 
and  audito-visual) — 

[  Naming  at  sight  common  objects,  numerals,  letters,  or  words. 
■  \  Reading  aloud. 
2.    Writing  from  dictation,  numerals,  letters,  words,  or  propositions. 

+  "Brain  as  an  Organ  of  Mind,"  p.  682. 


PARTIAL  AMNESIAS.  363 

This  view  is  supported  on  clinical  and  pathological  grounds, 
and  also  from  the  fact  that  the  posterior  third  of  the  hinder 
segment  of  the  internal  capsule  conveys  all  the  sensory  im- 
pressions both  general  and  special  from  one  half  of  the  body, 
and  also  because  the  fibres  composing  this  posterior  third  *of 
the  hinder  segment  of  the  internal  capsule  (which  lies  between 
the  posterior  extremity  of  the  lenticular  nucleus  and  the 
posterior  half  of  the  thalamus)  begin  to  be  distributed  to  the 
convolutions  in  parts  contiguous  to  the  posterior  extremity  of 
the  Sylvian  fissure. 

Of  possible  faults  in  the  vocal  and  oral  mechanisms  we 
shall  speak  later,  when  we  discuss  motor  aphasias.  For  the 
present  we  have  to  recognise  that  language  is  the  instrument 
of  thought.  "It  is,"  says  Wyllie,*  "the  magic  mirror  in 
which  a   man   mav  look   and    read    the  thouo-hts   of   another 

*■■■  C5 

person,  or  into  which  he  may  cast  his  own  thoughts  for 
another's  information.  It  was  l^y  the  mind's  own  efforts  that 
the  mirror  was  originally  polished  and  made  efficient ;  and  it 
is  only  by  the  mind's  constant  attention  that  it  can  be  kept  in 
good  order  for  daily  use.  When  the  mind  is  damaged,  the 
mirror  truthfully  reflects  a  damaged  and  distorted  image. 
When  the  mirror  is  damaged,  the  reflected  images  of  the  mind 
is  not  a  good  and  true  one ;  it  is  blurred,  if  not  distorted, 
owing  to  fault  in  the  reflecting  power  of  the  mirror." 

We  have  already  discussed  the  cjuestion  as  to  the  revival 
of  sense-images  or  memories  that  are  supposed  to  have  been 
stored  up  in  the  cortical  centres  belonging  to  the  various 
senses.  Each  organ  of  sense  must  have  its  cortical  area 
somewhere  in  the  brain,  and  each  centre  must  not  only  be 
instrumental  in  the  reception  of  fresh  impressions,  but  must 
also  be  the  storehouse  of  former  presentations  and  their  asso- 
ciations. These  storehouses  must  accommodate  the  material 
counterparts  of  sensations  derived  through  the  special  senses 
and  the  kintesthetic  sense.  As  to  whether  the  revived  images 
are  perceived  in  some  supreme  ideational  centre,  or  whether 
they  are  perceived  in  what  we  regard  as  their  own  areas,  we 
have  alreadj^  expressed  an  opinion.  We  have  hitherto  been 
unable  to  find  a  supreme  ideational  centre,  and  this  itself  leads 
*  "The  Disorders  of  Speech,"  p.  183 


364  DISOEDERS  OF  MEMORY. 

lis  to  favoiir  the  latter  view.  With  our  advance  in  knowledge 
of  cerebral  localisation  we  shall  probably  be  able  to  settle  this 
question  more  definitely.  In  the  meantime,  however,  we 
repeat,  that  we  do  not  know  the  mintite  anatomical  relations 
between  the  storehouses  of  revivable  images  and  the  organs 
of  perception. 

Aphasia  in  one  or  other  of  its  forms  may  be  produced  by 
affections  of  the  ingoing  or  outgoing  channels  or  centres,  or  of 
the  commissural  fibres  between  them.  According-  to  Wernicke, 
motor  aphasia  occurs  if  the  motor  centre  is  afiected,  and  sensory 
aphasia  if  the  sensory. 

Clinically,  the  following  forms  are  those  which  are  more 
commonly  met  with  : — * 

1.  Ataxic  aphasia  (Kussmaul),  in  which  there  is  loss  of 
volitional  speech,  repetition  of  words,  reading  aloud,  volitional 
writing,  and  writing  to  dictation.  The  patient,  however,  is 
able  to  understand  spoken  language,  written  language,  and 
possesses  the  faculty  of  copying.  The  lesion  is  at  the  centre 
for  motor  images, 

2.  Sensorial  aphasia  (Wernicke),  in  which  there  is  loss  of 
understanding  of  spoken  and  written  language,  inability  to 
repeat  words,  to  write  to  dictation,  and  to  read  aloud.  The 
patient  can  write  or  copy  words.  Volitional  speech  is  im- 
perfect, and  paraphasia  may  exist.  The  lesion  is  at  the  centre 
for  aiiditory  images. 

3.  Commissural  aphasia  (Wernicke)  may  occur  as  the 
result  of  lesions  aSecting  the  various  commissural  fibres.  The 
chief  forms  are  : — 

(a)  Lesions  between  the  perception  centre  and  the  centre 
for  motor  images  cause  motor  aphasia  with  loss  of  volitional 
speech  and  volitional  writing,  but  the  patient  understands 
spoken  and  written  language,  and  can  copy.  This  variety 
differs  from  Broca's  aphasia,  in  that  the  patient  can  repeat 
words,  wi-ite  to  dictation,  and  read  aloud. 

(&)  Lesions  between  the  centre  for  motor  images  and  speech 
apparatus  cause  Broca's  aphasia,  but  the  patient  can  write  at 
will  and  to  dictation.     In  some  cases  the  thoughts  can  be  ex- 
pressed in  writing,  although  the  patient  is  unable  to  speak; 
"'  Landois  and  Stirling,  p.  712. 


PARTIAL  AMNESIAS.  '  365 

(c)  Lesions  between  the  centre  for  auditory  images  and  the 
perception  centre  cause  loss  of  understanding  of  spoken  and 
written  language ;  but  there  is  volitional  speech  (paraphasia), 
volitional  writing  (paragraphia),  the  power  of  repeating  words, 
of  reading  aloud,  of  writing  to  dictation,  and  of  copying  words. 
The  patient,  however,  does  not  understand  what  he  repeats, 
reads  aloud,  or  copies. 

In  amnesic  aphasia,  should  the  patient  hear  a  word,  he  is 
able  to  appreciate  its  full  significance.  Occasionally,  only 
certain  words  are  forgotten,  or  only  parts  of  words  are  spoken. 
Kussmaul  employs  the  term  paraphasia  for  that  condition  in 
which  there  is  inability  to  connect  rightly  the  ideas  with  the 
proper  words  to  express  those  ideas,  so  that,  instead  of  giving 
expression  to  the  proper  ideas,  the  sense  may  be  perverted,  or 
the  form  of  words  may  be  unintelligible.  Agramimatism  and 
ataxaphasiaj  are  terms  used  to  indicate  the  inability  to  form  the 
words  grammatically  and  to  arrange  them  synthetically  into 
sentences.  Other  conditions  due  to  derangement  of  the  cortex 
are  described  as  hradyphasia,  a  pathological  slow  way  of 
speaking ;  and  tumidtus  sermonis,  a  pathological  and  stuttering 
way  of  reading. 

The  motor  tract  for  speech  passes  along  the  upper  edge  of 
the  Island  of  Reil.  then  into  the  substance  of  the  hemispheres 
internal  to  the  posterior  edge  of  the  knee  of  the  internal 
capsule ;  thence  it  passes  through  the  crusta  of  the  left  cerebral 
peduncle  into  the  left  half  of  the  pons,  where  it  crosses,  then 
into  the  medulla  oblongata.  Total  aphasia  would  result  from 
total  destruction  of  these  paths  ;  whilst  aMartliria  (defect  of 
articulation)  would  result  from  their  partial  destruction. 

"Word-blindness  and  word-deafness  may  occur  alone  or  in 
conjunction  with  each  other.  A  word-blind  or  word-deaf 
person  is  thought  to  resemble  one  who  in  early  youth  has 
learned  a  foreign  tongue  which  he  has  completely  forgotten 
at  a  later  period.  Words  and  written  characters  are  heard  or 
read,  but  the  significance  of  the  signs  is  lost.  Wernicke  found 
softening  of  the  first  temporo-sphenoidal  convolution  in  all 
cases  of  word-deafness.  Physical  blindness  is  said  to  occur 
after  injury  or  from  disease  of  the  lower  parietal  lobe. 

Before   we   can   fully   understand   the    physical    nature  of 


366  DISORDERS  OF  MEMORY. 

language  relations  we  must  know  more  about  the  anatomical 
regions  directly  concerned  with  the  perceptions  derived  through 
the  so-called  word-seeing,  word-hearing,  speech,  and  writing 
centres.  This  is  the  direction  in  which  a  certain  amount  of 
success  is  possible.  As  yet,  however,  the  clinico-pathological 
evidences  have  thrown  but  little  light  upon  those  forms  of 
amnesia  which,  psychologically  considered,  are  impairments  o± 
the  intellectual  power. 

Among  the  insane,  one  meets  with  nearly  every  variety 
of  aphasia,  ataxic  and  amnesic.  Mental  confusion,  emotional 
states,  transitory  conditions  of  excitement,  or  even  simple 
nervousness  may  produce  paraphasia,  agrammatism,  or  ataxa- 
phasia.  Bradyphasia,  or  tumultus  sermonis,  may  occur  as 
temporary  conditions  during  some  forms  of  mental  disorder,  or 
they  may  be  symptomatic  of  cortical  degeneration.  Other 
conditions,  such  as  verbigeration,  stuttering,  and  stammering 
will  be  considered  later.  In  general  paralysis  it  is  not  un- 
common to  find  that  the  patient  has  had  in  the  early  stages  of 
the  disease  slight  attacks  of  partial  amnesia.  Such  attacks 
may  consist  in  loss  of  memory  for  a  class  of  events  derived 
through  the  medium  of  any  of  the  special  senses  ;  or  there  may 
be  a  temporary  inability  to  recall  special  events.  In  states  of 
nervous  exhaustion  or  excessive  fatigue  an  individual  may  fail 
to  recall  events  or  facts  in  a  certain  direction.  Sometimes  the 
mere  volitional  activity  or  concentration  of  effort  involved  in 
an  attempt  to  recall  a  special  event  results  in  an  intensification 
of  that  partial  amnesia.  Such  an  experience  is  known  to 
everyone,  and  in  not  a  few  instances  has  this  factor,  excessive 
voluntary  effort  to  recall,  been  the  main  cause  of  the  amnesia. 

Hypermnesic  States. — The  various  states  of  exaltation 
of  memory  are  of  extreme  interest  psychologically,  but  up  to 
the  present  time  physiology  has  thrown  little  or  no  light  upon 
their  nature.  Exaltations  of  memory  may  be  general  or  partial. 
Sometimes  the  condition  appears  to  be  dependent  upon  physio- 
logical causes,  such  as  increased  rapidity  of  the  cerebral 
circulation.  More  commonly,  however,  the  cause  appears  to  be 
pathological.  Ribot  has  pointed  out,  that  general  excitation  of 
the  memory  frequently  appears  in  acute  fevers,  that  it  is  still 
more    common    in    maniacal    excitement,    in    ecstasy,    and    in 


HYPERMXESIC   STATES.  367 

hypnotism,  and  that  sometimes  it  appears  in  hysteria  and  in 
the  early  stages  of  certain  diseases  of  the  brain.  Hypermnesic 
conditions  are  usually  transitory.  Some  cases  have  been 
described  in  which  there  has  been  permanent  improvement  of 
the  memory  after  an  acute  fever  or  injury.  Teinporary  exalta- 
tions not  uncommonly  arise  in  the  early  stages  of  acute 
psychoses.  Thus,  in  general  paralysis  of  the  insane  a  tempo- 
rary hypermnesia  may  precede  a  progressive  amnesia,  just 
as  a  hypersesthesia  may  precede  an  anaesthesia.  Various  toxic 
deliriums  are  attended  with  hypermnesia.  Poisoning  by 
alcohol,  lead,  morphia,  absinthe,  ether,  chloroform,  chloral, 
haschisch,  or  cocaine,  may  present  initial  symptoms  of  exalta- 
tion, which  precede  the  more  grave  mental  disturbances. 

The  innumerable  instances  of  imrtial  hypermnesia  have 
usually  been  associated  with  morbid  mental  states  or  with 
defects  in  the  other  mental  faculties.  Of  the  extraordinary 
examples  of  revivification  of  long  forgotten  facts,  and  of  the 
various  hypotheses  which  have  been  advanced  to  explain  them, 
we  could  say  much;  but  we  refrain,  inasmuch  as  the  boundaries 
of  our  positive  knowledge  with  regard  to  them  are  so  limited. 

In  idiots,  imbeciles,  and  geniuses,  we  find  examples  of 
excessive  retentiveness  of  memory  in  certain  limited  directions. 
Forbes  Winslow  *  quotes  a  case  of  a  man  who  could  remember 
the  day  when  every  person  had  been  buried  in  the  parish  for 
thirty-five  years,  and  could  repeat  with  unvarying  accuracy  the 
name  and  age  of  the  deceased,  and  the  mourners  at  the  funeral. 
"  But  he  was  a  complete  fool.  Out  of  the  line  of  burials  he 
had  not  one  idea,  could  not  give  an  intelligible  reply  to  a  single 
question,  nor  be  trusted  even  to  feed  himself." 

A  boy  at  the  Royal  Albert  Asylum  remembered  accurately 
the  name,  date  of  entrance,  and  the  amount  of  clothing  of  ev^ery 
patient  admitted  to  the  institution  for  many  years.  In  other 
respects  he  was  an  idiot.  Another  patient,  at  the  Earlswood 
Asylum,  could  give  an  account  of  historical  facts  and  dates 
with  extreme  facility.  On  being  questioned  upon  any 
historical  subject,  he  showed  evidence  of  being  the  possessor 
of  a  memory  which  was  almost  encyclopsedic.  In  the  Massa- 
chusetts Asylum,  for  the  blind,  a  female  deaf  and  blind  mute 
*  "  Obscure  Diseases  of  the  Brain  and  Mind,"  1863,  p.  586. 


368  DISORDERS  OF  MEMORY. 

possessed   an   extraordinarily  keen  sense    of  smell.     Anybody 
M'hom  she  had  met  before,  she  recognised  by  smell.      She  knew 
all  her  acquaintances  b}^  the  smell  of  their  hands.     In  sorting 
clothes  that  had  come  for  the  wash,  she  could  distinguish  those 
of  each  friend.     If  half  a  dozen  strangers  threw  each  his  glove 
into  a  hat,  and  the  gloves  were  mixed,  she  would  take  them  up, 
and  bj^  means   of  smell    alone    assign  them  to   their  owners. 
Maudsley   records   the   case    of  an    idiot    who   could    repeat 
accurately  a  page  or  more   of  any  book  which   he   had  read 
years  before,  even   though  it  was  a  book  which  he  did   not 
understand  in  the  least.     The  proverbial  memory  of  Macaulay, 
and  that  of  Ben  Jonson,  who  could  repeat  all  that  they  had  ever 
written,  and  whole  books  that  they  had  read,  are  instances  in 
which  the  memory  itself  was    one  of  the    essential    elements 
of  their  genius.      Niebuhr,  Gibbon,   Pascal,  Leibnitz,    Burke, 
Themistocles,  and  Cyrus,  also  possessed  extraordinary  memories. 
It   is  difficult   to    imagine   the    physiological    "  process    of 
association"    which    determines    such   phenomenal    conditions. 
In   these    instances   there   is    no    constant    repetition    of    the 
process    of    association    which   makes    the    connection    easier. 
Bain   believes,    that    in    the    nerve-cells,    where    the    currents 
meet    and    join,    there    is,    in    consequence    of    the    meeting, 
a  strengthened  connection  or  diminished  obstruction ;  a  prefer- 
ence track  for  that  line  over  other  lines  where  no  continuity 
has    been    established.       How   far    this     hypothesis     is    ade- 
quate   we    have    already   inquired,    and   we    do    not    deem    it 
necessary  to  revert  to  the  subject.     Luys  quotes  the  instance 
of   a   young  married   lady  who   had  listened  to    one    of    his 
lectures,    and    who    could   repeat   the   lecture   several    months 
afterwards    in    a    state    of  somnambulism.     When    awakened, 
however,  she  was  utterly  unable  to  repeat  a  single  word  of  the 
lecture.     She  said  she  had  not  listened  to  it,  she  had  not  under- 
stood a  word  of  it,  and  could  not  say  a  single  line. 

Paramnesia. — The  various  illusions  of  memory — where  an 
individual  believes  that  he  has  before  experienced  circum- 
stances which  are  actually  new  to  him — have  been  termed 
paramnesic  states.  Kraepelin*  has  grouped  these  states  in 
three  classes : — 

*  "  Archiv.  f.  Psychiatrie,"  xvii.  and  xviii. 


PARAMNESIA.  369 

1.  Simple  paramnesia,  a  simple  image  which  appears  as 
a  recollection.  These  illusions  are  very  common  in  general 
paralysis  of  the  insane.  Thus,  general  paralytics  will  give 
marvellous  accounts  of  what  they  have  seen  and  what  they 
have  done,  although  the  accounts  have  no  real  foundation  in 
fact.  In  some  forms  of  alcoholic  insanity,  it  is  not  uncommon 
for  the  patient  to  give  details  of  experiences  imagined  to  have 
been  undergone.  One  patient,  at  present  in  Bethlem,  suffering 
from  alcoholic  peripheral  neuritis,  asserts  positively  that  she 
has  been  out  for  a  walk  in  the  garden  ;  whereas,  she  has  been 
kept  constantly  in  her  bed.  In  some  of  these  cases  an  illusion  or 
hallucination  may  have  been  the  initial  factor  in  the  production 
of  the  paramnesia,  inasmuch  as  the  confusion  results  from 
inability  to  distinguish  between  what  was  actually  a  false 
sensory  perception  and  a  perception  having  a  foundation 
upon  an  objective  reality.  When  there  is  revivification  of 
an  imagined  image,  the  fact  that  the  primary  image  was 
imaginary  may  be  lost  sight  of,  and  the  present  revival  appears 
to  be  based  upon  fact. 

2.  Paramnesia  hij  identification,  a  new  experience  appears 
as  the  photography  of  a  former  one  (Kraepelin).  Some  lunatics, 
brought  for  the  first  time  into  an  asylum,  have  the  feeling  as  if 
they  had  been  there  before  and  had  seen  the  same  persons  on 
some  former  occasion. 

According  to  Ribot,  the  illusion  is  easily  explained.  "  The 
received  impression  evokes  analogous  impressions  in  the  past — 
vague,  confused,  and  scarcely  "tangible, — but  sufficiently  distinct 
to  induce  the  belief  that  the  new  state  is  a  repetition.  I'here  is 
a  basis  of  resemblance  between  the  two  states  of  consciousness, 
which  is  readily  perceived,  and  which  leads  to  an  imaginary 
identification.  It  is  an  error,  but  only  in  part,  since  there 
is  really  in  the  recorded  impressions  of  the  past  something 
resembling  a  first  experience.  If  this  explanation  is  sufficient 
for  very  simple  cases,  there  are  others  where  it  is  inadmissible." 

3.  Associated  or  sugc/esfedj  para^nnesio.,  "an  actual  impres- 
sion suggests  an  illusion  of  the  memorj^ — a  pseudo-recollec- 
tion of  something  similar  in  the  past."  The  explanation  of  the 
method  by  which  actual  impressions  suggest  illusions  of  the 
memory  is   at  present  unsatisfactory.     We  all  experience  the 

24 


370  DISORDERS  OF  MEMORY. 

condition  of  associated  or  suggested  paramnesia,  but  it  is  more 
noticeable  in  those  who  are  mentally  unstable.  Ribot  suggests 
that  the  image  is  very  intense  and  of  the  nature  of  a  hallucina- 
tion ;  it  imposes  itself  upon  the  mind  as  a  reality  because  there 
is  nothing  by  "which  the  illusion  may  be  rectified.  "  Hence, 
the  real  impression  is  relegated  to  a  secondary  place  as  a 
recollection  ;  it  is  localised  in  the  past ;  wrongly,  if  the  facts  are 
considered  in  an  objective  sense ;  rightly,  if  we  take  the 
subjective  view." 

Before  concluding  this  part  of  our  subject,  mention  must  be 
made  of  those  somewhat  rare  and  interesting  conditions  in 
which,  although  a  patient  may  be  suffering  from  dementia  with 
inability  to  frame  one  coherent  sentence,  he  yet,  nevertheless, 
retains  the  power  of  playing  as  good  a  game  at  whist  as  ever; 
and,  moreover,  notes  and  remembers  the  cards  played  out. 
Such  instances  furnish  us  with  difficulties  which  cannot  be 
explained  from  either  a  physiological  or  pathological  point  of 
view.  Later,  we  shall  endeavour  to  harmonise  some  of  the 
pathological  conditions  of  memory  with  Hiighlings-Jackson's 
scheme  of  factors  of  the  insanities ;  but  we  shall  see  that  his 
hypothesis  is  far  from  being  sufficient  to  explain  many  of  the 
variations  in  memory  met  with  in  the  insane. 

Some  of  our  conclusions,  then,  in  regard  to  memory  must 
be  as  follows  : — (1)  We  do  not  yet  definitely  know  its  seat  in  the 
cortex  ;  (2)  we  do  not  know  how  mental  impressions  are  fixed 
and  retained ;  (3)  we  do  not  know  how  nutrition  of  the  ever- 
changing  brain-substance  affects  the  exactness  of  the  assimila- 
tion accomplished  in  the  formative  process ;  (4)  we  do  not 
know  the  physiological  conditions  which  cause  either  instability 
or  fixation  of  recollections ;  (5)  we  do  not  understand  how 
disintegration  of  molecular  structures  from  too  rapid  com- 
bustion can  determine  amnesic  states  which  can  be  recovered 
from  (in  such  instances  the  memory  is  often  completely 
regained) ;  (6)  the  physiological  explanation  of  the  organisation 
of  memory  is  incomprehensible ;  (7)  we  can  conceive  the 
variations  and  laws  of  memory  only  in  their  psj^chical  aspects  ; 
(8)  we  helieve  that  there  must  be  some  substantial  counterpart 
of  memorj?^,  but  we  are  unable  to  understand  its  nature.  The 
hjrpotheses  that  have  been   advanced  to  account  for  the  new 


PARAMNESIA.  371 

state,  the  organic  registration,  and  the  process  of  organisation, 
do  not  in  reality  prove  adequate  ;  and,  lastly,  (9)  in  the  future 
our  knowledge  of  the  relations  of  various  areas  and  tracts  may 
help  in  the  elucidation  of  the  active  processes  of  recall ;  but 
that  we  shall  ever  be  able  fully  to  explain  the  phenomenon  of 
memory  as  a  subjective  state  we  do  not  deem  possible. 

The  belief  that  feelings,  ideas,  and  intellectual  actions  in 
general,  are  not  fixed,  and  only  become  a  portion  of  memory 
when  there  are  corresponding  residiia  in  the  nervous  system, 
has  gained  ground  considerably.  Further,  it  is  generally 
held,  that  on  these  conditions,  and  these  only,  can  there  be 
conservation  and  reproduction.  AVe  have  already  devoted 
a  considerable  amount  of  attention  to  the  possibilities  of  the 
truth  of  such  doctrines,  and  we  are  compelled  to  remain  in  a 
condition  of  uncertainty,  because  we  are  unable  to  form  any 
conception  as  to  what  does  take  place.  We  do  not  wish  to 
falsify  existing  truths,  and  thereby  block  the  way  to  further 
knowledge ;  we  merely  wish  to  point  out,  that  the  doctrines 
which  have  been  propounded  are  not  in  themselves  adequate  to 
meet  the  requirements  of  the  mind. 

In  speculative  physiology,  little  or  no  account  is  taken  of 
the  nature  and  laws  of  mind,  and  whilst,  on  the  one  hand, 
speculative  psychology  errs  because  it  tends  to  ignore  the 
infinite  and  varied  functions  of  the  brain,  so,  on  the  other  hand, 
speculative  physiolog}'  errs  because  it  fails  to  appreciate  the 
infinite  varieties  of  phenomena  that  exist  in  the  mind  that 
perceives,  thinks,  imagines,  remembers,  feels,  and  wills.  Lord 
Salisbury  did  well  when  he  took  a  survey,  not  of  our  science, 
but  of  our  ignorance.  He  pointed  out,  that  we  are  living  in  a 
small  bright  oasis  of  kno\\'ledge,  surrounded  on  all  sides  by  a 
vast  unexplored  region  of  impenetrable  myster3^  Among  the 
scientific  enigmas  which  still,  at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  defy  solution,  he  included  the  nature  and  origin  of 
what  are  called  the  elements,  the  action  of  an  unknown  force 
on  ordinary  matter,  as  manifested  in  animal  and  vegetable  life. 
To  these  we  may  add,  the  physiological  activities  which  are 
regarded  as  being  the  counterparts  of  mind.  Criticising 
Weismann's  statement,  "  We  accept  natiiral  selection  because 
we  must,   because   it  is  the  only  possible  explanation  that  we 


372  DISORDERS  OF  MEMORY. 

can  conceive,"  he  said  that,  as  a  politician,  he  (Lord  Salisbury) 
knew  that  argument  veiy  well.  '  In  political  controversy  it 
was  sometimes  said  of  a  disputed  proposal  that  it  "  holds  the 
field,"  that  it  must  be  accepted  because  no  possible  alternative 
had  been  suggested.  In  politics  there  was  occasionally  a 
certain  validity  in  the  argument,  for  it  sometimes  happened 
that  a  definite  course  must  be  taken,  even  though  no  course 
was  free  from  objection.  But  such  a  line  of  reasoning  was 
utterly  out  of  place  in  science.  We  were  under  no  obligation 
to  find  a  theory  if  the  facts  would  not  provide  a  sound  one.' 
In  these  striking  observations  we  find  a  complete  shelter  for  all 
we  have  said  about  the  fanciful  hypotheses  in  the  domain  of 
physiology.  The  only  difference  between  our  position  and 
that  of  Professor  Weismann  rests  in  the  fact,  that  whereas  he 
believes  that  we  are  able  to  demonstrate  the  processes  of  natural 
selection  in  detail,  and  can  with  more  or  less  ease  imagine  them, 
we  are  totally  unable  to  demonstrate  any  psycho-physical  pro- 
cesses in  detail.  Further,  when  we  try  to  imagine,  or  speculate 
upon,  the  transcendental  aspects  of  these  questions,  our  efforts 
prove  unsatisfactory,  and  we  are  forced  to  rest  content  with  that 
which  is  empirical  and  within  the  realms  of  human  reason. 


373 


CHAPTER   XII. 

Feelings. 

States  of  Feeling — Relation  of  Feeling  to  Knowing — Instincts  and 
Emotions — Theory  of  the  Emotions — Temperaments — Laws  of 
Pleasm'e  and  Pain— Tone  of  Feeling — Physiological  Theory  of 
the  Feelings — Feeling  of  Effort — Varieties  of  Feelings — Classifi- 
cations. 

Disorders  of  the  Feelings  and  Emotions. 

Sense  Feelings — Feelings  Connected  with  Ideas — Intellectual  Feelings 
— Rational  Feelings — Disorders  of  Childhood,  Puberty,  Ado- 
lescence. 

FEELINGS. 

Any  state  of  consciousness  which  is  pleasurable  or  painful  is 
known  as  a  state  of  feeling,  and  it  is  upheld  by  many,  that 
every  state  of  feeling  has  a  pleasurable  or  painful  aspect  in 
some  degree.  Bain  speaks  of  a  neutral  excitement ;  but,  as 
Volkmann  observes,  it  is  difficult  to  understand  how  any  feeling 
as  such  can  be  altogether  uncoloured.  Feelings  have  their 
objective,  as  well  as  their  subjective,  significance.  They  form 
the  interesting  side  of  life.  Thus,  they  accompany  the  activities 
involved  in  intellectual  operations,  and  furnish  the  mind  with 
desires  and  motives  for  the  exercise  of  volition.  The  absence  or 
excess  of  feeling  has  much  to  do  with  the  development  of  mind 
as  a  whole.  The  moral  character,  the  intellectual  character, 
and  the  active  side  of  mental  life,  are  intimately  dependent  upon 
its  presence.  When  we  study  the  human  mind,  we  see,  not 
only  a  combination  of  intellect,  feeling,  and  will,  but  also,  in  a 
manner,  we  recognise  objectively  by  observation,  or  subjectively 


374  FEELINGS. 

by  introspection,  a  varying  inequality  or  preponderance  of  one 
or  other  of  these  psychic  manifestations  according  to  circum- 
stances. It  is  rare  to  meet  witli  perfect  equality  or  equanimity  ; 
and,  moreover,  the  preponderance  of  one  psychic  manifestation  is 
commonly  regarded  as  implying  a  decrease  or  impairment  of  one 
or  other  psychic  state. 

The  relation  of  feeling  to  knowing  has  been  clearly  pointed 
out  by  Sully.  It  is  impossible  to  carry  out  intellectual 
operations  effectively,  if,  at  the  same  moment,  there  is  any  strong- 
emotional  feeling.  "  All  violent  feeling  takes  possession  of  the 
mind,  masters  the  attention,  and  precludes  the  due  carrying- 
out  of  the  intellectual  process."  Thus,  the  emotional  tempera- 
ment is  extremely  difficult  to  train  intellectiially.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  certain  amount  of  interest  or  feeling  is  absolutely 
necessary  for  intellectual  growth.  As  associated  with  higher 
feelings,  or  with  complex  sentiments,  a  certain  degree  of  abstract 
thought  is  necessary.  Hence,  we  see  that  the  intellect  and  the 
emotions  are  to  a  certain  extent  essential  to  each  other.  The 
older  psychologists  held,  that  feeling  and  intellection  were  neces- 
sarily antagonistic  to  each  other.  Volkmann*  argues,  that  there 
is  a  close  connection  between  feeling  and  intellectual  activity. 
Spencer  upholds  the  view,  that  our  feelings  are  to  a  large  extent 
made  up  of  confused  representations  of  ancestral  experiences. 
Horwiczf  regards  feeling  as  the  primordial  type  of  mental 
manifestation.  Schneidel',  X  on  the  other  hand,  believes,  that  in 
the  simplest  sensational  consciousness  there  is  involved  a  rudi- 
ment of  intellection  in  the  shape  of  the  discrimination  of  a  state 
as  favourable  or  unfavourable.  Ward,  Wundt,  Shopenhauer, 
and  others  appear  to  think  that  activity,  impulse,  or  volition  is 
the  fundamental  psj^chological  phenomenon. 

Some  writers  regard  intellection  as  being  essentially  a 
reflex  phenomenon,  the  excitation  consisting  in  a  presentative 
or  representative  stimulus.  Feeling,  as  the  invariable  accom- 
paniment of  intellection,  may,  in  a  certain  sense,  be  regarded 
as  a  reflex  also  ;    whilst  volition,  being  the  result  of  previoiis 

*  "  Lehrbuch  der  Psychologie,"  vol.  ii.  sects.  127  and  129. 
+  "Psych.  Anal.,"  Theil.  i.,  Abschn  vi.,  and  Theil  ii.,  Halfte. 
:;:  "  Der  Menschliche  Wille,"  cap.  ix.  p.  190  et  seq. ;  and  Ward,  "  Mind," 
vol.  viii.  1883,  p.  472. 


INSTINCTS  AND  EMOTIONS.  375 

acquisitions,  intellectual  or  emotional,  appeal's  to  be  even  more 
a  reflex  activity.  AYe  must  assume  that  all  intellectual, 
emotional,  and  volitional  activities  are  intimately  connected 
in  mentalisation.  Some  urge  that  the  two  former  (in  their 
elementary  states)  are  coincidental  conditions,  whilst  the  latter 
is  a  result.  From  another  point  of  view,  intellection  is  regarded 
as  the  outcome  of  volition  or  emotion. 

It  is  difficult  to  draw  a  definite  line  between  instincts  and 
emotions.  Their  relation  is  very  intimate,  and  conditions  which 
excite  the  one,  as  a  rule  excite  the  other.  Accoi'ding  to  James, 
emotions  fall  short  of  instincts,  in  that  the  emotional  reaction 
usually  terminates  in  the  subject's  own  body,  whilst  the  in- 
stinctive reaction  is  apt  to  go  farther  and  enter  into  practical 
relations  with  the  exciting  object.  He  also  gives  the  theory, 
that  hodilt/  cJiamjes  folio uj  diredli/  the  perception  of  the  excitiruj 
fact,  and  that  oar  feelhuj  of  the  same  chamjes  as  they  occur 
is  the  emotion.  Further,  "every  one  of  the  liodily  changes, 
whatsoever  it  be,  is  felt,  acutely  or  obscurely,  the  moment 
it  occurs.  .  .  If  we  fancy  some  strong  emotion,  and  then 
tr}^  to  abstract  from  our  consciousness  of  it  all  the  feelings 
of  its  bodily  symptoms,  we  find  we  have  nothing  left  behind. 
.  .  .  for  us,  emotion  dissociated  from  all  bodily  feeling  is 
inconceivable.  ...  If  such  a  theory  is  true,  then  each 
emotion  is  the  resultant  of  a  sum  of  elements,  and  each  element 
is  caused  by  a  plwsiological  process  of  a  sort  alread}'  \\'ell  known. 
The  elements  are  all  organic  changes,  and  each  of  them  is  the 
reflex  effect  of  the  exciting  object.  The  moment  the  genesis  of 
an  emotion  is  accounted  for,  as  the  arousal  by  an  object  of  a 
lot  of  reflex  acts  which  are  forthwith  felt,  we  immediately  see 
why  there  is  no  limit  to  the  number  of  possible  different 
emotions  which  may  exist,  and  wh}-  the  emotions  of  different 
individuals  may  vary  indefinitely,  both  as  to  their  constitution 
and  as  to  objects  which  call  them  forth.  .  .  .  Any  classification 
of  the  emotions  is  seen  to  be  as  true  and  as  '  natural '  as  au}^ 
other,  if  it  onl^'  serves  some  purpose." 

It  is  difficult  to  reconcile  ourselves  to  this  theory,  and  Me 
feel  that  there  are  many  instances  which  cannot  he  accounted 
for  in  this  wa}^.  Thus,  in  various  dream-states,  it  is  hard  to 
imagine   that  an   intense  emotional   state  is  the  result  of  any 


376  FEELINGS. 

reflex  effect  of  an  exciting  object.  In  our  ordinary  waking 
moments  we  may  experience  various  emotional  states  without 
the  slightest  reference  to  any  physical  impressions  :  there  may 
be  none  of  those  wide-spread  bodily  effects  antecedent  to  the 
arousal  of  an  emotion  or  emotional  idea.  We  are  all  aware, 
that  extremely  rapid  reflex  acts  may  occur  through  immediate 
psychical  influences,  and  that  we  subsequently  experience  the 
effects  of  those  acts ;  but  the  raioidity  of  those  immediate 
psychical  influences  does  not  warrant  that  we  should  lose  sight 
of  them  altogether,  and  on\j  take  into  account  the  reflex  acts 
themselves.  The  best  proof  that  the  immediate  cause  of  emotion 
is  a  physical  effect  on  the  nerves,  is,  according  to  James, 
furnished  by  those  pathological  cases  in  which  the  emotion  is 
objectless.  "  It  must  be  confessed,  that  there  are  cases  of 
morbid  fear  in  which  objectively  the  heart  is  not  much  per- 
turbed. These,  however,  fail  to  prove  anything  against  our 
theory,  for  it  ■  is  of  course  possible  that  the  cortical  centres 
normally  percipient  of  dread  as  a  complex  of  cardiac  and  other 
organic  sensations  due  to  real  bodily  change,  should  become 
primarily  excited  in  brain-disease,  and  give  rise  to  an  hallucina- 
tion of  the  changes  being  there — an  hallucination  of  dread, 
consequently  co-existent  with  a  comparatively  calm  pulse,  etc, 
I  say  it  is  possible,  for  I  am  ignorant  of  observations  which 
might  test  the  fact.  Trance,  ecstasy,  etc.,  offer  analogous 
examples,  not  to  speak  of  ordinary  dreaming.  Under  all 
these  conditions,  one  might  have  the  liveliest  subjective  feelings 
either  of  eye  or  ear,  or  of  the  more  visceral  and  emotional 
sort,  as  a  result  of  pure  nerve-central  activity;  and  yet,  as  I 
believe,  with  complete  periplieral  repose."  ''■ 

Professor  Lange,  of  Copenhagen,  published,  in  1884,  a  theory 
almost  identical  with  that  of  Professor  James.  He  considered 
the  emotion  to  be  the  effect  of  the  organic  changes,  muscular 
and  visceral,  of  which  the  expression  of  the  emotion  consisted. 
The  order  of  events  was  regarded  to  be  as  follows : — (1)  An 
immediate  reflex  following  upon  the  presence  of  the  object,  the 
organic  change  in  question  being  regarded  as  the  primary  effect; 
(2)  a  secondary  feeling  indirectly  aroused. 

*  '•  Psychology',''  ^'ol.  ii.  p.  459. 


THEORY  OF  THE  EMOTIONS.  377 

Wundt*  has  severely  criticised  this  view,  and  has  pointed 
ont  that  the  same  vaso-motor  factors  may  be  attended  by 
totally  different  emotions — e.f/.,  joy  and  anger.  Moreover,  if  a 
certain  stimulus  causes  emotional  expression  by  its  mere  reflex 
effects,  why  is  it  that  another  stimulus,  almost  identical  with 
the  first,  will  fail  to  do  so  if  its  mental  efiects  are  not  the 
same?t 

The  question  would  appear  to  be,  Does  the  emotional 
excitement  which  follows  the  idea  follow  it  immediately,  or 
secondarily,  and  as  a  consequence  of  the  diffusive  "  wave "  of 
impulses  around  ?  J  If  the  diffusive  wave  of  impulses  causes 
the  emotion,  there  ought  to  be  some  constant  relation  between 
the  nature  of  the  wave  and  the  character  of  the  emotion.  The 
origin  of  an  emotion  would  appear  to  be  as  follows  : — (1)  The 
objective  qualities  with  wliich  perception  acquaints  us  affect  us 
with  pleasure  or  displeasure — i.e.,  the  perceptions  are  accom- 
panied by  a  tone  of  feeling.  (2)  There  may,  or  may  not  be,  a 
physical  reaction  to  the  idea  of  the  qiialities  of  the  object;  this 
would  determine  the  origin  of  the  secondary  sensations,  which 
would  constitute  the  emotion.  Professor  James  merely 
advocates  that  such  organic  sensations  being  also  presumably 
due  to  incoming  currents,  the  result  is  that  the  whole  of 
consciousness  seems  to  be  outwardly  mediated  by  these.     In 

*  "  Pliilosophische  Studien,"'  vi.,  1891,  p.  349. 

t  It  is  difficult  to  imagine  how  an  object  /*«/■  se  can  determine  the  physi- 
cal effects  apart  from  the  subjective  feeling  towards  the  object.  Irons 
("Mind,"  p.  78,  1894)  says,  "If  I  were  not  afraid,  the  object  would  not 
be  an  object  of  terror."'  Worcester  ("The  ]\Ionist,"'  1893,  vol.  iii.  p.  285) 
says,  "  Neither  running  nor  any  other  of  the  symptoms  of  fear  which 
he  (Professor  James)  enumerates  is  the  necessarj^  result  of  seeing  a  bear. 
A  chained  or  caged  bear  may  excite  only  feelings  of  curiosity,  and  a 
well-armed  hunter  might  experience  only  pleasurable  feelings  at  meeting 
one  loose  in  the  woods.  It  is  not,  then,  the  perception  of  the  bear  that 
excites  the  movement  of  fear.  We  do  not  run  from  the  bear  unless  we 
suppose  him  capable  of  doing  us  bodily  injury.  Why  should  the  expecta- 
tion of  being  eaten,  for  instance,  set  the  muscles  of  our  legs  in  motion  ? 
Common  sense  would  be  likely  to  say  that  it  was  because  we  object  to  being 
eaten  ;  but,  according  to  Professor  .James,  the  reason  we  dislike  to  be  eaten 
is  because  we  run  away.''  In  reply  to  the  latter  criticism,  Professor  James 
somewhat  modilies  his  position,  and  agrees  that  the  same  bear  may  truly 
enough  excite  us  either  to  fight  or  flight,  according  as  he  suggests  an  over- 
powering "  idea  "'  of  his  killing  us,  or  of  our  killing  him. 

X  "  Psychological  RevieAv,"  vol.  i.  No.  5,  p.  518. 


378  FEELINGS. 

short,  this  theory  of  the  emotions  applies  onlij  to  the  rajik 
feelings  of  excitement  ivhioh  are  onore  especially  derived  from 
organic  visceral  reflex  states.  The  observations  of  Sollier*  seem 
to  confirm  the  view,  that  the  rank  emotions  depend  ahnost 
exchisively  on  visceral  sensations. 

We  now  turn  to  some  other  considerations  which  have 
engaged  the  attention  of  psj^'chologists  and  mental  physiologists. 
For  an  emotional  type  of  character  a  lively  imagination  is  a 
prerequisite.  Unless  the  imagination  is  in  full  force,  the  life 
will  be  almost  emotionless.  Emotions  are  only  slightly  re- 
vivable  in  memory,  and  by  repetition  they  tend  to  become 
more  and  more  blunted. 

Here  it  may  be  well  to  speak  of  those  psycho-physical 
differences  between  men  which  are  designated  as  temperaments. 
When  we  consider  the  four  temperaments  described  by  the 
ancients,  we  find  that  pathological  conditions  of  the  mind  can 
be  assigned  to  them  with  a  certain  amount  of  appropriateness. 
In  general,  the  ancients  found  either  a  predominant  spontaneit}^ 
or  a  predominant  receptivity.  The  former  gave  the  active,  the 
latter  the  passive,  temperament,  whilst,  from  the  greater  or  less 
permanency  of  actions  or  impressions,  they  devised  a  fourfold 
subdivision.  These  four  temperaments  were : — (1)  The  sanguine 
or  passive,  with  receptivity  easily,  but  not  deeply,  affected ;  (2) 
the  melancholy,  with  receptivity  capable  of  being  deeply  affected; ' 
(3)  the  choleric  or  active,  with  quick,  vigorous,  biit  not  durable, 
activity ;  and  (4)  the  phlegmatic,  with  slow  but  enduring 
activity.f 

The  Laws  of  Pleasure  andj  Fain. — It  is  almost  universally 
held  that  some  form  of  nervous  activity  is  involved  in  every 
variety  of  pleasiire  and  pain.  Some  writers  refer  onl}^  to  the 
menta]  activities  involved ;  others  deal  almost  exclusively  with 
the  nervous  accompaniments  or  activities  of  organs  which  either 
directly  or  indirectly  affect  the  nerve-centres.  Leibnitz  regards 
the  cognition  of  furthered  vitality  as  the  mode  of  mental 
activity  which  gives  rise  to  feelings  of  pleasure.  We  may  take 
it,  that  all  sensations  or  feelings  of  pleasure  involve  a  certain 

*  "Recherclies  sur  les  Eapports  de  la  Sensibilite  et  de   rEmotion,"— 
"  Revue  Pliilosophique,"'  March,  189-1,  vol.  xxxvii.  p.  241. 

t  Kant, "  Anthrop.,"  p.  273 ;  Feuchtersleben, "  Medical  Psychology,"  p.  144. 


LAWS  OF  PLEASURE  AND  PAIN.  379 

amount  of  mental  activity  and  a  reference  to  some  physical 
state.  The  tone  of  feeling  accompanies  onr  sensations  with 
varying  degrees  of  intensity.  Ziehen  makes  a  sharp  distinction 
between  the  tone  of  feeling  which  accompanies  the  sensation  as 
such,  and  the  tone  of  feeling  that  accompanies  the  ideas  or 
images  of  memory,  whose  activity  has  no  direct  reference  to  the 
sensations.  Sensations  do  not  in  themselves  alone  determine 
the  various  emotional  feelings.  The  mental  accompaniments 
of  the  various  sensations  usually  derive  their  emotional  tone 
from  ideas  and  former  accjuisitions.  The  emotional  tone  of  a 
sensation  is,  to  a  certain  extent,  dependent  upon  the  intensity 
of  the  sensation  in  consciousness. 

The  relation  of  the  strength  of  the  stimulus  to  the  degree  of 
feeling  has  been  formulated  by  Wundt,*  who  found  that  as 
soon  as  the  stimulus  passes  the  threshold  and  causes  an  appre- 
ciable sensation  it  begins  to  be  pleasurable,  and  the  pleasure 
goes  on  increasing  as  the  stimulus  is  increased.  At  length  a 
point  or  region  of  maximum  pleasure  is  reached,  which  probably 
answers  to  that  medium  region  of  the  scale  where  the  finest 
discrimination  is  possible.  From  this  point  the  pleasure  rapid!}- 
diminishes  till  a  certain  point  of  indifference  is  readied.  Above 
this,  any  further  increase  produces  pain,  ^\■hich  in  its  turn 
increases  until  it  ciilminates  as  the  maximum  of  pain  is  reached. 
This  law  is  exemplified  in  all  the  higher  senses.  Horwiczf 
and  Beneke  have  pointed  out,  that  feelings  of  pain  are  some- 
times associated  with  very  weak  sensations.  J  AVundt  believes, 
that  in  this  case  the  indifference-point  is  so  low  that  it  is  no 
longer  distinguishable  from  the  threshold.  In  morbid  states, 
such  as  melancholia,  the  law  does  not  hold  good.  It  is  held 
that  melancholic  patients  have  usually  painful  feelings  ^\ith 
every  degree  of  sensation.  It  is  a  common  observation,  how- 
ever, that  with  morbid  mental  depression  there  is  often  failure 
to  respond  normally  to  ordinary  depressing  causes,-  and  we  ma}' 
formulate  the  general  law,  that  irith  the  depth  or  degree  of  patho- 

*  "Physiol.  Psj'chologie,"  chap.  x.  sect.  i. 

1"  "Psychol.  Aiialysen,"'  s.  ii.  2,  26. 

X  Ziehen,  op.  cit.,  p.  132.  Cesca,  "  Die  Lehre  von  derXatur  der  Gefiihle." 
Vierteljschr.  fiir  wiss.  Phil.,  1886,  x.  Compare  also  Kiilpe,  "  Zur  Theorie  der 
Sinnlichen  Gefiihle." 


380  FEELINGS. 

logical  melancholia  there  is  an  inverse  degree  of  normal  reaction 
to  loainful  sensations  or  suggestions.  For  example,  the  reception 
of  bad  news  has  little  or  no  emotional  effect  upon  those  who  are 
already  morbidly  depressed.  It  is  generally  held,  that  a  feeling 
of  pain  accompanies  the  slightest  sensation,  and  that  in  con- 
ditions of  melancholia  there  is  painful  response  to  much  slighter 
intensities  of  sensation  than  in  conditions  of  health.  We  hold 
that  the  opposite  is  true.  Every  sensation  is  received  and 
coloured  by  a  mind  saturated  with  melancholic  ideas,  but  the 
addition  of  such  percepts,  coloured  though  they  may  become, 
does  not  intensify  the  condition  of  depression.  On  the  con- 
trary, just  as  the  addition  of  a  clear  fluid  to  a  coloured  one  will 
tend  to  weaken  the  depth  of  that  colour,  so  the  addition  of 
ordinary  perceptions  tends  to  dilute  the  condition  of  grief  or 
pain  in  the  melancholiac.  Undoubtedly,  sensations  do  become 
realised  in  consciousness  as  painful  states,  but  with  every 
realisation  or  reaction  to  normal  influences,  the  morbid  thought 
tends  to  become  diluted,  as  it  were,  until,  with  the  process  of 
recovery,  the  individual  responds  normally  to  all  stimuli  from 
without.  The  law  simply  amounts  to  the  fact,  that  with  the  rise 
of  siibject  consciousness  there  is  a  corresponding' diminiition  of 
object-consciousness — i.e.,  the  attention  becomes  absorbed  by 
subjective  sensations. 

The  tone  of  feeling  which  accompanies  the  various  sensa- 
tions is  dependent,  therefore,  only  to  a  certain  extent  upon  the 
intensity  of  the  sensation.  Of  the  qualities  of  sensations  as 
factors  in  the  production  of  tones  of  feeling,  we  have  little  to 
add  to  what  has  already  been  said.  The  tone  of  feelings  may 
be  taken  as  dependent  upon  the  intensity  and  quality  of 
sensations,  pZws  associated  ideas. 

Fechner*  has  called  attention  to  the  spatial  arrangement  of 
sensations  as  a  factor  in  the  determination  of  positive  tones  of 
feeling.  The  time-relationships  of  sensations,  and  their  accom- 
panying tone  of  feeling,  have  been  clearly  demonstrated  by 
Ziehen.  He  points  out,  that  we  project  our  sensations  into  a 
space  of  three  dimensions,  while  not  only  our  sensations,  but 
also  their  mental  images  (the  ideas)  are  arranged  with  reference 
to  time  in  but  one  direction. 

*  "  Vorschule  der  ^sthetik."  Th.  i.,  Abschn  xiv. 


LAWS  OF  PLEASURE  AND  PAIN.  381 

To  explain  how  the  tone  of  feeling  accompanying  sensations 
is  dependent  on  their  duration  and  succession  in  time,  Ziehen 
says : — 

"  A  long  duration  of  sensation  generally  dampens  both  positive  and 
negative  tones  of  feeling.  The  manner  in  which  several  sensations 
follow  one  another  in  time  only  has  an  essential  influence  on  tlie  tone  of 
feeling  accompanying  sensations  of  musical  sound.  A  series  of  like 
sensations  of  tone,  following  one  after  the  other,  generally  becomes 
wearisome  ;  even  when  the  quality  of  the  tone  changes  an  unpleasant 
feeling  soon  appears. 

"  In  order  to  obtain  the  pleasurable  feeling  belonging  to  rhythmical 
division,  either  the  intensity  or  the  duration  of  the  single  tones  must 
be  subjected  to  a  more  or  less  regular  periodic  change.  In  musical 
tempo,  and  the  versification  of  poetry,  we  have  sequences  of  acoustic 
sensations,  in  which  certain  sensations  are  especially  accented  or 
intense,  and  all  together  have  a  definite  duration.  The  qualities 
{i.e.,  the  notes  and  words)  change,  but  the  intensities  of  tone,  the 
accentuations  and  diminutions,  constantly  recur  at  definite  intervals  or 
periodically.  In  poetry,  the  close  of  such  rhythmical  periods  can  often 
be  emphatically  marked  by  choosing  very  similar  tones  with  which  to 
close  the  periods.  In  this  form  of  emphasis  lies  the  importance  of  the 
rhythm. 

"  As  regards  the  succession  of  sensations,  therefore,  a  regular 
periodicity  is  the  chief  condition  for  the  appearance  of  feelings  of 
pleasure.  It  is  not  mere  chance  that  maniacs  and  those  afflicted  with 
emotional  paranoia  often  speak  in  rhythm  and  rhyme.  Such  phe- 
nomena harmonise  rather  "with  the  morbid,  positive  emotional  states 
characterising  these  forms  of  psychosis." 

The  contention  with  reo'ard  to  the  "tone  of  feelino-"  is, 
whether  the  feeling  arises  from  the  actual  sensations,  or 
whether  the  sensations  arc  attended  by  a  tone  of  feeling- 
determined,  for  the  most  part,  by  ideas  or  images  of  memory. 
It  seems  that  the  latter  condition  is  the  more  probable,  and 
that  the  sensations  themselves  act  by  suggestion  ;  the  actual 
feelings  being  thus  determined  secondarily  by  association. 
Ziehen  rightly  believes,  that  only  the  intensity  of  tlie  sensations 
and  their  succession  in  time  and  space  have  any  direct  effect 
upon  their  tone  of  feeling ;  hence,  we  may  assume  that  the  other 
qualitative  characteristics  of  sensations  derive  their  emotional 
tones  from  other  influences  which  are  wholly  dependent  upon 
psychical  factors,  apart  from  the  sensations  proper. 

It  is  impossible  here  to  re-enter  into  the  question  of  the 
relationship  of  external  stimuli  to  the  various  sensory  struc- 


382  FEELINGS. 

tures.  We  must  content  ourselves  with  a  few  of  the  particular 
applications  of  the  relationship.  When  the  stimulus  is  inap- 
propriate, painful  states  of  feeling  are  apt  to  occur.  There 
must  be  a  certain  proportion  between  the  stimuli  and  the 
nervous  activity.  When  the  nervous  structures  are  strained 
or  abnormally  active,  or  when  their  activit}?"  is  impeded  or 
defective,  there  may  be  an  emotional  accompaniment  of  dis- 
pleasure ;  but,  in  general,  we  are  more  competent  to  explain  the 
positive  or  negative  variations  in  the  emotional  tone  from  the 
subjective  side  than  from  the  consideration  of  the  objective 
qualities  of  sensation. 

The  prolongation  of  any  powerful  mode  of  stimulation  pro- 
duces fatigue  and  the  feeling  of  pain  or  displeasure.  In  order 
that  the  tone  of  feeling  may  continue  as  pleasurable,  it  is 
necessary  that  there  should  be  limited  duration  of  the  stimu- 
lation, and  variety  or  contrast  of  the  impressions. 

This  law  of  the  dependence  of  pleasure  on  change,  has 
been  the  basis  of  most  of  the  negative  theories.  Bain  defines 
those  emotions  which  depend  on  change  of  circumstances  as 
"  emotions  of  relativity  " — e.g.,  states  of  wonder,  novelty,  liberty, 
and  power.  The  tone  of  feeling  which  accompanies  stimula- 
tion of  the  bodil}^  apparatus,  furthers  or  retards  organic 
processes.  Thus,  organic  processes  are  promoted  by  cheer- 
fulness of  mind,  or,  conversely,  healthy  organic  processes 
favour  cheerfulness.  When  there  is  hindrance  of  activities, 
through  over-taxation  of  organic  processes,  painful  feelings  are 
apt  to  arise ;  or  over-taxation  of  the  mental  or  emotional 
faculties  leads  to  defective  organic  processes.  According  to 
Bain,  pleasure  is  connected  with  an  increase,  pain  with  an 
.abatement  of  the  vital  functions.* 

*  Spencer  says,  the  pleasurable  activity  of  any  organ  (e.ff.,  the  palate, 
coincides  in  general  with  what  is  beneficial  or  life  preserving  to  the  organ- 
ism. He  regards  pain  as  the  correlative  of  actions  injurious  to  the  organism, 
whilst  pleasure  is  the  correlative  of  actions  conducive  to  its  welfare.  He 
also  holds  it  to  be  an  inevitable  deduction  from  the  hypothesis  of  evolution, 
that  races  of  sentient  creatures  could  have  come  into  existence  under  no 
other  conditions.  Psychologically,  the  intrinsic  nature  of  pleasures  and 
pains  will  ever  prove  vexed  questions.  In  the  meantime,  we  must  agree 
witli  Sjjencer,  who  believes  that  while  pleasures  and  pains  are  partly  consti- 
tuted of  those- local  and  conspicuous  elements  of  feeling  directly  aroused  by 
■  special  stimuli,  they  are  largely,  if  not  mainly,  composed  of  secondary 


TONE   OF  FEELING.  383 

Before  entering  more  fully  into  a  consideration  of  the 
phj-siological  theory  of  the  feelings,  it  is  important  to  recognise, 
that  although  the  feelings  primarily  depend  upon  external 
agents,  yet  they  are  totally  disparate  in  kind  and  degree.  From 
a  comparative  point  of  view,  we  know  that  organisation  in 
structure  has  much  to  do  with  the  transmission  of  stimuli,  and 
that  subjective  effects  are  qualitativel}^  and  quantitatively 
determined  in  some  unknown  way  by  objective  stimuli ;  but 
he  nature  of  these  objective  agencies  are  unknown.  Spencer 
regards  the  peripherally-initiated  feelings  that  arise  in  internal 
organs,  and  the  centrally-initiated  feelings  or  emotions,  as  having, 
also,  their  several  forms  of  relativit}-.  '*  Thus,  the  truth  that 
subjective  consciousness  determined  as  it  is,  wholly  by  sub- 
jective nature,  state,  and  circumstances,  is  no  measure  of 
objective  existence.  What  we  are  conscious  of  as  properties 
of  matter  are  but  subjective  affections  produced  by  objective 
agencies  that  are  imknown  and  unkno^\■able.  All  the  sensa- 
tions produced  in  us  by  environing  things,  are  but  symbols  of 
actions  out  of  ourselves,  the  nature  of  which  we  cannot  even 
conceive."*  Further,  he  concludes,  as  an  obvious  corollary  from 
physiological  truths,  that  it  is  inconceivable  that  any  resem- 
blance exists  between  the  subjective  effect  and  that  objective 
cause  which  arouses  it  through  the  intermediation  of  changes 
resembling  neither.  "Not  a  step  can  be  taken  towards  the 
truth,  that  our  states  of  consciousness  are  the  only  things  we 
can  know,  without  postulating  an  unknoAvn  something  beyond 
consciousness.  The  only  thinkable  proposition  is,  that  the 
active  antecedent  of  each  primary  feeling  exists  independently 
of  consciousness."'  Having  fully  grasped  the  truth,  that  the 
fefelings  are  subjective  phenomena,  and  that  they  do  not  corre- 
spond, or  resemble,  any  interactions  or  connections  between 
outer  agents,  the  student  will  be  better  able  to  understand  that 
the  feelings  themselves  are  for  us  nothing  but  symbols  of 
agencies  which  are  beyond,  or  antecedent  to,  states  of  con- 
sciousness. 

In  order  that  feelings  may  be  revived,  certain  fit  states  of 

rleirents  of  feeling  aroused  indirectly  by  diffused  stimulation  of  the  nervous 
^ystem. — ("  Inductions  of  Psychology,""  p.  128.) 

*  '"Epitome  of  Spencer's  Synthetic  Philosojihy, "  by  Collins,  p.  ?07. 


384  FEELINGS. 

the  organism  are  essential.  Thus,  we  know  from  clinico-patho- 
logical  observations,  that  defects  in  the  circulator}'-  system  may 
abnormally  hinder  or  promote  the  revivability  of  feelings.  An 
active  circulation  and  a  blood  which  contains  the  required 
materials  may  favour  the  revivability ;  or  a  defective  circulation 
and  poor  blood  may  effect  an  increase  of  revivability,  but  with 
a  distortion  of  the  relations  between  feelings.  In  acute 
maniacal  states  the  feelings  revived,  and  the  consciousness  of 
their  relations,  are  often  morbidly  increased ;  but  the  quantita- 
tive increase  of  the  former  more  commonly  acts  as  a  deterrent 
to  the  latter,  especially  when  the  latter  are  of  the  same  nature 
as  the  former. 

Thus  far  we  have  seen  that  the  physiological  counter- 
part or  actual  basis  of  the  feelings  is  at  present  little  deter- 
mined. We  know  no  special  brain-centres  which  are  concerned 
with  the  emotions ;  nor  do  we  obtain  any  knowledge  from  the 
scientific  investigations  upon  the  presentations  of  sense  or  the 
time  relations  of  mental  phenomena.  * 

The  attempt  to  give  a  physiological  explanation  of  the 
origin  and  nature  of  the  feelings,  has  proved  unsatisfactory,  and, 
as  we  have  seen,  such  an  attempt  is  valueless,  because  the 
purely  mental  states  or  "  associative  ideas  "  cannot  be  eliminated 
from  consideration.  The  mere  consciousness  of  certain  con- 
ditions of  the  nervous  elements,  or  the  feeling  of  furtherance  or 
hindrance  of  activities,  does  not  form  any  really  conceivable 
basis  for  the  relations  between  the  siibjective  and  objective 
facts  at  our  disposal.  Ladd  regards  the  theory,  which  makes 
feeling  a  derived  consciousness  dependent  upon  the  relations 
of  the  ideas  as  furthering  or  checking  each  other,  as  unsatis- 
factory. Nor  does  he  admit  that  feeling  is  a  secondary  or 
derived  form  of  consciousness.  Horwicz,t  Lotze,|  and  Ladd 
uphold,  that  feeling  is  one  of  the  most  primitive  and 
unanalysable  of  mental  activities.  The  latter  writer  states, 
that  feeling  is  an  original  and  underived  form  of  consciousness, 

*  Ladd  says,  that,  "  On  these  matters,  nothing  but  the  greatest  caution 
is  fitted  to  inspire  confidence ;  the  supreme  wisdom  is  not  infrequently  a 
frank  confession  of  ignorance  or  uncertainty." 

t  "Psychol.  Analysen,"  i.  p.  168f. 

X  "  Medecin.  Psychologic,''  p.  235f. 


TONE  OF  FEELING.  385 

or  mode  of  the  operation  of  conscious  mind.     "It  can  neither 
be  defined  by,  nor  deduced  from,  sensation  or  ideation." 

Attention  has  been  given  to  the  question  as  to  whether  the 
same  nervous  elements  which  have  to  do  with  sensations  are 
also  concerned  with  the  accompanying  tone  of  feeling.  Lotze* 
believes  that  sensation  and  feeling  are  due  to  two  forms  of 
processes  in  the  same  nervous  elements.  Shiff  and  others 
believe  that  nervous  impulses  resulting  in  pain  travel  by  more 
or  less  distinct  paths.  Both  views  may  be  more  or  less  correct, 
but  the  difference  between  the  perception  of  pain  physically 
occasioned,  and  the  tone  of  feeling  accompanying  sensations  is 
so  great  psychologically,  that  for  our  purpose  the  contention  is 
of  little  value.  For  the  present  we  must  confess  that  our 
knowledge  of  the  physical  basis  of  pleasurable  or  painful  feeling 
is  sadly  deficient;  it  remains  to  be  shown,  whether  a  separate 
apparatus  is  involved  or  not.  That  a  separate  mechanism  of 
end-organs,  conducting  nerve-tracts,  and  central  areas  exists  for 
the  feelings  seems  improbable,  and  the  supporters  of  this  theory 
will  have  to  develop  a  cerebral  association  scheme  for  the  re- 
vivability  and  relativity  of  the  feelings  in  relation  to,  and  yet 
distinct  from,  the  ideational  scheme.  To  account  for  the  tone 
of  feeling  which  accompanies  sensations,  and  which  is  derived 
secondarily  from  associative  ideas,  physiology  is  silent;  nor  do 
we  deem  it  probable  that  this  part  of  the  subject  can  ever  be 
investigated  with  positive  results. 

The  consideration  of  the  affections  and  the  emotions,  or  pas- 
sions, involves  at  least  three  important  particulars.!  (1)  The 
characteristic  feeling  which  distinguishes  each ;  (2)  its  relation 
to  the  train  of  ideas,  and  the  changes  induced  in  it  by  the 
ideas  ;  (3)  the  relations  to  the  different  bodily  organs,  and  the 
reflex  effect  of  the  changes  in  these  organs  upon  both  the 
feelings  and  the  ideas.  We  know  that  there  is  a  psycholoo-ical 
connection  between  perceptions  and  feelings,  but  when  we 
attempt  to  establish  a  physical  basis  for  the  union  of  the  two 
series  of  facts,  Ave  utterly  fail  and  get  beyond  our  depth. 

"Speaking    generally,"  says    Spencer,    "feelings    and   the 
relations  between  feelings  correspond  to  nerve-corpuscles  and 
the   fibres  which   connect   nerve-corpuscles,   or,  rather,  to  the 
*  Op.  cit.  pp.  245  fif.  t  Ladd,  "Phys.  Psych.,"  p.  316. 


386  FEELINGS. 

molecular  clianges,  of  wliicli  nerve-corpuscles  are  the  seats,  and 
the  molecular  changes  transmitted  through  fibres.  The 
psychical  relation  between  two  feelings  answers  to  the 
physical  relation  between  two  disturbed  portions  of  grey 
matter,  which  are  put  in  such  direct  or  indirect  communica- 
tion that  some  discharge  takes  place  between  them." 

Mercier  regards  the  physical  substratum  of  feeling  as  a  very 
different  matter. 

"  It  is  the  discharge  itself.  The  discharge  at  one  end  of  a  nerve- 
path  is  the  physical  substratum  of  one  feehng.  The  discharge  at  the 
other  end  of  the  nerve-path  is  the  physical  substratum  of  another 
feeling,  and  the  current  from  the  one  position  to  the  other  is  the  phy- 
sical substratum  of  a  thought.  Now  the  current  is  fully  accounted  for 
by  the  discharges.  A  pressure  at  one  position  plus  or  minus  the  pres- 
sure at  the  other  is  sufficient  (other  things  being  equal)  to  determine 
the  setting  of  a  current  from  the  one  to  the  other.  Here,  then,  the 
physical  substratum  of  thought  is  complete.  It  needs  upon  these  lines 
no  further  elucidation.  But  with  the  substratum  of  feeling  it  is  other- 
wise. The  current  along  the  nerve-fibre  cannot  set  up  the  discharge  in 
both  positions,  and  may  not  initiate  it  in  either.  Whence,  then,  comes 
the  one  discharge,  and  whither  does  the  other  go  ?  Proximately,  the 
one  may  be  set  up  by  discharges  coming  from  other  positions,  and  the 
other  may  go  to  set  up  similar  discharges  elsewhere,  but  ultimately 
these  can  be  l3ut  one  source  and  one  outfall  for  every  discharge.  Traced 
to  its  origin,  every  discharge  of  grey  matter  is  set  up  directly,  or  with 
more  or  less  remote  indirectness,  by  currents  coming  into  the  grey 
matter  from  without — by  currents  set  up  by  the  impact  of  external 
forces  on  the  surface  of  the  organism.  Traced  to  its  destination,  every 
discharge  of  grey  matter,  with  which  the  psychologist  is  directly 
concerned,  expends  itself  in  producing  or  altering  muscular  con- 
traction— in  action  on  the  environment,  or  in  modification  of  such 
action.  And  the  physical  substratum  of  feeling  is  a  nervous  discharge. 
Hence  we  are  compelled  to  affirm  that  every  feeling  is  conditioned, 
either  by  action  of  the  environment  on  the  organism,  or  by  action  of 
the  organism  on  the  environment ;  and  this  leads  us  to  the  expression 
of  which  we  are  in  search.  If  the  foregoing  account  of  the  physical 
substratum  of  feeling  and  of  the  relations  of  feeling  to  thought  both 
when  viewed  introspectively,  and  when  viewed  as  correspondence  are 
correct,  then  it  follows,  that  while  thought  is  the  estabhshment  of  a 
relation,  feeling  is  the  occurrence  of  a  state  ;  and  that  while  thought  is 
the  correspondence  of  a  relation  in  the  organism  with  a  relation  in  the 
environment,  feeling  is  the  correspondence  of  a  state  in  the  organism 
with  an  interaction  between  the  organism  and  its  environment."* 

*  "  The  Nervous  System  and  the  Mind,"  p.  265. 


TONE  OF  FEELIXG.  ob7 

This  account  of  the  physical  basis  of  the  feelings  must  be 
accepted  \^ith  reservation.  It  would  appear  that  feeling  is  to  be 
regarded  as  the  symbol  of  an  antecedent  organic  state,  and  that 
this  organic  state  is  determined  by  discharges  ^vithin  the  grey 
matter.  Of  the  nature  and  direction  of  these  discharges  Ave 
are  left  in  complete  ignorance.  The  mere  terms  "  current"  and 
"  discharge"  are  held  to  be  sufficientl}''  explicit  in  themselves 
to  warrant  the  construction  of  such  a  physical  formula. 

Let  the  student  set  himself  the  task  of  explaining  in  detail 
the  phj^sical  formulge  of  the  so-called  "  higher  feelings  "  in- 
volved in  the  contemplation  of  such  complex  reactions  of  the 
mind  as  found  in  the  utilitarianism  of  Mill,  or  the  intuition- 
alism of  Calderwood.  Then  let  him  reduce  to  terms  of 
discharge  and  nerve-currents  those  feelings  associated  with 
moral  judgments,  laws  of  individual  life,  and  moral  relations, 
conscience,  duty  or  obligation,  biological  or  psychological 
evolution,  or  the  ethical  philosophy  of  first  cause,  self-deter- 
mination, self-realisation,  or  finite  existence.  The  attempt  M-ill 
be  made  through  the  medium  of  the  intellectual  operations, 
and  it  will  be  discovered  that  the  higher  feelings  are  com- 
pounded of  ideas,  and  that,  therefore,  the  elementary  components 
of  these  feelings  must  be  the  elementary  components  of  ideas. 
Then  the  student  will  find  that  he  is  no  better  off  than  before, 
and  that  he  has  to  resort  to  his  imagination  for  the  other 
details.  "VVe  know  nothing  about  the  correspondence  of  inner 
and  outer  relations,  nor  do  we  know  how  one  series  of  changes 
affects  the  other  series.  Tone  of  feeling  is  a  psychological  fact. 
The  correspondence  of  external  and  organismal  processes  with 
that  tone  of  feeling  is  inexplicable,  and  the  nature  of  the 
external  and  organismal  processes  is  a  matter  of  pure  specula- 
tion. 

Many  of  the  Eesthetic  feelings  have  been  investigated  from 
a  physiological  standpoint,  and  a  rational  conception  of  their 
origin  and  nature  has  been  sought  by  the  scientific  study  of  the 
various  presentations  of  sense.  Wundt*  has  demonstrated, 
however,  that  many  of  the  aesthetic  feelings  do  not  correspond 
to  the  sense-feelings,  nor  are  they  the  outcome  of  mere  com- 
pounding of  such  feelings.  ^Esthetic  feelings,  according  to 
*  "Phys.  Psych.,"  ii.  p.  179  f. 


388  FEELINGS. 

Ladd,  may  be  said  to  arise  from  the  manner  of  the  combination 
of  sensuous  feelings;  time  and  space  furnish  the  framework  in 
"SA'hich  they  are  arranged. 

The  feeling  of  effort  associated  with  the  performance  of 
certain  acts  has  been  the  subject  of  much  controversy  of  late. 
We  have  already  alluded  to  the  anatomical  relations  of  the  so- 
called  musciTlar  sense,  so  that  it  only  remains  for  us  to  discuss 
some  of  its  central  relations.  Miiller*  regarded  the  nervous 
process  to  be  purely  central,  and  to  consist  in  an  eflFerent 
discharge.  Bain  and  Wundt  have  adopted  somewhat  similar 
views.  Ferrier  and  many  others,  however,  believe  that  the 
feeling  of  effort  is  a  complex  of  afferent  sensations.  From 
the  observations  already  made,  we  are  inclined  to  adopt  the 
latter  view,  and  to  believe  that  the  feeling  of  effort,  with  its 
tone  of  feeling,  is  mainly  determined  by  peripherally  incited 
afferent  excitations.  The  further  consideration  of  this  subject 
will  be  taken  up  when  we  discuss  the  phenomenon  of  the  will. 

Paulhant  believes  that  the  emotions  are  due  to  an  inhibition 
of  impulsive  tendencies.  James  points  out,  however,  that  some 
kinds  of  emotion — namely,  uneasiness,  annoyance,  distress — -do 
occwY  when  definite  impulsive  tendencies  are  checked,  but 
that  other  emotions  are  themselves  primary  impulsive  tenden- 
cies of  a  diffusive  sort  (involving  a  multiplicity  of  phenomena), 
and  just  in  proportion  as  more  and  more  of  these  multiple 
tendencies  are  checked,  and  replaced  by  some  few  narrow  forms 
of  discharge,  does  the  original  emotion  tend  to  disappear.^: 
Darwin,  Spencer,  James,  and  others  regard  the  physical 
expressions  of  the  emotions  as  being  weakened  revivals  of 
movements  which  formerly-  were  iiseful  and  necessary  for  the 
defence  and  survival  of  the  subject.  Another  principle, 
mentioned  by  Darwin,  and  emphasised  by  James,  is  called 
"  The  principle  of  reacting  similarly  to  analogous-feeling 
stimuli."  The  latter  writer,  in  summing  up  the  whole  question 
of  the  genesis  of  the  emotions,  says,  "  We  see  the  reason  for  a 
few  emotional  reactions;  for  others  a  possible  species  of  reason 
may  be    guessed,   but   others   remain  for  which  no   plausible 

*  "Physiologie  d.  Menschen,  ii.  p.  500. 

t  "Les  Plienomenes  Affectifs  et  les  Lois  de  leur  Axiparition." 

t  Op.  cit.,  p.  477. 


TONE  OF  FEELING.  889 

reason  can  even  be  conceived.  These  may  be  reactions  which 
are  purely  mechanical  results  of  the  way  in  \\-hich  our  nervous 
centres  are  framed — reactions  which,  although  permanent  in  us 
no\\',  may  be  called  accidental  as  far  as  their  origin  goes.  In 
fact,  in  an  organism  as  complex  as  the  nervous  system,  there- 
must  be  many  such  reactions,  incidental  to  others,  involved  for 
utility's  sake,  but  which  woiild  never  themselves  have  been 
evolved  independently,  for  any  utility  they  might  possess.  Sea- 
sickness, the  love  of  music,  of  the  various  intoxicants,  nay,  the 
entire  aesthetic  life  of  man.  we  have  already  traced  to  this 
accidental  origin.  It  would  be  foolish  to  suppose  that  none  of 
the  reactions  called  emotional  could  have  arisen  in  this  ^y««^•<"- 
accidental  ^\'ay." 

That  the  movements  involved  in  expression  often  give  a 
clue  to  the  inner  mental  life,  is  perfect!}'  true  ;  but  the  corre- 
spondence between  physiognomical  and  mental  phenomena  is 
variable,  and  physical  expressions  may  be  entirely  independent 
of  any  prevailing  tone  of  feeling  or  emotion.  Meynert  argues, 
that  the  movements  of  expression  var)^  with  the  emotions  ; 
therefore  these  movements  must  be  either  of  an  aggressive  or 
repulsive  character.  According  to  this  observer,  physiognomical 
expression  is  chiefly  a  matter  of  secondary  presentations,  which 
are  evolved,  like  dream-presentations,  during  the  condition  of 
partial  sleep,  and  that  expression  is  dependent  altogether  upon 
the  simultaneous  excitation  of  such  secondary  presentations  as 
are  associated  with  oiir  emotions  or  our  thoughts. 

The  complicated  system  of  physical  expression,  comprising 
facial  movement,  attitude,  gesture,  and  intonation,  has  been 
elaborated  chiefly  by  Bain,  to  whose  labours  in  this  direction 
the  reader  is  referred  for  detailed  explanations.  Space  will  not 
permit  us  to  take  any  further  account  of  the  innumerable  con- 
troversies which  have  arisen  in  connection  with  the  physical 
occasions  of  the  emotions.  It  must  suffice,  for  the  present,  to 
recognise  that  all  the  explanations  hitherto  rendered  by  the 
workers  in  this  field  have  been  as  general  hypotheses  of  oj)era- 
tive  potentialities.  The  accounts  of  structures  and  their  related 
dynamical  operations,  though  meagi'e  in  the  extreme,  and  the 
constitution  of  the  physical  scheme,  expressed  in  terms  of 
matter  and  modes  of  motion,  may  widen    the  range  of  our 


390  FEELINGS. 

imagination ;  but  y^'e  cannot,  in  the  light  of  the  above  generali- 
sations, satisfy  ourselves  that  we  have  in  reality  made  much 
advance  since  .  the  time  when  Aristotle,  with  his  wonderful 
psychological  insight,  anticipated  the  modern  empirical  school 
of  thought,  and  promulgated  the  doctrine  that  all  knoMdedge 
was  to  be  traced  to  sense  and  association. 

Varieties  of  Feelings. — When  we  attempt  to  dissociate 
the  rank  feelings  from  all  bodily  or  sentient  experiences,  we 
find  that  we  are  without  material  to  explain  their  genesis,  and, 
moreover,  the  necessary  conditions  which  express  their  nature 
are  absent  also.  That  is  to  say,  we  so  habitually  refer  to  the 
bodily  accompaniments  or  expressions  of  the  feelings  when  we 
experience  a  state  of  feeling,  that  the  two  (the  mental  state 
and  the  bodily  expression)  cannot  be  dissociated.  The  fact 
that  we  do  not  know  hoAv  our  emotions  are  conditioned  by 
nervous  processes,  need  not  stand  in  the  way  of  our  belief,  that 
each  emotion  is  in  some  way  or  other  the  result  of  a  sum  of 
activities  or  physiological  processes.  The  causal  relation  of 
emotions  is  beyond  us,  and  when  we  enumerate  or  describe 
their  varieties,  we  do  not  impfy  more  than,  that  certain  mental 
states  have  certain  bodily  accompaniments  which  undoubtedly 
derive  their  reflex  effects  from  organic  changes  peripherally  or 
centrally  initiated. 

When  ^ye  take  into  account  the  infinite  nupiber  and  variety 
of  reflex  acts  which  may  occur  in  the  adjustment  of  our  physical 
organism  to  its  environment,  we  see  that  the  number  of 
emotions  symbolic  of  that  adjustment  is  without  limit.  Among 
the  insane,  we  meet  with  every  variety  of  emotional  accom- 
paniment due  to  absence,  exaltation,  or  perversion  of  reflex 
activity.  Lange  has  pointed  out,  that  some  men  are  dumb, 
instead  of  talkative,  with  joy.  Fright  sometimes  drives  the 
blood  into  the  head  of  its  victim,  instead  of  making  him  pale. 
Grief  may  cause  an  individual  to  run  restlessly  about  lamenting 
instead  of  sitting  down  and  becoming  mute. 

From  what  we  have  already  said,  the  student  will  no  doubt 
agree,  that  anj-  one  classification  of  the  emotions  or  feelings  is 
as  useful  and  as  natural  as  any  other,  if  it  only  serves  some 
purpose.  It  may  l^e  advisable  here,  however,  to  mention  briefly 
some  of  the  methods  of  classification  adopted  by  various  writers. 


VARIETIES  OF  FEELINGS.  391 

Sully  classifies  the  varieties  of  feeling  into  two  main 
divisions,  as  follows  : — 

1.  Sense  feelings. — (1)  Those  arising  immediately  from  a 
process  of  nerve-stimulation,  more  particularly  the  excitation 
of  sensory  (incarrying)  nerves  ;  and  (2)  those  depending  on 
some  mode  of  mental  activity. 

2.  Emotions  and  their  classes  (arranged  in  a  series  or 
ascending  scale,  according  to  their  degree  or  complexity,  or 
representativeness.). — The  order  of  their  development  is  :  (1)  The 
individual  or  personal  emotions  (the  pleasures  of  hope,  success, 
reputation,  etc.  ;  (2)  the  sympathetic  feelings  (the  participation 
in  others'  pleasuraljle  and  painful  experiences,  and  kindliness 
or  benevolence  of  disposition  generally) ;  (3)  the  sentiments, 
(a)  intellectual,  (h)  aesthetic,  (c)  moral. 

Herbert  Spencer  divides  the  emotions  according  to  the 
degree  of  intellectual  activity  or  representativeness  involved. 

1.  Presentative  feelings. — Ordinarily  called  sensations. 
Those  mental  states  in  which,  instead  of  regarding  a  corporeal 
impression  as  of  this  or  that  kind,  or  as  located  here  or  there, 
we  contemplate  it  in  itself  as  pleasure  or  pain — e.g.,  in  inhaling 
a  perfume. 

2.  Presentative-representajtive  feelings. — A  sensation,  group 
of  sensations,  or  group  of  sensations  and  ideas,  arouses  a  vast 
aggregation  of  represented  sensations,  partly  of  individual 
experience,  but  chiefly  deeper  than  individual  experience, 
and  consequently  indefinite — e.g.,  terror. 

3.  Representative  feelings. — Revived  sense-feelings.  Com- 
prehending the  ideas  of  the  feelings  above  classed,  when  they 
are  called  up  apart  from  the  appropriate  external  excitements. 
The  feelings  so  represented  may  either  be  simple  ones  of  the 
kinds  first  named  (as  tastes,  colours,  sounds,  etc.),  or  they 
may  be  involved  ones  of  the  kinds  last  named  (as  poetical 
fancies,  etc.). 

4.  Re-^'epresentative  feelings. — Involving  a  more  complex  or 
abstract  form  of  representation  (as  the  sentiment  of  property  or 
of  justice).  More  complex  sentient  states  that  are  less  the  direct 
results  of  external  excitements  than  the  indirect  or  reflex  results 
of  them.  It  is  the  abstract  of  many  concrete  representations, 
and  so  is  re-representative  (imagination). 


392  FEELINGS. 

Spencer  classifies  feelings  from  a  standpoint  mainljr  sub- 
jective. Bain  objects  to  Spencer's  system,  and  arranges  the 
feelings  with  reference  to  the  external  circumstances  with 
which  they  correspond.  Viewed  subjectively,  feelings  have 
been  described  according  as  they  are  founded  on  distinctions 
between  their  qualities.  The  following  are  some  of  the  chief 
methods  of  classification  : — * 

Appetites,  desires,  affections  (Reid). 

Subsidiary  faculties,  and  elaborative  faculty  (Hamilton). 

Sensual  feeling,  intellectual  feeling  (Kant). 

Harmony,  conflict  (Herbart). 

Affections,  moods,  passions  (Wundt). 

Direct,  reflective,  and  imaginative  emotions  (Hodgson). 

Coupland,  following  in  the  lines  of  Spencer,  bases  his 
classification  on  the  degree  of  representativeness  of  the  under- 
lying cognitive  fact.  He  speaks  of  feelings  which  arise  in 
connection  with  presentations  known  as  "  corporeal,"  those 
termed  representative  or  associative,  and  those  re-representative 
states  where  every  vestige  of  personal  reference  has  been 
eliminated,  and  the  pleasure  attaches  to  an  object  of  the  pure 
intellect.  Mercier,  objecting  to  the  classification  of  Spencer  as 
"  too  vague  to  be  of  any  real  service,"  has  constructed  a  scheme 
which,  in  our  opinion,  is  of  still  less  practical  value,  inasmuch 
as  it  involves  many  assumptions  which  are  doubtful  psycho- 
logically. Ladd  has  severely  criticised  Mercier's  scheme,  and 
rightly  condemns  its  "  uncouth "  terminology,  artificial  dis- 
tinctions, and  cross  divisions. 

For  students'  purposes,  however,  we  give  his  scheme  which 
is  based  upon  the  main  classes  of  interactions  between  the' 
environment  and  the  organism,  viz. : — 

I.  Those  which  primarily  affect  the  conservation  of  the 
organism. 

II,  Those  which  primarily  affect  the  perpetuation  of  the  race. 

III.  Those  which  primarily  affect  the  common  welfare. 

IV.  Those  which  primarilj^  aflect  the  welfare  of  others. 
V.  Those  which  are  neither  conservative  nor  destructive. 

VI.  Feelings   corresponding  with    relations   between  inter- 
actions. 

*  Mercier,  "The  Nervous  System  and  the  Mind,"  p.  286. 


DISOEDEES  OF  THE  FEELINGS  AND  EMOTIONS.         393 

Before  entering  upon  the  question  of  the  morbid  emotional 
states,  it  is  essential  that  we  should  better  understand  the 
subjective  nature  of  some  of  the  complex  feelings,  such  as 
sympathy,  and  the  intellectual,  a3sthetic,  and  moral  sentiments. 
Sympathy  involves  the  noting  of  objective  facts  in  others,  and 
the  comparison  of  the  objective  signs,  with  the  like  conditions, 
in  ourselves — i.e.,  sympathj^  involves  the  constructive  imagina- 
tion of  the  feelings  of  others  in  ourselves.  Thus,  it  depends 
upon  the  quickness  of  our  observation,  the  nature  and  extent  of 
our  own  feelings,  and  the  imaginativeness  we  possess.  Syiupatliy 
is  further  aided  hj  similarity  as  to  temperament,  experience, 
and  age  between  the  objects  and  ourselves.  Association,  daily 
concourse,  and  personal  liking  also  favour  it. 

The  intellectual  operations  and  the  sentiments  associated 
with  them  may  be  impartial  or  egoistic.  The  impartial  sub- 
merge their  individuality  in  the  contemplation  of  the  object ; 
the  latter  exalt  their  individuality,  and  tend  to  render  their 
contemplation  of  the  object  imperfect.  For  illustrations  we 
have  only  to  glance  at  some  of  the  scientific  and  philosophical 
literature  of  the  day. 

The  a3sthetic  sentiments  are  associated  with  presentations 
derived  through  the  medium  of  the  special  senses.  Their 
elements  have  been  regarded  as  sensuous,  perceptual,  correla- 
tive, and  associative. 

The  moral  sentiments  have  been  divided  into  those  which 
are  concerned  with  social  questions  of  obligation,  and  conduct 
in  life.  It  is  impossible  here  to  discuss  the  question  as 
to  the  origin  of  moral  sentiments,  for  we  cannot  enter  upon 
such  extensive  subjects  as  those  of  intuitionalism  or  utili- 
tarianism. The  controvers}^  as  to  whether  the  moral  sentiments 
are  the  outgrowth  of  simpler  feelings,  or  whether  they  are 
entirely  dependent  upon  the  modelling  of  environmental  con- 
dition, is  one  which  belongs  to  the  domain  of  the  Philosophy 
of  Ethics. 

DISORDEES  OF  THE  FEELINGS  AND  EMOTIONS. 

Changes  or  disturbances  in  some  part  of  the  organism  itself 
may  act  as  primary  factors   in   determining  morbid  feelings. 


394        DISORDERS  OF  THE  FEELINGS  AND  EMOTIONS. 

The  organic  sense-feelings  are  usually  vague  as  to  their  nature 
and  locality  ;  thus  differing  from  the  feelings  which  arise  ni 
connection  with  stimulation  of  the  special  senses.  In  conditions 
such  as  eiqyhoria  and  its  opposite,  malaise,  the  sum  of  all  the 
organic  feelings  constitutes  their  basis.  The  general  feeling  of 
well-being  or  ill-being  has  much  to  do  with  the  dominant  tone 
of  feeling  or  mental  tone  at  any  one  time. 

AVe  have  already  alluded  to  the  temperaments,  and  we  have 
noted  that  each  type  is  characterised  by  its  dominant  tones  of 
feeling.  We  have  also  noted  that  highly  emotional  states  tend 
to  interfere  with  the  due  activity  of  intellectual  processes. 
Some  individuals  are  incapable  of  effective  intellectual  work, 
owing  to  excessive  emotional  accompaniments.  Others,  again, 
have  little  intellectual  emotion,  and  follow  their  pursuits 
with  little  or  no  emotional  tone  of  feeling.  The  close  con- 
nection between  feeling  and  intellectual  activity,  and  their 
mutual  furtherance  and  hindrance,  is  liable  to  certain  excep- 
tions. Thus,  some  individuals  possess  finely  developed  intel- 
lectual activity  with  the  keenest  power  of  abstract  thought, 
who,  nevertheless,  are  deficient  in  one  or  all  of  the  higher 
emotions,  such  as  the  moral  sentiment,  or  the  love  of  truth. 

In  psj^chological  works  much  attention  has  been  devoted  to 
the  correlations  between  states  of  feeling  and  certain  bodilj^ 
accompaniments,  and  innumerable  examples  have  been  given 
of  the  bodily  manifestations  with  which  the  mental  states  are 
supposed  to  coincide.  Many  writers  uphold  the  view,  that 
when  the  physical  manifestations  of  a  feeling  are  cut  off,  the 
emotional  excitement  is  greatly  checked,  and  tends  to  subside. 
That  this  holds  true  in  some  forms  of  melancholia  with  agitation, 
is  evidenced  by  the  fact,  that  mechanical  restraint  is  often 
attended  by  relief  of  the  mental  distress.  Such  patients  not 
uncommonly  request  that  their  actions  may  be  restrained,  and 
they  volunteer  the  statement  that  the  mental  relief  is  the  result 
of  the  inhibition  of  their  physical  activities.  In  resistive 
melancholia,  on  the  other  hand,  any  attempt  to  control  the  move- 
ments sometimes  results  in  an  increase  of  the  mental  distress. 

The  relation  of  the  expression  of  misery  to  the  actual 
existing  state  of  mind  in  an  insane  individiial  is  always 
interesting.     Those  physical  changes  which  have  concomitant 


DISORDERS  OF  THE  FEELINGS  AND  EMOTIONS.         395 

sense-feelings,  including  the  movements  of  expression  which 
are'  partly  instinctive,  partly  accpiired,  not  infrecjuently  outlast 
the  emotion  in  duration,  so  that  the  expressions  themselves 
become  continuous  or  automatic,  whilst  the  mind  derives  its 
emotional  tone  from  other  sources.  Everyone  who  has  to  deal 
A^ith  the  insane  can  recall  instances  of  movements  expressive  of 
misery  occurring  coincidently  with  pleasurable  emotions.  In 
such  cases,  the  continuation  of  the  emotion  and  of  its  expression 
along  the  same  mental  and  physical  lines  respectively,  result 
in  a  wearing  out  or  subsidence  of  the  former,  and  an  automatic 
or  unconscious  repetition  of  the  latter.  Spencer  believ^es,  that 
as  the  feeling  rises  in  intensity  it  engages  muscles  of  larger  and 
larger  calibre.  Yolkmann*  points  out,  that  the  uncontrolled 
expression  of  a  feeling  tends  to  expedite  its  subsidence.  This  he 
explains  by  the  consideration,  that  the  movements  caiTied  out 
in  this  case  cause  a  loss  of  intensity  in  the  sensations  accom- 
panying the  emotion.  We  are  unable  to  confirm  the  theorj^  of 
Bain,  that  pleasure  is  connected  with  an  increase,  and  pain 
A\ith  a  decrease,  in  the  vital  energies.  One  has  only  to  walk 
throuo'h  the  wards  of  an  asvlum  to  arrive  at  the  conclusion, 
that  euphoria  and  malaise  are  not  proportionate  to  vital  activi- 
ties ;  at  least,  not  so  far  as  the  expressions  of  the  vital  activities 
are  concerned. 

In  the  insane,  many  emotional  states  are  found  to  be 
associated  with  some  delusion  which  has  obviously  been  deter- 
mined by  morbid  physical  conditions.  Thus,  one  individual 
now  in  Bethlem  is  depressed  because  he  believes  that  he  was 
formerly  made  of  chalk,  but  now,  since  taking  some  vinegar. 
he  is  "  only  in  solution,"  and  fears  he  may  be  emptied  away. 
This  patient  was  a  chemist,  and  was  aware  that  he  had  taken 
chalk  mixture  on  former  occasions.  In  such  instances,  the 
Cjuestion  naturally  arises.  How  far  may  the  character  of  the 
delusion  be  attributed  to  the  emotional  tone,  or  vice  versa  ?  We 
have  already  seen  that  emotional  tone  in  the  insane  can  scarcely 
be  conceived  upon  Wundt's  scale  of  intensity  of  excitation,  nor 
can  we  elucidate  the  occasion  of  painful  states  by  an  analysis 
of  stimuli,  appropriate  or  otherwise.  In  general,  we  conform 
to  the  law,  that  pleasure  depends  on  a  due  balance  between  the 
*  "Lehrbucli  der  Psycliologie,"  vol.  ii.  §  129. 


o96        DISORDERS  OF  THE  FEELINGS  AND  EMOTIONS. 

process  of  stimulation  on  the  one  hand,  and  that  of  reinvigora- 
tion  on  the  other ;  or  between  the  expenditure  and  the  accumu- 
lation of  energy ;  but  when  we  view  the  morbid  states  of  feeling 
arising  in  connection  Math  exhaustive  diseases,  and  note  the 
insane  euphoria  and  exaltation  that  accompany  the  progressive 
depression  of  the  vital  functions,  we  feel  that  there  is  something 
more  than  the  accumulation  and  transformation  of  potential 
energy  into  living  force. 

The  law  of  Weber  in  relation  to  the  ratio  of  increase 
of  stimulus  to  that  of  sensation,  has  been  pointed  out  by 
Fechner  as  bearing  a  certain  analogy  to  the  ratio  of  in- 
crease of  pleasurable  stimukis  to  increase  of  pleasure.  In  the 
melancholiac,  the  greater  the  depression  tlie  greater  is  the 
amount  of  depressing  influence  necessary  in  order  to  produce  a 
perceptible  increase.  In  some  hysterical  and  hypochondriacal 
persons  the  accommodation  of  the  mind  to  painful  impressions, 
in  time  results  in  an  acquired  liking  for  what  was  formerly 
disagreeable.  Thus,  just  as  the  sound  of  the  bag-pipes  may 
primarily  affect  us  in  a  disagreeable  manner,  but  ultimately 
become  pleasurable,  so  the  experience  of  a  painful  emotion  may 
by  repetition  become  essential  to,  and  form  part  of,  a  mental 
state  that  is  pleasurable.  It  is  familiar  to  everyone  how  the 
melancholiac  or  hypochondriac  will  "  hug  "  his  delusion,  and 
resent  any  cheerful  interpretation  of  his  feelings.  With  the 
repetition  of  sensations  and  ideas,  with  their  accompanying 
tones  of  feeling,  be  they  either  pleasurable  or  painful,  there 
arises  hahituaiion ;  and  removal  of  the  customary  stimuli  is 
attended  by  a  corresponding  want  or  negative  pain,  which  has 
been  termed  "  craving."  The  effects  of  change  and  habit  on 
pleasures  and  pains  form  an  interesting  study,  but  one  to  which, 
in  a  work  of  this  description,  we  are  unable  to  devote  attention. 

The  intimate  connection  between  the  activities  of  the 
various  organs  of  the  body,  and  the  tone  of  feeling  associated 
with  the  perception  of  those  activities,  f^irnishes  us  with 
innumerable  data  whereon  we  might  base  many  descriptions 
and  possible  explanations  of  the  morbid  phenomena  in  the 
insane.  It  must  suffice,  however,  to  recognise,  that  the  activity 
of  any  organ  does  not  necessarily  coincide  with  the  tone  of 
feeling  prevailing  at  the  time.' 


VARIOUS  DISTURBANCES  OF  FEELINGS.  397 

We  have  devoted  a  considerable  amount  of  attention  to  the 
sense-feelings,  and  we  have  discussed  the  nature  of  the  relation 
between  the  sense-organs  and  the  mind.  It  will  be  un- 
necessary, therefore,  to  revert  to  this  subject.  In  the  insane, 
and  more  especially  in  hypochondriacs,  there  is  often  a  morbid 
intensification  of  the  organic  feelings ;  and  where  these  are 
susceptible  of  localisation,  their  import  is  generally  exaggerated 
or  misinterpreted. 

In  regard  to  the  various  disturbances  of  feeling  most 
commonly  met  with,  we  may  note  the  following  as  the  normal 
foundations  from  which  variations  occur : — 

The  feelings  proper  (emotional). 

The  feelings  referring  to  the  will  (volitional). 

The  feelings  bearing  upon  thought  (intellectual). 

Mixed  feelings,  including  forethought,  desire,  and  relief.  * 

The  feelings  of  happiness  or  miser ij  are  derived  from  physical 
and  mental  agencies.  On  the  physical  side,  we  have  the 
various  causes  already  enumerated;  on  the  mental  side,  we  have 
numerous  examples  of  a  degree  or  intensity  in  the  happiness 
or  misery.  General  paralytics  usually  receive  sensations  and 
revived  impressions  in  the  aggregate  as  pleasurable.  Similarly, 
acutely  maniacal  patients  are  affected  pleasurably  rather  than 
painfully.  Melancholiacs,  on  the  other  hand,  seldom  experience 
pleasurable  emotions,  and,  in  the  aggregate,  their  sum  total  of 
feeling  is  painful.  Indifference  to  pleasure  or  pain  is  seen  in 
the  demented,  the  stiiporose,  and  in  the  advanced  general 
paralytic.  The  volitional  feelings  are  subject  to  morbid  j^er- 
versions,  as  seen  in  those  who  are  unable  to  control  their 
morbid  cravings,  desires,  or  lusts  ;  or  in  those  who  suffer  from 
conflicting  operations  of  the  will.  Intellectual  feelings,  or 
feelings  associated  with  intellectual  pursuits,  may  be  absent 
or  morbidly  exafffferated.  The  mutual  furtherance  or  hindrance 
of  the  two  activities  is  evidenced  in  every  asylum.  Broadly 
speaking,  the  male  lunatic's  intellect  perverts  his  feeling ; 
whereas  the  female  lunatic's  feeling  perverts  her  intellect. 
The  former  feels  because  he  knows,  and  therefore  believes ; 
the  latter  feels,  and  therefore  both  knows  and  believes.  The 
one  says,  "  I  know.  It  is  not  a  question  of  feeling."  The 
'"  Bain,  "  Mental  and  Moral  Science,"  j).  217. 


398        DISOEDEPtS  OF  THE  FEELINGS  AND  EMOTIONS. 

other  says,  "  I  feel — therefore  I  know."  The  practical  outcome 
of  this  broad  generalisation  is  evidenced  in  the  fact,  that 
rational  treatment  by  logical  methods  is  sometimes  effective 
with  the  former,  seldom  of  any  nse  with  the  latter.  Mixed 
feelings  involve  memories  of  past  events  and  former  mental 
states.  As  pointed  ont  by  Bain,  the  state  of  desire  grows  out 
of  the  retentiveness  of  the  mind  for  pleasure  or  pain.  Con- 
ditions of  belief  are  sometimes  dependent  merely  upon  feelings 
of  the  mind,  and  with  their  development  the  intellect  has  had 
little  to  do. 

Let  us  now,  however,  look  more  particularly  at  some  of  the 
morbid  emotional  conditions  met  with  in  the  insane.  For 
convenience,  we  will  note  those  perversions  associated  with : — 

I.  Sense-feelings. 

(a)  Connected  with  bodily  existence  (health,  depres- 
sion, hunger,  etc.) 
(V)  Organic  (feelings  of  special  sense), 
(c)  Inner  sense  (temper  or  high  spirits). 

II.  Feelings  connected  with  ideas. 

(a)  Ideas  from  sense  (disgust,  sj^mpathy  with  pain). 
(&)  From  imagination  (hope  and  fear), 
(c)  From  understanding  (shame,  reproach,  etc.) 
(cL)  The  Eesthetic  feelings  (physical  beaut^^). 

III.  Intellectual  feelings. 

(a)  From  acquiring  knowledge  (pain  of  idleness). 

(&)  From  intellectual  exercise  (novelty,  system,  order, 
symmetr}^,  harmony,  rhythm,  simple  and  com- 
plex, wit  and  humour,  comic  and  ridiculous). 

IV.  Rational  feelings.    ■ 

(a)  Truth  feelings. 

(&)  The  higher  aesthetic  feelings. 

(c)  Moral  feelings. 

((I)  Sympathetic  feelings. 

(e)  Religious  feelings. 
The  feelings  associated  with  bodily  existence  in  the  insane 
have  much  to  do  with  the  colouring  of  the  mind.  The  true 
bodily  state  which  most  favoiirs  a  feeling  of  health  is  that  in 
which  organic  sensations  are  absent.  The  transition  from  a 
2oainfal  state  to  one  which  is  pleasurable — e.g.,  the  feeling  of 


SENSE-FEELINGS.  399 

satisfaction  when  hunger  is  appeased — does  not  negative  this 
general  statement.  Further,  other  things  being  equal,  the 
existence  of  a  positive  organic  sense-feeling  is  attended  by  a 
proportional  feeling  of  uneasiness  or  displeasure.  In  the  sane 
person,  therefore,  visceral  consciousness  is  proportionately 
painful.  In-  the  insane,  the  dominant  feeling  existing  at  tlie 
time  may  override  or  even  obliterate  the  natural  accompani- 
ments; so  that  a  positive  organic  sense-feeling  becomes  dis- 
tinctly pleasurable.  Thus,  in  general  paralysis,  we  have  seen 
man}^  examples  of  exaltation  and  feelings  of  satisfaction  derived 
mainly  through  the  existence  of  morbid  visceral  states — e.g., 
one  patient  suffering  from  constipation  derived  extreme  satisfac- 
tion from  the  belief  that  he  was  the  happy  possessor  of  "  millions 
of  fteces."  Another,  suffering  from  anasarca,  magnified  his 
abdomen  into  the  "  abdomen  of  the  Deitj^,"  and  exhibited  it 
with  great  self-gratification.  In  general  paralytics,  the  organic 
sense-feelings,  which  are  symbols  of  hunger,  are  sometimes 
absent.  Such  patients  fail  to  appreciate  when  they  have  had 
enough  food,  and  exhibit  a  boulimia,  which  is  characteristic. 
Some  idiots  are  unhappy  unless  there  is  complete  distension  of 
the  abdomen  by  an  excessive  supply  of  nutriment,  and  instances 
have  been  known  where  the  conditions  of  rumination  are 
essential  to  the  feelings  of  well-being. 

The  morbid  exaggerations  and  excessive  emotional  accom- 
paniments of  the  activities  of  the  special  senses,  are  well 
illustrated  in  some  forms  of  hysteria.  The  emotional  displays 
associated  with  unstable  temperaments  are  often  suggested  by 
some  simple  sense-feeling.  Thus,  music  is  in  some  instances  a 
potent  factor  in  causing  an  outburst  of  emotion.  The  unequal 
development  of  the  special  senses,  and  the  fact  that  cultivation 
of  one  sense  in  excess  of  the  others  involves  with  it  feelings  of  a 
more  advanced  and  suggestive  order  when  that  sense  is  active, 
helps  to  explain  the  sensory  side  of  the  many  varieties  of  the 
special  sense-feelings.  In  degenerative  cerebral  states,  it  is  not 
uncommon  to  have  a  partial  exaltation  of  feeling  associated  with 
the  activity  of  a  special  sense  ;  especially  in  the  early  stages  of 
general  paralysis  and  organic  or  senile  dementia.  In  acute 
mania,  there  is  often,  with  the  hypersesthesia  of  the  senses, 
an  exaggerated  emotional  accompaniment.     In  melancholia,  in 


400        DISORDEKS  OF  THE  FEELINGS  AND  EMOTIONS. 

confasional  states,  and  in  anergic  or  melancholic  stnpor,  the 
emotional  accompaniment  proper  may  be  defective  or  entirely- 
absent. 

Those  inner  sense-feelings  known  as  temper,  high  or  low 
spirits,  are  met  with  in  every  degree  of  intensity  in  the  various 
forms  of  insanitjr.  In  some  forms  of  idioc}^,  as  in  the  Mongol 
or  KalmiTC,  continuous  amiability  and  placidity  are  noticeable. 
In  monomaniacal  states,  there  is  frequentl}^  a  stabilit}^  of  the 
inner  sense- feelings,  in  striking  contrast  to  the  nature  of  the 
delusions — i.e.,  there  is  no  proportional  feeling  accompaniment. 
In  hereditary  neuroses,  instability  of  the  emotional  side  of  mind 
is  a  noticeable  symptom.  Individuals  who  have  inherited  a 
neurotic  diathesis  are  often  subject  to  the  periodical  prepon- 
derance of  sorrowful  or  depressed  feelings,  or  feelings  of  a  gay 
or  expansive  kind. 

In  senile  decay,  the  emotional  element  is  often  perverted. 
An  attack  of  senile  mania  may  be  ushered  in  by  emotional 
instability  without  any  obvious  enfeeblement  of  the  intellectual 
faculties.  Depression  of  spirits  may  precede  an  attack  of  senile 
mania.  The  emotional  disturbances  may  or  iiiaj  not  be 
symptomatic  of  the  onset  of  dementia  due  to  gross  lesions  of 
.the  cerebrum.  In  cerebral  atrophy,  focal  lesions,  hgemorrhage, 
or  thrombosis,  the  perverted  state  of  the  emotions  is  sometimes 
characteristic.  Bevan  Lewis  dra^A-s  attention  to  the  diagnostic 
distinctions  between  simj)le  senile  depression  as  a  purely  func- 
tional ailment,  and  the  depression  which  indicates  a  serious 
structural  change  in  the  nervous  centres.  He  found,  that  in 
the  forms  of  simple  melancholia,  unaccompanied  by  any  delu- 
sional state,  there  was  a  strongij^-marked  suicidal  tendenc}^  in 
79  per  cent. 

In  general  paralysis,  the  emotional  condition  is  also  charac- 
terised }dj  its  instability.  The  prodromata  of  the  disease  may 
consist  in  emotional  depression  or  excitement ;  the  two  condi- 
tions may  alternate,  each  state  being  determined  by  insignifi- 
cant causes.  Sooner  or  later,  however,  the  condition  of  euphoria 
predominates,  and  later  that  of  complete  absence  of  emotional 
tone.  Those  feelings  connected  with  ideas  in  part  derived  from 
the  senses — e.g.,  disgust,  etc. — are  seen  chiefly  in  the  so-called 
delusional   insanities.     The    utter    contempt   with   which    the 


SENSE  FEELINGS.  401 

victims  of  imaginary  plots  treat  others  around  them  is  often  a 
noticeable  feature  of  asylum  life.  With  such  patients  no 
attem^Dt  is  made  to  conceal  or  control  their  expressions  of 
disgust.  On  examination,  some  sense-perversion  is  usually 
found  to  account  for  the  conduct.  It  may  be  due  to  an 
imaginary  persecution  by  means  of  drugs  or  other  substances, 
or  there  may  be  some  delusion  about  the  moral  attributes  of 
others.  Sexual  ideas  give  rise  to  many  expressions  of  disgust, 
and  in  every  asylum  there  is  some  individual  who  attributes 
unworthy  motives  or  actions  to  those  in  attendance.  These  un- 
controlled expressions,  sometimes  of  actual  loathing,  are  seen 
even  in  idiots,  who  make  false  accusations  of  immorality  and 
disgusting  conduct  in  others.  In  melancholiacs,  the  intense 
feelings  of  disgust  are  sometimes  the  outcome  of  ideas  of  un- 
worthiness  relating  to  themselves.  Such  patients  refuse  to 
shake  hands,  recoil  when  approached,  and  adopt  every  means 
within  their  power  to  avoid  contaminating  others.  Similarly, 
the  hypochondriac  with  ideas  that  he  is  suffering  from  a  foul 
disease,  that  his  breath  is  offensive,  that  he  is  covered  with 
vermin,  etc.,  will  hold  himself  aloof  from  others,  and  avoid  all 
possibilities  of  contact.  In  adolescent  mania  with  exaltation, 
just  as  in  the  evolution  of  conceit,  the  individual  will  often  treat 
his  superiors  with  contempt.  Such  conduct,  however,  is  as 
common  outside  asylums  as  within. 

The  absence  of  feelings  of  disgust  is  also  characteristic  of 
some  forms  of  insanity.  Thus,  in  some  forms  of  mania  there 
is  loss  of  all  the  higher  feelings  of  cleanliness  or  decency. 
Similarly,  in  states  of  dementia,  melancholia,  or  stupor,  there 
may  be  absence  of  attention  to  the  ordinary  conventionalities  of 
society  or  the  decencies  of  life.  It  is  not  uncommon  to  meet 
with  cases  in  which  this  absence  of  conventionalism  is  the  only 
characteristic  feature  of  the  mental  attack.  In  idiots  the  moral 
side  of  the  question  may  be  defective  from  the  beginning.  In 
insanity  it  may  be  symptomatic,  or  it  may  remain  as  a  sequel 
after  an  acute  cerebral  attack.  In  general  paralysis  it  is  some- 
times seen  in  an  extreme  degree. 

Sympathy,  depending  as  it  does  upon  a  fine  observation, 
Tightness  of  interpretations  of  the  objective  signs,  the  recalling 
of  past  personal  emotions,  and  the  constructive  imagination,  is 

26 


402        DISORDERS  OF  THE  FEELINGS  AND  EMOTIONS. 

liable  to  defects  or  perversions,  throngli  absence,  excess,  or 
alteration  of  one  of  these  factors.  Some  individuals  possess  an 
intense  emotional  temperament,  and  are  susceptible  in  an 
exaggerated  degree  to  the  infliaence  of  the  emotions  of  others. 
Others  are  deficient  in  emotional  capacity  and  have  little  or  no 
sympathy.  There  is  a  large  field  for  study  in  the  emotions  of 
the  insane. 

We  ma}'"  say  briefly ;  (1)  Emotional  and  sympathetic  states 
may  be  evidences  of  a  natural  temperament  in  the  sane ;  or 
their    existence   may   be    symptomatic    of  mental   perversion. 
Thus,  the  emotional  susceptibility  of  a  normal  character  in  one 
individual  may,  in  another,  be  unusual  and  pathological.     In 
determining   the  value    of  the    affection    of    the    sympathetic 
capacity  as  a  sign  of  disease,  comparison  must  be  made  with 
the    life   history  and    emotional  tendencies  of  the  individual. 
Benevolence  and  pity  may  be  natural  or  morbid.     It  must  not 
be  forgotten,  however,  that  in   some  forms  of  mental  disease 
(e.g.,  general  paralysis)  the  wide  sympathies  and  benevolence 
may  be  the   mere  exaggerations  of  a  natural    temperament. 
(2)  Fineness  of  observation  has  much  to  do  with  the  absence  or 
excess  of  the  sympathetic  feelings.     Reference  to  the  preceding 
chapters  upon  the  senses  will  enable  the  student  to  appreciate, 
that   just    as   the    cognitive    state  varies  with   the   functional 
activity  of  the  senses,  so  the  accompanying  tone  of  feeling  may 
be   proportionately   varied.     In    conditions    of    ansesthesia   or 
hypersesthesia  the    sympathetic    feelings,   other   things   being 
equal,  will  more  or  less  coincide  with  intellectual  interpretation 
of  the    presentations.     (3)  The  mind's    interpretation    of  the 
presentation  is  a  factor  of -much  importance,  and  the  sympathy 
will  var}^  with  the  rightness  of  that  interpretation.     We  have 
already  discussed  the  factors  which  give  rise  to  abnormal  inter- 
pretation, so  that  it  is  unnecessary  to  return  to  the  subject. 
(4)  The  recalling  of  past   experiences  is  productive  of  morbid 
exaggerations,  or  the  reverse.     Thus,  just  as  want  of  sympathy 
with  the  emotional  experiences  of  the  young  is  in  great  part 
due  to  the  fact  that  we  have  forgotten  our  experiences  when 
children,  so  the  apparent  callousness  of  the  general  paralytic, 
the  alcoholic,  or  the  senile  dement,  is  in  part  due  to  an  amnesic 
state  and  inability  to  revive  the  emotional  experiences  of  the 


IDEATIONAL  FEELIXC4S.  403 

past.  That  the  sorrow  of  another  should  engage  our  s\'mpathy 
it  is  essential  that  we  should  be  able  to  compare  the  cause 
and  effects  of  that  sorrow  with  our  own  experience.  (5)  In 
addition  to  the  revirabilitY  of  our  own  impressions  and  their 
emotional  accompaniments,  constructive  imagination  is  an  im- 
portant factor.  Absence  of  this  prevents  a  correct  interpreta- 
tion of  the  feelings  of  others.  Exas'Sfe ration,  on  the  other 
hand,  betokens  a  susceptibility  that  is  morbid.  The  absence, 
excess,  or  per\-ersion  of  the  sympathetic  feelings,  when  viewed 
as  the  outcome  or  accompaniment  of  the  various  cognitive 
states,  is  a  'subject  which  might  be  dealt  with  at  greater 
length. 

Those  feelings  connected  uith  ideas  of  hope  and  fear,  involve 
a  considerable  amount  of  imagination.  The  hopes  and  am- 
bitions in  the  insane  are  capable  of  modification.  We  have 
already  pointed  out,  that  the  hopes  which  arise  during  periods 
of  distress  are  sometimes  realised  by  the  general  paralytic,  and 
that  the  realisation  is  illusory,  indicating  thereby  a  process  of 
dissolution.  The  illuson,'  hopes  of  the  phthisical  are  well 
known.  Similarly,  in  chronic  cerebral  diseases,  the  condition 
of  buoyancy  and  hope  may  be  symptomatic.  In  adolescents 
we  meet  with  every  degree  of  hope,  from  mere  desire  to  com- 
plete confidence  and  assurance.  In  old  maids  and  others,  the 
non-realisation  of  long-sustained  hopes  may  result  in  a  de- 
spondency that  is  morbid.  In  unstable  temperaments,  there 
is  often  rapid  fluctuations  between  states  of  hope  and  de- 
spondency.* 

*  To  the  morbid  states  of  fear  numerous  names  have  been  given.  Amaxo- 
pJiobia  signifies  a  morbid  fear  of  being  in  a  waggon  or  cart  :  claustrojjhobia, 
fear  of  being  in  any  closed  space  or  chamber;  hatophohia,  a  morbid  fear  of 
heights  ;  ar/orcqjhobia,  a  fear  of  open  spaces.  Beard  ('•  Tuke's  Diet.,"  p.  844) 
has  classified  certain  conditions  of  fear  according  to  their  causes,  as 
follows : — monophobia^  fear  as  such ;  anthropophobia,  the  fear  of  being 
vrith  others;  pathophohia,  the  fear  of  becoming  ill;  pxintophobia,  fear  of 
everj'thing;  astrophobia,  fear  of  lightning;  rvpopjhobiu  (verga),  the  fear  of 
being  dirty ;  siderodromophobia,  the  fear  of  going  by  train ;  nyctophobia, 
the  fear  of  night  ;  phobophobia,  the  fear  of  becoming  afraid.  Arndt  suggests 
that  -were  we  to  carrj-  this  absiirdity  fiurther,  we  might  distinguish  a  much 
greater  number  of  conditions  of  fear:  skopophobia  and  klopsojjhobia,  the 
fear  of  spies  and  thieves ;  thanatophobia,  the  fear  of  death ;  necrophobia, 
fear  of  the  dead  and  of  phantasms  ;  triaJcaidekaphobia,  the  fear  of  number 
thirteen,  etc. 


404        DISOEDEES  OF  THE  FEELINGS  AND  EMOTIONS. 

The  feelings  of  shame,  reproach,  etc.,  may  be  absent,  or 
morbidly  intensified.  The  maniacal  person  suffers  little  from 
feelings  of  shame.  In  idiots  or  imbeciles  this  feeling  may  be 
entirely  absent  and  incapable  of  cultivation,  so  that,  sooner  or 
later,  the  condition  known  as  moral  insanity  is  developed. 
In  acute  attacks  of  mental  disorder  there  may  be  complete 
absence  of  shame  or  self-reproach ;  the  unconventional,  both  in 
language  and  conduct,  manifests  itself  as  a  symptom  of  the 
disease.  In  melancholiacs  these  feelings  are  usually  morbidly 
active,  and  self-condemnation  is  rather  the  rule  than  the  ex- 
ception. Introspection,  or  rise  in  the  subject-cotisciousness, 
is  a  prominent  factor  in  the  production  of  a  painful  conscience. 
To  "  know  thyself,"  is  to  suffer  shame  and  endless  reproach. 
In  asylums  those  individuals  who  have  a  tender  conscience 
often  know  themselves  better  than  do  the  sane.  It  must  not 
be  forgotten,  however,  that  a  morbid  introspection  may  be 
productive  of  false  accusations  and  needless  remorse. 

The  lower  cesthetic  feelings  connected  with  the  appear- 
ance of  the  body,  ma}"  be  considerably  perverted  in  the  insane. 
In  states  of  melancholia,  mania,  or  dementia,  there  may  be 
absence  of  all  personal  cleanliness  and  care  ;  or,  as  in  general 
paralj^tics,  exalted  maniacs,  and  monomaniacs,  there  may  be 
exaggeration  of  the  lower  gesthetic  feelings,  ranging  in  degree 
from  extreme  care  and  eccentricity,  to  decorativeness  and 
dandyism.  In  the  eyes  of  some  maniacs  and  general  paralytics 
every  object  assumes  the  charm  of  beauty;  while  the  persecuted 
and  melancholiac  may  view  everything  as  ugly  or  loathsome. 

The  intellectual  feelings  derived  from  the  acquisition  of 
knowledge,  are  familiar  to  most  of  us.  This  tone  of  feeling 
once  developed  is  associated,  during  its  temporary  absence,  with 
an  intensification  of  the  pain  of  idleness.  On  the  other  hand,  so 
great  may  be  the  desire  for  knowledge,  and  so  intemperate  the 
methods  of  acquiring  it,  that  the  emotional  tone  may  be  exhausted 
and  distaste  result.  In  the  insane,  the  engagement  of  the 
emotions  in  some  other  direction  acts  as  a  deterrent  from  any 
intellectual  activity.  Hence  it  is,  that  those  who  are  morbidly 
introspective,  or  hyperattentive  to  their  dominant  ideas,  are 
necessarily  unable  to  apply  themselves  to  any  consideration 
requiring  intellectual  effort. 


RATIONAL  FEELINGS.  405 

TiiB  rational  feeliiujs — those  feelings  associated  with  truth, 
morals,  and  religion — are  sometimes  absent,  exaggerated,  or 
perverted  in  the  insane.  Until  Prichard  described  affections 
of  the  moral  powers  as  occurring  without  obvious  impairment  of 
the  intellect,  it  was  doubted  whether  there  was  such  a  condi- 
tion as  moral  insanity.  Hack  Tuke  succeeded  in  convincing  us 
that  moral  insanity,  without  any  obvious  intellectual  impair- 
ment, does  exist  in  certain  individuals.  Moral  deficiencies  or 
perversions  may  be  determined  (1)  primarily  by  internal  factors 
through  inheritance.  Some  children  inherit  dispositions  in 
which  the  moral  sense  is  incapable  of  development ;  others 
betray  the  existence  of  an  immoral  tendency  during  childhood, 
and,  in  spite  of  training,  remain  incorrigible.  (2)  Moral  per- 
versions may  be  evolved  gradually ;  they  may  be  the  outcome 
of  special  social  influences,  or  the  result  of  some  slight  cerebral 
disturbance  or  disease.  Hack  Tuke  demonstrated  that  it  may 
be  practically  impossible  to  detect  the  intellectual  flaw,  and 
yet  a  physician  may  be  driven  to  decide  that  a  person  is 
insane.  (3)  Moral  insanity  may  show  itself  as  a  precursor  of 
other  forms  of  insanity.  Thus,  it  may  precede  delusional 
states ;  it  may  occur  as  an  early  sign  of  general  paralysis  or 
senile  insanity ;  it  may  also  show  itself  as  an  early  symptom 
of  an  acute  maniacal  attack.  (4)  Moral  insanity  may  exist  as 
a  sequel  to  a  cerebral  attack.  Thus,  cases  have  been  observed 
where  moral  defect  has  remained  as  a  sequel  to  sunstroke, 
febrile  delirium,  cerebral  syphilis,  and  acute  mania.  (5)  Moral 
insanity  may  exist  as  an  associative  phenomenon  with  brain 
disease,  or  with  other  diseases  which  affect  the  brain  and  its 
membranes.  (6)  Other  causes,  such  as  alcohol,  masturbation, 
amenorrhoea,  parturition,  lactation,  etc.,  may  determine  a  loss  or 
perversion  of  the  moral  sense,  without  obvious  change  in  the 
intellect.  (7)  In  an  unstable  nervous  system  a  moral  or  physical 
shock  may  determine  a  moral  disorder.  (8)  In  epileptic  states 
the  moral  nature  may  be  affected  without  affections  of  the 
memory  or  intellect.  Clinically,  we  have  to  note  the  following 
forms  of  moral  insanity:  (1)  In  children  there  may  be  absence 
or  precocity  of  the  moral  feelings.  Such  conditions  may  be 
manifested  by  affections  of  the  sexual  instincts,  homicidal  ten- 
dencies, wanton  cruelty,  lying,  stealing,  masturbation,  and  pyro- 


406        DISORDERS  OF  THE  FEELINGS  AND  EMOTIONS. 

manias,  etc.  (2)  In  adults,  we  have  to  note,  the  morbid  cravings 
for  intoxicants,  homicidal  and  suicidal  tendencies,  pyromanias, 
kleptomanias,  the  conditions  of  moral  languor,  the  morbid 
religious  emotions,  and  moral  dislikes  and  prejudices. 

Hack  Tuke  held,  that  the  theory  of  the  existence  of 
moral  insanity,  apart  from  intellectual  impairment,  is  in  full 
accord  with  the  principles  of  mental  evolution  and  dissolution 
as  laid  down  by  Herbert  Spencer.  After  a  careful  consideration 
of  the  psychological  and  clinical  facts  he  made  the  following 
propositions : — 

"  (1)  The  higher  levels  of  cerebral  development  which  are  con- 
cerned in  the  exercise  of  moral  control — i.e.,  '  the  most  voluntary '  of 
Hughlings-Jackson,  and  also  '  the  altruistic  sentiments '  of  Spencer — 
are  either  imperfectly  evolved  from  birth,  or,  having  been  evolved,  have 
become  diseased,  and  more  or  less  functionless,  although  the  intel- 
lectual functions  (some  of  which  may  be  supposed  to  lie  much  on  the 
same  level)  are  not  seriously  affected ;  the  result  being  that  the 
patient's  mind  presents  the  lower  level  of  evolution,  in  which  the 
emotional  and  automatic  have  fuller  play  than  is  normal. 

''  (2)  No  doubt  it  is  difficult  to  lay  down  rules  by  which  to  differ- 
entiate moral  insanity  from  moral  depravity.  Each  case  must  be 
decided  in  relation  to  the  individual  himself,  his  antecedents,  education, 
surroundings,  and  social  status,  the  nature  of  certain  acts,  and  the  mode 
in  which  they  are  performed,  along  with  other  circumstances,  fairly 
raising  the  suspicion  that  they  are  not  under  his  control."* 

In  concluding  this  chapter  we  may  mention  that, 
disorders  of  feeling  may  occur  at  all  or  any  periods  of  life. 
In  childhood  or  at  puberty,  the  usual  emotional  accompani- 
ments of  the  physical  or  mental  evolution  may  be  absent, 
perverted,  or  morbidly  intensified.  During  the  periods  of 
adolescence,  climacteriunij  prime,  or  senescence,  emotional  in- 
stability may  manifest  itself.  In  the  female  the  emotions  are 
liable  to  be  upset  during  pregnancy,  parturition,  and  lactation. 
Idiots  and  imbeciles  display  every  kind  of  emotional  disposition. 
Some  are  good-tempered  and  happy,  others  are  irritable  and 
morose.  Undoubtedly,  many  of  the  criminals  in  our  jails  are 
of  the  imbecile  class,  and,  in  the  commission  of  their  crimes, 
they  have  been  more  or  less  unconscious  agents.  Ireland  says, 
that  idiots  and  imbeciles  seem  to  be  much  more  expert  at 
taking  up  moral  relations  than  one  would  suppose  from  their 
*   Vide  "  Tuke's  Diet.,"'  p.  813. 


EATIONAL  FEELINGS.  407 

other  deficiencies.  "  They  attach  praise  and  blame  to  particular 
people  and  to  particular  actions.  They  are  accessible  to  pity,  and 
still  more  to  affection.  The  better  classes  of  imbeciles  can  often 
be  induced  to  make  considerable  sacrifices  for  the  happiness  of 
others,  giving  away,  for  example,  things  which  they  like,  and 
preferring  the  pleasure  of  seeing  others  enjoy  them.  .  .  .  The 
lower  class  of  idiots  have  no  religion.  Imbeciles  can  be  taught 
the  existence  of  a  Superior  Being,  though  their  ideas  thereupon 
are  childish,  and  have  a  tendency  to  become  anthropomorphic. 
Some  imbeciles  take  up  the  notion  of  responsibility  to  a  higher 
power,  which  distinguishes  the  religious  man  from  the  simply 
moral.  They  can  learn  the  biographical  and  historical  parts  of 
Scripture^  the  precepts  in  the  Gospels,  and  the  parables  ;  but 
it  is  vain  to  try  to  teach  them  doctrines  such  as  those  contained 
in  the  Shorter  Catechism  or  Thirt3r-nine  Articles,  which  they 
neither  can  remember  nor  comprehend."  Idiots  of  the  Mon- 
golian or  Kalmuc  type  are  usually  affectionate  and  cheerful. 
They  are  good  mimics,  and  fond  of  music.  Seguin  and 
others  suggest  that  these  types  are  connected  with  some  form 
of  hereditary  cretinism.  In  sporadic  cretinism  characterised 
by  the  presence  of  fatty  tumours  in  the  posterior  triangles  of 
the  neck,  and  in  many  instances  absence  of  the  thyroid  gland, 
there  is  usually  a  good  temper  ;  but  the  higher  emotions  are  little 
developed.  In  endemic  cretinism  the  emotions  or  tones  of  feeling 
may  be  entirely  absent ;  or,  in  the  higher  grade  (semi-cretinism), 
there  may  be  an  emotional  accompaniment  to  the  vegetative 
or  animal  instincts,  or  to  the  impressions  of  the  special  senses. 
In  the  still  higher  grade  {cretineux),  the  exercise  of  the  intellec- 
tual faculties  may  be  attended  by  a  corresponding  emotional  tone. 
Just  as  there  is  no  constant  relation  between  the  degree  of 
intelligence  and  the  weight  of  the  brain,  so  there  is  no  relation 
between  the  feelings  and  the  size  of  the  head.  It  is  not 
uncommon  to  meet  with  microcephalic,  hydrocephalic,  or 
scaphocephalic  idiots,  or  idiots  with  cerebral  hypertrophy, 
who  possess  emotional  characters  differing  little  from  ordinary 
human  beings.  Sometimes  they  enjoy  a  joke,  sympathise,  and 
form  affections  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  amount  of  their 
intellectual  development.  Cases  have  been  recorded  in  which 
all  the    special    senses  in  the  microcephalic   idiot   have  been 


408         DISORDERS  OF  THE  FEELINGS  AND  EMOTIONS. 

developed  to  an  exquisite  degree,  and,  with  the  development, 
also  a  corresponding  tone  of  feeling.  Some  idiots,  like  some 
sane  people,  have  little  intellectual  power,  but  acquire  a  religion 
through  imitation  and  habit. 

In  hereditary  epilepsy  the  epileptic  attack  is  often  preceded 
by  irritability  or  by  an  emotional  outburst.  Sometimes  the 
fits  are  followed  by  a  tendency  to  cruelty,  pyromania,  etc. 
Meschede*  has  described  such  a  case  due,  according  to  him, 
to  an  osseous  growth  upon  the  clivus,  with  consequent  inflam- 
matory affection  of  the  adjacent  membranes  and  nervous  tissue. 

The  period  of  puberty  is  attended  with  marked  physio- 
logical and  psychological  changes.  Associated  with  the  de- 
velopment of  the  genital  organs,  there  are  awakened  the  sexual 
instincts  and  all  their  corresponding  emotions.  In  the  female, 
we  have  to  note  the  occiirrence  of  hysterical  attacks,  and  those 
mental  manifestations  of  the  development  of  the  sexual  organs.  In 
the  male,  on  the  other  hand,  the  emotions  undergo  little  change 
at  this  period.  At  the  period  of  adolescence,  however,  he 
undergoes  a  mental  evolution,  with  which  there  is  developed  an 
egotism  that  sometimes  passes  the  border  line  of  sanity.  The 
psychology  of  puberty  and  adolescence  forms  an  important 
study,  and  one  that  ought  to  commend  itself  to  all  of  us.  We 
do  not  understand  the  physiological  side  of  the  special  evolution 
of  the  emotions  at  this  period,  nor  are  we  aware  that  any 
attempt  has  been  made  to  analyse  it. 

For  an  account  of  the  various  disorders  of  feeling  occurring 
at  the  different  periods  of  life,  the  student  is  referred  to  text- 
books on  insanit}^  It  only  remains  for  us  now  to  state,  that 
emotional  perversions  may -be  symptomatic  of  such  states  as 
mania,  melancholia,  or  even  of  mental  enfeeblement.  The 
emotional  disturbance  itself  may  or  may  not  be  the  only  in- 
dication of  unsoundness  of  the  mind.  Absence,  exaltation,  or 
perversions  of  the  emotions  may  be  symptomatic  of  degenera- 
tive states,  such  as  general  paralysis,  paralytic  or  senile 
dementia,  or  epilepsy  and  its  allied  states. 

*  "  Zeitschrift  flir  Psychiatrie,"  xxix.  Band.  1  Heft. 


409 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

The  Will. 

Definition  —  Deliberation  —  Choice  —  Resolution — Self-determination — 
Delayed  Reflex — Influence  of  Habit — Desire — Psycho-Physical 
Processes  of  Volition — Volition  not  to  be  explained  Anatom- 
ically, Physiologically,  Developmentally,  or  Pathologically  — 
Reflex  Acts — Periphero-Motor — Centro-Motor — Automatic  Acts 
— Voluntary  Acts — Motor  Images — The  Will  Power  in  Hypnosis 
— The  Feeling  of  Effort — Introspective  Evidences — Physiological 
Inhibition  —  Nervous  Resistance  —  Movements — Central — Peri- 
pheral —  Simultaneous  —  Sequential  —  Speech  Movements — Dis- 
orders of  the  Kinsesthetic  Word  Apparatus — Deaf  Mutism — 
Acquired  Defects  of  Speech  —  Alliteration  —  Verbigeration  — 
Akataphasia — Speech  Defects  in  the  Insane — In  Sleep  and  its 
Associated  Conditions — Conduct — Xervous  Mechanism  of  Con- 
duct— Conclusions  as  to  the  Existence  of  a  WiU — Impairment  of 
Will  Power  —  Irresolution  —  Defective  Impulsion  —  Excess  of 
Impulsion — Defective  Voluntary  Attention — Absence  of  Will — 
Conclusions. 

THE  WILL. 

To  those  active  operations  of  the  mind  which  involve  move- 
ments and  active  concentration  of  the  attention  upon  an  object 
or  idea,  with  the  addition  of  a  resolve,  the  term  "  will "  is 
applied.  Such  voluntary  operations  involve  a  purpose,  and 
the  movements  are  consciously  directed  towards  some  end. 
Volition  is  sometimes  regarded  as  only  a  more  energetic  form 
of  desire,  inasmuch  as  it  eno-ao-es  the  muscular  svstem  as  well 
as  the  motor  centres.  Expressed  psychologically,  volition  is 
the  revival  or  representation  of  former  presentations  which 
have  been  accompanied  by  feeling;  the  representation,  if  painful, 
is  avoided ;  if  pleasurable,  favoured.     Coiipland  describes  will 


410  THE  WILL. 

as  the  act  of  striving  to  procure  a  pleasure  or  to  suppress  a 
pain.  The  same  author  regards  the  term  "  deliberation,"  if 
taken  too  literally,  as  misleading,  because  it  is  apt  to  suggest 
that  the  human  subject  of  the  representations  is  passively- 
affected,  whereas,  the  experience  and  organised  nature  of  the 
subject  are  themselves  all-important  factors  in  the  case. 

The  human  being  possesses  an  organised  nature  which 
responds  to  its  environmental  influences.  The  nature  of  that 
organism,  and  the  nature  of  that  environment,  determine  the 
characters  of  the  representations.  Under  the  competing 
influences  of  such  representations,  action  may  be  delayed  until 
one  representation  gains  the  ascendency.  The  action  which 
follows  upon  this  delay  is  termed  ''voluntary,"  the  delay  is 
"  deliberation,'"  whiht  the  term.  '^  choice"  symbolises  the  com- 
paring of  ends,  and  "resolution,"  the  ascendency  of  one  end  or 
motive  over  the  others.  When  we  trace  the  origin  of  the 
phenomena  included  under  will,  we  find  that  there  is  no  hard 
and  fast  line  of  demarcation  between  the  so-called  "  appetitive 
action,"  and  the  highest  forms  of  purposive  action  or  self- 
control,  which  manifest  themselves  as  voluntary  only,  after 
passing  through  the  stages  of  deliberation,  choice,  and  resolu- 
tion. Before  discussing  the  questions  of  the  sense  of  efibrt, 
and  the  adjustments  of  the  motor  apparatus  involved  in  the 
active  operations  of  the  will,  it  is  essential  that  we  should  know 
something  about  the  specii.lations  which  have  been  made  as  to 
the  existence  of  a  free  will. 

Since-  Plato  made  the  distinction  between  voluntary  and 
involuntary  mental  activities,  the  discussion  as  to  whether  the 
will  is  self-determined,  o-r  whether  it  is  necessitated,  has 
engaged  the  attention  of  every  psychologist  and  moral  philoso- 
pher. The  older  writers,  such  as  Plato,  Aristotle,  the  Stoics 
and  Epicureans,  however,  did  not  discuss  the  problem  of 
freedom  in  the  same  way  as  did  the  Neo-Platonists,  and  the 
Christian  apologists  of  the  second  century.  The  latter  writers 
supported  the  view,  that  freedom  consisted  in  independence 
from  external  causes.  The  mind  itself  was  regarded  as  possess- 
ing perfect  freedom  of  choice  between  good  and  evil.  Some 
idea  of  the  theological  aspects  of  the  question  may  be  gathered 
from  the  writings  of  St.  Augustine,  Aquinas,  Calvin,  Pelagius^ 


FREE  WILL  THEORY.  411 

Arminius,  and  others ;  while  the  philosophical  relations  have 
been  treated  by  Hobbes,  Descartes,  Locke,  Leibnitz,  Clarke, 
Edwards,  Priestley,  Reid,  Hamilton,  Stewart,  Mill,  and  others. 
The  doctrine  which  implies  that  the  ego  is  in  itself  an  active 
principle,  is  one  which  we  are  compelled  to  leave  to  philosophy 
or  metaphysics.  We  have  not  the  means  of  testing  power  or 
final  causality ;  we  can  only  base  our  views  upon  the  observable 
phenomena  or  facts  of  volition  within  ourselves  or  others.  The 
ethical  side  of  the  doctrine  is  of  course  of  immense  importance, 
inasmuch  as  it  obviously  influences  the  theory  of  moral  re- 
sponsibility. 

The  modern  tendency  is  to  regard  the  will,  or  rather  the 
"active  expression  of  the  will,  as  a  delaijed  rejiex.  The  delay  is 
brought  about  by  the  co-operation  of  reflection,  which  serves  to 
modify  and  protract  the  ultimate  resolution  upon  which  the 
appropriate  action  depends.  This  ultimate  resolution  is  re- 
garded as  dependent  upon  some  impulse  or  idea  bearing  a 
relatively'  greater  degree  of  intensity  than  the  other  factors 
deliberated  upon.  Yolkmann*  regards  the  power  which  reveals 
itself  in  the  final  volition  as  being  no  power  above  the  repre- 
sentations, but  only  a  new  revelation  of  the  powers  working  in 
the  representations,  and  he  believes  that  the  final  volition  gives 
the  advantages  to  one  of  the  contending  volitions,  or  perhaps 
suspends  both.  This  he  explains  by  the  fact,  that  this  very 
volition  proves  itself  ultimately  to  be  the  resultant  of  the 
collective  internal  movement.  Sully  adopts  a  somewhat  similar 
view,  and  believes  that  in  ever}-  case  the  action  is  the  resultant 
of  the  factors  ultimately  engaged. 

Later,  we  shall  see  that  the  characteristic  manifestations  of 
"  will "  are  to  be  explained  as  the  results  of  habits  organised  in 
the  individual,  and  transmitted  to  the  progeny,  either  as  a 
tendency  to  react  readily,  or  as  a  tendency  to  deliberate  before 
acting.  In  any  case,  the  psychical  and  phj-sical  factors  acting 
at  the  time  determine  the  individual  or  particular  reaction 
characterised  as  the  effort  of  will.  It  is  unnecessary  to  point 
out  that  all  active  operations  of  the  mind  involve  an  intellectual 
and  emotional  element,  and  that  just  as  there  is  an  opposition 
or  furtherance  of  the  states  of  knowing  and  feeling,  by  reason 
*  "  Lehrbuch  der  Psychologie,"  vol.  ii.  p.  456. 


412  THE  WILL. 

of  their  mutual  relations,  so  there  maybe  a  mutual  furtherance 
or  hindrance  of  activities  of  the  will  by  reason  of  its  relation  to 
the  states  of  knowing  and  feeling.  As  Sully  puts  it,  "The 
outgoings  of  the  mind  in  action,  involving  the  excitation  or 
•*  innervation '  of  the  motor  nerves  and  muscles,  are  incom- 
patible with  the  comparatively  passive  state  of  observing 
something  or  thinking  about  something,  with  its  physical 
accompaniment  of  bodily  stillness.  The  man  of  energetic 
action  is  popularly  contrasted  with  the  man  of  reflection. 
Similarly,  strong  emotional  excitement  and  action  are  incom- 
patible, and  the  man  of  strong  will  is  one  who,  among  other 
things,  brings  emotion  under  control." 

A  full  account  of  the  nature  of  willing  would  include  (1) 
the  primary  presentation  with  its  accompanying  tone  of  feeling; 
(2)  the  representative  process,  with  the  realisation  that  the 
revived  process  forms  a  step  in  the  experience  of  the  ego;  (3) 
the  struggle  for  existence  among  the  representations  when 
reviewed  by  the  ego;  (4)  the  deliberation  upon  the  qualitative 
aspects  of  the  representations;  (5)  the  conscious  choice  of  a 
desired  representation;  (6)  the  belief  in  the  fitness  of  the  action 
to  acquire  the  desired  end;  (7)  the  resolution  to  acquire  the  de- 
sired end;  and,  lastly,  (8)  the  revival  of  the  appropriate  image, 
and  the  action  which  is  believed  to  lead  to  the  desired  end. 

With  the  growth  of  experience,  the  instinctive  impulse  of 
the  child  to  avoid  pain  involves  more  and  more  of  the  repre- 
sentative element,  until  the  consciousness  of  recoiling  from 
what  is  painful  becomes  a  desire  to  avoid  it  in  the  future. 
Thus,  desire  becomes  an  essential  element  in  all  voluntary 
action.  Without  the  representative  element,  there  is  little  or 
no  desire.  In  addition,  the  representative  element  must  be 
accompanied  by  a  revival  of  the  primary  tone  of  feeling,  other- 
wise, desire  disappears.  When  the  revived  tone  of  feeling  is 
morbidly  intense,  or  when  it  is  inferior  to  the  primary  tone, 
there  may  be  a  feeling  of  craving  for  the  actual  realisation. 

The  absence,  exaggeration,  or  perversion  of  the  representa- 
tive elements  of  desire  may  be  the  primary  factors  in  the 
development  of  the  morbid  apathies,  and  the  excessive  or 
abnormal  volitional  activities  of  the  insane.  Similarly,  failure 
in  the    revival  of  the  tone  of  feeling  that  accompanied  the 


FREE  WILL  THEORY.  413 

primary  presentation,  may  result  in  an  apathy  and  absence  of 
desire.  The  melancholiac  or  the  maniac  may  be  unable  to 
recall  the  feelings  of  love  for  home  and  its  surroundings,  and 
apathy  or  indifference  results.  There  is  no  desire  to  recover  or 
to  return  to  their  homes.  The  alcoholic  dement  may  be 
deficient  in  desire,  and  consequently  in  volitional  activity,  by 
reason  of  his  defective  memory.  Similarly,  in  dotage  the 
characteristic  amnesia  may  account  for  the  failure  of  desire. 

When  we  desire  a  thing  we  are  apt  to  concentrate  our 
attention  upon  it,  so  that  its  representation  assumes  the 
character  of  a  dominant  idea.  This  concentration  of  the 
attention  involves  a  certain  amount  of  effort,  which  may  become 
^active  tension  or  strain  if  the  desired  end  is  not  realised.  In 
this  way  we  see  how  the  motor  or  bodily  element  comes  into 
play,  either  as  a  distinct  voluntary  or  anticipatory  adjustment^ 
or  as  an  imaginary  representation  of  bodily  movement.  The 
degrees  of  intensity  of  desires,  and  the  range  of  movements 
prompted  by  them,  as  manifested  in  the  insane,  form  a  subject 
so  extensive  that  we  cannot  enter  upon  it  here.  It  must  suffice 
to  know,  that  just  as  sane  individuals  are  indolent  or  active 
according  to  their  moods  or  temperaments,  so  the  insane 
present  every  degree  of  activity  from  apath}-  and  anergia  to 
active  impulse  and  maniacal  violence. 

When  we  survey  the  endless  controversies  of  the  evolution- 
ists, both  biological  and  dialectic,  which  have  for  their  object  the 
identification  of  desire  and  will,  we  fail  to  understand  from  the 
analogies  of  lower  life  how  the  will,  the  volition,  the  conscious 
guidance,  or  call  it  what  you  will,  comes  into  existence  at  all 
as  a  factor  of  mental  life.  Here  we  must  confess  that  the 
intelligent  activities  of  ethical  life  do  appear  to  indicate  the 
existence  of  a  rational  principle.  The  ultimate  locus  standi  of 
the  moral  intuition  is,  however,  beyond  the  grasp  of  science. 

Whether  we  regard  the  will  as  a  separate  faculty  or  a  part 
of  the  mind  as  a  whole,  we  must  be  struck  with  the  fact,  that 
neither  intellect  nor  emotion  can  direct  itself  or  govern  the 
mental  life  of  the  individual  without  the  aid  of  the  intellig-ent 
self-determinating  influence  denominated  will.  We  do  not 
hold  with  Kant's  transcendental  theory  of  the  cognition  of 
moral  law,  that  the  will  stands  as   a  faculty  of  determining 


414  THE  WILL. 

oneself  to  action  in  accordance  with  the  conception  of  certain 
laws,  and  that  such  a  faculty  can  be  found  only  in  rational 
beings.*  It  is  well  nigh  impossible  to  mark  the  point  of 
transition  from  animal  life  to  the  so-called  rational  life.  In  ■ 
other  words,  we  do  not  know  where  thought-determined 
activity  comes  in  in  the  animal  series.  The  transition 
between  impulsive  and  reflective  activities  is  to  be  as  readily 
traced  as  the  transition  between  primary  sensations  and  repre- 
sentations. An  adequate  philosophy  must  posit  the  reflective 
activities  as  the  outcome  of  the  impulsive  at  the  very  beginning 
of  sentient  existence.  Those  activities  which  go  to  constitute 
action,  and  are  uniformly  present  in  conduct,  are  not  the 
exclusive  propertj^  of  mankind. 

When  we  try  to  account  for  the  origin  of  the  modification  of 
consciousness,  known  as  deliberate  purpose,  and  confine  its 
existence  to  man,  we  render  ourselves  open  to  a  discussion 
upon  the  main  problem  of  animal  life  and  conduct,  and,  at  any 
rate  from  the  empirical  point  of  view,,  we  have  to  begin  at  the 
very  beginning.  Whether  the  soul  possesses  an  independent 
energy,  which  makes  the  individual  the  source  of  activity,  and, 
therefore,  reasonably  and  justly  responsible  for  his  conduct,  is 
a  matter  of  individual  opinion.  The  materialist  scofis  at  such 
an  idea  as  absurd.  He  sees  the  mind  as  the  outcome  of 
molecular  activity.  The  spiritualist,  on  the  other  hand,  views 
the  mind  as  independent,  or  as  being  but  a  lesser  manifestation 
of  an  all-pervading  archetypal  essence  of  true  morality  or 
rationality  of  action.  The  former  pictures  the  mind  as  a 
result  of  infinitesimally  minute  atomic  movements.  The  latter 
pictures  an  all-pervading  mind  as  the  guiding  power  of  an 
infinite  cosmical  activity.  In  both,  hypotheses  are  scientifically 
of  no  avail.  The  ultimate  nature  of  both  series  of  events  is 
transcendental  to  all  the  powers  of  human  inquiry.  We,  as 
passive  onlookers,  view  the  empirical  sides  of  the  question,  and 
can  conceive,  that  if  the  infinitesimally  minute  atomic  move- 
ments within  lumbar  ganglion  cells  can  serve  a  higher  centre 
with  an  activity  which  ultimately  becomes  symbolised  as  moral 
law,  then  so  also  can  the  infinite  cosmical  movements  serve  a 
universal  mind.  When  we  look  through  a  microscope  at  a 
*  Kant,  "  Metaph.  of  Ethics,"  chap.  ii. 


NATURE  OF  WILLING.  415 

minute  nervous  structure,  we  see  the  structure  and  imagine 
the  movements  of  atoms  which  would  correspond  to  mind. 
When  we  gaze  at  the  vault  of  the  heavens  through  a  telescope, 
we  see  the  innumerable  worlds,  and  imagine  a  sensory  and 
motor  intelligence,  which  would  correspond  to  the  Deity.  If 
movement  is  all-sufficient  in  the  one  instance,  then  why  not  in 
the  other?  We  know  nothing  about  a  higher  mind,  it  is  true. 
But  it  is  readily  conceivable,  that  just  as  the  atoms  oY  a  lumbar 
molecule  may  serve  and  obey  a  mind,  of  which  they  know 
nothing,  so  we,  as  atoms  on  this  earth  molecule,  may  serve  and 
obey  a  mind,  of  which  we  also  know  nothing.  When  the 
student  has  once  grasped  the  meaning  of  the  mind  and  body, 
and  has  satisfied  himself  as  to  how  much  he  really  knows,  and 
when  he  has  reflected  upon  the  nature  and  extent  of  the 
cosmos,  he  need  never  be  accused  of  favouring  the  propagation 
of  scientific  dogmatism  with  regard  to  the  Unknowable.* 

Some  authors,  and  more  especially  those  of  the  modern 
German  school  of  thought,  are  satisfied  that  they  can  deduce 
action  from  presentations,  representations,  and  the  laws  of 
association.  They  ignore  the  assumption  that  there  is 
an  especial  will  as  the  cause  of  our  actions.  According  to 
Ziehen,  "  When  we  tvill  do  something,  our  own  psj'chical 
content  at  that  moment  is  only  distinguished  from  other 
psychical  contents  by  the  fact,  that  the  idea  of  a  desired  actioii, 
accompanied  by  a  positive  emotional  tone,  is  already  contained 
among  the  sensations  and  ideas  that  are  then  actually  present." 
The  same  author  gives  the  following  order  of  events  as  occur- 
ring, when  we  say,  "  I  tvill  do  somethimi ."  The  sentence,  when 
spoken,  is  "  a  series  of  motor  ideas  of  speech  with  which  are 
associated  (1)  the  er/o-idea  in  the  sense  formerly  discussed;  (2) 
the  idea  of  a  future  act,  accompanied  by  a  positive  emotional 
tone ;  (3)  motor  sensations  accompanying  attention  ;  and  (4) 
the  idea  of  a  causal  relation  existing  between  the  er/o-idea  and 
the  desired  action."  Ziehen  also  makes  the  positive  assertion, 
that  the  attempt  to  set  up  special  diseases  of  the  wdll  under  the 
name  of  monomania,  or  a  general  disease  of  the  will  designated 
as  moral  insanity,  have  all  been  recognised  failures.  He  seeks 
to  reduce  all  disturbances  of  voluntary  action  met  with  in 
*  The  consideration  of  the  Dogmata  of  Faith  is  quite  another  matter. 


416  THE  WILL. 

insanity,  to  disturbances  of  the  sentient  life,  especially  of  the 
emotional  tone,  or  to  intellectual  disturbances — i.e.,  disturbances 
of  the  ideas  or  of  the  association  of  ideas.  We  quite  agree 
with  him,  that  the  loss  of  will-power  may  always  be  reduced 
either  to  the  exceeding  sluggishness  of  the  association  of  ideas, 
to  the  abnormal  negative  tones  of  feeling,  or  to  other  similar 
afflictions ;  but  we  utterly  fail  to  follow  the  reasoning  which 
seeks  to  prove,  that  because  one  phenomenon  can  be  demonstrated 
as  dependent  upon  another  phenomenon,  therefore  the  one  phe- 
nomenon is  that  other  phenomenon.  Were  we  to  adopt  his 
method  of  argument,  we  should  be  compelled  to  deny  the 
assumption  of  a  special  faculty  of  the  emotions,  because  that 
faculty  is  dependent  upon  cognitive  states,  and  can  be 
reduced  to  the  terms  of  such  states.  Because  one  state  can  be 
demonstrated  as  the  obvious  outcome  of  another  state  is  no 
reason  why  the  two  states  should  be  held  as  identical.  The. 
phenomenon  of  the  will  is  psychologically  as  distinct  from  the 
intellectual  and  emotional  faculties  (although  dependent  upon 
them)  as  a  neAv-born  child  is  physiologically  distinct  from  its 
mother  (although  dependent  upon  her  for  its  origin).  Were 
our  task  of  analysing  the  nature  of  the  will  completed  by  the 
description  of  the  intellectual  states  and  their  emotional  accom- 
paniments, we  would  consider  ourselves  as  mere  automata 
responding  to  a  force  over  which  we  have  no  control.  The 
direction  of  our  efforts  would  be  turned  like  a  weathercock, 
with  every  stimulus.  It  is  just  the  conscious  selection  of  the 
most  aioiDroiJriate  reaction  to  circumstances,  and  the  voluntary 
activity  tJiereby  involved,  that  constitutes  ivhat  is  known  as  the 
vjill. 

It  is  significant  that  the  most  strenuous  opponents  of  the 
theory  of  the  will  faculty  are  foremost  in  drawing  a  line  of 
distinction  between  reflex  and  voluntary  acts.  Ziehen  himself 
regards  the  reflex  and  automatic  acts  as  the  physiological,  and 
the  ideational  acts  as  the  psychological,  antecedents  of  voluntarj^^ 
acts.  Here  again,  we  may  repeat,  that,  although  a  condition 
can  be  resolved  into  terms  of  its  antecedents,  there  is  no  proof 
that  the  condition  itself  is  not  present,  but  only  the  antecedents. 
Were  such  arguments  possible  with  physiological  or  patho- 
logical  problems,    we    should   find   ourselves    involved    in    a 


PSYCHO-PHYSICAL  PROCESSES.  417 

disquisition  upon  the  absolute  inseparability  of  cause  and  effect. 
In  the  meantime  we  have  to  recognise  that  the  terms,  "  volun- 
tary," "  conscious  guidance,"  "  will,"  etc.,  can  never  be  replaced 
by  terms  of  intellection  or  emotion. 

Let  us  now  analyse  the  Psycho-Physical  Processes  of 

Volition. — When  we  trace  the  evolution  of  the  early  move- 
ments of  an  infant  to  those  higher  movements  termed  volun- 
tary, we  find  that  there  are  involved  two  sensorial  elements 
— viz.,  the  impressions  derived  from  the  special  channels  of 
perception,  and  the  impressions  derived  from  the  movements 
(sense  of  effort,  kinaesthetic  auxiliary).  Andriezen*  regards 
the  mode  of  evolution  of  each  special  or  local  sense  as  having 
been  a  twin  evolution,  a  special  kinfesthetic  element  having 
entered  into  it,  and  got  incorporated  ^^'ith  it. 

"During  the  condition  of  attention,"  says  Andriezen,  "there  is  not 
only  an  increased  functional  activity  in  this  or  that  sensory  centre,  but 
an  overflow  or  discharge  from  that  centre  to  others  along  definite 
routes,  or  diffusely  all  over  its  borders.  Where  a  voluntary  act  or 
movement  is  one  of  the  outcomes,  the  neural  discharges  consist  of 
(«)  primary  sensation,  focussing-reflex,  attention ;  and  (6)  discharge 
from  such  sensory  centre,  (c)  with  resultant  excitation  of  other  sensory 
or  psychical  centres,  arousing  feelings  and  mental  images  (ideas),  or  of 
a  kinsesthetic  centre,  in  the  last  case  evoking  a  more  or  less  obviously 
special  movement.  The  sequence  of  events  comprises,  therefore,  (a) 
arousing  a  sensory  centre  to  attention ;  and  its  dischai-ge,  along  (b)  a 
tract  to  (c)  a  kinaesthetic  centre  ;  followed  by  an  appropriate  move- 
ment to  its  completion,  or,  in  psychological  language,^/-*^,  perception  ; 
second,  apperception  and  attention  ;  third,  strong  revival  in  mind  of  the 
act  to  be  performed ;  fourth,  execution  of  the  idea.  Attention  thus 
belongs  to  the  sensory  side  ;  volition  to  a  specialized  and  intensive 
discharge  therefrom  to  the  kinsesthetic  sphere.  Volition  is  thus  a 
development  from  attention,  and  passes  on  to  execution ;  it  is  thus  the 
passing  from  attention  to  execution:  in  the  brain  it  overlaps  the  psycho- 
motor sphere  on  the  one  side,  and  the  sensory  on  the  other  ;  its  region 
is,  therefore,  the  transitional  or  association  system  one  between  these 
two.  On  the  anatomic-physiological  side  we  think  the  mixed  pyra- 
midal or  polymorphic  system  to  chiefly  represent  this  association 
region,  partly  on  comparative  and  developmental  grounds,  and  partly 
from  pathological  considerations.  The  gradual  historical  development 
and  elaboration  of  this  system  in  the  mammal  till  it  attains  its  acme 
in  man,  and  the  lateness  of  this  lower  cortical  organisation  to  complete 
its  growth  in  the  new-born  and  young,  indicate  that  this  '  accessory 

*  "Brain,"  1894,  p.  676. 

27 


418  THE  WILL. 

association  system '  of  the  brain  is  the  chief  structure  which  subserves 
the  higher  psychical  functions,  and  especially  volition.  Further,  of  all 
the  various  cell  systems  involved  in  chronic  alcoholism,  it  is  the  one  in 
which  the  changes,  especially  the  trophic  ones,  are  most  advanced." 

In  the  main,  we  are  in  accord  with  these  views,  so  far  as 
they  go ;  but,  as  we  have  seen  in  preceding  chapters,  we  know 
nothing  about  the  perceptive  side  of  sensory  impressions  so 
far  as  their  ultimate  localisation  is  concerned;  nor  do  we 
know  the  regions  concerned  with  the  immediate  transition 
of  mental  to  motor  events.  If  we  assume,  that  within  the 
higher  psychical  regions — the  ultimate  substratum  of  conscious- 
ness— the  sensory  elements  are  distinct  from  the  motor,  then 
we  are  justified  in  imagining  an  association  scheme  between  the 
two.  We  are  not  aware,  however,  of  any  comparative,  develop- 
mental, or  pathological  facts  which  would  lead  us  to  decide 
upon  this  question.  The  arguments  advanced  to  prove  that 
the  "  accessory  association  system  "  of  the  brain  is  the  chief 
structure  which  subserves  the  higher  psychical  functions,  and 
especially  volition,  may  be  valid  as  far  as  they  go,  but  they 
give  us  no  light  upon  the  actual  serving  of  the  psychical  func- 
tions. The  student  is  urged  to  reflect  upon  the  question  as  to 
how  far  we  have  got  in  our  efforts  to  trace  a  sensory  stimulus 
to  its  terminal  point  in  the  cortex  ;  then,  if  he  can,  to  satisfy 
himself  as  to  the  fons  et  origo  of  a  highly  developed  motor  im- 
pulse. When  he  has  grasped  the  fact,  that  his  knowledge  about 
both  series  of  events  is  inadequate,  then  he  will  be  in  a  position 
to  estimate  the  value  of  the  various  hypotheses  hitherto  advanced. 
Volition  cannot  be  explained  anatomically,  physiologically, 
developmentally,  or  pathologically.  The  existence  of  voluntary 
activity,  as  viewed  objectively  and  expressed  psychologically, 
is  as  clearly  manifested  (in  its  rudimentary  form)  in  the 
protozoon  as  in  man.  Certainly,  the  gradual  historical  de- 
velopment and  elaboration  of  the  nervous  system  has  been 
coincidental  with  the  empirical  evolution  of  the  normal  will 
manifestations.  But  the  actual  conditions  of  reaction  or 
initiatory  transformations — to  say  nothing  of  many  patho- 
logical affections  of  the  will  hitherto  inexplicable  by  natural 
law — are,  and  doubtless  will  be,  unknown  to  us. 

In    an    early    chapter   we   briefly   mentioned   some    of  the 


REFLEX  ACTION.  419 

differences  between  reflex  and  automatic  acts.  We  propose  now 
to  study  the  progressive  development  of  these  acts,  and  to  trace 
them  to  the  so-called  conscious  or  voluntary  acts. 

We  are  all  acquainted  with  examples  of  conscious  acts 
becoming  automatic  through  repetition.  The  psychical  ac- 
companiment becomes  gradually  less  and  less  with  each 
repetition,  until  finally  there  is  no  obvious  psychical  correlate, 
or  the  mind  may  be  engaged  in  other  directions.  Ziehen 
divides  automatic  acts  into  two  large  groups,  according  to 
their  development :  (1)  Those  which  have  developed  from 
reflex  acts  in  the  course  of  long  ages  and  many  generations — 
i.e.,  phylogenetically ;  (2)  those  which  are  the  product  of 
voluntarj'-  acts  during  the  life  of  a  single  individual — i.e.,  that 
have  developed  ontogeneticall}^  Meynert  attempts  to  prove 
that  voluntary  acts  are  derived  from  automatic.  Miinster- 
berg,  on  the  other  hand,  tries  to  prove  that  automatic  acts  are 
derived  from  acts  of  the  will.  Automatic  acts  are  more 
complicated,  and  present  greater  variability  than  reflex  acts. 
In  neither  are  there  any  psychical  concomitants.  An  automatic 
act  also  resembles  an  instinctive  act  in  this  latter  respect.  On 
account  of  the  great  diversity  of  automatic  acts,  it  is  some- 
times difiicult  to  distinguish  them  from  conscious  or  voluntary 
acts.  Inasmuch  as  reflex  and  automatic  acts  do  not  involve  a 
psychical  correlate,  their  consideration  falls  more  particularly 
to  the  physiologist.  Physiologists  have  sought  a  mechanical 
cause  for  the  various  activities  of  life,  and  they  have,  to  a 
certain  extent,  succeeded  in  enumerating  many  of  the  phenomena 
displayed ;  but,  directlj^  the  question  of  a  psychical  correlate 
appears,  all  is  confusion. 

Let  us  now  look  more  closely  at  those  forms  of  activity 
known  as  (1)  "  reflex,"  (2)  "  automatic,"  and  (3)  "  voluntary," 
and  from  a  study  of  the  two  former  modes  let  us  see  what  we 
are  entitled  to  conclude  in  regard  to  the  third. 

Reflex  acts  have  no  psychical  accompaniment,  they  are 
initiated  by  means  of  external  stimuli,  and  the  motion  is  fairly 
constant.  The  term  "  excito-motor  "  has  been  applied  to  them. 
Such  reflexes  include  the  ordinary  physiological  reflexes  of 
organic  life.  Some  authors  describe  under  reflex  actions  all 
the  active  states  which  are  the  involuntary  results  of  psychical 


420  THE  WILL. 

states.     Harris*  has  attempted  to  classify  reflex  actions  on  a 
psyclio-plij^siological  basis,  as  follows  :- 
I.  Periphero-motor — 

1.  Excito-motor. 

2.  Algio-niotor. 

3.  Sensori-motor. 
II.   Geniro-motor — 

1.  Emotio-motor. 

2.  Ideo-niotor. 

In  this  scheme  the  various  groups  of  reflex  actions  are 
arranged  in  ascending  degrees  of  psychological  complexity. 
The  scheme  in  its  entirety  would  correspond  to  the  sum  total 
of  the  involuntary  actions  of  life,  and  were  we  unable  to 
exercise  the  prerogatives  of  a  will,  our  lives  would  be,  and 
possibly  might  be  explained  as,  mere  reflex  mechanisms,  with 
a  superimposed  ideational  state  which  becomes  aware  of  what 
has  happened  to  us  and  how  we  have  reacted  upon  it. 

Without  the  element  of  the  will  we  fail  to  differentiate 
between  actions  which  are  involuntary  and  those  which  are 
voluntary.  In  our  acceptation  of  the  term  "  reflex,"  it  is 
unnecessary  to  widen  its  meaning  to  include  the  various 
psychical  elements  of  action ;  otherwise  we  should  be  compelled 
to  return  to  the  metaphysical  question  as  to  how  far  all  mental 
activity  is  reflex. 

Automatic  acts  have  been  described  as  evidences  of  mental 
automatism.  The  actions  are  generally  appropriate,  modified  by 
some  intercurrent  cerebral  influence,  and  have  no  equivalent  in 
consciousness. 

Hack  Tuke  defines  mental  automatism  as  "  a  state  in  which 
a  series  of  actions  are  performed  without  cerebral  action  or 
conscious  will,  as  during  reverie,  or  in  certain  morbid  con- 
ditions." t  We  do  not  regard  this  definition  as  satisfactory, 
inasmuch  as  we  look  upon  the  phenomena  as  being  essentially 
forms  of  cerebral  action.  It  is  impossible  to  conceive  the 
occurrence  of  many  of  the  higher  forms  of  automatism  as  being 
other  than  the  expression  of  the  automatic  action  of  the 
cerebrum.  Carpenter  says,  •'  Looking  at  all  those  automatic 
operations  by  which  results  are  evolved  without  any  intentional 
directions  of  the  mind  to  them,  in  the  light  of  reflex  action  of 
*  "  Brain,"  1894,  p.  232.  f  "Tuke's  Dictionary,''  p.  115. 


AUTOMATIC  ACTIOX.  i21 

the  cerebrum,  there  is  no  more  difficulty  of  comprehending 
that  such  reflex  actions  may  proceed  without  our  knowledge, 
so  as  to  evolve  intellectual  products,  when  their  results  are 
transmitted  to  the  sensorium,  and  are  thus  impressed  on  our 
consciousness,  than  there  is  in  understanding  that  impressions 
may  excite  muscular  movements  through  the  reflex  power  of  the 
spinal  cord,  without  the  necessary  intervention  of  sensation."  * 
We  find  great  difficulty  in  satisfying  ourselves  upon  this  point. 
According  to  the  theories  of  the  day,  psychical  states  are  the 
concomitants  of  various  physiological  activities  within  the 
cerebrum.  With  the  higher  automatic  acts  we  are  forced  to 
assume  that  these  physiological  activities  occupy  within  the 
cerebrum  the  so-called  sensory  or  motor  areas ;  in  fact,  the 
same  nervous  elements  as  are  involved  in  ordinary  conscious 
reactions.  Therefore,  unless  we  hold  that  the  mind  depends 
upon  activities  occurring  at  some  other  site  or  level,  we  must 
grant  that  the  mere  physiological  activity  of  the  strata  which 
subserve  consciousness— the  so-called  sensory  and  motor  areas 
— are  capable  of  determining  a  psj'chical  correlate  in  some 
instances,  and  not  in  others.  For  the  present  we  can  offer  no 
solution  of  this  cjuestion.  It  is  difficult  to  understand  how 
apparently  identical  physiological  processes  may  occur  with 
such  widely  different  psychical  correlates. 

Voluntary  acts  have  conscious  correlates.  The  nature  of 
the  psychical  elements  involved  in  voluntary  action  we  have 
already  in  part  considered :  it  will  be  necessary,  however,  to 
devote  some  attention  to  the  so-called  "  ideas  of  motion "'  which 
precede  the  actual  motion,  and  to  the  so-called  "  kinesthetic 
sensation,"  or  "  sense  of  effort,"  which  follows  the  motion. 
Ziehen  believes,  that  between  an  idea  of  the  motor  act  to  be 
performed  and  the  sensation  derived  from  the  performance  of 
the  act,  there  is  no  other  psychical  element  introduced.  He 
reduces  the  psychical  elements  of  voluntary  action  to  ideas  and 
sensations.  He  does  not  believe  that  a  third  psychical  factor 
exists,  unless  the  association  of  sensations  and  ideas  be  con- 
sidered as  such.  In  his  efforts  to  prove  that  no  other  psychical 
element  is  introduced,  he  shifts  the  whole  responsibility  of  the 
action  upon  ideation,  and  thereby  makes  the  individual  an 
*  "  Mental  Physiology,"  p.  607. 


422  THE  WILL. 

icleo-motor  reflex  meclianisni.  He  fails  to  account  for  the 
conscious  selection  of  one  out  of  a  series  of  ideo-motor  reactions. 
We  hold,  therefore,  that  in  the  play  of  motives  (the  review  of 
ideo-motor  activities — deliberation)  a  choice  is  made  by  the 
mind  as  to  which  action  is  most  appropriate,  and  with  this  is 
involved  the  recognition  that  the  ego  is  free  to  judge  the  merits 
of  the  ideas.  With  the  selection  of  the  most  appropriate  idea, 
the  necessary  activity  is  called  forth.  Moreover,  it  is  just  this 
conscious  selection  of  activity,  and  the  relation  of  its  inter]yreta- 
tion  to  the  ego,  that  determines  the  difference  hetiveen  the  higher 
forms  of  automatism  and  voluntary  activity. 

Ziehen  believes,  that  the  feeling  that  we  exercise  a  free  choice 
in  the  association  of  ideas  and  in  action  is  easily  explained  by 
the  fact  that,  in  distinction  from  automatic  acts,  association  and 
action  are  not  only  determined  by  external  stimuli,  but  are  also 
influenced  by  ideas,  the  sum  total  of  which  we  may  designate 
as  our  empirical  "  JEgo."  "We  believe  that  we  exercise  a  free 
choice,"  says  Ziehen,  "because  (1)  we  ourselves  are  conscious 
participants  in  the  active  association  of  ideas ;  and  (2)  although 
the  result  of  this  association,  or,  in  other  words,  the  result  of 
the  play  of  motives,  is  not  distinctly  foreseen,  it  is  nevertheless 
anticipated  •  (3)  because  the  decision  is  also  finally  made  by  a 
part  of  the  ego — i.e.,  the  prevailing  ideas."  This  assumption, 
that  the  ideas  themselves  make  the  final  decision,  is  incompre- 
hensible. We  can  as  readily  conceive  a  series  of  examination 
papers  settling  among  themselves  the  question  as  to  which 
should  take  the  prize,  without  the  decision  of  the  examiner,  as 
we  could  conceive  a  series  of  ideas  determining  among  them- 
selves as  to  which  might  be  the  most  fit  to  represent  the  organism, 
without  reference  to  the  ego  itself.  If  we  grant  that  an  idea  alone 
can  determine  an  activity,  then  we  must  also  grant  that  an  idea 
can  actively  compare  itself  with  other  ideas.  Similarly,  when  a 
fallacious  conclusion  is  brought  into  consciousness  side  by  side 
with  a  conclusion  that  is  valid,  the  fallacioiTS  does  not  itself  bow 
and  retire  on  account  of  the  merits  of  the  valid.  The  decision 
is  made  by  the  ego  itself ;  the  logical  train  of  thought  whereby 
that  decision  is  arrived  at  is  merely  the  instrumental  means 
at  the  disposal  of  the  individuality  which  reflects  and  judges. 
Hence  we  take  it  that  the  arguments  hitherto  adduced  against 


VOLUNTARY  ACTION.  423 

the  existence  of  a  will  are  invalid.  The  conception  that  the 
last  witness  in  a  trial  determines  the  decision,  and  that  the 
witness  is,  in  fact,  the  judge  himself  can  scarcely  commend  itself 
to  anyone ;  and  yet  this  is  the  argument  pushed  forward  by  one 
of  the  most  strenuous  advocates  of  the  non-existence  of  the  will. 

Let  us  now  consider  more  particularly  those  motor  images, 
or  ideas  of  movement  that  immediately  precede  the  actual  per- 
formance of  a  movement.  A  pi'imary  act"  is  reflex  or  involun- 
tary, and  the  revival  in  memory  of  the  image  of  tlie  act  maj'' 
result  in  its  repetition,  also  involuntarily.  When,  however,  an 
image  of  movement  is  deliberated  upon,  desired,  resolved,  and 
willed,  then  the  realisation  of  the  act  is  voluntary.  Some 
individuals — persons  who  possess  a  weak  will — are  subject  to 
uncontrollable  or  involuntary  reactions,  due  to  the  intensity  or 
nature  of  the  revived  image.  James  says  the  first  point  to 
understand  in  the  psj^chology  of  volition  is,  that  "  voluntary 
movements  must  be  secondary,  not  primary,  functions  of  our 
organism."  He  regards  reflex,  instinctive,  and  emotional 
movements  as  being  primary  performances.  It  is  difficult  to 
clearly  define  the  transition  between  so-called  primary  perform- 
ances and  those  which  are  secondary.  In  some  of  the  emotional 
movements,  for  instance,  we  are  often  unable  to  decide  that 
there  has  been  no  revival  of  a  former  experience.  In  fact,  we 
are  inclined  to  lay  more  stress  vipon  the  factor  of  conscious 
deliberation  and  selection,  than  upon  the  mere  question  of  the 
secondary  nature  of  the  movement.  Undoubtedly,  ideas  of 
movement  are  pre-requisites  of  voluntary  action ;  but  were  the 
elements  of  memory  entirely  eliminated  from  an  emotional 
movement,  that  movement  would  be  wanting  in  its  charac- 
teristic features  and  expression.  We  have  only  to  observe  the 
absence  of  emotional  movements  in  some  amnesic  patients  to 
satisfy  ourselves  that  the  memory  is  almost  as  important  in  the 
higher  involuntary  as  in  the  truly  voluntary  or  deliberative 
series  of  events.  In  both  instances,  guiding  sensations  are 
absolutely  essential  for  the  successful  performance  of  the  series 
of  acts.  The  pianist  who  performs  automatically  depends  upon 
guiding  sensations  as  much  as  the  one  who  concentrates  his 
attention  iipon  his  kinsesthetic  impressions. 

In  the  state  of  artificially  induced  hypnosis,  the  will  power 


424  THE  WILL. 

is  sometimes  retained  intact.  Bramwell  has  demonstrated  that 
although  there  is  an  extreme  readiness  to  react  to  suo'o-estion 
from  without,  jet  there  still  remains  a  higher  controlling 
influence,  or  auto-suggestion,  which  enables  the  hypnotised 
person  to  deliberate,  choose,  and  inhibit  at  will. 

During  the  waking-state  of  one  of  Dr.  Bramwell's  patients  we 
made  the  suggestion  to  her  that  she  ought  to  resist  a  certain 
movement  during  her  hypnotised  state.  Dr.  Bramwell  was 
not  present  at  the  time  that  the  suggestion  was  made,  and  was 
quite  unaware  of  the  restriction  imposed  upon  the  patient.  On 
testing  the  movements  suggested  during  the  hypnotic  state,  he 
found  that  the  patient  absolutely  refused  to  carvj  out  his  sug- 
gestion with  regard  to  this  particular  movement.  The  auto- 
suggestion proved  as  efiicacious  during  the  artificial  state  as 
during  the  normal  state.  How  we  are  to  explain  this  retention 
of  the  individuality  of  the  subject  we  do  not  know.  The  facts 
alone  would  appear  to  warrant  the  conclusion  that  the  memory 
image  of  the  special  act  to  be  restrained  was  present. during  the 
ai"tificial  state,  and  that  there  existed  a  certain  degree  of  con- 
tinuity between  the  primary  mental  conception  and  the 
secondary  inhibition.  On  again  awaking  this  patient  remem- 
bered our  suggestion,  but  had  not  the  faintest  recollection  as  to 
what  had  happened  dxiring  hj^pnosis. 

This  question  becomes  one  of  extreme  importance  from  a 
medico-legal  point  of  view.  Dr.  Bramwell  believes  that  patients 
in  the  hypnotic  state  almost  invariably  refuse  to  perform  acts 
which  would  be  criminal  or  even  indecent.  Whether  the 
refusal  is  only  a  manifestation  of  an  acquired  tendency  to  resist 
or  to  act  in  certain  directions,  or  whether  there  is  some 
mentalisation  possible  apart  from  true  consciousness,  we  cannot 
attempt  to  decide.  In  the  present  instance  the  refusal  to 
perform  the  movement  (to  make  her  arm  stiff)  was  evidently 
the  result  of  ante-hypnotic  suggestion.  We  have  yet  to  learn 
how  far  an  individual  is  truly  responsible  for  his  actions  during 
certain  mental  states  ;  and,  as  the  student  may  gather  from 
such  instances,  the  mere  absence  of  memory  of  the  events 
which  have  taken  place  during  those  states  need  not  entirely 
negative  the  possibility  of  there  having  been  some  freedom  of 
choice  and  the  power  of  restraining  certain  actions. 


FEELING  OF  EFFORT.  425 

The  Feeling  of  Effort  is  of  great  psjxhological  interest, 
and  its  relation  to  voluntary  action  has  been  the  subject  of  a 
considerable  amount  of  discussion.  Miiller*  believed  the 
nervous  process  to  be  purely  central,  and  to  consist  in  an 
efferent  motor  discharge.  Bain,  Wundt,  and  others  adopt 
similar  views.  Most  observers,  however,  believe  that,  apart 
from  the  psychical  elements  of  deliberation,  choice,  resolu- 
tion, etc.,  the  feeling  of  effort  is  derived  from  the  periphery 
by  means  of  afferent  sensory  stimuli.  From  what  we  have 
already  said  about  the  feeling  of  effort  in  regard  to  the  localisa- 
tion of  objects  in  space,  the  student  will  probably  agree,  that 
the  theory  of  its  central  origin  does  not  appear  to  be  true. 
One  fact  in  itself  is  significant,  a  person  may  retain  his  power 
of  voluntary  movement,  but  fails  to  obtain  the  feeling  of  effort 
when  peripherally  initiated  stimuli  are  rendered  impossible 
through  paralysis  of  sensation,  or  after  the  amputation  of  a  limb. 
Ludwig,  Hughlings-Jackson,  Crichton  Browne,  and  others 
still  iiphold  the  "  central "  theory.  Bastian,  Ferrier,  and  others 
refer  to  the  doctrine  as  disproved.  Waller  t  made  an  objective 
study  of  the  sense  of  effort,  and  supported  the  theory,  that 
nerve,  in  so  far  as  it  is  accessible  to  physical  examination,  is 
pre-eminently  a  passive  and  force-transmitting  organ,  and  not 
an  active  force-producing  organ.  After  excluding  the  nerve- 
hbre  from  consideration,  he  attempted  to  prove  that  the  sense 
of  effort  is  derived  from  sensations  with  action,  whilst  the  sense 
of  fatigue  is  also  derived  from  sensations,  but  with  after  action. 
"The  first  is  a  sensation  accompanying  muscular  action;  the 
second  is  a  sensation  consequent  upon  muscular  action.  The 
first  owes  its  being  to  molecular  changes  which  accompany 
muscular  action ;  the  second  to  molecular  changes  which  have 
accompanied  muscular  action — i.e.,  they  have  a  common  cause, 
the  changes  which  produce  the  first  also  produce  the  second, 
and  it  is  not  material  to  our  argument  whether  the  positive 
changes  with  the  effect  are  succeeded  by  positive  or  by  negative 
after-changes,  as  the  substratum  of  the  after-effect." 

We  cannot  enter  further  into  the  physiological  aspects  of 
this  question.     What  we  have  to  decide  is.  Is  there,  in  addi- 

*  "  Fsychologie  d.  Menschen,"  ii.  p.  500. 
t  "Brain,"  1891,  p.  181. 


426  THE  WILL. 

tion  to  the  images  of  passive  sensation,  a  feeling  of  a  particular 
kind  associated  with  an  outgoing  current  ?  Professor  James 
has  shown  that  the  assumption  of  the  feeling  of  innervation  is 
unnecessary.  To  this  view  we  conform,  and  we  do  not  admit  the 
necessity  of  an  additional  antecedent — the  feeling  of  an  efferent 
current — for  the  determination  of  a  movement.  The  actual 
movement  may  be  preceded  by  a  state  of  consciousness  made 
up  of  impressions  derived  from  the  peripher}:-,  or,  possibly, 
reference  may  be  made  to  impressions  derived  from  a  former 
completed  circuit  of  afferent  and  efferent  currents-  but  the 
mere  fact  of  reference  being  made  to  the  results  of  former  out- 
going currents,  in  no  way  implies,  that  before  the  present  move- 
ment occurs  there  is  a  similar  discharge  iii  an  outward  direction. 

Our  experience  is  mainly  derived  from  ingoing  stimuli,  and 
from  the  secondary  ingoing  stimuli,  which  are  determined 
coincidently  with  the  efeds  of  outgoing  stimuli.  Therefore, 
we  hold  that,  before  the  performance  of  a  voluntary  move- 
ment, there  may  be  a  revival  in  consciousness  of  the  effects 
of  former  ingoing  and  outgoing  currents ;  but  that  it  is  un- 
warrantable to  assume,  that  with  such  a  revival  in  consciousness, 
there  is  any  actual  revival  of  those  physiological  ingoing  and 
outgoing  currents  themselves.  The  feeling  of  outgoing  dis- 
charge is  in  reality  nothing  else  than  the  feeling  associated  with 
the  perception  of  the  effects  of  an  outgoing  discharge — i.e., 
kinsesthetic  images  may  be  the  last  psychic  antecedents  of 
actual  movements,  but  those  images  need  not  necessarily  be 
attended  by  actual  outgoing  currents.  Why  the  feelings  of 
innervation  should  be  supposed  to  exist  for  movement  alone, 
we  do  not  know ;  were  the  theory  plausible,  we  ought  to  be 
able  to  formulate  some  similar  doctrine  in  the  case  of  the  other 
senses,  and  imagine,  apart  from  adjustment,  an  outgoing 
current  from  the  brain  to  the  visual  apparatus,  preceding 
the  voluntary  perception  of  an  object  already  within  focus. 

Professor  James  has  pointed  out  in  very  clear  terms,  that 
we  have  no  introspective  evidence  of  the  feeling  of  innervation. 
The  only  psychic  state  which  introspection  lets  us  discern  as 
the  forerunner  of  our  voluntary  acts  is  an  anticipatory  image 
of  the  sensorial  consequences  of  a  movement,  j^lus  (on  certain 
occasions)    the    fiat    that    these    consequences    shall    become 


FEELING  OF  EFFORT.  427 

actual.*  Ferrier  has  demonstrated,  that  the  consciousness  of 
effort  coincides  with  actual  muscular  movements  present,  and 
that  no  matter  how  much  a  person  wills  to  perform  a  movement, 
unless  there  is  some  actual  movement  determined  by  an  out- 
going current,  there  can  be  no  consciousness  of  effort. 
Miinsterbergt  has  also  denied  the  existence  of  such  a  thing 
as  a  sensation  of  volitional  energy.  H^  gives  as  reasons  against 
the  theory  of  the  feeling  of  innei'vation :  (1)  Our  ideas  of 
movement  are  all  faint  ideas,  resembling  in  this  the  copies  of 
sensations  in  memory.  Were  they  feelings  of  the  outgoing 
discharge,  they  would  be  original  states  of  consciousness,  not 
copies,  and  ought  by  analogy  to  be  vwid,  like  other  original 
states.  (2)  Our  unstriped  muscles  yield  no  feelings  in  contract- 
ing, nor  can  they  be  contracted  at  will,  differing  thus  in  two 
peculiarities  from  the  voluntary  muscles.  What  more  natural 
than  to  suppose  that  the  two  peculiarities  hang  together,  and 
that  the  reason  whj'  we  cannot  contract  our  intestines,  for 
example,  at  will,  is,  because  we  have  no  memory-images  of  how 
their  contraction  feels  ?  Were  the  supposed  innervation-feeling 
always  the  "  mental  cue,"  we  do  not  see  why  we  might  not 
have  it  even  where,  as  here,  the  contractions  themselves  are 
unfelt,  and  why  it  might  not  bring  the  contractions  about.| 
Having  satisfied  ourselves  that  the  feeling  of  effort  or  innervation 
is  nothing  more  than  the  revival  of  the  sensible  effects  of  a  former 
reaction,  and  that  the  revival  anticipates  a  present  movement,  we 
pass  to  the  consideration  of  some  of  the  active  motions  which 
seem  to  involve  a  special  fiat  of  the  will. 

At  the  outset,  we  granted  that  feelings  or  ideas  may  precede 
actual  movements,  and  that  the  existence  of  an  idea  may  pre- 
cipitate the  movement ;  but  we  hesitated  to  adopt  the  view  that 
all  voluntary  movement  was  simply  ideo-motor — i.e.,  involving- 
no  other  psychical  elements  than  ideas. 

Professor  James  believes  that  the  inhibition  of  a  movement 
no  more  involves  an  express  effort  or  command  than  its  execu- 
tion does.  "A  waking  man's  behaviour  is  at  all  times  the 
resultant  of  two  opposing  neural  forces.     With  unimaginable 

*  "Principles  of  Psychology,"  vol.  ii.  p.  501. 
t  "Die  Willenshandluiig  "  (1888),  pp.  73,  82. 
X  Miinsterberg,  op.  cit.,  pp.  87,  88  (quoted  from  James). 


428  THE  WILL. 

fineness  some  currents  among  the  cells  and  fibres  of  his  brain 
are  playing  on  his  motor  nerves,  whilst  other  currents,  as  un- 
imaginably fine,  are  playing  on  the  first  currents,  damming  or 
helping  them,  altering  their  direction  or  their  speed.  The 
iipshot  of  it  all  is,  that  whilst  the  currents  must  always  end  by 
being  drained  off  through  some  motor  nerves,  they  are  drained 
off  sometimes  through  one  set,  and  sometimes  through  another, 
and  sometimes  they  keep  each  other  in  equilibrium  so  long  that 
a  superficial  observer  may  think  they  are  not  drained  off  at  all." 
This  hypothetical  explanation  of  what  takes  place  within  the 
sensorium  would  be  more  readily  conceivable  were  we  able  to 
■eliminate  the  psychical  element  from  our  consideration.  It  is 
difficult  to  imagine  a  conflict  between  physiological  currents, 
irrespective  of  their  psychical  correlates.  We  can  speak  of  the 
conflict  between  motives,  or  incentives  to  act,  from  a  psychical 
point  of  view ;  but  we  cannot  grant  that  the  act  is  determined 
entirely  by  the  result  of  opposing  influences  in  currents.  The 
student  must  remember,  that  mental  conflict  is  a  fact  of  ex- 
perience, and  that  the  physiological  equivalent  is  a  mere  con- 
jecture which  will  not  bear  investigation.  We  are  no  more 
warranted  in  this  case  to  suppose  that  the  physical  activities 
provide  the  full  contents  of  conscious  volition,  than  we  were  in 
the  case  of  perception  to  suppose  that  the  physical  apparatus 
provided  the  mind  with  the  ready-made  percept.  The  conflict- 
ing currents — if  currents  there  be — do  not  "  fight  it  out "  among 
themselves,  and  provide  the  ego  with  a  ready-made  flat  presenta- 
tion— i.e.,  we  have  no  data  to  assume  that  the  physical  process 
accomplishes  a  definite  activity  without  the  correlation  of  just 
as  definite  a  thought  or  mental  process.  When  we  attempt  to 
explain  the  origin  of  these  opposing  currents,  we  are  forced  to 
take  account  of  various  psychical  elements ;  and  here,  again,  we 
become  involved  in  difficulties,  for  we  cannot  assume  that  mind 
in  itself  possesses  a  material  force. 

Mercier  concludes,  that  the  action  of  nerve  centres  is  arrested 
by  a  modification  of  the  same  process  that  sets  the  action  going 
by  the  impact  of  an  extraneous  force.  "  The  nerve-currents," 
says  Mercier,*  "  are  known  to  be  undulatory  in  form,  and  the 
nullification  of  one  set  of  waves  by  another  similar  set,  is  a 
*  "  The  Nervous  System  and  the  Mind,"  p.  74. 


INHIBITIOX.  429 

familiar  occurrence  in  various  regions  of  physics.  The  phe- 
nomena of  the  interference  of  waves  of  light  and  of  sound,  are 
cases  in  point.  One  set  of  sound-waves  may  so  act  on  another 
set  as  to  result  in  silence.  .  .  .  Hence,  if  a  centre  is  put  in  action 
by  one  nerve-current,  it  is  easy  to  conceive,  nay,  it  is  a  necessary 
consequence  of  the  constitution  of  nervous  tissue  as  thus  far 
expounded,  that  it  should  be  liable  to  be  put  out  of  action  by 
another  nerve-current."  The  same  author  has  sought  to  prove 
that  ever}"  part  of  the  nervous  system  is  at  all  times  the  seat  of 
continuously  flowing  currents  of  force.  "  Along  every  nerve- 
fibre  gushes  of  force  continually  succeed  one  another,  as  waves 
of  blood  pass  through  the  arteries.  Every  nerve-cell  is,  as  it 
were,  a  heart,  which  receives  the  current  flowing  into  it,  and 
discharges  it  with  increased  impetus."*  Mercier  also  states  that, 
in  order  to  start  a  nerve-centre  into  action,  some  force  must 
impinge  upon  the  centre  from  a  source  external  to  itself.  "A 
centre  at  rest  will  continue  at  rest,  and  if  in  action,  will  con- 
tinue to  act  in  the  same  wa)",  unless  acted  on  by  some  extraneous 
force.  Both  to  start  the  action,  and  to  arrest  it,  some  influence 
from  outside  the  centre  is  necessary.  The  initiating  impulse 
comes  always,  directlj^  or  indirectly,  from  the  periphery  of  the 
body,  and  so  from  the  outside  world." 

Let  us  now  try  to  adapt  a  psychical  process  of  inhibition 
to  the  imaginary  physical  counterpart,  and  let  us,  if  possible, 
understand  what  happens.  Firstly,  we  are  to  regard  the  nerve- 
cell  as  a  pump  somewhat  similar  to  the  heart,  its  functions 
being  to  receive  and  pump  currents  in  this  and  that  direction. 
Next,  we  are  to  regard  its  pump  action  as  determined  from  the 
periphery.  The  "  gushes  of  force  "  succeed  each  other  regu- 
larly in  the  ordinary  way — i.e.,  when  there  is  no  particular  form 
of  movement  to  be  performed.  When,  however,  a  special 
movement  is  to  be  performed,  there  is  a  special  stimulus  from 
the  periphery,  a  special  action  of  the  nerve-cell,  and  a  special 
direction  of  the  current  to  the  special  motor  apparatus ;  and,  as 
the  consequence  of  this  peripherall}^  initiated  nerve-current,  the 
movement  is  rendered  eflfective.  Inhibition  is  thought  to  arise 
in  much  the  same  ^^'ay.  A  specially  appointed  and  peripherally 
initiated  current  starts  the  activity  of  another  nerve-pump, 
which  directs  an  opposing  current  to  impede  the  other,  and 

*  Op.  cit.,  p.  75. 


430  THE  WILL. 

thereby  inhibit  it.  Mercier  raises  the  hypothesis,  tliat  the 
extrinsic  influence  which  tends  to  keep  the  nerve-cell  from 
excessive  activity  is  carried  on  by  the  motor  centres  concur- 
rently with  their  more  generally  recognised  function.  Here, 
then,  we  have  two  sets  of  peripherally  initiated  currents — the 
active,  and  the  inhibitory — acting  in  succession.  The  former 
leads  off  from  periphery  to  pump,  thence  to  motor  apparatus ; 
whilst  the  latter  also  leads  off  from  periphery  to  pump,  but 
overtakes  the  former,  gets  in  front  of  it,  as  it  were,  turns  it 
back,  and  thereby  inhibits  it.  If  the  student  can  imagine  one 
pulse-wave  overtaking  another  and  preventing  its  further  flow, 
then  he  can  also  imagine  the  same  with  the  nerve-currents. 
Inhibition  is,  psychologically  and  phj^siologically,  a  positive 
activity  ;  and  just  as  it  is  impossible  to  obliterate  a  recent 
thought  by  a  present  one,  so  it  is  impossible  to  interfere  with 
one  current  by  the  passage  of  another.  Each  event  is  distinct 
and  separate.  With  the  assumption  that  there  is  a  special 
inhibitory  apparatus  for  the  control  of  the  force  of  the  nerve- 
currents,  we  have  nothing  to  do.  We  are  prepared  to  admit 
that  the  nervous  apparatus  itself  has  a  regulated  tone.  At  the 
same  time,  however,  we  confess  that  we  do  not  understand 
either  the  physiological  nature  of  the  tone  or  of  the  activities 
regulated  by  it. 

The  term  "  nervous  resistance  "  is  freely  employed  by  some 
authors  to  indicate  a  hypothetical  physiological  state.  Mercier 
says,  "It  seems  reasonable  to  suppose  that  just  as  the  physical 
process  of  the  nervous  discharge,  when  viewed  in  the  aggregate 
as  a  physiological  process,  is  the  motor  of  muscular  movement ; 
so  the  nervovTS  resistance  when  raised  to  the  same  power  is  the 
phjT-siological  factor  inhibition."  Let  the  student  analyse  the 
nature  of  events  during  an  act  of  inhibition.  In  the  first 
instance  we  must  presuppose  a  tendency  to  act  in  a  certain 
direction,  and  we  may  assume  that  there  is  a  corresponding 
nervous  activity  ;  next  there  comes  the  inhibitory  act  with  its 
nervous  equivalent.  We  ask.  In  what  waj^  does  the  second 
activity  differ  from  the  first?  In  both  series  of  events  the 
activities  are  positive.  I  forcibly  exaggerate  my  knee-jerk,  or 
I  inhibit  it.  Wherein  is  the  difference  ?  We  can  resist  the 
effects   of  a  just    past  nervous  activity  by  the    exertion  of  a 


NERVOUS  RESISTANCE.  431 

present  positive  activity ;  but  we  cannot  set  iip  two  currents  in 
opposition  to  each  other.  When  we  look  at  an  acutely  maniacal 
patient  we  note  his  varied  and  often  purposeless  movements ; 
and,  moreover,  such  patients,  on  recovery,  will  sometimes  say 
of  themselves  that  they  also  had  noted  the  motor  excitement, 
but  had  insufficient  power  to  control  it.  In  such  instances  the 
nervous  apparatus  has  been  unduly  active,  and  the  individual 
has  been  deficient  in  the  strength  to  control  action.  Mercier's 
conception  that  every  nerve-centre  is  at  all  times  subject  to 
continuous  control  or  inhibition,  appears  to  be  perfectly  feasible, 
and  we  must  accept  the  hypothesis  that  the  nerve-centres  are 
maintained  in  a  condition  of  mobile  equilibrium  by  the  oppo- 
sition of  the  inhibition  exercised  upon  them,  to  their  own 
inherent  tendency  to  discharge,  as  manifestly  true,  inasmuch 
as  it  would  be  ridiculous  to  imagine  any  physical  or  systemic 
activities  without  such  controlling  influences. 

We  do  not,  however,  go  so  far  as  to  imagine  that  the  state 
of  inhibition  is  maintained  by  centres  which  exercise  this 
function  concurrently  with  others.  The  student  must  not 
confuse  the  notion  of  mere  mechanical  obstruction  with  that  of 
so-called  nervous  resistance.  The  former  may  exist  as  a  patho- 
logical factor  of  great  significance  in  the  causation  of  morbid 
mental  states ;  whilst  the  latter  may  exist  as  a  law  of  physics, 
of  ^A'hich,  however,  we  do  not  as  yet  grasp  the  full  psychological 
significance.     To    put    the  matter  shortly,    we  may  say,  that 

(1)  the  regulation  of  the  activities  of  the  nervous  system  is 
determined  by  physiological  laws,  which,  by  analogy,  appear  to 
warrant  an  hypothesis  about  "discharge"  and  "resistance"; 

(2)  when  a  psychical  element  is  involved,  the  inhibition  of  one 
act  is  only  possible  by  the  positive  exertion  of  another  act 
which  overcomes  or  negatives  the  effects  of  the  first  act ;  (3)  the 
tendency  to  excessive  activity  of  the  nervous  elements  may  be 
checked  by  the  exertion  of  controlling  nervous  influences  apart 
from  any  psychical  influence,  in  which  case  the  inhibitory 
influence  may  be  termed  physiological ;  but  this  physiological 
inhibition  does  not  necessarily  imply  the  existence  of  an 
opposing  current  which  checks  the  positive  current  by  an 
intra-tubular  conflict ;  (4)  the  tendency  to  excessive  activity  of 
the  nervous  elements  may,  by  the  involving  of  psychic  influ- 


432  THE  WILL. 

ences,  be  controlled  by  the  positive  exertion  of  other  activities 
which  overcome  or  render  inert  the  effects  of  the  excessive 
nervous  activities.  Thus,  we  are  warranted  in  steering  clear 
between  the  incomplete  conceptions  of  physiological  and 
psychological  inhibition. 

Movements. — Mercier  has  classified  movements  according 
to  their  character  and  to  the  parts  of  the  body  concerned  with 
them.  He  clearly  points  out  the  difierence  between  central  and 
'peripheral  movements  in  regard  to  their  precision,  number  and 
variety,  generality  and  speciality,  simplicity  and  complexitj^. 
Generally  speaking,  peripheral  are  more  precise,  more  numerous, 
more  varied,  more  special,  and  more  complex  than  central 
movements.  The  co-ordination  of  movements  may  be  simulta- 
neous or  sequential — i.e.,  one  movement  may  be  combined  with 
another  movement  simultaneously,  or  one  movement  may  follow 
upon  another  movement  as  a  sequence.  "  Those  movements 
which  are  combined  (co-ordinated)  in  simultaneity  being 
mainly  central,  while  those  which  are  co-ordinated  in  succes- 
sion are  predominantly  peripheral."  The  movements  of  the 
more  central  parts  serve  as  a  basis  for  many  peripheral  move- 
ments. The  human  body  is  capable  of  carrying  on  several 
series  of  central  and  peripheral  movements  at  the  same  time. 
Thus,  the  organist  may  co-ordinate  the  movements  of  simul- 
taneity and  sequence  of  his  legs,  as  in  the  act  of  pedalling ;  he 
may  co-ordinate  a  similar  series  of  movements  of  his  arms  in 
the  act  of  fingering  the  key-boards  and  stops  ;  he  may  also  read 
the  score  before  him,  and  co-ordinate  the  movements  of  speech 
and  song  ;  and  moreover,  in  addition  to  all  this  complex  activity, 
he  may  be  conscious  of  totally  irrelevant  matters. 

In  the  insane  we  see  every  variety  of  movement  in 
simultaneity  and  succession.  Thus  some  idiots  and  imbe- 
ciles constantly  sway  to  and  fro ;  others  incessantly  move 
their  fingers  or  toes  in  a  rhythmical  manner.  The  flocci- 
tatio  of  the  comatose,  the  rocking  movements  of  the  agitated 
melancholiac,  the  picking  movements  of  the  general  para- 
lytic, the  constant  restlessness  of  the  maniac,  the  move- 
ments of  the  fingers  in  chorea,  and  the  convulsions  of 
the  epileptic  are  all  capable  of  classification.  Space,  how- 
ever, will   not  permit  us  to   consider    all   those  variations    of 


MOVEMENTS.  433 

movements  that  depend  primarily  upon  diseases  of  bones,  liga- 
ments, mnscles,  tendons,  or  upon  affections  of  the  motor 
nerves ;  nor  can  we  discuss  the  influence  of  lesions  of  the 
sensory  nerves,  or  the  reflex  mechanism  of  the  spinal  cord  in 
the  production  of  disorders  of  co-ordination.  From  a  clinical 
point  of  view  it  is  of  interest  to  note,  that  cerebellar  lesions 
determine  movements  which  spread  centrifu gaily,  while  cerebral 
lesions  usually  determine  movements  which  extend  from  the 
periphery  to  the  more  central  regions. 

Before  entering  upon  the  Cjuestion  of  abnormal  conduct, 
and  the  habits  and  limits  of  self-control,  it  is  necessary  that  we 
should  devote  some  attention  to  the  physiological  processes 
connected  with  the  production  of  speech.  The  motor  pro- 
cesses, so  far  as  they  affect  the  larynx,  pharynx,  mouth,  and 
nose,  in  the  production  of  musical  tones  and  noises,  do  not 
concern  us.  Presently  we  shall  take  some  account  of  the 
pathological  variations  of  the  voice  and  speech  ;  for  the  present 
we  have  only  to  do  with  the  psychical  and  ph^^sical  processes 
involved.  We  have  already  considered  the  cjuestion  of  the  locali- 
sation of  the  centre  for  speech,  and  we  have  taken  some  account  of 
the  motor  tract,  and  the  effects  of  its  lesions  upon  the  mechanism 
of  articulation,  so  that  it  is  unnecessary  to  revert  to  them. 

By  far  the  most  important  mechanism  of  expression 
possessed  by  the  human  being  is  that  of  speech.  By  the  move- 
ments of  articulation  we  give  expression  not  only  to  our  sensa- 
tions and  special  emotions,  but  also  to  ideas  derived  from 
memory  and  innumerable  associations.  When  the  region  of 
Yv^ernicke,  in  the  auditory  centre  in  the  left  temporo-sphenoidal 
lobe,  is  destroyed,  words  are  still  heard  but  not  understood.* 
In  studying  the  mode  of  expression  in  speech  it  is  important 
to  note  the  anatomical  localisation  of  the  tracts  which  have  to 
do  with  expressive  and  imitative  movements.  Bechterewt  and 
Ziehen  :|:  found  that  after  the  entire  cortex  of  the  cerebrum  had 
been  removed  from  a  rabbit  it  still  performed  its  characteristic 

*  Ziehen,  op.  cit.,  p.  260  ;  "Wernicke,  "  Der  Aphasisclie  SjTnptomen-com- 
plex,"  Breslaii,  1874  ;  and  in  Friedlander's  "  Fortschritten  der  Medicin," 
1886  ;  Grashey,  "  Archiv.  f.  Psycliiatrie,"  1885  ;  Lichtheim,  "  Deutscli.  Arch, 
f.  Klin.  Med.,"'  Bd.  xxxvi. 

+  "  Yirchow's  Arch.,"'  Bd.  ci. 

X  "  Archiv.  f .  Psych.,"  xx. 

28 


434  THE  WILL. 

movements  of  expression,  sucli  as  bobbing  the  tail.  Notlmagel* 
believes,  that  the  centre  for  the  mimic  expressive  movements  is 
located  in  man  in  the  thalamus  opticus,  Avhereas  the  centre  for 
the  most  complicated  expressive  movements  is  located  in  the 
cortex  cerebri,  the  nerve-tract  being  chiefly  in  the  pyramidal 
tract.  The  tract  between  the  thalamus  and  the  cortex,  which 
would  provide  the  psychical  factor,  is  not  as  yet  determined. 
Ziehen  t  believes,  that  certain  expressive  movements,  such  as 
the  bristling  of  the  hair,  blushing,  etc.,  probably  have  their 
centres  in  still  deeper  parts  of  the  brain,  particularly  in  the 
medulla  oblongata.  This,  he  says,  harmonises  with  the  fact, 
that  these  expressive  movements  also  result  from  psychical 
causes,  but  are  virtually  not  subject  to  the  volition,  or,  more 
properly,  to  the  process  of  association  at  all ;  they  cannot  even 
be  voluntarily  suppressed. 

Of  the  various  forms  of  aphasia  we  have  already  spoken. 
Undoubtedly,  it  is  to  the  study  of  such  conditions  as  word- 
blindness  (alexia,  coodtas  verhalis)  and  word-deafness  (surditas 
verhalis)  that  we  are  to  look  for  some  clue  as  to  the  localisation 
of  events  revivable  in  memory.  In  word-deafness  the  patient 
does  not  hear  words,  but  hears  other  sounds,  and  is  not  deaf. 
In  word-blindness  there  is  inability  to  understand  printed  or 
written  words,  or  familiar  objects,  although  he  can  see  quite 
well.  Lichtheim  has  pointed  out,  that  the  "  auditory  word- 
representations"  form  the  starting  point  of  language.  Auditory 
images  and  motor  images  must  be  combined  in  order  that  an 
imitation  of  a  sound  may  be  produced. 

The  physical  equivalents  of  ideas  of  articulation  are  sup- 
posed to  rest  in  the  posterior  inferior  part  of  the  frontal  con- 
volution. When  this  part  of  the  brain  is  destroyed  the 
power  of  moving  the  apparatus  of  speech  is  retained,  but 
the  individual  is  unable  to  articulate  a,nj  word.  For  the  com- 
plete utterance  of  articulate  language  it  is  essential  that  this 
latter  region  should  be  intact.  Similarly,  as  we  have  seen 
in  a  previous  chapter,  it  is  essential  that  the  regions  for 
acoustic  and  visual  images  should  also  be  working  normally. 
In  the  case  of  visual  images  both  hemispheres  of  the  brain  are 

*  "Zeitschr.  f.  Klin.  Med.,"  1889,  Bd.  xvi.  H.  5  and  6. 
t  "  Sphygmograph.  Untersuchungen,"  1887. 


MECHANISM   OF   SPEECH.  435 

involved,  whereas  the  images  of  articulation  and  hearing  appear 
to  be  deposited  in  one  hemisphere  only  (in  the  left  hemisphere 
in  right-handed  persons).  For  the  complete  conception  in  con- 
sciousness and  the  due  utterance  of  articulate  language,  there- 
fore, it  is  essential  that  the  regions  concerned  with  the  repro- 
duction of  the  images,  both  sensor}^  and  motor,  should  be  intact, 
and  that  the  tracts  of  communication  with  the  higher  j)erceptive 
centres  should  also  be  normal. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  return  to  the  c|uestion  as  to  how 
the  component  parts  of  the  idea  of  words  become  associated 
as  a  general  concrete  conception.  We  know  so  little  about 
the  formation  of  simple  perceptions  from  a  phj^siological 
point  of  view,  that  we  naturally  hesitate  to  attempt  to 
explain  the  formation  of  a  general  concrete  conception  such 
as  is  involved  in  articulate  lano-uage.  The  view  of  Huffhlinp's- 
Jackson,  that  words  are  revived,  in  silent  thought,  as  faint 
articulatory  processes  taking  place  in  motor  centres,  need  not 
be  discussed,  inasmuch  as  it  Avould  only  involve  a  repetition  of 
the  arguments  against  the  existence  of  actual  outgoing  currents, 
or  feelings  of  innervation.  The  fact,  that  some  people  read 
aloud,  or  give  articulate  expression  to  their  thoughts,  is 
obviously  no  evidence  in  favour  of  the  theory.  We  agree  with 
Bastian,  who  believes,  that  there  are  good  reasons  for  rejecting 
the  notion,  and  that  the  materials  of  our  recollection,  in  the 
idea  of  words  during  silent  thought,  are  revived  articulatory 
sensations.  The  arguments  we  have  given  as  to  the  nature  of 
ordinary  revived  kintesthetic  sensations  apply  equally  well  to 
actual  speech.  We  are  aware  of  the  importance  to  be  attached 
to  the  joint  operation  of  the  auditory  and  visual  apparatuses  in 
the  development  and  production  of  speech,  and  we  fully  appre- 
ciate the  fact,  that  total  deafness  supervening  in  a  child  in  full 
possession  of  speech,  as  late  as  the  fourth,  fifth,  or  even  the 
sixth  year,  will  entail  dumbness  ;  but  that  a  revival  of  the 
auditory  impression  is  not  essential  to  acquired  articulatory 
speech  is  evidenced  by  the  fact,  that  the  auditory  word-centre 
may    be    aifected    without    any    impairment    of    articulation.'"" 

*  Bastian,  however,  does  not  attach  too  much  importance  to  the  auditory 
impressions  in  the  production  of  articulate  speech  ;  his  remarks  apply  rather 
to  the  revived  images  of  silent  thought. 


436  THE  WILL. 

Before  leaving  this  part  of  our  subject  it  is  essential  that  we 
should  speak  briefly  of  some  of  the  clinical  disorders  of  the 
kineesthetic  word-apparatus.  We  have  already  discussed  the 
auditory  and  visual  word-apparatuses  and  their  aberrations  of 
external  and  internal  origin,  and  when  we  take  into  account  the 
lowered  or  excessive  activity  of  them  as  associated  even  with 
various  states  of  health,  and  also  include  the  possibilities  of 
their  being  affected  by  the  excitability  of  the  perceptive  centres 
supposed  to  exist  elsewhere,  we  can  more  readily  understand 
how  morbid  presentations  and  representations  arise  in  the 
insane. 

Speech  movements  and  writing  movements  may  be  affected 
secondarily  through  lesions  of  the  auditory  or  visual  word- 
centres  of  the  associative  or  thought-processes,  or  through 
lesions  of  the  kingesthetic  word-centres,  which  serve  to  transmit 
the  impressions  derived  from  the  active  expression  of  our 
thoughts  by  speech  or  writing. 

Clinicalty,  we  have  to  note — (1)  deaf-mutison  as  the  result  of 
congenital  disease.  Idiots  may  never  acquire  the  power  of 
speech.  In  some  cases  this  is  the  result  of  disease  before  or 
after  birth  ;  in  others  it  is  merely  the  result  of  deafness.  Many 
idiots  only  acquire  the  power  about  the  fifth  or  sixth  year ;  others 
have  acquired  the  power,  but  lost  it  again  owing  to  deafness 
supervening.  It  is  common  to  meet  with  idiots  who  can  hum 
tunes,  but  who  cannot  repeat  words.  The  auditory  apparatus 
ma}^  be  quite  normal,  and  there  may  even  be  a  certain  amount 
of  musical  taste  in  idiots  ;  b^it  there  is  not  a  parallel  develop- 
ment of  the  vocal  articulatory  apparatus.  Ireland  observes  that, 
in  idiocy  the  gift  of  speech  bears  a  pretty  well-marked  relation 
to  the  number  and  complexity  of  ideas.  He  describes  a  certain. 
class  of  "idiotic  aphasiacs "  who  remain  obstinately  mute, 
although  they  have  more  intelligence  than  other  children  who 
talk  volubly.  In  spite  of  the  fact,  however,  that  they  are  often 
able  to  hear  and  to  understand  speech,  these  cases  do  not  make 
much  progress.  In  some  cases  the  defect  is  attributed  to  a 
want  of  power  over  the  muscles  of  the  tongue.  Sir  W.  Wilde* 
has  pointed  out,  that  in  man}^  instances  of  defective  articulation, 

*  '•  Aural  Surgery  and  Diseases  of  the  Ear,"  London,  1853,  pyj.  465-7. 
Ireland,  op.  cit.,  pp.  274-6. 


SPEECH   DEFECTS.  437 

as  well  as  severe  stuttering  and  of  partial  mutism,  there  is  a 
peculiar  narrowness  and  an  unnatural  height  of  the  palate 
immediately  behind  the  upper  incisor  teeth.  As  a  rule,  idiots 
cut  their  sentences  very  short :  sometimes  they  confine  their 
remarks  to  monosyllables.  Another  characteristic  feature  of 
their  speech  is  that,  wh^n  a^ked  a  question  they  repeat  the 
question  several  times  before  they  recognise  its  import  and 
attempt  to  reply.  (2)  Acquired  defects  of  speech  may  supervene 
at  any  period  of  life.  Lesions  of  those  parts  of  the  brain  con- 
nected with  the  associative  apparatus  of  thought  may  so  alter 
the  intelligence  as  to  render  speech  defective ;  or  the  defect 
may  lie  in  the  articulatory  apparatus  (the  kin^esthetic  word- 
centre,  as  well  as  the  mere  motor  tract).  Stuttering  and 
stammering  are  usually  the  results  of  defective  co-ordination  of 
the  articulatory  movements.  Aphemia  is  generally  the  result  of 
defective  movement  alone.  It  is  common  in  giosso-laryngeal 
paralysis  and  other  diseases  of  the  medulla  oblongata  ;  it  may 
also  occur  in  association  with  paralysis  from  cerebral  disease, 
general  paralysis  of  the  insane,  disseminated  cerebro-spinal 
paralysis,  and  hemiplegia,  either  cerebral  or  pontine.  A  lesion 
of  one  of  the  oro-lingual  centres  of  Ferrier  causes  oro-lingual 
hemiparesis,  which  is  characterised  by  slight  unilateral  weak- 
ness, and  not  by  complete  paralysis.  When  the  lesion  is  on 
the  left  side  of  the  cerebrum  speechlessness  results.  The  effects 
of  lesions  in  the  island  of  Reil,  and  the  not  uncommon  associa- 
tion of  aphasia  with  heminanaesthesia  of  the  right  side  of  the 
body,  are  subjects  of  great  import,  but  we  cannot  discuss  them 
here. 

In  the  insane  we  have  to  note  the  following  varieties  of 
speech : — (1)  The  slow  and  often  difficult  way  of  speaking  in 
melancholiacs,  and  sometimes  also  in  the  feeble  minded ;  (2) 
the  incessant  and  rapid  talking  of  maniacs  and  general  para- 
lytics (logorTliceci) ;  (3)  cdliteraAloii  (Mendel),  the  derangement 
in  which  words  are  not  placed  according  to  their  meaning,  bu.t 
according  to  their  sound ;  (4)  verbigeratioii,  in  which  there  is 
monotonous  utterance  of  incessantly  repeated  words  (Kahlbaum), 
the  words  being  in  some  cases  forcibly  enunciated  in  an  ex- 
tremely strained  manner,  and  with  evident  difficulty  (Neisser) ;  * 

*  "  Take's  Dictionary,"'  p.  1355. 


438  THE  WILL. 

(5)  Neisser  describes  mutism  as  being  an  important  symptom 
in  katatonia.  The  patient  remains  silent  for  months  or  even 
years ;  there  may  be  a  desire  to  speak,  but  inability  to  do 
so.  Verbigeration  not  infrequently  supervenes  upon  this 
mutism.  (6)  AJmtaphasia  is  the  term  applied  to  that  form  of 
speech  in  which  the  individual  speaks  of  himself  in  the  third 
person,  common  in  Scotchmen,  and  in  idiots;  (7)  mutism  in 
the  insane  may  be  due  to  deaf  and  dumbness,  absence  of  ideas, 
or  the  presence  of  delusions.  Such  delusions  may  be  hallu- 
cinatory in  origin,  and  in  the  form  of  a  special  mandate  tO' 
maintain  silence  ;  or  they  may  be  hjqDochondriacal  with  a  fear 
of  the  consequences  of  speech. 

Clinically,  we  have  to  note  also,  that  speech  defects  occur  : 
(1)  As  spasmodic  stuttering  or  stammering  in  childhood, 
either  as  a  temporary  or  permanent  defect.  Bristowe  regards 
such  defects  as  due  mainly  to  imperfect  training,  to  bad 
habits  or  slovenliness,  or  to  some  defect  in  the  relations 
between  the  ear  and  the  organs  of  articulation.  When  it 
arises  in  adult  life,  he  attributes  it  to  an  attack  of  fever  or 
other  acute  disease,  to  hysteria  or  some  other  nervous  disorder, 
to  nervousness  or  excitement,  or  even  to  temporary  soreness  of 
the  tongue  or  lips,  or  other  parts  engaged  in  articulation. 
Among  other  defects  of  speech  due  to  bad  habits,  or  imperfect 
education,  he  enumerates,  the  habits  of  interpolating  such 
expressions  as  "  You  know,"  "  I  mean,"  etc.  (2)  As  a  character- 
istic tremulousness  or  stammering  in  alcoholism.  This  con- 
dition closely  simulates  the  speech  of  general  paralysis,  but 
there  is  difficulty  and  embarrassment  rather  than  true  ataxy. 
Tuczek  has  described  the  occurrence  of  grandiose  ideas  with 
motor  and  speech  derangements  in  ergotism,  simulating  cases 
of  general  paral^rsis.  Toxic  agents  such  as  quinine,  chloral, 
atropine,  iodoform,  etc.,  have  been  described  as  giving  rise  to 
speech  perversions,  either  increased  volubility,  incoherency,  or 
embarrassment.  Atropine  sometimes  causes  difficulty  of  articu- 
lation, whilst  iodoform  has  caused  actual  aphasia  (Legrain).  (3) 
Speech-changes  following  enteric  fever  have  been  described  by 
Colin  M.  Campbell,  \^-ho  found  a  distinct  impairment  of  speech 
co-ordination  during  excitement  and  fatigue,  and,  that  this 
state  continued  for  some  months  after  the  fever.     Mickle  has 


SPEECH   DEFECTS.  439 

also  described  certain  post-febrile  speech  defects  which  simu- 
lated those  of  general  paralysis.  A  slow  speech  with  deliberate 
drawling,  and  articulation  of  the  syllables  in  a  monotonous  tone, 
and  with  a  nasal  twang,  has  been  noted  by  the  author  as  follow- 
ing typhoid.*  Westphal  noted  after  typhus  the  scanned,  nasal, 
and  monotonous  speech,  vin  which  the  letters  and  syllables  were 
not  displaced,  but  separated  by  intervals  and  uttered  jerkily,  or 
with  visible  efforts,  yet,  as  after  typhoid,  without  co-existing 
tremblings  of  the  lips  and  face.  (4)  The  dyslogic  and  articula- 
tory  defects  met  with  in  general  paralysis  are  characteristic, 
but  space  will  not  permit  us  to  describe  them  here.f  As  a  rule, 
the  presence  of  tremors  of  the  lips,  and  the  characteristic  dra^^'l, 
serve  to  distinguish  the  speech  of  the  general  paralytic  from 
that  of  patients  suffering  from  disseminated  sclerosis.  Cases  of 
bulbar  paralysis  exhibit  speech  defects  very  similar  to  those  of 
general  paralysis,  and  often  by  themselves  difficult  to  diagnose. 
(5)  The  photisms  of  the  sounds  of  speech  have  already  been 
considered.  It  is  interesting  to  note  further,  however,  that 
vowel  sounds  are  more  apt  to  give  rise  to  photisms  than  con- 
sonants. Photisms  for  entire  A\'ords  have  been  described  by 
Bleuler  and  others.  The  readiness  with  which  photisms  and 
phonisms  are  produced  is  suggestive  of  a  possible  explanation 
of  several  forms  of  sensory  perversion  in  the  insane,  and 
assuredly,  in  the  not  very  far  future,  we  shall  have  some  more 
definite  account  of  the  relationship  between  the  activities  of 
the  special  senses  and  the  kinaesthetic  impressions.  (6)  Aphasia 
may  occur  as  a  transient  condition  in  association  with  the 
hemiplegia  of  children.  Such  transient  alterations  of  speech 
have  been  noted  in  hereditarj^  syphilis,  and  in  one  case  re- 
corded by  Barlow  and  Bury:|:  there  was  thought  to  be  endo- 
arteritis  of  symmetrical  branches  of  the  middle  cerebral  arteries 
and  degeneration  of  the  cortical  centres,  especially  of  the  third 
frontal  of  both  sides.  (7)  Special  affections  of  speech,  either 
of  a  temporary  character  immediately  following  an  attack 
of  sunstroke,  or  as  a  continued  impairment  or  failure  in 
development    of   the    faculty,    have    been    described    by    the 

*  "Takes  Dictionary,''  p.  986. 

t  See  Mickle,  "  Take's  Dictionary "' — "  General  Paralysis." 

:J;  "  Tuke's  Dictionary,"  p.  1265. 


440  THE  WILL. 

author.*  The  somatic  sequelse  of  sunstroke  may  include 
tongue  tremors,  and  thickness  or  slurring  of  speech  very 
similar  to  those  in  general  paralysis.  (8)  In  sleep  and  its 
associated  conditions,  a  person  may  speak  and  sing  in  a 
perfectly  automatic  way  without  involving  an  element  of 
waking  consciousness.  Owing  to  the  kindness  of  Dr.  Bram- 
well,  the  author  was  able  to  witness  the  artificial  production 
of  every  variety  of  amnesia  and  aphasia  in  a  hypnotised 
person.  The  suggestions  were  made  during  hypnosis,  and 
the  effects  were  manifested  during  the  post-hypnotic  state 
when  the  patient  was  only  imperfectly  roused. 

Conduct. — We  have  seen  how  voluntary  movement  is 
related  to  impulsive  movement,  and  we  have  come  to  the  con- 
clusion, that  voluntary  movements  of  the  body  imply  a  consider- 
able development  of  the  mental  activities  of  ideation  and  volition ; 
but  we  do  not  know  the  physical  basis  of  volition.     We  ma}^, 

/Nvith  the  advance  of  our  knowledge  of  the  localisation  of  cerebral 
function,  arrive  at  some  more  definite  conclusions  as  to  the 
structures  concerned  with  the  carrjdng  out  of  an  act  of  volition, 
but  we  are  not  so  hopeful  with  regard  to  our  prospects  of  ever 
knowing  what  molecular  changes  are  correlated  with  the 
psychical  elements.  The  theories  hitherto  given  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  will — those  explanations  which  have  sought  to 
show  that  voluntary  motions  follow  upon  certain  ideas  or 
excited  states  of  feeling,  without  a  conscious  fiat  of  the  will — 
serve  to  illustrate  the  nature  of  truly  impulsive  actions.  If  we 
regard  such  actions  as  voluntary,  we  find  ourselves  in  the  diffi- 
culty of  having  to  differentiate  psychologically  between  such 
activities  and  those  which  involve  an  element  of  conscious 
^  choice.  We  do  not  know  what  happens  in  the  brain  when  the 
\  fiat  of  will  issues  in  consciousness.  The  phenomenon  is  some- 
thing above,  or  in  addition  to,  mere  forced  attention,  and  it  is 
unwarrantable  to  assume  that  the  fiat  is  a  purely  mechanical 
state  dependent  upon  the  infliience  of  mechanical  stimuli. 

A  complete  study  of  conduct  would  involve  the  consideration 

of  the  various  forms  of  action  and  resistance,  together  with  the 

psychical  elements  known  as  the  motifs  and  fiats,  or,  in  other 

words,  the  whole  of  the  physical  and  psychical  factors  which 

*  "  Sunstroke  " — "  Tuke's  Dictionary,"  p.  1234. 


CONDUCT.  441 

serve  to  bring  about  the  adjustment  of  the  org-anism  to  its 
environment.  The  physiological  methods  b}^  which  internal 
processes  of  the  organism  are  adjusted  to  one  another,  and 
by  which  movements  are  brought  about,  are  little  known  to  us. 
The  psychical  methods,  on  the  other  hand,  by  which  the 
organism  is  consciously  adjusted  as  a  whole  to  its  environment, 
are  more  easily  demonstrated. 

The  nervous  mechanism  of  conduct  has  already  been  con- 
sidered, and  we  have  tried  to  understand  the  nature  of  the  pro- 
cesses in  the  highest  nervous  centres,  by  which  the  acts  of  the 
organism  are  adjusted  to  external  circumstances.  We  may  say, 
briefly,  that  the  appropriateness  of  individual  conduct  depends 
upon  (1)  the  proper  working  of  an  educated  reflex  or  automatic 
mechanism ;  and  (2)  the  proper  physiological  and  psychological 
adaptation  of  the  nervous  system  and  the  mind  to  the  environ- 
ment. 

Mercier  says  of  a  reflex  act,  "It  is  an  act  that  A\'as  once   X 
intelligent,  that  was  once  preceded  by  deliberation,  by  choice,    j 
and  by  will,  but  that  in  the  course  of  innumerable  repetitions  / 
in  the  lifetime  of  many  generations  has  become  first  habitual,   ■  / 
then  automatic,  and  finally  reflex  ;  and  to  this  end  all  our  acts    f 
are  tending."  *     In  another  place  he  says,  "  If  there  is   any- 
thing certain  in  life  it  would  appear  to  be  that  we  move  our 
limbs  and  speak  our  thoughts  by  an  effort  of  will,  and  that  in 
this  case,  undoubtedly,  the  mental  process  is  not  only  the  fore- 
runner, but  the  actual  cause  of  the  bodily  movement.     It  is  not 

so,  however The  exercise  of  the  will,  which  appears  to 

be  the  cause  of  bodily  movements  is,  in  reality,  the  mental 
shadow  of  the  particular  nervous  process  which  really  is  the 
cause."  t  In  the  first  quotation,  deliberation,  choice,  and  will  ■ 
are  regarded  as  essential  to  the  development  of  reflex  action. 
In  the  second,  however,  these  factors  are  regarded  as  the  effects, 
or  "  mental  shadows/'  of  nervous  activities.  In  yet  another 
place  he  speaks  of  the  intensification  of  nascent  activities,  "all 
of  which  are  striving,  as  it  were,  to  become  actual  and  to  produce 
movement At  length,  owing  to  the  nature  of  the  im- 
pression, and  to  the  direction  of  paths  previously  traversed  by 

*  "The  Nervous  System  and  the  Mind,"  p.  166. 
t  "  Sanity  and  Insanity,"  pp.  53,  54. 


442  THE  WILL. 

currents  in  circumstances  somewhat  similar,  one  of  these 
struggling  centres  gains  the  preponderance.  The  fittest  sur- 
vives. The  tension  among  the  bursting  centres  is  relieved  by 
the  discharge  of  one  of  them,  and  thus  the  nervous  accompani- 
ment of  volition  is  not  merely  a  discharge  of  a  single  centre, 
but  a  discharge  which  follows  a  struggle  for  preponderance, 
and  marks  the  triumph  of  one  of  the  conflicting  factors.  Hence, 
this  feeling  arises  not  only  when  actual  movement  follows  this 
successful  struggle,  but  arises  also  in  a  somewhat  modified 
form  when  a  similar  struggle  takes  place  on  a  higher  plane  of 
nervous  action,  and  terminates  in  the  preponderance  of  one  of 
the  struggling  activities,  without  that  activity  finding  imme- 
diate expression.  In  other  words,  volition  or  willing  comes  to 
be  the  feeling  which  accompanies  the  termination  of  a  struggle 
among  nascent  activities  by  the  preponderance  of  one,  just  as 
hesitation  is  the  feeling  that  corresponds  with  the  duration  of 
the  struggle."  Here  we  leave  this  discussion,  in  the  hope  that 
the  struggle  for  preponderance  of  these  conflicting  statements 
may  awaken  among  the  nascent  activities  of  the  student  a 
tendency  to  react  in  the  right  direction.  That  one  or  other  of 
these  factors  will  be  successful  we  do  not  doubt ;  we  only  trust 
that  the  right  nascent  activity  may  be  intensified,  that  is,  if  he 
is  to  be  denied  the  freedom  of  choice. 

Much  of  the  confusion  about  the  actual  mental  state  that 
precedes  voluntary  acts  arises  from  the  fact,  that  an  insufficient 
distinction  is  made  between  the  guiding  and  instigating  effects 
of  kineesthetic  impressions.  Kingesthetic  impressions  are  guides 
only ;  they  do  not  instigate  movements.  In  the  exercise  of 
voluntary  movements  the  conscious  accompaniments  are  epiphe- 
nomena,  and  there  is  every  grade  of  mental  accompaniment, 
ranging  from  so-called  ideo-motor  to  true  voluntary  activity. 
According  to  Ladd,  voluntary  movement  implies  (1)  the  posses- 
sion of  an  educated  reflex-motor  mechanism,  under  the  control 
of  those  higher  cerebral  centres  which  are  most  immediately 
connected  with  the  phenomena  of  consciousness  ;  (2)  certain 
motifs  in  the  form  of  conscious  feelings  that  have  a  tone  of 
pleasure  or  pain,  and  so  impel  the  mind  to  secure  such  bodily 
conditions  as  will  continue  or  increase  the  one,  and  discontinue 
or  diminish  the   other ;    (3)  ideas  of  motions  and  positions  of 


CONDUCT.  443 

the  bodily  members,  which  previous  experience  has  taught  us. 
answer  more  or  less  perfectly  to  the  motifs  of  conscious  feeling; 
(4)  a  conscious  fiat  of  the  will,  settling  the  Cjuestion,  as  it  were, 
which  of  these  ideas  shall  be  realised  in  the  motions  achieved 
and  positions  attained  by  these  members  ;  (5)  a  central 
nervous  mechanism,  ^^-hich  serves  as  the  organ  of  relation 
between  this  act  of  will  and  the  discharge  of  the  requisite 
motor  impulses  along  their  nerve-tracts  to  the  groups  of 
muscles  peripherally  situated. 

In  our  estimation  of  conduct  we  must  distinguish  between 
acts  and  their  effects.  Sane  individuals  are  liable  to  faulty  and 
inaccurate  psychological  adaptations  of  the  organism  to  the 
environment ;  hence,  imperfection  of  movement  or  fallacious 
reasoning  is  not  necessarily  an  evidence  of  insanity.  In  every 
asylum  patients  are  to  be  seen  whose  ordinary  conduct  is  con- 
ventional in  the  extreme  :  moreover,  they  may  possess  a  degree 
of  intelligence  and  will-power  superior  to  the  sane,  yet  who  are 
unable  to  manage  themselves  or  their  affairs.  We  have  ob- 
served dements  and  even  general  paralytics  rally  after  a  period 
of  apparent  mental  dissolution  and  converse  rationally  for  a 
time,  -vA-ithout  exhibiting  a  trace  of  their  recent  insanity.  In 
the  wards  of  an  asjdum  we  see  ever}'  variety  of  conduct,  and 
witness  the  extreme  limits  of  control,  as  well  as  of  abandonment. 

If  the  student  will  refer  to  the  following  chapters  which 
deal  with  the  factors  of  the  insanities,  and  build  upon  them  the 
knowledge  he  has  acquired  of  the  development  of  morbid 
mental  states,  and  then  appl^-  the  rule,  that  exercise  strengthens 
function,  he  will  be  able  to  recognise  how  a  given  set  of 
circumstances  arouses  by  its  impress  on  the  organism  the 
same  reaction  that  it  has  previously  roused.  Further,  by 
applying  the  law  of  the  "  survival  of  the  fittest,"  not  only  to 
stimuli,  but  also  to  their  effects,  he  will  be  better  able  to 
understand  how  successful  acts  tend  to  be  repeated,  and  un- 
successful acts  to  be  suppressed.  Among  the  insane,  the  novel 
and  often  amusing  combinations  of  actions  are  explained  as 
the  adaptation  of  old  waj'S  of  meeting  some  circumstances,  to 
circumstances  of  a  totally  difterent  nature. 

The  conduct  of  the  insane  is  usually  determined  either  by 
the  co-operation  or  the  opposition  of  impulses.     The  existence 


444  THE  WILL. 

and  co-operation  of  motives  derived  through  some  ideational  or 
emotional  derangement  will  often  determine  and  further  a 
special  line  of  conduct.  Conflicting  impulses,  on  the  other 
hand,  may  cause  a  cessation  of  activity,  and  even  a  temporary 
paralysis  of  volition.  We  have  already  spoken  of  the  effects  of 
doubts,  deterrents,  and  the  rivalry  of  impulses  in  their  relations 
to  simple  and  complex  actions,  so  that  it  only  remains  for  us 
now^  to  give  some  account  of  the  state  knovi'-n  as  self-control. 

The  will  is  able  to  check  action  or  impulse  by  the  voluntary 
exertion  of  an  inhibitory  or  contra-action.  The  action  wdiich, 
in  the  natural  course  of  events,  would  follow  upon  a  motor 
idea  can  be  inhibited  by  the  will,  by  the  exertion  of  another 
positive  activity  which  checks  the  ideo-motor  activity.  Defect 
in  this  controlling  influence  renders  an  individual  liable  to 
become  a  passive  participator  in  impulses  which  range  from 
mere  rashness  to  homicide.  An  individual  with  imperfect 
control  is  apt  to  act  on  the  sj)ur  of  the  moment,  and  to  respond 
to  every  stimulus  from  without.  In  acute  mania,  active  im- 
pulses, inability  to  inhibit  sensory  stimuli,  and  almost  constant 
restlessness,  are  characteristic  symptoms.  In  these  instances 
there  is  loss  of  the  higher  order  of  development  of  the  faculty 
of  control — i.e.,  there  is  no  subordination  of  the  particular  and 
temporary  ends  to  the  general  and  permanent  interests. 

Control  of  the  feelings  is  often  a  much  more  difficult  matter. 
There  are  times  when  it  is  well-nigh  impossible  to  control  our 
emotional  reactions.  Undoubtedly,  however,  it  is  among  the 
insane  that  the  feelings  are  wont  to  play  the  greatest  pranks. 
Emotions  literally  take  possession  of  our  muscular  system,  so 
that  a  greater  expenditure  of  energy  is  necessary  in  order  to 
overcome  their  effects ;  and,  moreover,  the  intensity  of  the 
emotion  tends  to  weaken  the  force  of  the  will  from  the 
psychical  side. 

Perfect  control  of  thought  presupposes  not  only  the  faculty 
of  attention,  or  fixation,  or  focussing  representations  before  the 
mind,  but  also  perfect  control  of  feeling.  Ferrier  says  the 
internal  diffusion  of  nerve-energy  involved  in  thought,  and  the 
external  diffusion  of  it  in  muscular  action,  vary  in  an  inverse 
ratio ;  consequently,  in  the  deepest  attention,  every  movement 
which  would  diminish  internal  diffusion  is  likewise  inhibited. 


LOSS  OF  CONTROL.  445 

Hence,  in  deep  thought,  even  automatic  actions  are  inhibited, 
and  a  man  who  becomes  deep  in  thought  while  he  walks  may 
be  observed  to  stand  still.  Mercier  objects  to  the  expression 
•'  loss  of  control,"  and  seeks  to  reduce  what  we  accept  as  a  fact 
of  psychological  significance  to  its  equivalent  in  molecular 
physics.  This  physical  equivalent  he  finds  in  the  stability  of  a 
mobile  equilibrium  of  atoms.  Eeference  might  with  advantage 
be  made  by  the  student  to  the  quotation  on  p.  147,  in  which 
the  same  author  demonstrates  that  similar  hypotheses  are,  to 
use  his  own  expression,  "  nonsense." 

The  amount  of  force  which  can  be  overcome  by  an  effort  of 
the  will  is  the  test  whereby  the  strength  of  the  will  is  measured. 
Some  individuals  are  unable  to  resist  forcible  stimuli  coming 
either  directly  from  without,  or  indirectly  by  the  association  of 
ideas.  An  inci'ease  of  the  force  to  be  overcome,  or  an  impair- 
ment of  the  power  of  overcoming  that  force,  may  determine  loss 
of  control.  This  is  well  shoAvn  by  Ribot  in  respect  both  of  the 
loss  of  control  over  impulse,  and  of  the  impairment  of  control 
of  the  attention  and  the  flow  of  ideas.  In  mental  diseases 
there  may  be  loss  of  self-control  in  a  psychical  sense,  or 
defective  inhibition  in  a  physiological  sense  (as,  e.r/..  in  im- 
pulsive insanity,  and  maniacal  states)  ;  or,  oix  the  other  hand, 
there  may  be  defective  energisation  or  loss  of  power  of  exciting- 
activity  (as  in  stupor,  melancholia,  etc.).  Clouston  puts  it 
clearly  when  he  says,  "  The  driver  may  be  so  weak  that  he 
cannot  control  well-broken  horses,  or  the  horses  may  be  so 
hard-mouthed  that  no  driver  can  pull  them  up."  In  some  cases 
it  is  difiicult  to  say  where  the  defect  lies. 

Clouston  states,  that  in  the  young  ''there  is  absolutely  no     / 
such  brain-power  existent  as  mental  inhibition;  no  desire  or  -i 
tendency  is   stopped   by  mental   act."     Later,  he  says,   '•  The    ^ 
power  of  control   is  just    as    gradual    a   development    as    the 
motions  of  the  hands."     With  the  latter  statement  we  agree, 
and,  in  conformity  with  the  fashionable  phraseology  of  the  day, 
we  may  posit  the  rudiments  of  mental  inhibition  as  a  "  nascent 
state  "  with  the  first  act  of  life.     The  processes  of  experience  of 
the  physical  activities   are  parallel  with  those  of  the  mental. 
There  is  no  period  in  the  life  history  of  an  individual  ^^-hen 
physical    or    mental    inhibition  can    be    said   to    develop  as   a 


446  THE  WILL. 

snpernumerary  factor.  The  parallelism  must  be  complete 
from  the  beginning ;  the  "  nascence "  of  one  must  coexist 
with  the  ■  "  nascence "  of  the  other.  When  dealing  with 
the  minds  of  idiots  and  imbeciles,  however,  we  are  scarcely 
warranted  in  assuming  that  their  mental  defects  may  be  only 
nascent  potentialities  of  the  powers  of  a  Mozart,  Darwin,  or 
Spencer. 

In  mental  disease  loss  of  self-control  is  often  a  characteristic 
symptom.  The  loss  of  power  of  inhibition,  viewed  phj^siolo- 
gically,  may  be  due  to  causes  which  interfere  with  the  due 
regulation  of  the  physical  activities  ;  and  in  dealing  with  such 
modes  of  activity,  we  have  to  take  account  not  only  of  the 
molecular  physics  and  the  possibilities  of  decomposition  of 
unstable  matter,  but  also  the  special  molecular  physiology 
which  would  correspond  to  what  we  term  "  life."  The  loss  of 
power,  when  viewed  psychologically,  however,  involves  the 
consideration,  not  only  of  the  phenomena  of  physics  and  life, 
but  also  of  the  epiphenomenon  of  mind.  As  we  have  already- 
seen,  it  is  utterly  impossible  to  explain  life  by  the  mere 
enumeration  of  its  physical  manifestations,  and  it  is  just  as 
impossible  to  explain  mind  by  the  enumeration  of  the  mani- 
festations of  life.  We  cannot  explain  the  will  by  the  mere  emi- 
meration  of  the  contents  of  consciousness  preceding  the  actual 
perfor'inance  of  a  voluntary  movement.  So  long  as  we  view 
self-control  from  a  purely  physiological  point  of  view,  we  must 
of  necessity  view  the  mind  as  a  mere  passive  spectator  of  the 
conflicting  activities  going  on  within  the  organism.  Mercier 
asks  us  to  try  to  imagine  the  idea  of  a  beefsteak  binding  two 
molecules  together.  Of  course,  it  is  impossible.  We  only  ask 
in  return,  try  to  imagine  two  molecules  binding .  themselves 
together  so  as  to  produce  an  idea  of  a  beefsteak.  Simply 
because  there  is  no  community  in  nature  between  the  two 
series  of  events,  such  a  conception  is  regarded  as  unimaginable  ; 
and  yet  we  are  told  almost  at  every  turn  that  the  phj^sical 
series  can  regulate  its  own  activities,  but  that  the  mental 
cannot  do  so.  Here,  again,  u.nless  we  develop  a  disposition  to 
materialism,  we  must  grant  that  the  parallelism  between  the 
brain  and  mind  series  of  events  is  complete;  otherwise  we 
decide  arbitrarily  that  the  activity  of  the  inevitable  molecule  is 


CONCLUSIONS.  447 

the  cause  and  not  the  concomitant  of  the  psychical  event.  The 
tendency  of  most  writers  upon  this  vexed  qiiestion  is.  to  dis- 
continue the  parallelism  after  they  have  reached  a  certain  stage 
in  their  inquiries.  ^lercier  appears  to  regard  the  exercise  of 
the  will  as  merel}''  "  the  mental  shadow  of  the  particular 
nervous  process  whicli  really  is  the  cause " ;  thus  making  the 
nervous  structure  the  guiding  and  controlling  mechanism,  the 
mental  equivalent  being  only  a  shadow  of  what  takes  place. 
The  relationship  of  the  molecule  to  its  mental  shadow  is 
particularly  susceptible  to  speculation,  and  it  is  only  reasonable 
to  assume,  that  the  mental  shadow  may,  in  its  turn,  be  a 
motor  or  inhibitory  one.  In  fact,  an  inhibitory  mental  shadoAv 
is  a  necessary  correlate  of  a  physical  inhibition.  That  one 
factor  is  essential  to  the  existence  of  the  other,  we  believe ;  but 
we  have  no  more  authority  to  state  that  a  material  action  can 
throw  an  immaterial  shadow,  than  we  have  to  state  that  an 
immaterial  action  can  throw  a  material  shadow.  Both  are 
shadows,  so  far  as  we  are  concerned,  and  we  do  not  understand 
their  nature. 

For  an  account  of  the  so-called  "fulminating  psj^choses,"  or 
states  of  defective  inhibition,  the  student  is  referred  to  the 
various  text  books  on  insanity.  It  is  in  the  insane  that  we 
meet  with  the  most  marked  evidences  of  the  existence  of  a 
will  which  may  become  violently  affected  or  rendered  altogether 
inert.  That  this  is  coincidental  with  some  impaired  vitality,  Ave 
do  not  deny ;  we  merely  stop  short  at  the  arbitrary  decision 
that  the  manifestations  of  what  we  conveniently  term  the 
"  will "  possess  any  causal  efficacy. 

Let  us  now  briefly  sum  up  what  we  can,  with  perfect  fairness, 
assume  as  to  the  existence  pf  a  will.  (1)  There  are  no  grounds - 
to  assume  that  a  wall  exists  for  us  independent  of  physical  or 
physiological  activities.  Matter,  life,  and  mind  are  for  us 
empirical  correlative  states,  developed  in  a  parallel  series,  and 
capable  of  manifesting  their  existence  by  activities,  which  are 
respectively  equally  complex.  Any  attempt  at  explanation  of 
the  one  in  terms  of  the  other  results  only  in  confusion,  or  in  an 
implied  causal  influence.  (2)  The  fact,  that  the  point  to  which 
the  will  is  directly  applied  is  always  an  idea,  is  no  proof  that 
the  idea  always  determines  the  application  of  the  will.     The 


448  THE  WILL. 

idea  itself  is  the  mental  equivalent  of  the  instrumental  means 
whereby  the  fiat  becomes  realised.     Were  this  otherwise,  the 
responsibility    of  remembering,    comparing,   and   determining- 
action   would   rest  upon  an  idea.     The  struggle  for  survival 
among  ideas  is  not  one  in  which  one  idea  has  summed  up  the 
perfections   or  imperfections  of  other  ideas,  and  has   decided 
that   its    action  is  the  one  best  fitted  for  the  conservation    of 
the  organism.     It  does  not,  without  the  word  of  command,  ride 
astride  its    material   basis    of  "  stable  mobile   equilibrium   of 
atoms."  and  merely  inform  the  ego  of  what  it  is  doing.     That 
the  idea  immediately  precedes  the  action,  we  believe;  but  that  it 
causes  the  action  is  another  matter.     The  ideas  are  the  elements 
in  consciousness  from  which  the  ego  derives  its  knowledge  of 
conflicting  influences.     It  would  be   difficult  to   demonstrate, 
that  ideas  themselves  possess  the  faculty  of  comparing  them- 
selves with  other  ideas,  or  that  the  continuity  of  a  life  experi- 
ence is  only  an  integral  part  of  an  idea.     Here  again  we  repeat, 
that  just   as    in   the    leading    principles    in    modern    natural 
philosophy  the  terms  attraction,  gravitation,  cohesion,  etc.,  are 
used  to  represent  the  various  manifestations  of  material  move- 
ments, and  just  as  the  terms  currents,  mobile  equilibrium  of 
of  atoms,  inhibition,  etc.,  are  used  to  represent  physiological 
manifestations  of  what  we  symbolise  as  life,  so  the  terms  intel- 
lection, emotion,  and  volition  are  used  to  represent  psychical 
manifestations   of  what  we  symbolise  as  the  individuality,  or 
the  ego.      (3)  The  outcome   of  the  contentions  is  one  of  vast 
importance  both  to  speculative  theology  and  to  science.      On 
one  point  we  are  perfectly  clear.     The  all-pervading  condition 
of  ignorance   by    which  we   are  surrounded,   most  effectually 
prevents  us  from  giving  vent  to  one-sided  dogmas,  either  in  the 
cause  of  materialism  or  spiritualism.     We  can  onlj  contemplate 
the  phenomena  of  matter,  life,  and  mind  as  they  exist  for  us, 
and  avoid  being  blinded  in  our  view  by  molecular  dust  or  the 
film  of  fantasy. 

In  concluding  this  chapter  we  may  note  that  Impairment 
of  the  will  may  manifest  itself  as  a  condition  of  irresolution. 
This  may  be  due  to  (1)  weakness  of  motives  or  incitements ; 
(2)  various  states  of  doubt  as  to  the  nature  or  result  of  the 
action  to  be  performed ;    (3)  excessive  number  of  ideas,  which 


DISEASES  OF  THE  WILL.  449 

tend  to  delay  and  counterbalance  the  impulsion  to   act  in  a 
definite  direction. 

Ribot*  divides  diseases  of  the  will  into  two  principal  classes, 
according-  as  the  will  is  impaired  or  abolished.  Impairinent  of 
the  will  may  be  due  (1)  to  lack  of  impulse,  or  (2)  to  excess 
of  impulse.  Gviislain.f  Griesinger,  |  Leubuscher,  §  Escjuirol, 
Carpenter.!  Ribot, IF  and  Billod**  have  made  observations  upon 
the  first  group.  When  a  patient  is  able  "to  will''  to  act,  or 
when  the  desire  is  present,  but  the  impulsion  to  carr}-  out  the 
act  is  absent,  the  condition  is  known  as  ahouUa.  One  patient, 
formerly  an  inmate  of  Bethlem,  used  to  lament  this  inability  to 
act.  She  was  able  to  understand  and  reason  upon  her  ordinary 
experiences  without  any  observable  impairment  of  intelligence. 
She  was,  however,  unable  to  put  into  effect  the  result  of  her 
deliberations,  and  the  desire  to  react  to  circumstances  prov^ed 
ineffective.  Not  uncommonly,  such  patients  believe  that  their 
will  is  taken  possession  of  by  others,  or  that  their  actions  are 
inhibited  by  some  mysterious  influence.  Ribot  believes,  that 
the  muscular  system  and  the  organs  of  movement  remain  intact; 
they  offer  no  impediment.  The  automatic  activity  Mhich  con- 
stitutes the  ordinary  routine  of  life  persists.  The  difficulty 
appears  to  be  in  passing  from  the  consciousness  of  a  desired 
end  to  the  action  which  would  presumably  acquire  that 
end. 

The  cause  of  this  impotence  of  will  is  at  present  a  matter  of 
considerable  doubt.  Some  authors  maintain,  that  the  affection 
is  mainly  due  to  impairment  of  the  motor  centres  in  the  brain, 
and  that  it  is  the  motor  apparatus  which  is  at  fault.  This 
theoiy,  however,  is  generally  held  to  be  unsatisfactory.  Certain 
it  is.  that  patients  affected  with  ahoidia  are  not  necessarily  - 
deficient  in  guiding  sensations  or  ideas  of  the  movements  which 
they  are  unable  to  perfoi-m.  Ribot  maintains,  that  there  is 
principally  an  impairment  of  the  incitements  to  action. 

*  "  Diseases  of  the  Will,"  chap.  ii. 
t  "Lecons  Orales  sur  les  Phrc'-nopitliies,"  vol.  i.  p.  479. 
X  "  Traite  des  Maladies  Mentales,"  p.  46. 
§  "Zeitschrift  f iir  Psychiatrie,"'  1847. 
Ii  "  Mental  Physiology-,""  p.  385. 
IT  Op.  cit.  chap.  ii. 
**  "  Annales  MtVlico-Psychologiques,"  vol.  x. 

29 


450  THE  WILL. 

The  condition  may  not  be  dne  to  weakness  of  the  desire 
to  act,  but  we  do  not  concur  with  Ribot,  that  the  aboulia 
invariably"  results  from  the  absence  of  the  states  of  feeling  and 
sentiment  which  normally  accompany  every  sensation  and  idea. 
In  some  cases  of  aboulia — especially  in  melancholia  and  stupor 
— there  is  a  comparative  insensibility^,  or  even  absence  of  the 
general  sensibility  ;  but  again,  in  other  cases,  patients  have 
been  not  only  morbidly  desirous  of  performing  certain  actions, 
but  even  highl}^  sensitive  and  morbidly  susceptible  to  the 
emotional  accompaniments  of  ordinary  sensations. 

The  performance  of  the  actual  action  itself  is  purely  physio- 
logical, but  the  perception  of  sensations  and  their  accompani- 
ments is  psychical.  We  can  hardlj^  suppose  that  a  pure  state 
of  consciousness  is  of  itself  capable  of  producing  action  or 
prohibiting  it ;  but,  were  we  to  eliminate  the  various  mental 
states  which  we  symbolise  as  "  ■\^'ill,"  the  complicated  adaptive, 
delayed,  and  purposive  actions  performed  by  the  human  being 
would  be  nothing  short  of  miraculous.  In  fact,  to  whatever 
extent  the  physiological  theory  of  will  be  iirged,  it  must  always 
fail  to  give  an  explanation  of  those  empirical  psychical  factors 
which  we  denominate  as  the  will. 

The  sense  of  fear  acts  as  a  deterrent  of  action.  In  such  cases 
the  incitement  to  act  is  not  necessarily  absent.  The  power  of 
reading  to  circumstances  seems,  however,  to  be  entirely  lost. 
Often  there  is  no  cause  for  the  fear,  but  the  motor  apparatus  is 
Mirown  completely  out  of  gear  for  a  time.'^  Agorcfpholna,  for 
example,  is  a  condition  of  anxiety  which,  as  previously  men- 
tioned, renders  a  person  powerless  when  he  sees  an  open  space. 
A  condition  similar  in  its-  effects  to  that  of  fear  is  sometimes 
witnessed  among  troops  of  men  on  active  military  service,  and 
more  particularh^  during  the  course  of  a  fatiguing  march. 
Suddenly,  and  "s^'ithout  any  apparent  cause,  a  panic  seizes 
the  men,  and  they  halt  in  almost  breathless  silence.  An  old 
Indian  officer  has  narrated  many  instances  of  this  to  me, 
and  he  states,  that  the  panics   are  usually  only  momentary; 

*  Westphal,  "  Arcliiv.  fur  Psychiatrie,"  vol.  iii. ;  Legrand  du  Saulle, 
"  Annales  Medico-Psychologiques,"  1876,  p.  405;  Kitti,  "Diet.  Encycloped. 
des  Sciences  Medicales,"  art.  "  Folie  avec  Conscience  " ;  Ribot,  "  Diseases  of 
the  AVill,"  p.  15  (Humboldt  Series). 


DISEASES  OF  THE  AVILL.  451 

for,  at  a  word  from  the  commanding  officer,  the  men  gener- 
ally pull  themselves  together,  and,  with  a  laugh,  again  fall 
into  step. 

We  now  pass  to  the  consideration  of  the  second  group  of 
cases,  in  which  there  is  impairment  of  the  will  through  excessive 
activitj/  of  the  mechanism  of  impulsion.  The  degree  of  con- 
sciousness of  the  operation  varies  considerabh^  with  different 
cases.  Thus,  the  impulse  may  be  sudden  and  without  any  fore- 
thought :  the  individual  performs  an  action  which  is  closely 
allied  to  the  instinctive.  In  epileptics,  hysterical  maniacs,  and 
in  some  forms  of  weakmindedness,  Avith  sudden  explosive  out- 
bursts, we  find  numerous  instances  of  such  excess  of  impulsion. 
Some  patients,  after  an  attack  of  an  acute  mania,  will  volunteer 
the  information,  that  they  were  conscious  of  their  actions  through- 
out the  whole  attack,  and  that  they  could  not  account  for  the  ex- 
traordinaiy  things  they  did.  Others  are  fully  conscious  of  their 
own  condition,  and  feel  bound  to  perform  certain  actions  which 
they  at  the  same  time  condemn.  A  patient  was  brought  to 
Bethlem  bound  hand  and  foot,  at  his  own  request,  in  order 
to  prevent  self- mutilation,  which  proved  an  ungovernable 
impulse  to  him.  Another  patient  begged  and  implored  that 
mechanical  restraint  might  be  employed  to  prevent  him 
injuring  himself.  Instances  of  this  kind  are  numerous  ;  and 
not  infrequently  patients  will  state,  that  the  employment  of 
some  restraint  to  their  actions  has  been  a  great  source  of  relief. 
The  fear  of  committing  suicide,  or  of  killing  someone,  often 
prompts  patients  to  place  themselves  voluntarily  under  restraint. 
Thus,  for  instance,  a  barber,  admitted  recently  to  Bethlem,  felt 
the  almost  irresistible  impulse  to  cut  the  throats  of  his  cus- 
tomers while  shaving  them.  Other  examples,  such  as  those  of* 
pyromania,  kleptomania,  etc.,  are  so  common  that  the}^  need 
scarcely  be  referred  to. 

Intoxication  b}"  alcohol  is  especially  productive  of  excessive 
impulsions..  The  usual  explanation  is,  that  the  power  of  inhibi- 
tion is  impaired,  and  that  the  reflex  actions  become  excessive  or 
violent  as  the  case  may  be.  The  numerous  cases  recorded  as 
instances  in  which  the  higher  regions  of  the  brain  have  been 
injured  and  the  brain  impaired  have  furnished  several  writers 
with  the  idea,  that  the  will-power  occupies  a  distinct  locality  in 


452  THE  WILL. 

the  brain.  Ferrier  has  recorded  a  case  in  which,  through  injury 
to  the  prsefrontal  region  of  the  brain,  a  patient  lost  the  balance 
between  his  intellectual  faculties  and  his  instinctive  tendencies. 
He  became  nervous,  disrespectful,  and  grossly  profane.  He 
showed  but  little  politeness  to  his  equals,  was  impatient  of 
contradiction,  and  would  listen  to  no  advice  that  ran  counter  to 
his  own  ideas.  At  times  he  was  exceedingl}^  obstinate,  though 
capricious  and  indecisive.  He  would  make  plans  for  the  future, 
and  forthwith  reject  them  and  adopt  others.  He  was  a  child 
intellectually,  a  man  in  passions  and  instincts.  Before  the 
accident,  though  he  had  not  received  a  school  education,  he  had 
a  well-balanced  mind,  and  was  regarded  as  a  man  of  good 
natural  abilility,  sagacious,  energetic,  and  persevering.  In  all 
these  respects  he  was  now  so  changed  that  his  friends  said  they 
no  longer  recognised  him. 

Ribot  remarks,  that  in  this  case  the  will  is  impaired  in 
proportion  as  the  inferior  activity  becomes  stronger.  In  all 
theories  which  seek  to  demonstrate  how  morbid  symptoms 
arise  as  the  result  of  activities  within  the  undamaged  remain- 
ing cerebral  substance,  we  meet  with  the  assumption,  that  all 
that  is  vicious,  distasteful,  and  immoral  is  to  be  attributed  to 
activities  within  these  undamaged  regions.  In  fact,  some 
authors,  in  their  endeavours  to  affix  the  physical  evidences  of 
dissolution  to  physiological  factors,  involve  themselves  in 
hj^potheses  as  to  the  relative  functions  of  nervous  structures 
which,  on  analysis,  prove  to  be  not  only  fanciful,  but  even 
absurd.  Of  these  hypotheses,  however,  we  shall  speak  more 
particularly  in  remaining  chapters. 

Clinically,  we  have  to  note  the  following  types  of  morbid 
impulse*: — (1)  General  impulsiveness,  or  the  tendency  to 
react  immediately  to  all  sorts  of  external  or  internal 
stimuli.  Patients  of  this  type  break  windows,  strike  others^ 
and  are  continually  getting  into  mischief.  (2)  Epileptiform 
impulses  which  are  unconscious  in  character,  or,  in  which,  at 
any  rate,  the  patient  is  unable  to  recall  the  reasons  for,  or 
the  nature  of,  the  impulsive  act.  (3)  Sexual  impulses,  which 
include  the  excessive  tendencies  towards  sexual  intercourse, 
onanism,  bestiality,  etc.  (4)  Morbid  appetites  in  which" 
*  Clouston,  "Mental  Diseases." 


DISEASES  OF  THE  WILL.  453 

patients  are  unable  to  resist  eating  and  drinking  all  sorts 
of  filth.  (5)  Homicidal  impulses.  (6)  Suicidal  impulses. 
(7)  Dipsomania,  kleptomania,  pyromania,  etc.  (8)  Impulsive 
conditions  which  alternate  with  forms  of  intellectual  or  moral 
insanity. 

In  some  instances  the  morbid  impulse  is  preceded  by  an 
aura  similar  to  that  of  epilepsy.  According  to  Bevan  Lewis,* 
the  morbid  sensation  is  often  peripherally  referred,  is  of 
sudden  accession,  and  may  rapidly  pervade  distant  parts  of 
the  body.  Taylor,  f  Skae,  Pinel,  and  Maudsleyij:  have 
described  the  occurrence  of  various  aurce,  such  as  burning- 
heat  in  the  epigastrium,  constriction  of  the  throat,  colicky 
pains,  flushings  of  blood  to  the  brain,  cold  waves  on 
scalp,   etc. 

At  certain  critical  epochs  of  life — e.g.,  puberty,  climacterium, 
and  at  menstrual  and  puerperal  periods — there  is  often  a  ten- 
dency to  excess  of  impulsion.  According  to  Bevan  Lewis,  § 
homicidal  impulses  may  prevail  in  one  of  four  conditions  in 
the  epileptic  subject — viz. : — (a)  in  epileptic  furor  or  mania, 
associated  with  hallucination  or  delusion  ;  (Jj)  in  the  so-called 
"epilepsia  larvata "  (Morel),  the  "masked  epilepsy"  of 
Esquirol ;  (c)  in  the  dreamy  state  of  epilepsy ;  or,  lastly, 
(d)  as  a  simple  impulsive  derangement  during  the  inter- 
paroxysmal  period. 

In  the  insane  the  various  forms  of  morbid  impulse  are 
commonly  found  as  follows  : — (a)  The  impulse  to  destroy, 
in  mania,  imbecility,  moral  insanity,  and  dementia ;  (//) 
epileptiform  impulse,  in  epilepsy,  early  stages  of  general 
paralysis,  in  the  neuropathic  diathesis  generally ;  (c)  sexual 
impulses — satyriasis  in  the  male,  nymphomania  in  the  female — 
in  maniacal  states,  at  puberty,  adolescence,  climacterium,  and 
at  the  senile  epoch  :  (d)  morbid  appetites — associated  with 
menstruation,  pregnancy,  puerperium,  and  lactation,  in  acute 
mania,  general  paralysis,  and  in  imbecility ;  (e)  homicidal 
impulses  —  in    imbecility,    masturbatic    insanity,     puerperal, 

*  "Text  Book  of  Mental  Diseases,"  p.  180. 
+  "Med.  Jurisprud.,"  vol.  ii.  p.  553. 
X  "  Responsibility  in  Mental  Disease,"  p.  141. 
§  Op.  cit.,  p.  185. 


454  THE  WILL. 

epileptic,     traumatic,      alcoholic,     religious,     and     delusional 
insanities. 

Aboulia  is  commonly  found  in  simple  melancholia,  or  in 
the  early  stages  of  mania,  or  of  general  paralysis.  Hyperboulia 
is  usually  manifested  as  a  condition  of  wilfulness  in  states  of 
mental  exaltation  with  excitement ;  also  in  some  forms  of 
weak-mindedness  and  delusional  insanit}^. 


455 


CHAPTER    XIV. 

The  Factors  of  the  Insaxities. 

Growth  and  Development  of  the  Mental  Faculties  —  Development:^! 
Processes  in  the  Infant — Microkinesis — ^licropsychosis — Rever- 
sion in  Adults — ^Factors  of  Development.  Interned  Factors  : — 
Original  Capacities — Genius — Degeneration  and  Genius — Balance 
as  the  test  of  Mental  Health — Genius  a  Sociological  not  a  Psy- 
chological Concept — Hallucinations  not  Incompatible  with  inanity 
— Mental  Health  not  to  be  Estimated  Entirely  from  an  Objective 
Standpoint — The  Degenerate  Advocates — Unreliability  of  Statis- 
tics— Inherited  Dispositions — The  Views  of  Spencer  and  Weis- 
mann — Hereditary  Factors  in  Insanity — Consanguinity — Phthisis* 
Scrofula,  Gout,  Kheumatism,  Syphilis  —  Alcohol  —  Diabetes  — 
Neurotic  Manifestations.  External  Factors  :  —  Social  Environ- 
ments —  Psychopathic  Epidemics  —  Children's  Pilgrimages  — 
Lycanthropy  —  Raphania  —  Sensory  Tyi:)es  —  Religious  Impos- 
tures—  Sympathy  and  Mimicry  —  Endemic  and  Epidemic  Psy- 
copathies  —  Folie  a  deux  —  Ueligion  —  Physical  Environment: 
Seasons — Climate — Occupation — Town  and  Country  Life. 

THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

In  speaking  of  the  development  of  mental  states,  or  of  the 
human  faculties,  we  must  fully  recognise  that,  as  in  the  case  of 
the  physical  organism,  there  is  no  parallelism  between  groivth 
and  development.  Mind  is  said  to  grow  when  it  increases  its 
stock  of  materials  ;  when  it  elaborates  its  materials  into  higher 
and  more  complex  foi'ms  it  is  said  to  develop.  With  abnormal 
growth,  development  is  sometimes  impeded — e.g.,  in  preparing 
for  examinations  the  excessive  growth  of  the  bulk  of  retentions 
may,  for  a  time,  impede  true  mental  development ;  just  as  an 
excessive  amount  of  nutriment  may  produce  fatness,  while, 
at  the  same  time,  rendering  the  physiological  activities  more 


456  THE  FACTOKS  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

sluggish.  When  the  mental  retentions  are  elaborated,  and 
their  intellectual  bearings  reduced  to  the  abstract,  development 
results.  If,  however,  they  remain  as  mere  retentions,  growth 
results  ;  and,  just  as  with  physical  corpulency,  we  have  lessened 
bodily  activity,  so  with  mental  agglomeration,  we  have 
diminished  power  of  thought.  The  development  of  the 
mental  faculties  involves  an  increased  facility  and  rapidity 
of  acquired  processes,  requiring  less  effort  or  activity  on  the 
part  of  the  executive  mechanism  :  new  operations  of  the  same 
grade  of  complexity  become  easier ;  and  with  the  increased 
capabilities,  new  operations  of  greater  complexity  and  difficulty 
are  more  readily  effected.*  Exercise  helps  the  physical 
organism  to  grow  and  to  develop,  and  so  with  the  mind, 
"  exercise   strengthens  faculty." 

How  brain  activity  is  brought  about,  or  how  it  reacts  on  the 
particular  structures  engaged,  we  do  not  know  :  we  can  only 
assume,  that  with  each  activity  some  modification  or  physical 
disposition  to  act  in  a  similar  manner  is  created.  The 
mechanical  law  is  true  under  any  conditions,  and  the  repetition 
of  the  flow  of  nerve  energy  in  definite  directions  gradually 
exerts  a  disposition  towards  activit}^  being  propagated  along 
these  lines  of  least  resistance. 

In  order  that  we  may  obtain  some  idea  of  the  morbid 
processes  of  development  of  the  mental  faculties,  it  is  advisable 
that  we  take  into  account  the  developmental  processes  in  the 
infant.  Warner  f  has  endeavoured  to  trace,  from  the  movements 
of  infants,  indications  of  action  in  the  nerve-centres,  and 
thereby  to  demonstrate  their  spontaneity  and  impressionability 
to  forces  acting  upon  the  organs  of  sense.  By  noting  the 
attributes  of  the  actions  seen  in  series  of  movements  as  the 
evolution  of  the  individual  advances,  he  concluded,  that  some 
spontaneous  movements  indicated  conditions  of  growth,  v^^hile 
others  were  indicative  of  development  of  the  mental  faculty. 
The  spontaneous  ("  microkinetic  ")  movements  of  the  infant 
he  regarded  as  analogous  to  the  spontaneous  movements  in 
all  young  animals.  | 

*  Sully,  "  Outlines  of  Psychology,"  p.  42. 

t  "  Tuke  s  Dictionary,"  p.  465. 

X  "  Journ.  Ment.  Science,"  April,  1889. 


GROWTH  AND  DEVELOPMENT.  457 

With  regard  to  the   indications   of  mentation  as  observed 
in  the  movements  of  the  infant,  Warner  says  : — 

"  Observation  affords  abundant  evidence  that  the  various  members 
and  parts  of  a  healthy  infant  present  constant  movement  while  it  is 
awake. 

"  Tliese  movements  in  the  new-born  infant  are  not  controlled  through 
the  senses  by  sight  or  st)und,  but  movements  of  respiration  and  deglu- 
tition are  controlled  by  impressions  on  the  skin  and  mucous  membrane. 
At  this  early  stage  we  do  not  observe  the  phenomena  of  delayed  ex- 
pression, cerebi-al  inhibition,  or  compound  cerebral  action. 

"  It  is  commonly  said  that  the  infant  at  birth  does  not  give  expression 
to  the  faculties  of  mind  because  it  does  not  present  signs  showing  that 
its  nerve  centres  are  impressed,  even  temporarily,  by  the  sight  of  sur- 
rounding objects,  its  hands  do  not  move  towards  objects  within  the 
field  of  vision,  and  none  of  its  movements  indicate  that  they  arc  con- 
trolled by  sight  or  sound. 

"  When  about  three  months  old  some  control  of  movements  through 
the  senses  may  be  observed,  and  the  head  may  turn  towards  a  bright 
light. 

"  There  is  not  much  capacity  for  adapted  action. 

"  When  the  infant  is  about  four  months  old,  we  find  coming  signs  of 
impressionability  to  stimulation.  Then  the  senses,  the  sight  of  objects, 
and  sounds  around,  begin  to  control  the  microkinesis. 

"  In  the  new-born  infant  it  may  be  assumed  that  there  is  no  menta- 
tion, no  memoiy,  no  will.  It  is  intrinsically  possessed  of  a  certain 
histological  structure,  with  its  properties  and  powers  of  reflex  action, 
microkinesis,  susceptibility  to  impressions,  received  through  the  special 
senses. 

"Compare  the  action  seen  at  birth  with  that  seen  at  five  months. 
Microkinesis  still  continues,  but  is  capable  of  control  by  stimulation 
through  the  senses :  it  may  be  arrested  temjiorarily  by  sight  or  sound, 
and  this,  after  many  repetitions,  may  be  followed  by  new  series  of 
movements  occurring  upon  less  and  less  stimulation,  and  with  increasing 
quickness  and  accuracy  as  time  goes  on.  We  infer  a  corresponding 
change  in  the  nerve-centres.  It  appears  that,  whereas  at  birth  they  act 
slowly  and  independently  of  one  another — as  far  as  we  know  without 
any  order  in  their  acting — and  the  time  of  this  action  is  not  determined 
through  the  senses,  at  the  age  of  five  months  they  may  temporarily 
be  suspended  from  action  by  external  stimulation,  and  during  the  time 
when  no  apparent  currents  are  passing  from  them,  undergo  a  change 
indicated  subsequently  by  special  combination  and  series  of  movements. 
This  appears  a  great  advance  in  cerebral  evolution. 

"  The  following  kinds  of  movements  may  then  be  seen  in  the  infant : — 
Movements  of  the  outcome  of  inherited  conditions  in  the  nerve-system 
(microkinesis).  Movements  following  immediately  upon  stimulation  by 
certain  external  agencies,  as  light,  sound,  etc.     Movements  resulting 


458  THE  FACTOIIS  0?  THE  INSANITIES. 

from  the  acquired  association  of  nerve-centres.  Movements  similar  to 
those  previously  resulting  from  a  similar  cause.  Movements  in  different 
special  areas,  such  as  the  small  joints;  asymmetry  or  symmetry  of 
parts,  etc.     Action  indicating  delayed  expression." 

When  we  consider  these  visible  movements  as  indicative  of 
the  evolution  of  the  nerve-centres,  the  first  question  we  ask 
Ourselves  is  :  What  is  the  significance  of  the  movements  which 
are  universal  at  birth  ?  Warner  says,  "  Each  movement  corre- 
sponds to  actions  in  a  nerve-centre,  the  mass  of  movements 
corresponds  to  a  mass  of  nerve-centres  in  actipn.,  Further, 
these  movements,  as  far  as  we  can  see,  as  to  their  time,  and  the 
parts  moving,  are  not  determined  by  forces  around ;  that  is  to 
say,  the  nerve-centres  are  not  controlled  in  their  attribtites  of 
action  as  to  its  time  by  external  stimuli  acting  through  the 
senses.  We  conclude;  that  in  the  infant,  in  its  earliest  stages, 
the  nerve-centres  act  separately  and  independent  of  special 
stimulation."  Are  we  really  in  a  position  to  say  that  there  is 
no  mentation,  no  memory,  no  will  in  the  new-born  infant  ?  If 
with  the  first  movement  there  is  no  corresponding  first  impres- 
sion in  consciousness,  then  we  are  in  a  position  to  assume  that 
there  is  no  mentation.  This,  however,  we  are  far  from  being 
able  to  prove.  Similarly  with  the  second  movement,  which 
should  bear  sonie  relation  in  consciousness  to  the  first  move- 
ment if  it  is  taken  as  involving  the  primary  element  of  memory. 
Unless,  therefore,  we  postulate  the  occurrence  of  mentation  at 
the  very  beginning  we  become  responsible  for  an  account  of  its 
Appearance  at  a  period  somewhere  along  the  succession  of 
physical  phenomena. 

The  term  "  micropsychosis  "  is  applied  to  the  neural  action 
corresponding  to  a  certain  known  mode  of  irregular,  spon- 
taneous uncontrolled  thinking ;  but  such  an  employment  of  the 
term  is  misleading,  inasmuch  as  it  is  based  upon  an  assumption 
which  is  unjustifiable,  and  would  lead  us  to  speak  of  matter  in 
psychological  terms.  Because  a  mental  act  depends  upon  the 
formation  of  a  didactic  union  among  nerve-centres  formed  by 
stimuli  from  without  or  spontaneously,  is  no  reason  why  we 
should  term  that  physical  process  a  psychical  one.  If  we 
restrict  the  term  to  mean  the  exjJ^'ession  of  mentation  as 
witnessed   in   movements    of  the   infant,   we  do  not  improve 


MICROKINESIS  AND  MICROPSYCIIOSIS.  459 

matters.  The  latter  is  apparently  the  waj'^  in  which  Warner 
applies  it.  He  saj^s  :  "  The  expression  of  all  acts  of  psychosis 
necessitates  the  kind  of  neural  action  termed  compound  cere- 
bration ;  we  cannot  then  expect  to  observe  the  expression  of 
niicropsychosis  till  Ave  get  evidence  of  acts  of  compound  cere- 
bration occurring  ixi  the  evolution  of  the  brain  as  evidenced  by 
adapted  action  in  its  visible  parts.  The  first  little  adapted 
actions  in  the  infant  indicate  compound  cerebration,  and  pro- 
bably correspond  to  niicropsychosis."  From  this  it  would 
appear,  that  the  term  "  microkinesis  "  is  applied  to  those  move- 
ments which  are  spontaneous  and  purposeless,  and  "  micro- 
psychosis  "  to  those  which  are  adaptive. 

The  point  we  wish  to  be  clear  upon  is,  at  what  period  of 
the  evolution  of  the  infant  do  the  spontaneous  movements 
become  adaptive  ?  Does  the  first  spontaneous  movement  form 
the  basis  for  movements  which  become  adaptive  ?  Or,  to  look 
at  the  question  from  another  point  of  view,  does  the  first 
adaptive  movement  evolve  from  some  spontaneous  movement, 
not  at  the  beginning  of  the  series,  but  at  some  later  period  ? 
The  answer  to  this  is  clear.  Every  adaptive  movement  must 
take  its  origin  from  the  sum  total  of  all  the  movements  that 
have  occurred  before  it ;  that  is  to  say,  with  the  first  movement 
we  have  the  starting-point  of  the  evolution  of  adaptive  move- 
ments, and  the  microkinesis,  in  its  physical  sense,  is  synchro- 
nous in 'origin  with  the  niicropsychosis  in  its  psychical  sense. 
Warner  fully  appreciates  the  very  early  occurrence  of  thought 
or  niicropsychosis.     He  writes  : — 

"  The  commencement  of  the  rudiments  of  spontaneous  thought  in  the 
evolution  of  the  infant  is  not  known  to  the  physiologist — we  cannot 
know  the  occurrence  of  thoughts  before  they  are  expressed  by  si^ns  or 
words  more  or  less  like  those  used  by  adults.  If  thought  depends  upon 
the  diatactic  unions  it  may  be  assumed  that  such  occur  very  early,  for 
we  see  signs  of  them  in  combinations  of  the  spontaneous  movements  of 
microkinesis — diatactic  unions  occur  with  different  discliarge — pro- 
ducing movements,  and  such  may  produce  some  vague  thoughts.  We 
infer,  then,  tliat  the  neural  action  corresponding  to  the  microj)sychosis 
is  a  form  of  spontaneous  diatactic  neural  action,  not  stimulated  by  the 
present  surroundings,  but  due  to  inheritance  ;  it  is  known  only,  like  all 
sorts  of  psychosis,  by  its  subsequent  expression.  It  is  inferred  that  in 
the  infant  brain  the  centres  act  more  or  less  separately  and  indepen- 
dently, but    that   when   they   act   together   they  may  correspond    to 


460 


THE  FACTOES  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 


spontaneous  thoughts;  when  they  become  controllable  through  the 
senses  into  special  combinations,  then  they  are  signs  of  thought  and 
intelligent  action.  EA^en  later  on  in  the  child's  life,  much  of  its  spontan- 
eous thinking  and  movement  is  not  controlled  by  external  impressions, 
but  remains  entirely  spontaneous  as  micropsychosis  and  microkinesis. 

"  It  must  not  be  supposed  that  in  micropsychosis  every  act  represents 
a  definite  thought,  we  do  not  say  that  every  movement  is  a  definite 
action ;  special  diatactic  unions  in  combinations  and  series  are  called 
thinking,  and  special  combinations  and  series  of  movements  are  called 
actions.  The  commencing  signs  of  intelligence  are  actions  following 
some  stimulus,  the  intelligent  character  becomes  more  marked  when 
we  find  some  period  of  delay — a  latent  period — between  the  stimulus 
and  its  expression." 

The  two  tables  constructed  by  Warner,  to  show  the  com- 
parisons and  analogy  between  micropsychosis  and  microkinesis 
in  the  infant,  and  the  reversion  of  microkinesis  and  micro- 
psychosis in  adults,  wdll  prove  of  interest  to  the  student. 


Micropsychosis . 
There  may  not  be  defined  thoughts 

Dreams. 


A  child's  talk  during  play  is  frag- 
mentary. 

Early  expressions  of  thought  are 
vocal  utterances  —  e.(/.,  cooing, 
single  words. 


Infant. 

1  Microkinesis. 

There  is  movement,  but  no  definite 
actions  are  performed. 

In    sleep  there    are  some  spon- 
taneous movements. 

In    play    movements    are    spon- 
taneous. 

Simple  acts    or    gestures    feebly 
maintained. 


Revehsion  in  Adults. 


Microkinesis. 
Post- epileptic  action. 
Fidgety  movements. 
Movements  in  restless  sleep. 
Uncontrolled  movements. 
Movements  controlled  by  sight. 


Mic7'op,iychosis. 
Post-epileptic  "  mental  reduction." 
Wandering  thoughts — inattention. 
Dreams. 

Uncontrolled  thoughts. 
Thoughts     controlled    by    sight. 
Cries  of  "  Mother  "  during  sleep. 


All  morbid  mental  manifestations  may  be  traced  more  or 
less  to  factors  which  may  be  grouped  as  follows  : — (1)  Internal 
factors,  under  M^hich  we  group  (a)  the  variations  or  inequalities 
of  the  individual's  original  capacities,  and  Qj)  the  influence  of 
heredity.  (2)  External  factors,  which  include  the  variations  in 
external  circumstances,  both  physical  and  social. 


ORIGINAL  CAPACITIES.  461 

We  now  propose  to  study  somewhat  in  detail  these  internal 
and  external  factors,  and,  if  possible,  to  obtain  some  further 
insight  as  to  the  oi'igin  and  development  of  abnormal  mentation. 
So,  first  of  all,  we  will  consider  the  variations  or  inequalities  of 
the  individual's  original  capacities. 

Original  Capacities. — At  birth  the  mind  must  possess 
certain  simple  and  fundamental  capabilities.  To  account  for 
their  presence  at  all  is  exceedingly  difficult.  A  similar  amount 
of  difficulty  would  be  found  in  giving  a  full  exposition  of  the 
process  of  development  as  a  growing  adaptation  to  surroundings. 
We  know  that  environmental  conditions  act  upon  the  mind 
through  the  medium  of  the  nervous  organism,  and  we  are  able 
to  trace  innumerable  modifications  in  the  nervous  system  which 
correspond  to  the  growing  adaptation  to  external  relations. 
Were  this  all,  our  task  would  be  comparatively  easy,  and  we 
might  seek  to  explain  everything  under  mechanical  causes  and 
effects.  The  development  of  the  nervous  structures,  however, 
is  due  to  more  than  mere  growth  and  adaptation  to  external 
surroundings.  The  laws  of  organic  development  have  to  be 
explained  in  some  way  other  than  as  mere  effects  of  external 
conditioning  causes ;  that  is  to  say,  the  physical  organism  must 
possess  certain  fundamental  capacities  which  determine  its 
adaptation  from  the  very  first.  Similarly,  mental  development 
must  start  from  some  inherent  state  differing  in  character  from 
anj-  bodily  state,  and  the  operation  of  the  mental  causes  and 
influences  of  the  development  is  often  only  to  be  estimated  by 
observing  those  mental  laws,  facilities,  or  prohibitions  which 
do  not  directly  depend  upon  Avhat  we  know  of  the  physical 
successions.  The  absence  of  normal  microkinesis  in  a  fairly- 
nourished  infant  is  a  marked  character  of  the  imbecile  class  ; 
spontaneous  movement  may,  however,  be  lost  temporarily  from 
conditions  of  lowered  nutrition.  The  mental  development  is 
undoubtedly  dependent  upon  the  physical  development  in  their 
ultimate  aspects  ;  and,  arrest  or  interference  with  the  latter  will 
arrest  or  modify  the  former.  Other  things  being  equal,  however, 
the  mind  possesses  within  itself  certain  fundamental  attributes, 
which,  so  far  as  we  know,  cannot  be  explained  in  physiological 
terms,  and  which  manifest  themselves  throughout  the  process 
of  development  apart  from  adaptive  reactions  of  the  physical 


462  THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

organism  to  any  environment.  That  the  mind  itself  really 
possesses  fundamental  intellectual  functions  of  discrimination 
and  assimilation,  also  primary  capacities  of  feeling  and  willing, 
which  manifest  themselves  out  of  all  proportion  to  any  apparent 
physical  development,  is  evidenced  over  and  over  again  in  the 
moulding  of  Genius. 

Herbert  Spencer  regards  the  great  man  as  the  product  of 
many  co-ordinated  social  influences  over  which  he  personally 
has  no  control'^  "  along  with  the  whole  generation  of  which  he 
forms  a  minute  part,  .  .  .  along  with  its  institutions,  lan- 
guage, manners,  and  its  multitudinous  arts  and  appliances,  he 
i§  a  resultant.  The  genesis  of  the  great  man  depends  upon  the 
long  series  of  complex  influences  which  has  produced  the  race 
in  Avhich  he  appears  and  the  social  state  into  which  that  race 
has  slowly  grown.  .  .  .  Before  he  can  remake  his  society,  his 
society  must  make  hirn.  All  those  changes  of  which  he  is  the 
proximate  initiator  have  their  chief  causes  in  the  generation  he 
is  descended  from." 

"The  caiises  of  production  of  great  men,"  says  Professor 
James,  "  lie  in  a  sphere  wholly  inaccessible  to  the  social  phi- 
losopher. He  must  accept  geniuses  as  data,  just  as  Darwin 
accepts  spontaneous  variations.  For  him,  as  for  Darwin,  the 
only  problem  is.  How  does  the  environment  afiect  them,  and 
how  do  they  affect  the  environment  ?  Now,  I  affirm  that  the 
relation  of  the  visible  environment  to  the  great  man  is,  in  the 
main,  exactly  what  it  is  to  the  '  variation '  in  the  Darwinian 
philosophy.  It  chiefly  adopts  or  rejects,  preserves  or  destroys 
— in  short,  selects  him."  The  determining  causes  of  the  great 
man  are,  continues  James,  "molecular,  and  invisible,  and 
inaccessible,  therefore,  to  direct  observation  of  any  kind.  .  .  . 
The  same  parents,  living  in  the  same  environing  conditions, 
may  at  one  birth  produce  a  genius,  at  the  next  an  idiot  or  a 
monster  .  .  .  and  the  more  we  consider  the  matter,  the  more 
we  are  forced  to  believe  that  two  children  of  the  same  parents 
are  made  to  differ  from  one  another  by  a  cause  which  bears  the 
same  remote  and  infinitesimal  proportion  to  its  ultimate  effects 
as  the  famous  pebble  on  the  Rocky  Mountain  crest,  whose  angle 
separates  the  course  of  two  rain  drops,  itself  bears  to  the  Gulf 
*  "  Principles  of  Sociology." 


ORIGIXAL  CAPACITIES.  463 

of  St.  Lawrence  and  to  the  Pacific  Ocean."  *  Joly  agrees  with 
James  to  a  large  extent.  "The  great  man,"  says  Joly,  "is 
evidently  the  culminating  point  of  his  race,  and  all  experience 
shows  the  unlikelihood  of  two  geniuses  following  each  other  in 
the  same  family.  If.  however,  by  the  side  of  an  extraordinary 
individual,  immediately  preceding  or  succeeding  him,  there 
should  be  found  a  nature  resembling  his,  it  appears  almost 
always  under  a  feminine  form.  Here  may  be  found  maintaining 
for  a  time,  or  reviving  their  lustre,  those  gifts  which  the  head 
of  the  family  has  brought  to  perfection  and  whose  fertility  at 
the  same  time  he  has  exhausted."  f 

Flourens  says,  "Genius  is  the  faculty  carried  to  an  extreme  of 
seeing  and  thinking  justly.  Man}'  roads  lead  to  the  truth.  The 
man  of  genius  is  he  who  opens  these  roads."  Galton  maintained 
that  "  intellectual  gifts,  of  whatever  kind,  were  the  attributes  of 
a  superior  type  of  humanity ;  and  that,  like  the  physical  perfec- 
tions of  the  racehorse  or  the  prize-bullock,  they  were  transmis- 
sible from  one  generation  to  another  in  the  favoured  families 
where  they  occurred."  "  It  is  undoubtedly  true,"  says  Maudsley, 
"  that  where  hereditary  taint  exists  in  a  family,  one  member  may 
exhibit  considerable  genius  while  another  is  insane  or  epileptic; 
but  the  fact  plainh'  proves  no  more  than  that  in  both  there  has 
been  a  great  natural  sensibility  of  nervous  constitution,  which, 
under  different  outward  circumstances  or  internal  conditions, 
has  issued  differently  in  the  two  cases.  Such  a  condition, 
moreover,  is  not  characteristic  of  the  highest  genius,  since  B,ny- 
one  possessing  it  lacks,  by  reason  of  his  great  sensibility,  the 
power  of  calm,  steady,  and  complete  mental  assimilation,  and 
must  fall  short  of  the  highest  intellectual  development  of  the 
truly  creati^■e  imagination  of  the  greatest  poet,  and  the  powerful, 
almost  intuitive  ratiocination  of  the  greatest  philosopher.  His 
insight  may  be  marvellously  subtle  in  certain  cases,  but  he  is 
not  sound  and  comprehensive.  Although  it  might  be  said  then, 
by  one  not  caring  to  be  exact,  that  the  genius  of  an  acutely 
sensitive  and  subjective  poet  denoted  a  morbid  condition  of 
nerve  element,  yet  no  one.  after  a  moment's  calm  reflection, 
would  venture  to  speak  of  the  genius  of  men  like  Shakespeare 

*  Quoted  from  Nisbet's  "  Insanity  of  Gen*  us." 
t  Henry  Joly,  quoted  from  "  Insanity  of  Genius.'' 


464  THE  FACTOES  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

and  Goethe  as  arising  out  of  morbid  conditions."  "  The  acts 
of  the  genius  may  be  novel,  but  they  contain,  consciously  or 
unconsciously,  well  formed  design,"  whereas  "  the  acts  of  the 
person  who  has  the  evil  heritage  of  an  insane  temperament  are 
purposeless,  irregular,  and  aim  at  the  satisfaction  of  no  beneficial 
desire.  ...  In  both  cases  there  may  be  an  uncommon  deviation 
from  the  usual  course  of  things  ;  but  in  the  one  case  there  is 
the  full  recognition  of  the  existing  organisation  as  the  basis  of 
a  higher  development,  in  the  other  there  is  a  capricious  rebellion 
as  the  initiation  of  a  hopeless  discord."  "  Genius  "  says  Nisbet, 
"  has  never  been  the  monopoly  of  any  class  or  system.  It  is  as 
likely  to  manifest  itself  in  the  peasant  as  in  the  peer." 

Lelut,  Moreau,  Lombroso,  Hagen,  Radestock,  all  regarded 
genius  as  a  nevrose.  Ribot,  Locke,  Helvetius,  Goethe  opposed 
this  view.  Ribot  thinks  that  genius  is  rarely  transmitted ; 
Galton,  on  the  other  hand,  believed  that  genius  could  be  trans- 
mitted from  one  generation  to  another.  "  Year  by  year"  says 
Nisbet,  "thousands  of  young  men  are  turned  out  by  the  univer- 
sities and  the  higher  schools  of  the  country,  but  very  few  rise  to 
the  level  of  genius.  Such  education  as  is  received  in  his  youth 
by^a  great  man  has  seldom  much  to  do  with  the  shaping  of  his 
career.  It  was  not  education  that  made  Shakespeare  a  poet, 
Reynolds  a  painter,  or  Darwin  a  naturalist."  "  Diversity  of 
tastes  and  aptitudes  is  shown  by  hojs  in  the  schoolroom  long 
before  circumstances  influence  their  lives  materially,  and  if  an 
eminent  poet  or  painter  could  be  found  willing  to  take  the  com- 
mand of  an  army  in  the  field,  it  is  inconceivable  that  a  successful 
general  should,  by  taking  thought,  excel  in  writing  poetry,  or 
painting  pictures  in  times  of  peace.  Much  is  said,  again,  of  the 
importance  of  taking  pains.  But  nothing  is  more  certain  than 
the  fact  that  industry  alone  is  not  enough  to  enable  the  aspirant 
in  any  walk  of  life  to  become  distinguished.  Some  men  toil  hard 
to  learn  what  others  acquire  by  the  slightest  application.  Nay, 
more,  the  art  of  taking  pains  is,  itself,  a  natural  endowment, 
like  a  good  or  a  bad  memory,  and  is  probably  responsible  for 
much  of  the  difference  existing  between  the  reckless,  scatter- 
brained ne'er-do-well,  who  never  accomplishes  anything,  and 
the  steady,  persistent  worker  who,  with  similar  faculties,  carves 
his  name  indelibly  upon  his  epoch."     "  To  the  genius  that  con- 


DEGENEEATION  AND  GENIUS.  465 

trives  to  assert  itself,  environment  is  more  or  less  accident." 
"  The  great  man  assimilates  and  recasts  the  material  supplied 
him  by  his  epoch.  It  is  the  faculty  of  utilising  existing 
material  that  constitutes  his  genius,  and  this  he  cannot  be  said 
to  owe  to  his  environment.  It  is  something  personal  to  himself ; 
something  due  to  his  physical  organisation."  "  Genius  is  essen- 
tially a  manifestation  of  nerve-energy,  and  the  scope  of  a  man's 
faculties  is  necessarily  determined  by  a  physical  organisation 
over  which  he  has  no  control."  In  the  preface  to  the  second 
edition  of  his  work  upon  "  The  Insanity  of  Genius,"  Nisbet 
quotes  the  authority  of  the  late  Professor  Huxle}^,  \vho  says, 
"  Genius  to  my  mind  means  innate  capacity  of  any  kind  above 
the  average  mental  level.  From  a  biological  point  of  view,  I 
should  say  that  a  '  genius '  among  men  stands  in  the  same  posi- 
tion as  a  '  sport '  among  animals  and  plants,  and  is  a  jjroduct  of 
that  variability  which  is  the  postulate  of  a  selection  both  natural 
and  artificial.  In  my  apprehension,  Darwin's  theory  proper 
assumed  variation  as  a  fact,  and  does  not  attempt  to  account 
for  it,  nor  can  be  called  upon  to  do  so.  And  ever  since  the 
subject  was  first  discussed,  I  have  tried  to  insist  upon  this  upon 
the  general  ground  that  a  strong  and  therefore  markedly 
abnormal  variety  is,  ijMo  facto,  not  likely  to  be  so  well  in 
harmony  with  existing  conditions  as  the  normal  standard,  which 
has  been  brought  to  be  what  it  is  largely  by  the  operation  of 
those  conditions.  I  should  think  it  probable  that  a  large  pro- 
portion of  '  genius  sports  '  are  likely  to  come  to  grief,  physically 
and  socially,  and  that  the  intensity  of  feeling  which  is  one  of 
the  conditions  of  what  is  commonly  called  genius,  is  especially 
liable  to  run  into  the  fixed  ideas  which  are  at  the  bottom  of  so 
much  insanity." 

Degeneration  and  Genius.* — Here  it  may  be  appro- 

*  For  aT  account  of  genius  and  its  relations  to  insanity,  the  student  may 
consult  the  following  works  : — Spencer,  "  Psychology,"  vol.  i.  part  III.,  and 
^'  Sociology  "  ;  James,  "  Atlantic  Monthly,"  Oct.  1880  ;  Joly,  "  Psychologie  des 
Grands  Hommes,"  1883  ;  Nisbet,  "  Insanity  of  Genius  " ;  Flourens,  "  De  la 
Raison  du  Genie  et  de  la  Folie  "  ;  Maudsley,  "  Pathology  of  Mind";  Lelut, 
"  Du  Demon  de  Socrate  "  ;  Moreau,  "  La  Psychologie  Morbide  "  ;  Lombroso, 
"  Entartung  und  Genie,  Neue  Studien,"  and  "  Genio  e  Follia  "  ;  Hagen,  "  All- 
gemeine  Zeitschrift  fiir  Psychiatrie,"  1877  ;  Badestock.  "  Genie  und  Walin- 
sinn,"  1884;  Ribot,  "  L'Her(5dite  Psychologique,"  1887  ;  Galton,  "  Hereditary 

30 


466  THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

priate  to  briefly  consider  some  of  the  interesting  relationships 
betAveen  phj^sical  and  mental  development.  Diiring  the  last 
few  5^ears  there  has  been  so  much  vigorous  writing  upon  the 
subject,  that  we  cannot  afford  to  pass  over  the  main  contentions 
without  criticism.  We  may  preface  our  views  on  the  subject 
by  the  following  statements  : — (1)  There  are  certain  fundamental 
capacities  of  mind  which  cannot  be  demonstrated  as  the  result 
of  ancestral  experience  ;  nor  do  they  necessarily  represent 
acquisitions  made  in  the  life  historj^  of  the  race.  (2)  These 
capabilities  need  not  necessarily^  manifest  themselves  at  the 
early  periods  of  an  individual's  life  ;  nor  are  they  entirely 
dependent  upon  the  environment  which  acts  upon  the  mind 
through  the  nervous  structures.  (3)  The  conditionings  of  such 
mental  developments  do  not  invariably  follow  what  we  imagine 
to  be  the  proper  laws  of  organic  and  nervous  development.  (4) 
Genius,  although  not  invariably  associated  with,  or  sj^mptomatic 
of,  a  neuropathic  process,  is,  nevertheless,  often  closely  allied  to 
the  neuropathic  diathesis,  as  evidenced  in  the  histories  of  past 
and  present  geniuses.  (5)  So  far  from  being  the  result  of  pro- 
gressive achievements  of  the  intellect  are  some  forms  of  geniiis, 
that  they  may  more  truly  be  classed  with  the  degenerate  than 
with  the  healthy. 

Now  let  us  review  some  of  the  examples  given  of  the 
"  degenerate  "  genius,  and  form  our  own  conclusions  as  to  the 
validity  of  the  arguments  given  by  the  strenuous  advocates  of 
the  degeneration  theory.  We  are  told  that  Moliere,  Petrarch, 
Flaubert,  Charles  V.,  Handel,  St.  Paul,  Peter  the  Great,  and 
Dostoieffsky  were  epileptics  ;  Paganini,  Mozart,  Schiller,  Alfieri, 
Pascal,  Eichelieu,  Newton,  and  Swift  were  the  victims  of  diseases 
epileptoid  in  character  ;  Lenan,  Montesquieu,  Buffon,  Dr. 
Johnson,  Santeuil,  Crebillon,  Lombardini,  Thomas  Campbell, 
Carducci,  Napoleon,  and  Socrates  suffered  from  spasmodic  and 
choreic  movements  ;  Zeno,  Clean thes,  Dionj^sus,  Lucan,  Stilpo, 
Chatterton,  Blount,  Haydon,  Clive,  &c.,  committed  siiicide ; 
Coleridge,  James  Thomson,  Carew,  Sheridan,  Steele,  Addison, 

Genius";  Lewes,  "Fortnightly  Review,"  Feb.,  1872;  Beneke,  " Erziehung- 
slere,"  i.  p.  101 ;  Pfisterer,  "  Pfeclagogische  Psychologie,"  §  2  ;  Weir,  "  Genius 
and  Degeneration";  Dallemagne,  " Degeneres  et  Desequibres,"  Paris,  1895; 
Nordau,  "  Degeneration,"  1895,  Leipzig,  1894  ;  Hirsch,  "  Genie  und  Entartung, 
eine  Psychologische  Studie,"  Leipzig,  1894. 


DEGEx\ERATIOX  AND  GENIUS.  467 

HofFman,  Charles  Lainb,  Madame  De  Stael,  Burns,  Alfred  De 
Musset.  Kleist,  Caracci,  Ian  Steen,  Morland,  Turner,  Gerard 
De  Nerval,  Hartley  Coleridge,  Dussek,  Handel,  Gliick,  Praga, 
Rovani.  and  the  poet  Somerville  abused  the  use  of  alcohol  and 
opium ;  Saliust,  Seneca,  and  Bacon  were  suspected  felons ; 
Rousseau,  Byron,  Foscolo,  and  Caresa  were  grossly  immoral ; 
Murat,  Rousseau,  Wagner,  Clement,  Diderot,  and  Pi'aga  were 
sexual  perverts.  Lombroso  says  : — "  I  have  been  able  to 
observe  men  of  genius  when  they  had  scarcely  reached  the  age 
of  puberty.  They  did  not  manifest  the  deep  aversions  of  moral 
insanity,  but  I  have  noted  among  all  a  strange  apathy  for  every- 
thing which  does  not  concern  them,  as  though,  plunged  in  the 
hypnotic  condition,  they  did  not  perceive  the  troubles  of  others, 
or  even  the  most  pressing  needs  of  those  who  were  dearest  to 
them.  If  they  observed  them,  they  grew  tender  and  at  once 
hastened  to  attend  them  ;  but  it  was  a  fire  of  straw,  soon 
extinguished,  and  it  gave  place  to  indifference  and  weariness." 
The  following  list  of  men  of  genius  has  been  taken  from 
Lombroso's  work  : — Carlo  Dolce,  painter,  religious  monomania  ; 
Bacon,  philosopher,  meijaloma/iiia,  moral  ancesthesia ;  Balzac, 
writer,  marl-eel  epilepsij,  mer/alomania ;  Caesar,  soldier,  writer, 
einlepsij  ;  Beethoven,  musician,  amneaia,  meluncholia ;  Cowper, 
writer,  melancholia  ;  Chateaubriand,  writer,  chorea ;  Alexander 
the  Great,  soldier,  alcoholism ;  Moliere,  dramatist,  epilepsy  ; 
Charles  Lamb,  writer,  alcoholism,  acute  mania,  melancholia ; 
Mozart,  musician,  epilepsy,  hallucinations ;  Heine,  writer,  melan- 
cholia, spinal  disease;  Dr.  Johnson,  writer,  chorea;  Malibran, 
epilepsij ;  Newton,  philosopher,  a/mnesia ;  Cavour,  statesman, 
philosopher,  suicidal  impulse ;  Ampere,  mathematician,  amnesia; 
Thomas  Campbell,  writer,  chorea;  Blake,  painter,  hallucinations; 
Chopin,  musician,  melancliolia ;  Coleridge,  writer,  alcoholism, 
morphinism;  Donizetti,  musician,  moral  ancesthesia;  Lenau, 
writer,  melancholia ;  Mahomet,  theologian,  epilepsij;  Manzoni, 
statesman,  folie  d.u  clonte ;  Haller,  writer,  hallucinations ;  Dupuy- 
tren,  surgeon,  suicidal  impulse;  Paganini,  musician,  epilepsii ; 
Handel,  musician,  epilepsy ;  Schiller,  writer,  epilepjsy ;  Richelieu, 
statesman,  epilepsy;  Praga,  writer,  alcoholism;  Tasso,  writer, 
alcoholism,  melancholia ;  Savonarola,  theologian,  hallucinations ; 
Luther,  theologian,  licdlucinaiions ;  Schopenhauer,  philosopher, 


468  THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  INSAj^ITIES. 

'melancholia,  omniphobia ;  Gogol,  writer,  melancholia,  tahes  dor- 
salis ;  Lazaretti,  theologian,  Jiallucinations ;  Mallarme,  writer, 
suicidal  imjmlse ;  Dostoieffsky,  writer,  epilepsy ;  Naj)oleon, 
soldier,  statesman,  folie  du  doute,  ^jseudo-epilepsy  ;  Comte,  philo- 
sopher, hallucinations ;  Pascal,  philosopher,  epilepsy ;  Poushkin, 
writer,  megalomania  ;  Penan,  philosopher,  folie  d.u  doute ;  Swift, 
writer,  paresis ;  Socrates,  philosopher,  chorea ;  Schumann, 
musician,  paresis ;  Shelley,  writer,  hallucinations ;  Bunj^an, 
writer,  hallucinations ;  Swedenborg,  theologian,  hallucinations ; 
Loyola,  theologian,  hallucinations ;  J.  S.  Mill,  writer,  suicidal 
impulse ;  LinnEens,  botanist,  paresis. 

With  snch  a  formidable  array  of  evidences  one  is  apt  to 
gain  bias  in  favour  of  the  "  degenerate"  theory,  and  to  class 
genius  with  the  neurasthenic,  hysteric,  and  epileptic  types  of 
dissolution.  The  notion  of  hcdance  as  the  test  of  mental  health 
would  serve  to  rid  us  of  many  of  the  difficulties  in  estimating 
the  degenerate  characteristics  of  genius.  In  former  chapters 
we  have  emphasised  the  law,  that  with  the  evolution  of  the 
particular  there  is  a  corresponding  dissolution  of  the  general. 
Many  of  the  so-called  geniuses  are  merely  instances  of  a  pro- 
gressive evolution  of  the  particular  at  the  expense  of  the  general. 
They  have  devoted  their  attention  to  the  development  of  one 
faculty  to  the  neglect  of  the  others.  The  individual  who 
possesses  a  versatile  mind,  and  an  aptitude  to  deal  with  all 
conditions  of  his  environment,  may  be  said  to  have  a  well- 
balanced  mind.  Directly,  however,  he  seeks  to  cultivate  one 
faculty  in  excess  of  the  others,  evolution  of  the  pai-ticular  facult}^, 
and  dissolution  of  the  other  faculties  begin.  Many  geniuses 
might  more  truly  be  described  as  men  with  a  special  aptitude  in 
one  direction,  or  as  men  whose  general  ability  has  given  way  to 
the  development  of  a  special  ability.  There  is  a  vast  difference 
between  a  genius  proper,  or  even  a  very  clever  man,  and  a  man 
who  exhibits  an  unusual  aptitude  or  cleverness  in  some  limited 
direction.  Some  of  Lombroso's  "  borderland  "  cases  of  calcu- 
lating geniuses,  thought  readers,  artists,  political  and  religious 
"  mattoids,"  are,  however,  scarcely  to  be  accounted  for  in  this 
way :  in  fact,  they  seem  rather  to  fall  within  the  domain  of  the 
abnormal  as  exhibiting  symptomatic  effects  of  degenerative 
processes. 


DEGEXERATION.  469 

Hirsch  has  pointed  out  in  clear  language  that  genius  is  a 
sociological,  not  a  psychological  concept.  Poets,  musical  com- 
posers, musical  executants,  actors,  painters,  men  of  science, 
statesmen,  soldiers,  and  devotees,  when  geniuses,  seem  at  first 
sight  to  have  nothing  in  common  except  rarity  and  originality. 
The  unusual  and  the  extraordinary  often  arrest  our  attention. 
Thus  it  is,  that  the  fertility  of  novel  ideas  in  some  of  the  so- 
called  geniuses,  which  somewhat  resembles  involuntary  maniacal 
raving,  often  serves  to  build  a  reputation. 

Again,  the  fact  that  hallucinations  are  exceedingly  common 
in  insane  people  is  no  argument  that  they  are  necessarily  insane 
symptoms.  On  the  contrary,  hallucinations  may  be  perfectly 
compatible  with  sanity.  Again,  who  shall  define  the  limits  of 
interpretation  of  what  appears  to  the  mind  ?  The  materialist 
assumes  the  existence  of  a  molecular  causation  to  account  for 
the  origin  of  all  objects  of  perception ;  whereas  the  spiritualist 
believes  in  spiritual  factors.  Who  shall  decide  upon  such  a 
point,  and  prove  the  sanity  or  insanity  of  these  combatants  ? 
Until  we  are  able  to  solve  these  ultimate  problems,  we  must,  as 
presumably  sane  individuals,  be  generous  in  the  limits  we 
assign  to  the  interpretations  which  others  give  to  their  own 
experiences. 

Unfortunately,  many  writers  upon  the  pathological  aspects 
of  genius  attempt  to  define  mental  health  from  its  purely 
objective  standpoint.  They  make  of  it  an  objective  description, 
and  not  a  subjective  appreciation.  The  objective  manifesta- 
tions of  the  sensibilities,  aims,  beliefs,  and  characteristics  of 
others,  they  regard  from  their  own  subjective  standpoint. 
Their  own  functions,  which  they  regard  as  sound,  are  compared 
with  the  objective  manifestations  of  others,  and,  any  departure 
from  their  own  standpoint  is  regarded  as  psychopathic,  and 
therefore  not  to  be  tolerated. 

"Were  we  to  resort  to  the  argmnentuvi  ad  hominem  we  might 
say,  that  these  advocates  of  degeneracy  are  in  reality  degenerate 
advocates.  They  themselves  adopt  that  weapon  of  rhetoricians 
and  demagogues,  the  argumenhmi  ad  j^ojyidum,  in  that  they 
address  themselves  to  the  masses  at  large,  and  seek  to  excite 
their  feelings  by  arrogant  and  insulting  biographical  details, 
which  tend  to  prevent  the  formation  of  a  dispassionate  jndg- 


470        .  THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

ment  upon  the  matter  in  hand.  Max  Nordaii  might,  from  his 
writings,  be  described  as  a  degenerate.  He  is  not,  however,  an 
example  of  the  genius  who  is  degenerate,  but  of  the  gifted  man 
who  suffers  from  auto-hypnotism,  and  who  appears  to  exhibit  a 
condition  of  monoideism,  which  has  been  developed  at  tjie 
expense  of  his  sense  of  justice  and  practical  reason.  We  agree 
with  Professor  James,  who  believes  that  the  real  lesson  of  the 
genius-books  is,  that  we  should  welcome  susceptibilities,  im- 
pulses, and  obsessions  if  we  have  them,  so  long  as  by  their 
means  the  field  of  our  experience  grows  deeper,  and  we  contri- 
bute the  better  to  the  race's  stores ;  that  we  should  broaden  our 
notion  of  health  instead  of  narrowing  it ;  that  we  should  regard 
no  single  element  of  weakness  as  fatal — in  short,  that  we  should 
not  be  afraid  of  life. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  pursuit  of  a  natural  bent 
is  not  infrequently  attended  by  pre-occupation,  sleeplessness, 
nervous  exhaustion,  constipation,  dyspepsia,  and  other  effects 
determined  by  close  and  sedentary  work.  Hence,  many  of  the 
affections  described  as  being  coincidental  with  the  efforts  of 
genius  are  in  reality  mainly  caused  by  the  efforts  themselves. 
Again,  various  bodily  infirmities  or  diseases  may  be  determining 
factors  in  favouring  the  pursuit  of  a  hobby,  be  it  scientific  or 
otherwise.  Thus,  for  instance,  the  cripple,  imable  to  use  his 
limbs,  may  give  more  time  to  the  cultivation  of  his  mind.  The 
blind  man  cultivates  his  ear  for  music,  and  so  on. 

The  investigation  as  to  the  percentage  of  geniuses  who  have 
psychopathic  traits  has  never  been  accurately  carried  out.  We 
do  not  know  whether  the  percentage  of  diseases  is  higher  in  the 
geniuses  than  in  the  population.  Nisbet*  foinid,  that  out  of 
250  men  of  genius,  all  died  of  some  nerve  disorder.  But, 
inasmuch  as  he  appears  to  include  under  nerve  disorders  such 
affections  as  phthisis,  pneumonia,  heart  disease,  scrofula,  rheu- 
matism, syncope,  diabetes,  gout,  and  stone,  etc.  etc.,  his  con- 
clusions are  not  very  satisfactory.  We  can  imagine  that  a 
genius  is  as  liable  to  disease  as  ordinary  persons,  and,  of  course, 
the  genius  must  die  of  something. 

Much  of  the  farcical  writing  upon  the  subject  of  genius  we 
believe  to  be  due  to  (1)  want  of  true  breadth  of  culture — i.e., 
*  '-The  Insanity  of  Genius,"  1893,  p.  315. 


INHERITED  DISPOSITIONS.  471 

a  sympathy  ^^■itll,  art  pursuits,  literature,  and  religion,  derived 
from  something  more  than  a  superficial  examination  of  the 
evidences  thereof;  (2)  the  difficulty  of  forming  an  opinion  of 
the  general  question  from  any  one  standpoint,  and  under  the 
light  of  any  one  set  of  traditions  ;  (3)  the  fact  that  the  causes 
and  sources  which  are  most  vital  can  often  only  with  reluctance 
be  disclosed  to  a  nerveless  and  unsympathetic  public  opinion  ; 
(4)  materialistic  bias,  and  the  consequent  lack  of  healthy  socio- 
logical determination  of  the  will,  seeing  that  the  belief  in  the 
supernatural  has  always  been  almost  universal. 

Inherited  Dispositions. — When  we  speak  of  inherited 
dispositions  we  mean,  that  some  mental  tendency,  or  disposition 
to  think,  feel,  or  act  in  some  particular  way  is  the  result  of  a 
transmitted  tendency  gained  by  ancestral  experience,  and  that 
it  r.'presents  some  mental  attribute  gained  in  the  course  of  the 
histor^i^  of  the  race.  The  points  upon  which  evolutionists 
endeavour  to  assert  themselves  are  : — (1)  The  psychical  develop- 
ment of  the  individual  is  mainl}?-  conditioned  by  that  of  the 
race — i,e.,  owing  to  the  principle  of  hereditary  transmission,  the 
nerve-centres  and  the  corresponding  psychical  activities  tend  to 
unfold  in  the  individual  in  the  order  in  which  they  have  been 
developed  in  the  history  of  the  race  ;  (2)  in  the  evolution  or 
progressive  development  of  the  race  any  improvement  of  faculty 
or  capability  tends  to  transmit  itself  as  a  fundamental  capacity 
or  inherited  disposition. 

Since  Lamarck  published  his  views,  there  has  been  an  almost 
constant  discussion  about  the  laws  of  heredity.  Cuvier  and 
St.  Hilaire  discussed  the  question  in  1830.  Darwin,  Wallace, 
and  Huxley  have  since  revived  the  debate  in  England,  whilst 
Haeckel  has  discussed  the  matter  in  Germany.  The  present 
discussion  between  Spencer  and  Weismann  began  in  1883, 
when  Weismann  first  challenged  the  principle  of  inheritance  of 
acquired  characters  as  a  factor  of  evolution. 

In  any  theory  of  development  and  heredity  we  must  take 
into  account  the  facts  of  embryology ;  and  firstly,  we  have  to 
note,  that  new  individuals  arise,  not  from  all  parts  of  the  bod}", 
but  from  the  more  or  less  isolated  germinal  cells.  These  cells 
are  apparently  isolated  during  the  whole  of  the  life  of  an 
individual,  and  yet,  if  they  are  to  contain  the  whole  store  of 


472  THE  FACTOES  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

heredit}',  they  must  have  some  connection  with  the  bodily  and 
mental  activities  of  the  individual.  Were  this  otherwise  it 
would  be  difl&cult  to  account  for  the  transmission  of  acquired 
characters  through  successive  generations.  On  this  subject  of 
the  connections  between  the  germinal  cells  and  the  individual 
we  have  only  very  scanty  knowledge.  Retzius  investigated  the 
nerye-endings  in  the  regions  of  the  germinal  cells,  but  he  found 
that  nerve-fibrillge  were  scanty  rather  than  plentiful.  It  is 
difficult,  therefore,  to  imagine  how  the  potential  activities  of 
the  germinal  cells  are  derived  through  the  medium  of  the 
nervous  sj^'stem.  And  yet,  we  cannot  but  believe  that  the 
germinal  substance  does  contain  certain  specific  characters 
which  manifest  themselves  in  the  offspring. 

Spencer*  and  Weismannf  have  been  at  issue  as  to  the 
adequacy  of  natm-al  selection  in  the  process  of  evolution. 
Spencer  believes  that  the  reactions  of  the  individual  to  his 
environment  is  by  transmission,  and  that  this  is  the  main  factor 
of  evolution.  Weismann,  on  the  other  hand,  contends  that 
evolution  depends  exclusively  upon  the  survival  of  fortuitous 
favourable  variations.  To  attempt  to  decide  the  issue  would  be 
presumption  on  our  part.  We  can  only  accept  the  evidences  of 
both  sides  as-  inconclusive.  From  a  theoretical  point  of  view, 
the  arguments  of  both  combatants  would  appear  to  contain 
much  that  is  plausible ;  but  we  have  yet  to  see  how  the  theories 
A^'ill  stand  the  test  of  the  exact  methods  of  science  and  induction. 
In  any  case,  we  have  yet  to  clear  up  the  obscurity  as  to  the 
relation  between  the  nervous  S5^stem  and  the  hereditary 
germinal  substance. 

The  transmission  of  normal  traits  is  a  wide  subject,  and  in 
this  ^^•ork  we  shall  have  chiefly  to  deal  with  the  transmission  of 
abnormal  or  diseased  modes  of  thought.  Much  stress  is  laid 
upon  the  hereditar}^  factors  in  insanity'' ;  but  there  is  still  much 
confusion  and  inaccuracy  as  to  their  relative  importance  and 
frequency.  Thus,  the  confusion  may  arise  through  imperfect 
conception  as  to  what  constitutes  an  hereditary  predisposition — 

*  "The  Inadequacy  of  'Xatural  Selection,'"  a  rejoinder  to  Professor 
Weismann — "Contemporary  Review,"  Feb.,  March,  May,  and  Dec,  1893. 

t  "The  All-Sufficiency  of  Natural  Selection" — "  Contemporary  Review," 
Aug.  and  Sept.,  1893. 


INHERITED  DISPOSITIONS.  473 

i.e.,  the  notion  as  to  the  neurotic  factors  in  the  ancestry  may  be 
too  narrow ;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  the  notion  may  be  too  wide, 
and  inckide  hereditary  factors  which  are  of  little  practical 
significance. 

With  regard  to  these  causes  of  confusion  we  have  to  note 
the  tendency  to  omit  the  consideration  of  many  of  the  so-called 
functional  nervous  disorders  in  the  parents.  Thus,  for  example, 
a  history  of  instability,  hysteria,  epilepsy,  chorea,  somnambulism, 
etc.,  in  the  parents  is  not  infrequently  overlooked.  Again, 
most  people  know  no  other  members  of  their  ancestry  than 
their  father  and  their  mother,  and  many  do  not  even  know 
them  ;  and  even  though  a  patient  may  know  much  about  one  or 
both  of  his  parents,  he  verj'  commonly  knows  little  or  nothing 
about  their  diseases.  When  you  go  farther  back  into  his 
genealogy,  and  recollect  that  every  individual  has  four  grand- 
parents, from  any  one  of  whom  he  may  inherit  a  disposition  or 
tendency  to  disease,  how  little  does  he  know  of  the  condition 
of  the  health  of  any  of  these  grandparents  beyond  the  disease, 
possibly,  of  which  they  died  ?  If  we  transfer  our  observation  to 
the  third  line  of  ancestry  only,  and  reflect  that  there  are  eight 
great  grandparents  to  every  individual,  we  get  into  a  haze  of 
ignorance  and  confusion,  out  of  which  it  is  well-nigh  impossible 
to  extricate  ourselves.  Every  individual  must  die  sooner  or  later 
of  something,  and  a  physiological  decay  without  evidence  of 
disease  is  a  rarity.  In  short,  unless  careful,  we  are  apt  to  attach 
undue  importance  to  family  histories,  and  more  especially  per- 
haps where  the  members  affected  are  remote  from  the  individual 
in  question.  At  the  same  time,  there  can  be  no  doubt,  that 
many  hereditary  tendencies  are  transmitted  from  grandparents 
and  even  great  grandparents,  nearly  as  readily  as  from  the 
parents  themselves ;  and  sometimes  from  a  comparatively 
remote  ancestry  you  will  find  the  mental  peculiarities,  the 
same  dispositions,  and  the  same  tendencies  transmitted,  with 
astonishing  precision  of  reproduction. 

Speaking  generally,  the  offspring  tends  to  inherit  the 
characteristics  of  both  parents.  In  some  instances,  however, 
there  may  be  a  preponderance  of  the  characteristics  of  one  or 
other  parent ;  or  there  may  be  a  combination  of  some  of  the 
parents'  qualities,   which  manifest  themselves  coincidently   or 


474  THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

alternately  during  the  lifetime  of  the  offspring.  The  inherited 
disposition  of  the  offspring,  therefore,  depends  upon  the  con- 
stitution of  the  germ  and  sperm.  Defects  in  the  germ  or 
sperm  may  consist  in  alDnormality  of  structure,  or  energy,  or 
both.  Physically,  there  may  be  stunted  growth  or  deformity  ; 
mentally,  there  may  be  defective  intellect  or  other  mental- 
abnormality.  Most  idiots  are  not  only  defective  in  stature  and 
mental  power,  but  also  in  vital  energy.  Some  possess  great 
bodily  vigour,  and  attain  to  an  advanced  age.  This,  according 
to  Mercier,  is  because  in  them  the  idiocy,  the  premature  arrest 
of  the  development  of  the  brain,  does  not  arise  from  failure  of 
the  developmental  impetus  in  consequence  of  its  own  inherent 
weakness,  but  from  violent  arrest  due  to  some  influence  acting 
from  without,  to  violence  to  the  head  at  or  after  birth,  to 
inflammation  of  the  meninges  in  early  life,  to  the  effect  of 
exanthemata  or  other  external  action. 

Intermarriages  also  intensify  family  traits.  The  ill  effects 
which  result  from  the  marriage  of  first  cousins  may  be  attributed 
to  the  heritage  of  a  neurosis  from  a  near  ancestor,  either  from 
the  common  or  the  separate  families.  When  there  is  no  inherit- 
ance in  the  common  family,  but  near  inheritance  in  one  only  of 
the  separate  families,  the  kinship  alone  is  held  to  be  no  bar  to 
marriage.  This,  however,  is  an  opinion  which  might  prove 
dangerous  if  accepted  without  due  consideration  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  near  inheritance.  The  safer  course  would  appear 
to  be,  to  disapprove  of  the  marriage  of  cousins  when  there  is  a 
near  inheritance  of  insanity  on  either  side. 

Too  great  similarity  or  dissimilarity  between  parents  is  apt 
to  influence  the  developm.ent  of  the  offspring.  The  conditions 
which  render  the  germ  and  sperm  unsuitable  to  each  other  are, 
however,  but  little  known.  The  practical  points  we  have  to 
remember  are :  (1)  an  individual  may  develop  or  acquire  a 
neurosis  which  affects  his  own  life,  or  the  life  history  of  his 
famil}^ ;  (2)  the  neurosis  may  increase  or  diminish  in  strength 
from  generation  to  generation,  or  it  may  skip  a  generation ; 
(3)  the  neurosis  may  appear  at  a  later  period  of  life  in  the 
offspring  than  in  the  ancestors  ;  (4)  the  forms  of  the  neurosis 
may  alternate  in  the  life  history  of  the  individual,  or  in  that  of 
the  family ;   (5)  the  type  of  neurosis  may  be  determined  by  one 


HEREDITARY  NEUROSES.  475 

or  other  parent,  with  or  without  transmission  of  identical 
tendencies ;  (6)  the  inheritance  of  a  slight  neurosis  connotes  a 
ready  break- down,  iDut  rapid  recovery;  a  strong  neurotic 
tendency,  on  the  other  hand,  connotes  either  earh'  and  com- 
plete breakdown  or  perpetual  instability ;  (7)  an  inherited 
neurosis  often  manifests  itself  as  epilepsy  ;  comparatively  infre- 
quently in  general  paralysis. 

Revinglon  believes,  that  some  cases  point  strongly  to  the 
theory,  that  while  both  hereditary  and  acquired  neuroses,  if 
strong,  tend  to  the  development  of  general  paralysis  at  an  early 
age,  the  tendency  of  the  former  is  to  protract,  and  that  of  the 
latter  to  shorten  the  duration  of  the  disease.  The  offspring  of 
general  paralytics  are  liable  to  suffer  from  all  sorts  of  neuroses, 
and  more  especially  epilepsy.  Of  the  other  factors  which  tend 
to  produce  hereditary  neurosis  we  would  have  to  take  into 
account  consumption,  gout,  rheumatism,  sj^'philis,  paralysis, 
alcoholism,  spasmodic  asthma,  diabetes,  all  of  which  may  be 
coincidental,  or  they  may  be  one  of  the  links  which  will,  in  the 
future,  be  found  to  connect  so-called  functional  potentialities 
with  organic  realities. 

Phthisis,  according  to  Van  der  Kolk*  and  Guislain.f  is  in 
direct  relationship  with  insanity,  and  it  is  frequently  seen  in 
the  descendants  of  the  insane,  and  in  their  progenitors, 
Thompson  ^  shows  that  the  heredity  in  the  two  diseases  is 
similar  in  the  following  respects — viz.,  (1)  Transmission  is 
from  either  parent ;  (2)  the  disease  may  appear  in  the  child 
before  it  is  developed  in  the  parent ;  (3)  the  disease  may  be 
transmitted  by  the  parent  without  development ;  (4)  atavism  is 
a  frecpient  and  important  characteristic.  Clouston  believes 
that  a  simple  phthisical  heiedity  is  not  so  dangerous  in  lead- 
ing to  insanity,  as  a  hereditary  legacy  of  insanity  is  in  leading 
to  phthisis. 

Scrofula. — Ireland  §  says  of  the  association  of  scrofula  with 
idiocy  and  imbecility,  •'  Perhaps  two-thii*ds  or  even  more  are  of 
the  scrofulous  constitution."'    Any  one  who  has  worked  amongst 

*  ■'  Mental  Diseases," 

t  ••  Lecons  orales  sur  les  Phrenopathies,"  2nd.  edit.,  by  Engels. 

t  "Phthisical  Insanity" — "Take's  Dictionary,"  p.  939. 

§  "  Idiocy  and  Ijcnbecility." 


476  THE  FACTOES  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

idiots  and  imbeciles  cannot  have  failed  to  note  how  important 
a  role  is  played  hj  the  strumous  diathesis. 

Gout  is  supposed  by  some  to  be  a  determining  factor  in  the 
production  of  an  hereditary  neurosis. 

Rheumatism  is  also  supposed  to  start  a  diathetic  condition 
which  may  predispose  to  neuroses. 

Syphilis. — Clifford  AUbutt,  writing  upon  mental  affections 
in  children,  says,  "Apart  from  traumatism,  sunstroke,  poisons, 
malformation,  and  the  seqiielse  of  typhoid  and  other  fevers,  etc., 
insanity  in  children  is  practically  always  hereditary;  though 
bad  bringing  up  and  excessive  study  maj^  largely  conspire  with 
original  tendency  to  produce  it.  If,  in  such  a  case,  the  parents 
are  not  actually  insane,  eccentric  or  dissipated,  we  shall  find 
that  syphilitic  antecedents  ma}^  have  been  the  cause  of  insanity 
in  the  offspring,  or  the  father  may  have  been  well  advanced  in 
years,  if  not  himself  also  of  failing  vigour,  at  the  time  of  pro- 
creation." Drs.  Langdon  Down,  Shuttleworth,  Fletcher  Beach, 
and  others  have  described  evidences  of  congenital  syphilis  in 
idiots  and  imbeciles.  Savage  believes,  that  "  congenital  syphilis 
causes  death  from  convulsions  and  from  other  diseases  in 
children,  who  would  probably  have  been  mentally  defective  had 
they  lived,  and  that  many  minor  nervous  disorders  occur  in 
such  children  who  are  managed  at  home  because  they  are  physi- 
cally weak,  and  that  these  lesser  neuroses  are  seen  by  oiit- 
patient  physicians  in  manj^  patients  who  die  before  maturit}'." 

The  cases  of  mental  defect  or  disorder  in  connection  with 
congenital  syphilis  have  been  classified  by  Savage  under  three 
heads,  viz. : — 

"  1.  Those  with  general  defect  of  development,  with  moral  and  intel- 
lectual want  ;  the  only  special  feature  being  a  distinct  history  of 
parental  syphilis  with  evidences  of  the  disease  in  the  patient.  Such 
children  may  have  fairly  well  formed  heads,  but  who  after  early  infancy 
have  not  developed ;  they  have  learned  to  walk,  but  not  to  talk,  and 
are  restless  and  mischievous,  and  only  to  a  very  small  degree  educable. 
They  require  to  be  removed  from  home  for  the  sake  of  the  other 
children  and  for  special  training. 

"2.  Those  with  sensory  defect  and  consequent  mental  want.  This 
group  contains  cases  in  which  specific  inflammation  has  caused  deafness 
or  blindness,  or  both,  in  early  infancy :  these  defects  leading  to  idiocy 
by  deprivation  of  sensory  stimulation.     In  some  of  these  cases  special 


HEREDITARY  NEUROSES.  477 

education  for  deaf  and  dumb  and  blind  fails  to  deA'elop  any  really  use- 
ful mind,  and  with  the  growth  of  sexual  desire  much  serious  trouble 
may  arise,  and  the  small  mental  gain  effected  may  be  ruined  very 
rapidly.  The  probable  end  of  these  cases  is  the  early  death  from  some 
physical  disease,  such  as  phthisis. 

"  3.  Those  with  epilepsy  or  paralysis,  and  consequent  epileptic  or 
paralytic  idiocy,  (a)  The  epileptic  varieties  frequently  begin  with 
convulsive  seizures  in  early  infancy,  and  these  fits  recurring,  become 
habitual  and  prevent  mental  development.  In  some  cases  the  fits 
cease  at  some  period  of  life,  say  about  seven  or  fourteen  years  of 
age,  but,  as  a  rule,  the  mind  has  been  too  seriously  damaged  to 
recover,  and  the  patient  remains  a  quiet  non-epileptic  idiot.  (6)  In 
the  paralytic  cases,  as  also  in  some  epileptic  ones,  local  lesions 
about  the  cranium,  the  membranes,  and  the  brain  itself  are  the  cause 
of  the  convulsive  or  paralytic  symptoms.  As  a  rule,  these  paralytic 
idiots  are  hopelessly  weak,  and  need  asylum  care,  and  they  usually  live 
but  a  short  time.  In  a  few  cases  the  general  symptoms  of  congenital 
syphilis  only  affect  the  mind  later.  Thus,  defect  of  sight  and  hearing 
may  act  in  the  same  way  that  disfigurement  did  in  making  the  patient 
morbidly  solitary,  self-conscious,  and  suspicious ;  in  the  end  becoming 
deluded  and  insane.  These  cases  generally  are  met  with  in  young- 
women,  and  the  prospect  of  cure  is  very  slight,  most  of  the  patients 
passing  into  chronic  weakmindedness  or  delusional  insanity." 

To  these  we  might  also  add  a  fourth  group  of  great 
interest,  of  which  the  symptoms  may  be  due  to  inherited 
syphilis,  though  the  evidence  is  as  3''et  unsatisfactory.  These 
cases  present  a  remarkable  resemblance  to  general  paralysis. 
The  salient  features  of  some  of  them  are  slow  but  progressive 
dementia,  with  concomitant  steady  development  of  generalised 
paralysis  and  great  emaciation.  This  malady  has  been  fully 
recognised  by  Wigiesworth,  Clouston,  Shuttleworth,  and  others, 
and  the  writer  has  seen  several  cases  which  answer  to  this 
description.  Whether  they  are  true  cases  of  early  general 
paralysis  is  still  doubtful,  and  their  pathology  is  undetermined. 

Intemperance. — The  consequences  of  alcoholism  on  the 
part  of  the  parents  are,  not  only  impairment  of  their  own 
mental  faculties,  but  also  in  the  offspring  a  tendency  to  drink, 
epilepsy,  insanity,  nerve  diseases,  idiocy  or  imbecility,  and  in 
a  word,  extinction  of  the  race.  From  the  social  point  of  view, 
there  is  an  increase  of  mortality,  diminution  of  the  number  of 
births,  decrease  of  moral  energy,  and  of  the  rate  of  develop- 
ment of  intelligence ;  in   fact,  there  is  weakening  of  the  vital 


478  THE  FAOTOHS   OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

and  intellectual  energies  of  the  race.  Legrain  believes  that 
the  great  majority  of  drinkers  are  predisposed  by  heredity,  and 
that  the  craving  for  strong  drink  is  transferred  from  father  to 
son,  and  in  many  cases  in  an  aggravated  form.  Undoubtedly, 
many  of  the  cases  of  alcoholic  insanity,  are  individuals  who 
have  a  neuropathic  diathesis,  and  vt^ho  are  predisposed  to  be 
more  readily  affected  by  the  influence  of  alcohol. 

A  predisposition  to  alcohol  shows  itself  in  several  wajs — e.g., 
(a)  Alcoholic  symptoms  appear  more  readily ;  (h)  there  is  a 
tendency  to  drink  at  an  earlier  age  ;  (c)  the  mental  condition 
during  drunkenness  often  reveals  the  inheritance  of  ideas  or 
tendencies,  which  normally  were  kept  in  subjection;  (d)  the 
mental  symptoms  are  often  characterised  by  impulsiveness,  and 
tendencies  to  commit  rash  acts  ;  (e)  delirium  tremens,  transitory 
mania,  and  even  epileptiform  convulsions  manifest  themselves 
as  sjanptomatic  of  a  predisposition ;  (/)  in  addition  to  suscep- 
tibility to  alcohol,  mental  perversions  may  be  caused  suddenly 
by  exciting  causes  in  which  alcohol  plays  no  immediate  part ; 
(g)  alcohol  may  determine  a  psychosis  which  is  inherited  ;  (Ji) 
the  predisposed  individual  tends  more  to  misinterpret  his  sensory 
impressions  ;  (?')  the  mental  states  or  ideas  are  changeable,  and 
constantly  interrupted  by  lucid  intervals  ;  (j)  the  melancholic 
symptoms  are  somewhat  different,  and  suicidal  tendencies  are 
thought  by  some  authors  to  be  an  indication  of  a  special 
predisposition. 

Legrain*  gives  four  varieties  of  the  special  predisposition  to 
suicide  in  these  cases — viz.,  (1)  Instead  of  having  the  form 
of  genuine  alcoholic  suicide  (an  accidental  act,  or  caused  by 
fright  in  consequence  of  special  hallucinations),  the  tendency 
is  logically  connected  with  the  melancholic  ideas  as  expressed 
by  the  patient ;  (2)  sometimes  those  who  relapse  into  delirium 
tremens  attempt  suicide  at  each  attack ;  (3)  in  the  course  of 
one  and  the  same  attack  of  delirium  tremens,  several  attempts 
may  be  made ;  (4)  in  the  ancestors  of  drinkers  who  become 
melancholiacs  and  commit  suicide  during  an  act  of  delirium 
tremens,  a  special  predisposition  to  melancholia  exists. 

In  a  predisposed  individual,  it  is  not  imcommon  to  meet 
with  maniacal  conditions  of  an  ambitious  or  an  exalted  kind. 
*  "  Tuke's  Dictionary,"  p.  71. 


HEREDITARV  NEUROSES.  479 

In  an  attack  of  deliriiim  tremens  in  a  person  predisposed, 
the  delirium  lasts  longer  and  is  more  apt  to  be  followed  bv 
another  ps^'chosis.  than  in  the  case  of  one  ^\'ho  has  not  the 
predisposition. 

Diabetes. — The  frequency  of  the  occurrence  of  diabetes  in 
the  parents  or  near  ancestors  of  insane  patients  is  note^^■orthy. 
Savage  believes  that  its  occurrence  is  chiefl}^  among  the  affluent 
classes.  Whether  there  is  any  direct  relationship  between 
insanity  and  diabetes,  we  are  as  yet  unable  to  say.  From  the 
records  of  Bethlem  Hospital  it  would  appear,  that  most  of -the 
cases  with  a  family  history  of  diabetes  have  been  of  the  melan- 
cholic or  hj'pochondriacal  type.  This  confirms  the  observations 
of  Savage,  who  also  noted  that  the  periods  of  adolescence  and  the 
climacterium  were  especially  prone  to  favour  the  occurrence  of 
neuroses  in  such  cases.  Other  morbid  factors,  which  tend  to 
determine  the  life-histories  of  a  family,  might  be  mentioned ; 
but  the  scope  of  this  work  will  not  allow  us  to  do  justice  to  the 
innumerable  investigations  that  have  been  made.  We  must, 
however,  note  one  or  two  of  the  main  functional  and  organic 
diseases  of  the  nervous  system,  which  appear  to  be  the  result  of 
ancestral  taint,  and  which  alternate  or  interchange  in  the  life- 
history  of  the  individual  or  of  the  race. 

There  are  some  inherited  neurotic  tendencies  which  do  not 
become  manifest  unless  the  individual  is  subjected  to  exciting 
causes.  Such  individuals  are  excitable,  eccentric,  very  suscep- 
tible to  shock,  passionate,  and  easily  affected  by  alcohol  or  by 
injury  to  the  head.  Others  are  affected  by  migraine,  neuralgia, 
headaches,  sensoiy  epilepsy,  spasmodic  asthma,  neurasthenia, 
and  other  neurotic  manifestations.  The  various  forms  of  mental 
disease  in  the  adult  may  be,  in  great  part,  due  to  neurotic 
inheritance.  General  paralysis  may  be  in  part  due  to  inherit- 
ance, but  it  is  more  common  for  the  offspring  of  general 
paralytics  to  be  neurotic. 

There  are  other  forms  of  inherited  neuroses  which  are  apt  to 
develop  in  the  life  history  of  the  individual.  Chorea,  hysteria, 
and  some  forms  of  epilepsy,  may  develop  into  grave  forms  of 
mental  disturbance.  Sometimes  a  strong  neurotic  inheritance 
develops  early  in  the  life  of  the  individual,  and  manifests 
itself   in    the    graver    forms    of    epilepsy,    moral    insanity,    or 


480  THE  FACTOES   OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

criminality.  In  infancy  a  strong  inheritance  may  show 
itself  in  convulsions,  epilepsy,  hydrocephalus,  imbecility,  or 
idioc3^* 

External  Factors  in  Development.  —  Social  En- 
vironment. —  That  the  social  environment  of  which  we  are 
memlDers  may  influence  our  minds  through  the  media  of  our 
sense-impressions,  there  can  be  no  possibility  of  a  doubt.  Not 
only  are  we  influenced  morally  and  intellectually  by  our  social 
surroundings,  but  our  mental  development  would  be  but 
rudimentary  without  them.  As  we  advance  in  life  these  social 
influences  gradually  increase  in  complexity.  That  they  are 
essential  to  the  mental  development  of  the  ordinary  individual 
is  manifest ;  but,  as  already  pointed  out,  they  are  not  everything 
to  the  manifestations  of  genius. 

The  influences  of  society  upon  an  individual  may  be  exerted 
in  a  natural  way — i.e.,  the  individual  adopts  the  prevailing  tone 
of  thought  of  his  family  and  immediate  acquaintances.  It  is 
impossible  to  extend  our  range  of  view  so  as  to  include  all  that 
belongs  to  social  life ;  nor  can  we  attempt  to  consider  all  the 
implications  of  moral  life,  nor  how  moral  law  influences  social 
life,  organisation,  and  government.  A  philosophy  of  moral  life 
would  have  to  include  the  whole  range  of  social  questions. 
Just  as  the  unity  of  a  familj?-  is  founded  on  biological  and 
ethical  laws  conjointly,  so  all  the  relative  duties  of  the  social 
life  conform  to  those  universal  laws  which  exist  in  accordance 
with  the  bonds  of  nature. 

Here  we  have  only  to  consider  how  members  of  a  society 
may  combine  to  predispose  the  generation  of  a  morbid  psychosis. 
In  the  struggle  for  existence  the  stronger  often  carries  ofl"  the 
prey  from  the  weaker.  In  the  building  up  of  character  in  man 
and  of  mankind  generally,  there  is  an  enlargement  of  the 
evolutional  activity,  a  finer  elaboration  of  the  moral  and  intel- 
lectual contents  of  consciousness,  and  the  executive  effectiveness 

*  See  Eevington,  "  Neuropathic  Diathesis,"  Journ.  Ment.  Science,  April 
and  July,  1888  ;  Mercier,  "  Sanity  and  Insanity,"  also  "  Heredity" — "  Tuke's 
Diet." ;  Thomson,  "  Hereditary  Nature  of  Crime,"  Journ.  Ment.  Science,  vol.  xv. 
p.  487  ;  Spencer,  "  Principles  of  Biology,"  Part  II.  chap.  viii. ;  Dunlop,  "  Illus- 
trations of  Heredity,"  Journ.  Ment.  Science,  vol.  xxvii.  pp.  39,  131 ;  Dexter, 
"  Heredity,"  ibid.,  vol.  xxii.  p.  152  ;  Compayre,  "  Heredity  in  Children,"  ibid. 
vol.  xxvii.  13.  29. 


PSYCHOPATHIC  EPIDE31ICS.  481 

of  volition  is  progressively  acquired.  At  any  period  of  our  habitu- 
ated cerebration,  contrarieties  of  motive  may  affect  the  ego  and 
germinal  power  of  self-determination,  and,  by  persuasion,  cause 
the  ego  to  decide  arbitrarily,  by  fresh  importations  of  energy, 
options  which  are  significant  of  deterioration  or  dissolution. 

The  whole  historj-  of  the  world  is  covered  by  the  shadows 
of  beliefs,  germinated  endemically  and  in  ignorance.  Social 
requirements  and  traditions  have  given  rise  to  the  most  diverse 
religions,  views,  and  modes  of  life.  It  is  susceptible  of  proof 
that,  with  the  increase  of  refinement,  the  occurrence  of  nervous 
and  mental  disorders  has  increased  in  a  proportion  which  has 
been  maintained  to  the  present  day ;  and,  inasmuch  as  this 
subject  is  of  great  importance  to  the  community,  we  must  devote 
some  time  to  its  consideration. 

Psychopathic  Epidemics. — Many  of  the  narratives 
recorded  in  the  Old  Testament,  and  some  of  the  Saifiovl^ofxevot 
in  the  New,  are  ascribed  b}^  some  authors  to  madness.  Greek 
mythology,  in  the  stories  of  Hercules,  Ajax,  Orestes,  Athanias, 
and  Alcmseon,  touches  on  these  phenomena  and  on  lycanthropy, 
and  the  madness  of  the  daughters  of  Proetus,  and  the  uterine 
disease  of  the  Lj^thians  are  even  quoted  as  examples  of  epi- 
demical psychopathies.*  We  have  examples  of  manj^  psychical 
anomalies  from  the  work  of  Galen.f  The  monomania  of  the 
Silesian  maidens,:]:  and  the  feverish  psychical  excitement  of  the 
inhabitants  of  Abdera,  after  witnessing  the  performances  of 
the  Andromache  of  Euripides,  are  adduced  as  being  in  some 
degree  instances  jof  an  epidemic  psychopathy.  Manj^  of  these 
accounts  of  the  ancients  are,  however,  hardly  germane  to  the 
inquiries  of  the  alienist  or  the  philosopher.  And  then  again, 
the  undefined  word  madness  used  in  reference  to  religious 
matters  is  often  misleading. 

All  ae-es  seem  to  have  been  characterised  bv  absurd  fables 
and  exaggerated  speculative  conceptions.  Ever,  in  the  history 
of  the  world,  new  and  mighty  movements  have  agitated  all 
nations,  awakening  men  from  their  dream  of  permanent  repose, 
and  convulsed  the  whole  or  parts  of  the  civilised  \^'orld. 

*  Friecler,  "  Litt.  Gescli.,"  17  etc. 

t  "  Diseases  of  the  Mind." 

X  "  Plutarch  de  Virtut.  Mulierum." 


482  THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  IXSANITIES. 

In  the  middle  ages  destrvictive  epidemics,  for  the  most 
part  advancing  from  east  to  west,  visited  the  whole  of  the 
known  earth ;  characterised  during  the  earlier  periods  of  this 
epoch,  rather  by  cutaneous  affections,  and  during  the  later,  by 
affections  of  the  abdominal  organs  and  sensori-motor  system.'* 
Of  the  latter  we  may  specially  notice  the  dancing  mania 
(pilgrimage  mania)  ,t  which  first  appeared  about  the  jear  1212. 
Thousands  of  young  people,  mostly  approaching  the  age  of 
puberty — i.e.,  from  twelve  to  eighteen — assembled  together, 
and  formed  what  were  called  "  children's  pilgrimages."  They 
proceeded  (1237)  till  they  sank  exhausted  to  the  ground,  so 
that  many  died,  and  the  survivors  were  afflicted  with  tremors 
which  continued  as  long  as  they  lived.  This  disorder  seized 
boys  and  girls  suddenh^,  and,  together  with  other  phenomena, 
was  combined  with  a  morbid  antipathy  to  red  colours  and  to 
weeping ;  and,  when  the  disease  was  at  its  height,  tympanic 
swellings  of  the  abdomen  ensued,  and  paroxysms  of  howling, 
screaming,  leaping,  and  an  excessive  love  of  dancing  set  in. 

In  the  time  of  Paracelsus  the  form  of  this  disorder  was 
milder,  and  approached  that  of  St.  Vitus's  Dance.  Haser  com- 
pares this  epidemic  with  the  lycantJvrojyi/  of  the  ancients. 
However  hypothetical  any  notion  may  be,  which  we  are  able  to 
form  as  to  the  nature  of  this  disorder,  a  psj'chical  momentum 
was  certainly  in  operation,  ^  ancl  a  very  able  writer  §  treats  even 
the  Crusades  as  an  epidemic  of  mental  disease.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  the  eighth  century  raphania,  which  often  commenced 
with  mania  and  terminated  in  imbecility,  became  particularly 
prevalent.  Webster  speaks  of  an  epidemic  madness  wdiich 
prevailed  in  England  in  .1354,  which  attacked  the  lower  classes, 
and  subsequently  spread  through  France  and  Italy.  "  During 
periods  of  plague,"  he  adds,  as  if  by  way  of  exjolanation, 
*'  some  general  influenza  appears  to  have  seized  the  brain, 
even  of  persons  who  were  not  attacked  by  the  plagiae  itself." 
Since  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  neurotic  storms 
in  social  life  have  become  more  and  more   developed.  ||     Un- 

*  Haser,  "  Geschicte  der  Epidemischen  Krankheiten." 

t  Hecker,  "  Die  Tanzwuth." 

X  Feuchtersleben,  "  Med.  Psych.,"  p.  42. 

§  Wawriich,  "  De  Morb.  Pop.,"  (MS). 

II  Leujjholdt,  "  Gesch.  d.  Ges.  n.  Krankh."  136. 


PSYCIIOPATIIIC   EPIDEMICS.  483 

doubtedly  all  ages  have  been  characterised  by  absurd  beliefs 
and  speculations ;  and  the  mental  epidemics  of  the  days  of  old 
are  thought  by  some  writers  to  have  their  equivalent  in  the 
mental  rhapsodies  of  the  present  day,  as  sllo^vn  in  almost  incredi- 
ble psychical  deviations  and  beliefs  in  the  fantastic  and  unreal. 

The  mystical  aberrations  of  primitive  people,  were,  in  their 
universality,  no  more  within  the  actual  borderland  of  true 
psychopathy,  than  many  superstitious  beliefs  and  traditions 
of  the  present  age.  The  endemic  beliefs,  with  their  histories 
and  endless  variations,  however,  do  not  form  part  of  our 
subject ;  so  we  propose  to  deal  more  particularly  with  those 
morbid  manifestations  which  have  passed  the  borderland  of 
sanity,  and  in  their  nature  and  violence  have  appeared  as 
clearly  marked  epidemic  psychopathies. 

Considered  seriatim,  the  various  psychopathies  may  be  de- 
scribed, as  they  have  been  characterised,  as  purely  mental  or 
moral  perversions,  or  as  physical  aberrations  secondary  to  the 
physical  contagion. 

Of  the  sensory  type,  the  world  has  witnessed  many  curious 
illustrations.  The  spectral  illusion  occurring  on  the  banks  of 
the  Clyde  (1686)  affected  a  great  many  persons  who  saw,  while 
others  failed  to  see,  companies  of  men  in  arms  marching  along 
and  disappearing.  They  also  saw  bonnets,  guns,  and  swords. 
In  this  instance,  emotional  predisposition  doubtless  favoured 
production.  There  is  a  striking  observation  made  by  Theresa, 
whom  M.  Maury  characterises  as  the  metaphysician  of  feminine 
mysticism  and  of  ecstatic  illumination — namely,  "  I  have  known 
some  of  weak  mind  who  imagine  they  see  all  that  they  think ; 
and  this,"  she  adds,  "is  a  very  dangerous  condition."  Many 
writers  believe,  that  whatever  mental  or  bodily  state  can  be 
excited  through  the  senses  from  without,  may  also  arise  from 
^^•ithin  from  imagination  proper.  It  is  this  principle  which 
continuall}^  turns  up  in  the  consideration  of  the  Cjuestions  now 
engaging  our  attention,  and  which  would  seem  to  enable  some 
psychologists  to  form  a  successful  clue  to  many  otherwise 
inexplicable  sensory  manifestations.  We  have  already  seen 
that,  whatever  the  cause  may  be,  in  some  conditions  of  the 
brain,  the  sensory  centres  may  be  so  powerfully  excited  that 
the  effect  is    identical  in    sensory  force  (in    objectivity)  with 


484  THE  FACTOES  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

that  which  results  from  an  impression  produced  upon  the 
peripheral  terminations  of  the  nerves,  causing  hallucinations  or 
phantasmata.  The  mind,  under  certain  circumstances,  can,  by 
attention,  recall  the  sensorial  impression  so  distinctly,  as  to 
produce  {e.g.,  in  the  case  of  sight)  the  spectrum  or  image, 
which  was  impressed  on  the  retina  and  perceived  by  the 
sensorium.*  It  cannot  be  denied,  however,  that  there  are 
sensorial  phenomena,  whose  origin,  at  any  rate  at  present, 
cannot  be  explained  by  an  exercise  of  the  imagination  process, 
as  such,  either  voluntary,  normal,  or  unduly  stimulated. 

Yet  many  of  the  astonishing  psychological  dramas  which 
have  at  various  epochs  arrested  the  attention  of  the  world, 
have  arisen  through  phenomena  allied  to  the  products  of  the 
imagination  and  propagated  by  imitation. f  At  the  present 
day  we  look  back  with  a  degree  of  wonder  at  the  belief  in 
witchcraft,  which  may  be  said  to  have  formed  an  article  of 
religious  faith  in  every  European  country  throughout  the 
sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries.  A  notion  was  uni- 
versally entertained,  that  the  devil  and  some  subordinate 
evil  spirits,  in  pursuance  of  their  malevolent  ends,  went  about, 
sometimes  in  visible  shape,  seducing  poor  human  nature.  Such 
"  trafficking  with  the  powers  of  darkness,"  as  it  was  technically 
called,  was  witchcraft,  and,  according  both  to  the  letter  of 
Scripture  and  of  civil  law,  was  a  crime  punishable  with  death. 

Originating  in  ignorance,  together  with  a  love  of  the  mar- 
vellous and  from  many  religious  misconceptions,  the  belief  in 
witchcraft  may  be  traced  through  the  early  ages  of  Christianity; 
but  the  modern  prevalence  of  the  delusion  may  be  said  to  date 
from  the  promulgation  of  an  edict  of  Pope  Innocent  VIII.,  in 
1484,  declaring  witchcraft  to  be  a  crime  punishable  with  death. 
Like  all  popular  manias,  the  witchcraft  delusion  had  its 
paroxysms.     It    followed   the   well-known    law  of  supply  and 

*  Hack  Tuke,  Body  and  "  Mind,"  p.  80,  vol.  i. 

f  Due  to  imagination,  understood  in  the  sense  of  expectation,  we  have, 
as  examples,  the  Okeys,  the  Wizards  of  Kamschatka,  the  Whirling  Dervishes 
of  India,  the  Second  Sight  Men  of  the  Highlands,  the  Serpent  Eaters 
of  l^^gypt,  and  the  Wise  Men  and  Prophets  who  may  still  be  found  in  York- 
shire, all  knowing  how  to  excite  convulsions,  or  delirium,  or  spectral 
illusion  and  somnambulism  in  themselves  or  their  dupes,  by  mental  acts 
or  drugs. 


PSYCHOPATHIC  EPIDEMICS.  485 

demand,  and  the  frenzy  never  lacked  victims.  As  soon  as 
Avitches  Avere  in  request  they  made  their  appearance.  The  folly 
while  it  lasted  was  complete,  and  received  the  solemn  sanction 
of  people  of  eveiy  quality  and  profession. 

It  is  a  curious  law  of  human  nature,  of  which  we  have  seen 
many  modern  illustrations,  that  even  crimes,  real  or  imputed, 
when  they  excite  much  public  attention,  tend  to  produce  repe- 
titions of  themselves.  In  this  way,  such  offences  sometimes 
assume  a  character  approaching  that  of  epidemical  diseases. 
In  1515.  during  the  space  of  three  months,  500  witches  were 
burned  in  Geneva ;  in  a  single  year,  in  the  diocese  of  Como,  in 
the  north  of  Italy,  1,000  were  executed;  and  it  is  related,  that 
altogether  more  than  100,000  individuals  perished  in  Germany 
before  the  general  mania  terminated. 

In  France,  the  belief  in  witchcraft  led  to  a  remarkable 
variety  of  superstition,  known  in  French  law  as  hjcanthropy,  or 
the  metempsychosis  of  a  witch  into  a  wolf. 

In  the  reign  of  Henry  VIII.,  1541,  Elizabeth,  1562,  and 
also  of  James  I.,  witchcraft,  though  always  penal,  then  became 
of  itself  a  capital  crime.  James  I.  passed  an  act  in  the  first 
year  of  his  reign,  which,  on  account  of  its  degree  of  minuteness, 
is  almost  unprecedented.  He  defined  witchcraft  distinctly,  and 
enacted  that,  "  Any  one  that  shall  use,  practise,  or  exercise  any 
invocation  of  any  evil  or  wicked  spirit,  or  consult  or  covenant 
with,  entertain  or  employ,  feed  or  reward  any  evil  or  -wicked 
spirit,  to  he  for  any  purpose,  or  take  up  any  dead  man,  etc.  etc. 
etc. ;  such  oifenders,  duly  convicted  and  attainted,  shall  suffer 
death."  Many  years  had  not  passed  away  after  the  passing  of 
this  statute,  ere  the  delusion,  which  had  theretofore  caused  but 
occasional  and  local  mischief,  became  an  epidemical  frenzy, 
affecting  every  corner  of  England. 

The  revolting  crimes  of  the  monster,  Matthew  Hopkins, 
who,  with  his  assistants,  moved  from  place  to  place  in  the 
regular  and  authorised  pursuit  of  his  trade  of  witch-finding, 
will  give  an  example  of  the  horrible  fruits  of  the  witchcraft 
frenzy  in  general.  From  each  town  he  visited,  Hopkins 
exacted  the  stated  fee  of  twenty  shillings ;  and  in  consideration 
thereof,  he  cleared  the  locality  of  all  suspected  persons,  bring- 
ing them  to  confession  and  the  stake  in  the  following  manner : — 


486  THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  INSANITIES- 

He  stripped  them  naked,  shaved  them,  and  thrust  jDins  into 
their  bodies,  to  discover  the  witch's  mark ;  he  wrapped  them  in 
sheets,  with  great  toes  and  thumbs  tied  together,  and  dragged 
them  through  ponds  and  rivers,  when,  if  they  sunk,  it  was  held 
as  a  sign  that  the* baptismal  element  did  not  reject  them,  and, 
they  were  cleared ;  but  if  they  floated,  as  they  usually  would 
do  for  a  time,  they  were  then  set  down  as  guilty,  and  doomed. 
In  short,  such  abominable  cruelties  were  practised  upon  the 
accused,  that  they  were  glad  to  escape  by  confession.  After  he 
had  murdered  hundreds,  however,  the  tide  of  popular  opinion 
was  turned  against  him,  and  he  was  subjected  by  a  party  of 
indignant  experimenters  to  his  own  favoiirite  test  of  swimming. 
It  is  said  he  escaped  with  his  life,  but  from  that  time  forth  he 
was  never  heard  of  again. 

It  was  during  the  era  of  the  Long  Parliament  that  the 
growth  of  witch-mania  proceeded.  Three  thousand  persons  are 
said  to  have  perished,  during  the  continuance  of  the  sittings  of 
that  body,  by  legal  executions,  apart  from  many  summary 
deaths  inflicted  by  a  ruthless  mob.  This  long  and  black  cata- 
logue of  murders  was  on\j  completed  after  the  number  of  those 
put  to  death  had  reac|ied  30,000. 

Thus,  we  have  with  the  "  Daemonologie "  of  the  sapient 
James  a  record  of  a  popular  mania,  which  in  time  would  have 
abated,  had  not  the  spirit  of  Puritanism  gained  strength,  and 
the  belief  in  witchcraft,  by  the  great  and  educated,  had  the 
natural  effect  of  reviving  the  frenzy  among  the  flexible  popu- 
lace. Once  more  the  old  impossible  and  abominable  fancies 
were  revived,  but  this  time  witchcraft  assumed  the  form  of 
a  religious  persecution,  -and  with  even  a  deeper  degree  of 
attendant  horrors  than  at  any  other  time. 

This  mania  was  not  confined  to  Great  Britain,  but  ex- 
tended with  virulence  to  North  America,  where  the  inhabit- 
ants, carrying  their  religious  opinions  to  excess,  yielded  a 
remarkable  credence  to  the  popular  superstition,  and  carried  it 
as  far,  in  their  modes  of  judicial  punishment,  as  it  had  gone  in 
any  European  nation. 

Of  the  ultimate  causes  of  such  transient  delusions  which 
run  so  high  and  terminate  so  fatally,  no  definite  explanation 
can  be    given.      Such  moral  desolations  often    pass  over    the 


RELIGIOUS   IMPOSTORS.  487 

face  of  society.  The  thunderstorm  does  its  work — the  atmo- 
sphere becomes  clear,  and  the  sun  shines  forth  and  reveals  to  all 
the  work  of  death. 

Next,  we  come  to  the  spirit  of  the  religious  pilgrimages  of 
which  we  have  spoken.  On  the  establishment  of  Christianity 
in  the  Roman  Empire  by  Constantine  in  the  year  321,  Palestine 
and  Jerusalem  became  objects  of  interest  to  all  Christians,  and 
crowds  of  pilgrims  flocked  to  the  localities  celebrated  b}^  the 
Evangelists  ;  but  it  was  not  until  Peter  the  Hermit,  with  his 
strange  and  wild  aspect,  his  glittering  eye,  his  shrill  and 
unearthly  eloquence,  and  the  grandeur  of  his  theme,  had 
traversed  the  whole  of  Europe,  and  had  produced  eve^y^\■here 
the  most  extraordinary  sensations  b}^  his  pathetic  descriptions 
of  the  state  of  Jerusalem  and  the  Christians  there,  that  the 
love  of  adventure,  the  spirit  of  chivalry,  and  the  desire  to  wage 
deadlj^  war  with  falsehood  and  guile,  burst  into  a  passion  so 
powerful  and  deadly,  that  the  force  of  it  not  only  overmastered 
thousands  of  noble  and  refined  human  beings,  but  compelled 
into  his  heterogeneous  train,  robbers,  murderers,  and  all  sorts 
of  criminals,  until  the  vast  masses  set  in  motion  towards  Holy 
Land  amounted  to  millions  of  souls.  Evidently,  very  numerous 
were  the  miscreants  and  fanatics  of  that  age ;  poor  ^^■retches 
who  had  been  hurried  on  by  a  blind,  impulsive  kind  of  mania 
into  the  enterprise,  without  forethought  or  preparation  of  any 
sort,  and  whose  main  anxiety  was  to  be  the  first  to  reach  the 
sacred  shrine.  There  were  to  be  seen  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
human  beings,  the  mere  tools  of  the  enthusiasm,  and  the 
monster  result  of  that  grief  and  rage  which  had  filled  the  breast 
of  Peter  the  Hermit ;  and  the  conclusion  and  consummation  of 
their  desire  was  a  carnage  and  work  of  blood  in  the  redemption 
of  the  very  birthplace  of  the  religion  of  peace. 

Religious  Impostors. — Of  religious  excesses  originating  in 
imposture,  or  the  delusions  of  overheated  neurotic  tempera- 
ments, the  world  has  had  many  lamentable  examples  ;  and  of 
all  excesses,  that  of  excess  in  mistaken  or  misguided  devotional 
feeling  has  proved  the  most  dangerous.  History  abounds  in 
accounts  of  Messiahs,  and  of  their  contagious  influence  and 
temporary  success  in  working  on  the  credulity  of  their  followers. 
We  have  only  to  mention  the  Munzer  fanatics  in  Germany, 


THE  FACTORS  OF  THE   INSANITIES, 

who,  amid  the  turmoil  of  the  Reformation,  bj^  their  pretended 
visions,  miracles,  and  prophecies,  kindled  the  flame  of  fanaticism 
in  the  minds  of  the  peasants  ;  and  the  equally  infatuated 
zeal  of  the  followers  of  Bockholt  or  John  of  Leyden.  Here, 
in  both  cases,  the  doctrines  of  an  hallucination  spread  into  a 
popular  belief  which  held  its  sway  over  great  multitudes  of 
people.  In  almost  all  countries  of  Europe  an  enornious 
number  of  these  people  preferred  death  in  its  worst  forms  to 
a  retraction  of  their  beliefs.  Neither  the  view  of  the  flames 
kindled  to  consume  them,  the  ignominy  of  the  gibbet,  nor 
the  terrors  of  the  sword  could  shake  their  invincible  constancy, 
or  indu.ce  them  to  abandon  tenets  that  appeared  dearer  to  them 
than  life  and  all  its  enjoyments.  The  would-be  more  enlight- 
ened policy  of  modern  times  would  either  leave  alone  such 
beings,  or,  at  the  most,  enc|eavour  to  consign  them  to  the 
humane  treatment  of  a  lunatic  asylum. 

The  mass  of  absurdities — blasphemous  in  the  extreme,  if 
viewed  as  the  outpourings  of  mental  sanity  —  of  the  New- 
foundland prophet,  Eichard  Brothers,  excites  a  sense  alike  of 
the  painful  and  ludicrous.  That  the  man  was  neither  more 
nor  less  than  a  confirmed  lunatic  may  be  easily  seen  by  the 
perusal  of  the  gross  specimens  of  his  ravings  as  set  down  in 
his  work,  called  "  A  Revealed  Knowledge  of  the  Prophecies 
and  Times."  The  victims  of  such  a  contagious  epidemic  create 
a  world  of  their  own  around  them,  and  in  imaginary  inter- 
course with  the  beings  that  people  it,  find  more  pleasure  than 
in  any  commerce  with  the  material  creation.  Richard  Brothers, 
as  far  as  he  lived  at  all  for  the  ordinary  world,  lived  only  to 
aflbrd  another  proof  of  the-  irregular  exercise  of  the  superstitious 
feeling  and  love  of  the  marvellous  in  man,  as  well  as  of  the 
difficulty  which  even  education  has  in  repressing  their  undue 
exercise.  During  the  past  century  the  religious  world  has 
been  scandalised  by  the  wild  fancies  and  pretensions  of  several 
female  fanatics,  equally  mad  or  self-deceiving  with  the  most 
visionary  impostors  of  the  male  sex. 

Anna  Lee,  the  founder  of  the  religious  sect  commonly 
called  Shalcers,  was  a  violent,  hysterical,  vehement,  and  ambi- 
tious girl,  who  claimed  to  be  the  Bride  of  the  Lamb  seen  in 
Revelation  by  St.  John.     Yet,  such  was  the  powerful  influence 


SPECULATIVE  MANIAS.  489 

of  the  morbid  visions  of  this  illiterate,  hysterical  factory-girl, 
that  the  course  of  American  thought  and  sentiment  was  con- 
siderably altered  by  it.  The  extravagant  pretensions  of  the 
fanatics  Jemima  Wilkinson  ("the  universal  friend"),  Mrs. 
Buchan  ("mother  of  the  elect"),  and  Joanna  Southcott.  with 
her  100,000  excited  followers,  are  other  instances  of  uncouth 
epidemics,  in  which  thousands  of  crazy  dupes  became  infected 
by  the  crude  and  oftentimes  coarse  raving  of  a  maniac.  The 
religious  wanderings  of  Matthews,  "  the  prophet,"  excited  a 
frenzy  in  America,  which  in  ordinary  times  would  lead 
to  no  other  result  than  the  committal  of  such  a  madman 
to  an  asylum.  The  assumption  of  Divine  power  by  John 
Nicolls  Thorns  in  Cornwall,  was  followed  by  confinement  in 
an  asylum,  but  not  until  his  exhortations  and  denunciations 
had  induced  an  enthusiastic  fervour  amongst  his  vast  concourse 
of  deluded  followers.  Lastly,  mention  must  be  made  of  the 
80,000  enthusiastic  disciples  of  Sabbathias  Zwi,  who  claimed 
to  be  the  Messiah,  and  endeavoured  to  convert  all  humanity 
by  the  magic  and  mystical  doctrines  of  the  Cabbala. 

Closely  allied  with  hysterical  insanity  on  the  one  hand  and 
epileptic  insanity  on  the  other — and  when  ceasing  to  be  sporadic, 
forming  the  best  illustration  of  epidemic  insanity — is  a  form  of 
mental  disorder  known  under  the  various  designations  of  Taran- 
tism,  Dancing  Mania,  Tigretier,  Chorea-Demonomania,  and 
Choreomania,  but  which  must  not  be  confounded  with  ordinary 
chorea  in  combination  with  insanity.*  It  consists  of  an  irresist- 
ible impulse  to  active  movements,  remarkably  stimulated  by 
music,  with  marked  perversion  of  the  feelings.  On  several 
occasions  this  remai'kable  disorder  has  deeply  affected  the 
course  of  political  and  religious  national  life.!- 

Speculative  Manias. — Another  important  series  of  epidemics 
are  catalogued  u^nder  the  speculative  manias,  among  which  the 
avaricious  desire  of  being  speedily  rich   has  been  a  prominent 

*  Bucknill  and  Tuke,  "Manual  of  Psychological  Med.,"  p.  400. 

t  Dr.  Tuke  has  given  the  narrative  of  epidemic  choreomania  occurring 
in  Madagascar,  "  Manual  of  Psych.  Med.,"  3rd  edit. ;  and  Dr.  Constans  has 
given  an  interesting  account  of  the  "  Epidemie  d'Hystero-Demonopathie," 
in  1861,  at  Morzines,  in  the  Department  of  Chablais  (in  Haute-Savoie), 
Paris,  1863. 


490  THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

feature.  Sometimes  the  schemes,  though'  visionary,  arose  with 
no  bad  intention,  being  merely  a  consequence  of  inconsiderate 
enthusiasm  ;-  but  in  others,  if  not  originating  from  deception, 
they  were  continued  with  a  reckless  disregard  of  consequences, 
and  evidently  for  the  sake  of  immediate  and  unjustifiable 
returns. 

John  Himter  laid  down  the  law,  that  "  every  part"  of 
the  body  sympathises  with  the  mind;  for  whatever  affects 
the  mind,  affects  also  the  body  in  proportion."-*  The 
mischievous  influence  of  sympathy  or  imitation  is  exemplified 
in  the  following  case  quoted  from  Dr.  Tuke's  work.  In  a 
workshop  where  sixty  women  were  at  work,  one  of  them  after 
a  violent  altercation  with  her  husband  had  a  nervous  attack. 
Her  companions  pressed  round  her  to  assist,  but  no  sooner  had 
they  done  so,  than  first  one,  then  another,  fell  a  prey  to  the 
same  kind  of  attack,  until  twenty  were  prostrated  by  it.  The 
contagion  appeared  likely  to  spread  through  the  company,  but 
A^'as  checked  by  clearing  the  room.f  That  there  is  a  pernicious 
influence  in  connection  with  reading  the  graphic  reports  of 
atrocious-  crimes  is  at  the  present  day  manifest ;  the  images  of 
these  crimes  are  impressed  upon  the  mind  through  the  senses, 
and  with  defective  control  there  is  simply  a  reproduction  of 
the  acts  as  pictured.  There  can  be  no  doubt,  that  suicide  is 
frequently  brought  about  by  suggestion  in  this  way.  A  case 
is  quoted  by  Tuke  of  a  sentinel  in  Napoleon's  army,  who  com- 
mitted suicide  by  hanging  himself  in  his  sentry-box,  and  whose 
example  was  immediately  followed  by  several  others,  when  they 
became  his  successors  in  the  same  box,  until  Napoleon  found  it 
necessary  to  entirely  destroy  the  box  by  fire.  The  comparatively 
recent  epidemic  of  suicide  among  the  youth  of  Austria  furnishes 
us  with  another  illustration.  Every  youth  who  failed,  or  nearly 
failed,  or  fancied  he  might  fail  at  any  examination  whatever, 
immediately  began  to  think  of  suicide,  and  sometimes  even 
committed  it,  without  waiting  to  hear  the  result  of  the 
examination. 

Of  mimicry  of  disease  there  are  innumerable  instances.     The 

cases  quoted  by  Weir  Mitchell,  of  six  or  seven  inmates  of  the 

*  Tuke,  "  Influence  of  Mind  on  Body,"  p.  167. 

t  "  Journ.  des  Connaissances  Med.  Chir.,"  Feb.  1,  p.  16,  1851, 


MIMICKY  OF  DISEASE.  491 

Pennsylvania  Hospital  who  imitated  another  patient  suffering 
from  croup  ;  and  Durand"s  account  of  the  influence  of  imagina- 
tion causing  vomiting  in  80  out  of  100  patients  simultaneoiisly, 
exemplify  the  influence  of  suggestion. 

Tamburini  and  Tonnini*  make  a  distinction  between 
endemic  and  epidemic  insanity.  Endemic  insanit}^  is  confined 
to  one  region  or  district,  but  may  extend  and  become  epidemic. 
Besides  their  local  character,  the  particular  forms  of  endemic 
insanity  are  described  as  being  stable,  and  as  tending  to  pi'opa- 
gate  without  any  active  moral  contagion.  They  are  also  thought 
to  reflect  the  tendencies  of  primitive  races.  When  the  endemic 
psychopathies  spread  among  people  of  different  habits  and 
conditions,  the  disorder  tends  to  become  less  intense  and  less 
frequent.  Uindemic  insanity  extends  over  a  much  larger  area 
than  endemic.  The  epidemics  may  develop  under  the  influence 
of  the  same  psychological  tendencies — i.e.,  the  same  moj'bid 
tendencies  may  exist  throughout  a  large  number  of  individuals. 
It  is  more  common,  however,  for  an  epidemic  to  arise  through 
the  influence  of  some  individual  who  infects  others  with  his 
own  morbid  ideas. 

The  psychic  manifestations  may  take  the  form  of  (1)  illu- 
sions or  pure  hallucinations,  which  affect  many  persons 
at  the  same  moment ;  (2)  morbid  psychoses,  in  A\'hich  there 
may  be  melancholia,  excessive  religious  zeal,  political  or 
pseudo-scientific  intemperance ;  (3)  sensory  perversions  with 
ecstasy,  impulses,  and  morbid  activities ;  (4)  actual  convul- 
sive attacks,  as  in  the  various  epidemics  of  hysteria,  epilepsy, 
and  chorea. 

Insanity  may  be  communicated  {Folie  d  deux)  from  one 
individual  to  another  m  various  ways  : — (1)  Occasionally  one 
patient  becomes  infected  b}'  the  mental  disorder  of  another. 
Not  only  may  the  actual  existing  delusion  or  moral  perversion 
be  communicated,  but  also  numerous  abnormal  activities,  such 
as  the  rlwthmical  movements  of  idiots.  Thus,  in  County  asylums 
it  is  not  uncommon  to  see  several  insane  individuals  of  a 
degraded  type  who  have  copied  the  perverted  activities  of  their 
neighboiirs.  (2)  In  consequence  of  the  shock  of  witnessing 
an  attack  of  insanity,  and  the  strain  occasioned  by  nursing,  etc., 
*  "  Tuke's  Dictionary  of  Psychological  Medicine,"  p.  434. 


492  THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

some  individuals  break  down  mentally  and  may  acquire  the 
same  insane  ideas  as  their  patients.  These  instances  of  course 
differ  from  those  in  which  two  or  more  persons  become  insane 
simultaneously  from  the  same  cause. 

On  the  whole,  however,  from  an  analysis  of  the  clinical  facts, 
it  would  appear  justifiable  to  state,  that  (1)  the  insane  have 
little  influence  upon  the  sane — i.e.,  other  things  being  equal, 
attendants  upon  the  insane  are  not  especially  liable  to  attacks 
of  insanity.  (2)  When  an  individual  breaks  down  in  conse- 
quence of  association  with  the  insane,  the  probability  is,  that 
that  individual  has  a  neurotic  inheritance,  or  is  subjected  by 
disease  or  other  causes  to  mental  and  physical  strain.  (3)  It  is 
more  common  for  women  to  break  down  than  men.  (4)  The 
young  are  more  likely  to  become  affected  by  the  delusions  of 
the  old  than  vice  versa ;  especially  if  the  old  are  related  to,  and 
intimately  associated  with,  the  development  of  the  former.  (5) 
An  individual  who  is  obviously  insane  seldom  influences  the 
thoughts  of  those  who  are  sane.  The  greater  danger  arises 
from  the  insane  person  who  is  able  to  conceal  his  madness  and 
apply  his  intellect  in  a  methodical  way,  so  as  to  influence 
another  in  the  direction  of  his  own  delusion.* 

Delusions  of  persecution,  and  the  beliefs  in  conspiracies  to 
defraud  of  property,  are  the  commonest  forms  of  communicated 
insanity.  Patients  seldom  mimic  an  attack  of  mania,  melan- 
cholia, or  dementia.  Occasionally  among  the  hysterical  there 
is  mimicry  of  the  paralytic  affections  of  their  neighbours.  One 
patient  at  present  in  Bethlem  has  copied  the  incoherence  of  a 
maniacal  patient,  but  his  efforts  have  the  appearance  of  being 
voluntary,  and  the  seriality  of  thought  is  too  evident  to  resemble 
the  rapidity  of  utterance,  and  the  inconsequent  ramblings,  of 
the  acute  maniac. 

Of  direct  stress  and  the  various  physical  causes  of  insanity 
we  shall  speak  in  the  next  chapter.  It  only  remains  for  us  now 
to  sum  up  our  conclusions  with  regard  to  the  influence  of  our 
social  environment. 

Sooner  or  later  the  question  must  arise  within  the  mind  of 
each  of  us  whether,  as  physicians,  it  is  our  duty  to  study  man 
as  man,  devoting  ourselves  to  the  contemplation  of  the  mental 
*  "Tuke's  Dictionary  of  Psychological  Medicine,"'  p.  241. 


RELIGION.  493 

faculties  possessed  by  him  in  a  greater  degree  than  any  other 
animal,  and  to  apply  these  laws  as  principles  for  the  synthetical 
explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  the  understanding,  and 
tliereb)^  support  the  philosophy  which  Hippocrates  contem- 
plated, and  Avhich  led  him  to  give  the  character  of  "  Divine  "  to 
the  medical  art ;  or  whether  we  are  to  brand  ourselves  with  the 
reproach  of  advocating  an  irrational  materialism.  When  we 
reflect  that,  in  the  old-world  days,  the  relations  of  mind  and 
body  were  recognised  and  discussed  in  their  various  bearings, 
and  that  the  fundamental  problems  of  Hippocrates  are  still 
unsolved,  we  marvel  that,  even  at  this  day  of  methodically  regu- 
lated experimental  investigation,  we  are  no  nearer  the  solution 
of  the  all-important  problem  of  the  ultimate  relation  of  the 
mind  and  body. 

In  the  history  of  philosophy,  we  see  in  clear  detail  that  all 
our  modes  of  thought,  so  far  as  they  rest  on  specific  funda- 
mental differences,  have  been  anticipated  in  the  S3^stems  of  the 
Greek  philosophers.  No  matter  how  the  various  problems  may 
clothe  themselves  to  us,  the  human  mind  has  always  been  con- 
fronted with  the  same  metaphysical  im^Msse,  When  we  review 
the  philosophy  of  to-da^-,  we  see  its  exact  representation  in 
antiquity.  Plato's  "  Freedom  of  Rational  Ideality,"  Aristotle's 
"  Legalitjr  of  Intelligible  Realism,"  Zeno's  •'  Intellectual  View 
of  the  World,"  and  the  materialistic  views  of  the  Epicureans, 
fully  represent  the  possible  directions  of  our  own  present 
thoughts. 

The  philosophy  of  the  infinite,  far  from  becoming  a  source 
of  aberration  of  thought,  is  the  ultimate  point  of  our  mental 
evolution.  Beliefs  which  are  narrow  and  deal  with  traditions 
in  the  concrete  are  but  symbols  of  dissolution.  A  true  and 
philosophical  religion  raises  the  mind  above  a  mere  incidental 
emotionalism,  and  gives  stability.  With  no  religion,  and  no 
moral  obligation,  the  organism  becomes  a  prey  to  all  the  lusts 
of  the  flesh  with  their  consequences.  Gasquet*  observes,  that 
religion  may  either  produce  or  tend  to  hinder  unsoundness  of 
mind ;  that  it  may  cause  certain  symptoms  of  insanity,  or 
modify  them  ;  and  lastly,  that  it  msij  be  employed  as  a  means 
of  moral  prevention  and  treatment.  He  believes,  that  every 
*  "Tuke's  Dictionary,"  p.  1088. 


494  THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

religion,  however  widely  it  may  differ  from  our  standard  of  tlie 
truth,  if  it  enforces  the  precepts  of  morality,  is  a  source  of 
strength  to  the  sound  mind  that  sincerely  accepts  it. 

"  An  agent  which  can  effect  so  much  good  must,  however,  be  equally 
potent  for  harm.  The  mind  on  which  religion  acts  may  be  abnormal ; 
in  -which  case  it  is  not  wonderful,  as  an  old  author  puts  it,  '  that  the 
light  should  be  painful  to  the  sick  eyes,  M^hich  to  healthy  ones  is  de- 
lightful.' Or  the  fault  may  lie  in  the  application  of  religion,  like  a  drug 
which  can  save  a  life,  but  is  equally  able  to  destroy  it,  if  given  inoppor- 
tunely or  excessively.  The  sense  of  responsibility  to  omniscient  justice 
may  pass  into  a  belief  in  condemnation  irrevocable  and  inevitable  ;  the 
habit  of  communing  with  God  may  easily  grow  into  self-contemplation 
and  ecstasy  ;  the  repression  of  the  lower  part  of  human  nature  may  be 
strained  into  practices  ruinous  to  health  of  mind  and  body.  The  common 
factor  in  all  these  exaggerations  is  fanaticism^  which  looks  only  at  one 
side  of  religion,  and  commits  the  fallacy  of  supposing  that  the  depend- 
ence of  man  upon  a  higher  being  must  supersede  all  those  other  duties 
which,  on  the  contrary,  derive  therefrom  their  greatest  sanction.  As 
one  of  the  natural  growths  of  an  ill-balanced  mind,  fanaticism  is  closely 
akin  to  the  other  manifestations  of  the  insane  temperament ;  and  this 
accounts  for  the  fanatical  habit  of  mind  that  is  so  often  associated  with 
the  hereditary  neuroses,  above  all  with  epilepsy.  Overstrained  and 
one-sided  religious  views  are,  however,  not  so  often  the  primary  cause 
of  an  attack  of  insanity,  as  its  first  symptoms,  though  symptoms  which 
in  turn  act  as  causes  of  further  evil  and  intensify  the  disease.  For 
Instance,  an  endeavour  to  study  the  mystery  of  existence  and  solve 
the  problem  of  evil  has  been  rightly  denounced  as  highly  dangerous  to 
mental  health  ;  yet  it  is  recognised  as  an  early  symptom  ('  Griibelsucht') 
of  an  otherwise  deranged  mind.  Or,  again,  a  case  of  melancholia  in 
which  religious  delusions  seem  at  first  sight  to  have  been  the  cause  of 
all  the  troubles,  will  be  found,  if  traced  from  the  beginning,  to  have 
originated  in  disordered  bodily  health." 

The  same  author  believes,  that  a  delusion  which  is  to  account 
for  the  morbid  feelings  of  a  lunatic  must  be  constructed  out  of  the 
previous  beliefs,  and  that  many  religious  delusions  must,  there- 
fore, be  confined  to  the  members  of  particular  religious  bodies. 
The  form  of  mental  disorder  generally  determines  the  colouring 
of  the  religious  delusion :  thus  maniacal  patients  have  exalted 
delusions;  melancholiacs  depressed  ones;  general  paralytics  those 
of  an  inconsistent  and  wild  character;  while  chronic  delusional 
cases  have  more  or  less  definitely  fixed  ideas  that  they  are 
special  messengers  of  God,  or  even  the  Almighty  Himself. 
'Gasquet  mentions  the  mixture  of  erotic  and  religious  excite- 


PHYSICAL  ENVIRONMENT.  495 

ment  in  manj^  epileptics,  the  simple  belief  in  perdition  common 
in  amenoi-rlioeal  melancholia,  and  the  manner  in  which  insane 
masturbators  will  assert  that  they  are  heroes  and  martyrs  under 
some  special  dispensation  of  Providence. 

Dr.  Hack  Tuke  classifies  religious  delusions  according  as 
they  (1)  accompany  the  mental  development  of  over-stimu- 
lated and  injudiciously  educated  children  (fear,  remorse,  etc.) ; 
(2)  characterise  the  insanity  of  pubescence  (fear,  depression, 
and  wish  to  do  penance)  ;  (3)  are  caused  by  self-abuse  (self 
conscious,  unpardonable  sinners,  weak  minded,  auditory  hallu- 
cinations, visions,  trances,  ecstasies,  suicide)  ;  (4)  are  associated 
with  (so-called)  paronoia  (delusions  of  superior  spirituality, 
fanaticism) ;  (5)  are  associated  with  epilepsy,  dementia,  and 
general  paralysis  (rarely  fear,  usually  un^^'orthiness,  or  exalted 
ideas)  ;  (6)  are  observed  in  melancholia  and  climacteric  insanity 
(unworthiness,  fear  of  endless  life,  etc.) ;  (7)  arise  in  chronic 
mania  or  toxic  insanity  (usually  exalted). 

Physical  Environment. — The  Seasons  .-  Climate. — Par- 
chappe  and  Escjuirol  have  estimated  that  admissions  into 
asylums  are  more  numerous  during  the  summer  months. 
Guislain  believes,  that  there  is  some  relation  between  the 
warmth  of  the  atmosphere  and  mental  disturbance.  Aubanel 
and  Thore  also  formed  the  same  conclusions.  Guislain  has 
pointed  out,  however,  that  we  do  not  find  more  insanity  in  hot 
climates  than  in  cold.* 

Moon. — The  influence  of  the  moon  is  doubtful.  Most 
modern  observers  believe,  that  mere  increase  of  light  is  suffi- 
cient to  cause  the  excitement  in  some  patients. 

Occupation  :  Town  and  Country  Life. — Sibbald  believes,  that 
of  insane  patients  a  more  considerable  proportion  may  be 
assigned  to  previous  urban  surroundings  than  has  generally 
been  supj)osed,  that  cases  of  general  paralysis  and  other  rapidly 
fatal  diseases  of  the  nervous  system  are  more  common  under 
the  conditions  of  town  life,  and  that  attacks  of  insanit}^,  swift 
in  their  onset  and  swift  in  their  retreat,  are  also  more  common. 
The  general  opinion  now  is,  that  civilisation,  abounding  with 
artificial  conditions  and  influences,  is  the  most  general  cause  of 
stress  and  strain,  and,  as  a  consequence,  mental  disorder,  irre- 
*  Bucknill  and  Tuke,  "Psychological  Medicine,"  p.  78. 


496  THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

spective  of  any  special  occupation  or  localit}^.  When  we 
discussed  the  special  senses,  we  took  account  of  the  forms  of 
illusion  as  determined  b}^  the  environment  and  by  the 
organism,  and  we  saAv  how  unusual  relations  between  the 
physical  environment  and  the  organism  afforded  data  for 
misinterpretation  by  the  mind. 

In  conclusion,  the  student  will  do  well  to  bear  in  mind,  that 
next  in  order  to  the  process  of  determining  the  nature  and 
significance  of  phenomena  is  that  of  discovering  their  causes. 
We  cannot  afford  to  dispense  with  philosophy,  for  it  is  by 
that,  in  our  efforts,  the  laity  are  most  apt  to  measure  us. 
Instead  of  bewailing  our  ignorance  of  natural  causes  as  the 
most  fruitful  source  of  superstition  and  disease,  it  is  our  duty 
to  exert  the  prerogatives  of  philosophy,  and  to  endeavour 
to  free  ourselves  from  the  traditions  and  shadowy  appre- 
hensions of  others.  It  is  eminently  true  of  the  medico-psycho- 
logist, that  the  fears  and  hesitancy  with  which  he  approaches 
the  treatment  of  mental  disease  are  in  exact  proportion  to  his 
ignorance  of  its  causes.  If  he  is  only  a  physiologist,  or  only  a 
psychologist,  he  does  not  possess  that  privileged  understanding 
of  cause  which  alone  can  give  him  confidence.  He  must  be 
both.  He  must  combine  a  philosophy  with  a  handicraft.  In 
his  efforts  to  combine  the  two,  however,  he  must  beware  how^ 
he  proceeds.  Nearly  fifty  years  ago  Simon  said,  "  It  would  be 
difficult,  in  polite  language,  to  find  phrases  sufficiently  strong 
for  stigmatising,  according  to  its  deserts,  the  state  of  medical 

aetiology In    the    absence    of   exact    physiology    how, 

indeed,  could  it  exist,  save  as  nurses'  gossip  and  sick  men's 
fancies,  and  the  crude  conipilations  of  a  blundering  empiricism?" 

vSince  this  statement  was  made  great  advance  has  taken  place 
in  many  departments  of  our  science.  We  still,  however,  are 
asked  to  accept  many  vague  generalities  of  expression.  At  every 
turn  we  are  asked  to  rest  satisfied  with  post  hoc,  ergo  iwoioter 
hoc,  as  our  inductive  formula.  Some  of  our  most  advanced 
schools  of  thought  try  to  teach  us  to  say,  "  I  don't  know  I  am 
sure "  instead  of  "  I  am  sure  I  don't  know."  Lord  Bacon 
reprobates  the  "  over-earl}'-  and  peremptory  reduction  of  know- 
ledge "  into  systems  as  a  "  mere  covering  and  palliating  of 
ignorance,  that  men  have  used  of  a  few  observations  on  any 


CONCLUSIONS.  497 

subject  to  make  a  solemn  and  formal  art,  by  filling  it  up  with 
discourse  and  accommodating  it  with  some  circumstances  and 
directions  to  practise";  and  he  further  notes,  that  "  as  young 
men  when  they  knit  and  shape  perfectly,  do  seldom  grow  to  a 
further  stature,  so  knowledge,  while  it  is  in  aphorisms  and  in 
observations,  it  is  in  growth;  but  when  it  once  is  comprehended 
in  exact  methods,  it  may  perchance  be  fui-ther  polished  and 
illustrated  and  accommodated  for  use  and  practice ;  but  it 
increaseth  no  more  in  bulk  and  substance."  * 

When  we  review  the  absurd  superstitions  that  have  been 
connected  with  the  so-called  congenital  malformations,  and 
observe  the  process  by  which  we  have  been  led  to  the  solution 
of  the  mystery  in  simple  and  intelligible  laws,  the  furnishing 
of  such  a  physiological  standard  for  interpreting  the  apparent 
anomalies  of  birth,  encourages  us  to  persevere  in  trying  to  find 
the  true  teleological  interpretation  of  whatever  in  nature  may 
seem  at  first  to  be  causeless  and  capricious.  In  the  problems 
of  pathology  there  are  always  two  methods  of  investigation.! 
Firstly,  morbid  phenomena  must  be  generalised  in  the  direction 
of  the  vital  forces  concerned  in  their  production ;  secondly, 
morbid  influences  or  causes  must  be  contemplated,  not  in  the 
multiformity  of  the  outward  world  whence  they  originate,  but 
in  their  relation  to  the  living  agent,  whose  excitability  is  the 
condition  of  their  causativeness ;  the  living  agent  whose  powers 
and  functions  they  excite  or  depress,  or  whose  organic  material 
they  modify. 

*  "Advancement  of  Learning,"  31,  and  "  Interpretation  of  Nature,"'  IS. 
t  Simon,   "Aims   and  Philosophic  Method  of  Pathological  Kesearch," 
London,  184". 


32 


498 


CHAPTEE   XY. 


The  Factors  of  the  Insanities  {Continued). 

Physiological  Periods  of  Life — Infancy — Causes  of  Idiocy  and  Imbecility 
— Types  of  Infantile  Mental  Defect — Night-Terrors — Dreams- 
Nightmares — Somnambulism — Infantile  Insanity — Causes — Heat 
— Fevers — Masturbation — Puberty — Adolescence — Puerperium — 
Menopause — Senescence— Bodily  Affections  as  Factors— Genital 
— Urinary — Digestive — Circulatory — Eespiratory — Other  Diseases 
— Neuroses  —  Spinal  —  Sympathetic  —  Cerebral  —  Intoxicants  — 
Immediate  Factors  —  Vaso-Motor  —  Vascular  —  Nutritional  — 
Hughlings-Jackson's  Scheme  of  Factors  —  Conclusions. 


THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

In  order  to  make  our  account  of  tlie  setiology  of  insanity  fairly 
complete  it  is  essential  that  we  should  devote  our  attention  to 
the  consideration  of  those  affections  of  the  body  which  either 
determine  or  are  associated  with  morbid  mental  states.  "We 
cannot  undertake  to  discuss  in  detail  all  these  numerous 
relationships.  It  must  suffice  that  we  discuss  the  various 
questions  from  a  general  point  of  view,  and  note  more  particu- 
larly those  bodily  and  mental  perversions  which  are  most 
commonly  met  with  as  associated  conditions. 

The  physiological  periods  of  life  which  are  most 
fraught  with  danger  to  an  individual  are  those  of  birth, 
infancy,  puberty,  pregnancy,  the  menopause,  and  senility. 
We  now  propose  to  study  these  periods  somewhat  in  detail. 


FACTORS  DURING  INFANCY.  499 

Infanci/. — The  various  forms  of  idiocy  and  imbecility  may 
arise  from  causes  acting  before  birth,  at  birth,  or  subsequently. 
Of  the  causes  acting  before  birth  we  have  to  note — in  addition 
to  those  dependent  on  a  neurotic  inheritance  of  insanity, 
epilepsy,  syphilis,  alcoholism,  tuberculosis,  etc., — the  liability  of 
the  mother  to  suffer  from  abnormal  mental  or  physical  condi- 
tions during  gestation.  The  causes  acting  at  birth  may  be, 
premature  birth,  difficult  labour,  instrumental  delivery,  accident, 
asphyxia  neonatorum,  or  primogeniture.  Those  acting  subse- 
quently to  birth  may  be,  infantile  convulsions,  epilepsy,  cerebral 
affections,  febrile  disturbances,  paralytic  affections,  sunstroke, 
nervous  shock,  or  phj'sical  injury  to  the  head.* 

Among  the  more  important  factors  which  determine  mental 
defects  or  aberrations  in  the  infant,  we  have  to  note  the  follow- 
ing structural  abnormalities  of  the  brain  and  spinal  cord : — 
(1)  Alienee plial'us,'\  in  which  the  vault  of  the  cranium  is  absent, 
the  base  of  the  cranium  being  occupied  by  a  mass  of  connective 
tissue  and  blood-vessels,  formed  from  ingrowths  of  the  pia 
mater;  (2)  Ahsence  of  the  prosenceplialon,X  in  which  there  is 
found  a  rudimentary  thalamcephalon,  the  cerebellum,  pons,  and 
medulla  being  reduced  in  size  owing  to  the  absence  of  develop- 
ment of  the  prosencephalic  fibres ;  (3)  Cyclops,  §  in  which  there 
is  an  undivided  anterior  cerebral  vesicle  occupied  by  only  one 
ventricle,  and  in  some  cases  the  presence  of  only  a  single  optic 
nerve  and  a  single  eye.  One  case  has  been  described,  in  which 
there  was  merely  a  superficial  furrow  between  the  frontal  lobes. 
A  tri-lobular  brain,  and  a  double  brain  of  four  hemispheres, 
have  been  recorded. 

The  other  abnormalities  of  the  brain  and  spinal  cord  have 
been  grouped  as  follows  I : — 

*  Shuttleworth  and  Fletcher  Beach,  "  Tuke's  Dictionary,"  p.  659. 

t  "  Encyclopfedia  of  Diseases  of  Children,"  vol.  iv.  part  II.  p.  728. 

%  Starr,  "  Journ.  Nerv.  and  Ment.  Diseases,"  July,  1886  ;  Dana,  ibid., 
January,  1888. 

§  Vide  "  Edin.  Med.  Journ.,"  vol.  xxxii.  No.  3  ;  Hadlich,  "  Arch.  f.  Psych.," 
1880,  Bd.  X.  p.  97  ;  Wille,  iUd.,  1880,  Bd.  x.  p.  97  ;  Heydenreich,  "  Virchow's 
Archiv.,"  iv.  1885,  Bd.  c.  p.  24  ;  "  Internat.  Monatschr.  f.  Anat.  u.  Phys.," 
1888,  p.  11  ;  also  "  Virchow's  Archiv.,"  Bd.  cvi.  p.  390. 

II  McNutt  and  Post,  "  Encyclopaedia  of  Diseases  of  Children,"  vol.  iv. 
p.  730. 


500  THE  FACTOES  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

1.  Ahnormalities    accom]_xbnied    by     defects  in   the    envelopes    of 

the  part : — 

j  Encephalocele. 

(a)  Cranioschisis .     .  <  Hydreyicephalocele. 

I  Meningocele. 

i  Myelocele. 

(Ij)  Rachischisis  .     .  (  Meningocele  spinalis. 

I  Spina  bifidxi  occulta. 

2.  Abnormalities  in  ivhich  the  envelopes  are  entire  : — 

/  Hydrocephalus. 
Microcephalus . 
Porencephalus . 
■{    Aberrant  arrangement  of  fissures  and 
convolutions. 
Agenesis  of  cortical  elements,  commis- 
sures, and  associative  tracts. 

The  consideration  of  these  structural  abnormalities  is  of 
great  interest,  and  at  the  hands  of  Spitzka,*  Mills,!  ^^'^^  Sachs,  :|: 
the  arrangement  of  convolutions  and  the  degree  of  develop- 
ment of  the  nerve-elements,  in  connection  w^ith  the  brains  of 
imbeciles  and  criminals,  have  received  a  certain  amount  of 
attention.  We  lack  space,  however,  to  give  a  more  complete 
review  of  the  subject. 

Of  the  various  types  of  congenital  and  acquired  imbecility 
which  may  be  diagnosed  during  infancy,  we  have  to  note  the 
following  §  : — 

1.  Congenital,  in  which  the  individual  is  usually  of  a 
low  type,  with  a  tendency  to  physical  weakness,  strabismus 
or  nystagmus,  a  highly-arched  or  elongated  palate;  also, 
automatic  movements,  contractures,  or  spastic  rigidity.  Such 
patients  not  infrequently  slaver,  and  appear  to  be  incapable 
of  caring  for  themselves.  Their  special  senses  may  be  defect- 
ive or  only  partially  developed,  and  there  may  be  little  or  no 
power  of  attention  or  volition. 

*  "  American  Journ.  of  Neur.  and  Psych.,"  1882,  p.  386. 

t  "  Journ.  Nerv.  and  Ment.  Dis.,"  Sept.  and  Oct.  1886. 

:J:  Ibid.,  Sept.  and  Oct.  1887. 

§  Fide  Shuttleworth,  "  Brit.  Med.  Journ.,"  Jan.  30,  1886. 


CONGENITAL  AND  ACQUIRED  FACTORS.  501 

The  types  of  congenital  imbecility  have  been  classified  as 
follows  : — (a)  8im2ole  cowjenital,  which  include  those  forms 
without  any  obvious  physical  deformity  of  the  head  or  limbs. 
The  Mongol  or  Kalmuc  idiot  belongs  to  this  class.  A  typical 
Mongol  idiot,  however,  is  usually  of  stunted  growth  and  brachy- 
cephalic.  His  fingers  and  hands  are  short  and  dwarfed. 
Defective  circulation,  and  inability  to  resist  acute  diseases, 
usually  incapacitate  them  from  attaining  to  adult  age.  (li) 
Microcephalic,  in  which  the  brain  has  ceased  to  grow,  due 
either  to  some  internal  cause  or  to  the  premature  closure  of 
the  sutures  of  the  skull.  As  a  general  rule,  heads  below 
17  inches  in  circumference  are  held  to  be  too  small  for  ordinary 
intelligence.  Vogt  believes,  that  microcephaly  is  an  instance 
of  atavism  due  to  the  inheritance  from  some  very  remote 
ancestral  ape.  (c)  Hydroceplialic,  in  which  the  fontanelle  is 
raised :  the  head  is  globular,  with  the  widest  circumference  at 
the  temples,  and  occasionally  a  slight  bulging  above  the  super- 
ciliary ridges.  (cZ)  Scaphocephalic,  in  which  the  head  is  keel- 
shaped,  (e)  Paralytic,  in  which  there  is  arrest  of  development 
of  part  of  the  brain,  due  to  injury,  disease,  or  apoplexy.  In 
such  cases  the  mental  powers  can  sometimes  be  cultivated  to  a 
certain  extent,  but  the  physical  development  is  locally  arrested. 
Usually  one  hemisphere  only  is  affected,  (f)  Cretinism, 
which  may  be  sporadic  or  endemic. 

2.  The  types  of  acquired  imbecility  are  as  follows : — 
(a)  EclamjJsic,  in  which  there  is  arrest  of  development  of  the 
mental  functions,  due  to  the  occurrence  of  convulsions  soon  after 
birth,  and  which  have  damaged  the  structure  of  the  brain. 
(h)  Mpileptic,  in  which,  as  the  result  of  frequent  fits,  the  intellect 
becomes  dull,  and  the  individual  becomes  incapable  of  advancing 
intellectually,  (c)  Paralytic,  in  which  the  paralysis  is  acquired 
at  some  period  after  birth.  Some  of  the  cases  are  due  to  the 
occurrence  of  fits,  or  to  cerebral  apoplexy,  (cl)  hiflammatory  is 
usually  a  sequel  to  some  acute  illness,  such  as  measles,  typhoid 
fever,  whooping-cough,  sunstroke,  etc.  The  amount  of  impair- 
ment of  the  mental  faculties  depends  in  great  part  upon  the 
amount  of  damage  to  the  brain-tissues,  (e)  Hypertrophic,  which 
may  or  may  not  be  associated  with  rickets.  Usually,  the  brain 
is  not  so  large  as  in  hydrocephalus.     The  head  is  somewhat 


502  THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

square,  and  bulges  above  the  superciliary  ridges.  Hypertrophy 
is  said  to  differ  from  hydrocephalus  in  the  fact,  that  in  the 
former  there  is  no  elasticity  over  the  late-closed  fontanelle  as 
in  the  latter.  In  hydrocephalus  the  distance  between  the  eyes 
is  increased  ;  in  hypertrophy  this  is  not  the  case.*  (/)  Trau- 
matic, due  to  a  fall  or  blow  on  the  head.  Sometimes  the  injury 
has  caused  the  occurrence  of  fits,  which  serve  to  prevent  mental 
improvement.  (^)  Endemic  cretinism,  in  which  there  are  none 
of  the  fatty  tumours  in  the  posterior  triangles  of  the  neck  like 
those  found  in  the  sporadic  cretins.  Usually,  cretins  are 
classified  according  to  their  degree  of  development.  The  lowest 
types  are  termed  "  cretins " ;  those  with  a  certain  amount  of 
intelligence  "  semi-cretins "  ;  while  those  who  have  a  fair 
amount  of  mental  power  are  termed  "  cretineux." 

Insanity  is  comparatively  rare  in  early  infancy.  It  occurs 
in  children  who  have  a  strong  neurotic  inheritance,  and  mani- 
fests itself  by  terrors,  nightmares,  nocturnal  delirium,  and 
visual  hallucinations.!  Some  children  have  morbid  and  often 
dangerous  impulses.  Attacks  of  melancholia  or  mania  are  rare, 
although  some  writers  mention  cases  they  have  had  to  deal 
with.  The  dreams,  somnambulistic  attacks,  and  night-terrors 
of  childhood  are  explained  as  the  result  of  loss  of  the  higher, 
and  exaltation  of  some  of  the  lower,  cerebral  functions.  When 
the  higher  functions  (those  concerned  with  consciousness)  are 
suspended,  their  inhibitory  influence  is  lost ;  and  the  lower 
functions,  no  longer  under  control,  run  wild  in  various  ways. 
According  to  Hughlings-Jackson,  when  these  higher  functions 
are  suspended,  two  sets  of  symptoms  are  observed — first,  the 
deficiencies  directly  owing  to  the  suspension  of  the  higher 
f auctions ;  second,  those  which  arise  from  the  tmnatural  pro- 
minence of  the  lower  functions,  which  manifest  themselves  in 
response  to  various  excitations. 

Night-terrors  may  occur  every  night,  every  few  nights,  or  at 
irregular  intervals.  Sometimes  a  child  has  sevefal  attacks 
during  the  same  night.  Usually  they  occur  an  hour  or  two 
after  going  to   sleep.     Between  the  periods  of  the  first  and 

*  Fletcher  Beach,  "  Hypertrophy  of  the  Brain  in  Imbeciles  " — "  Journ. 
Ment.  Science,"  April,  1881. 

t  Regis,  "Mental  Medicine,"  p.  331, 


NIGHT  TERRORS.  503 

second  dentition,  children  are  particularly  liable  to  night-terrors, 
which  may  continue  even  to  the  age  of  puberty.  Each  attack 
is  characterised  by  excessive  fear,  screaming,  and  usually  some 
terrifying  hallucination.  Night-terrors  are  more  commonly 
observed  in  children  of  a  neurotic,  scrofulous,  or  angemic  type. 
The  immediate  exciting  causes  may  be  indigestion,  worms, 
teething,  enlarged  tonsils,  ear  disease,  catarrh  of  the  respiratory 
passages,  irritation  of  the  skin,  ill-ventilated  bedrooms,  fevers, 
or  to  various  conditions  of  mental  excitement  during  the  day. 
Steiner*  mentions  scrofulous  ophthalmia  and  other  ailments  as 
being  sufficient  to  cause  night-terrol's.  Putnam  f  believes  there 
is  no  question  that,  in  some  cases,  every  attempt  to  find  an 
immediate  excitant  of  the  attack  has  been  fruitless,  and  he 
advances  the  hypothesis  that,  as  with  epilepsy,  there  may  be 
cyclic  explosions  in  the  form  of  night-terrors  for  which  the 
brain  is  preparing  all  the  time  between  the  attacks,  so  that  the 
attacks  take  place  not  as  the  resvilt  of  any  disturbance  of  other 
organs,  nor  even  under  the  stimulus  of  distorted  recollections, 
but  purely  or  mainly  as  the  result  of  a  certain  degree  of  tension 
acquired  by  the  brain  in  this  interval.  | 

Soltmann§  believes,  that  if  the  attacks  occur  spontaneously, 
without  any  outside  influence,  and  if  visual  hallucinations  are 
always  present,  there  must  be  some  abnormal  activity  of  the 
central  sensation  areas  (pulvinar  of  the  optic  thalamus,  corpora 
geniculata,  quadrigemina,  and  cortex  of  the  occipital  lobe) — i.e., 
it  is  a  hyperaesthesia  of  the  optic  tract,  or  a  cerebral  neurosis. 
Silbermann||  and  Baginsky^  believe,  that  the  attack  may  be 
either  idiojyathic,  in  the  form  of  a  transitory  hallucination  of 
sight,  due  to  increased  irritation  of  the  brain-cortex,  or  sym- 
ptomatic, as  a  reflex  neurosis  of  the  pulmonary  vagus  resulting 
in  dj^spnoea,  and  thereby  in  a  sensation  of  subjective  terror. 

It  is  not  common  for  night-terrors  to  be  associated  with  organic 
brain  disease  or  with  epilepsy.    Occasionally,  however,  children 

*  "  Jahrbuch  fiir  Kinderheilkunde,"  1875. 

t  "  Keating's  Encyclopaedia  of  Diseases  of  Children,"  vol.  iv.  p.  1013. 
."t:  Alcohol,  belladonna,  stramonium,  qiiinine,  and  several  other  drugs  are 
said  to  produce  night-terrors  in  children. 

g  "  Handbuch  der  Kinderkrankheiten,"  1880. 
|i  "Jahrbuch  fiir  Kinderheilkunde,"  1883. 
IT  "Lehrbuch  der  Kinderkrankheiten,"  1887. 


504  THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

affected  with  night-terrors  become  epileptic.  Moizard*  quotes 
the  case  of  a  child  who  suffered  from  night-terrors,  then  hallu- 
cinations, somnambulism,  and  finally  epilepsy.  Henoch  f  men- 
tions a  case  in  which  night-terrors  took  the  place  of  epilepsy. 
The  apparent  relationship  between  the  two  conditions  prompted 
Money  J  to  regard  night-terrors  as  a  species  of  reflex  cortical 
epilepsy. 

Dreams,  nightmare,  and  somnambulism  occur  in  children, 
due  to  causes  similar  to  those  of  night-terrors.  In  nightmare 
there  is  generally  some  distressing  hallucination  with  the  feel- 
ing of  inability  to  move.  In  somnambulism  the  child  actually 
walks  about  during  his  sleep.  Sometimes  adults  perform 
various  complex  intellectual  acts  during  a  somnambulistic 
attack ;  children  seldom  or  never.  The  memory  of  what  has 
happened  during  the  somnambulistic  attack  may  be  imperfect 
or  entirely  absent.  Insomnia  in  infants  and  children  may  be 
due  to  digestive  disturbances,  cold,  heat,  or  to  want  of  ventila- 
tion. Over-fatigue  or  nervous  excitement  diiring  the  daytime 
also  tend  to  produce  it,  and,  as  a  consequence,  there  is  imperfect 
brain-rest  with  its  disastrous  sequelae. 

Hagen§   estimated  that    one  in   70,684    children    annually 

become   insane,    excluding   those  born   so.     The  immunity  is 

doubtless  due  to  the  fact  that  infants  are   little  subjected  to 

the  vicissitudes,    intoxicants,    and   wear    and  tear    of  a   more 

_  advanced  age. 

Among  the  more  important  factors  which  determine  an 
attack  of  insanity  in  a  child,  we  may  mention  sudden  changes 
in  temperature,  or  over-exposure  to  the  sun.  ||  Affections  due 
either  directly  to  heat  of-  the  sun  (cou^^  de  soleil) ,  or  indirectly 
to  heat  and  other  influences  {coivp  de  chaleur) ,  are  attended  with 
prostration  of  the  nervous  powers,  syncope,  debility,  vertigo, 
nausea,  and  incontinence  of  urine ;  or  there  is  venalisation  of 

*  "  Revue  Mensuelle  des  Maladies  de  I'Enfance,"  1884. 

t  "  Vorlesungen  liber  Kinderkrankheiten,"  1889. 

J  "Treatment  of  Diseases  of  Children,"  1887. 

§  Moeller  (Heppenheim),  "Beitrag  zur  Lehre  von  dem  im  Kindesalter 
entstehenden  Irrsein,  Statistische  Untersuchungen  Uber  Greisteskrankheiten, 
Erlangen,"  1876. 

II  Steiner,  "  Compendium  der  Kinderkrankheiten  " ;  also  Hyslop,  "  Joiirn. 
Ment.  Science,"  Oct.  1890. 


INFANTILE  INSANITY.  505 

the  blood,  with  absence  of  perspiration,  suppression  of  urine, 
and  constipation.  The  most  abiding  results  of  heat-stroke  are 
all  referable  to  impaired  functional  energy  of  the  cerebro-spinal 
system,  and  this  impairment  shows  itself  either  in  motor  para- 
lysis, hyper-  and  dys-testhesia  of  the  nerves  of  common  and 
special  sensation,  in  debility,  and  lastly,  in  undue  excitability 
of  the  cerebral  regions  concerned  with  the  emotions. 

In  children,  as  in  adults,  the  neuroses  following  sunstroke 
are  somewhat  similar  to,  and  have  much  in  common  with,  the 
traumatic  neuroses.  The  chief  clinical  features  noted  in 
children  whose  mental  perversions  have  been  attributed  to 
sunstroke  are : — (1)  The  absence  of  bodily  infirmity ;  (2)  the 
full  development  and  comparatively  normal  dimensions  of  the 
muscular  and  osseous  systems  (including  the  shape  of  the  head, 
jaAvs,  and  teeth,  etc.)  ;  (3)  the  special  aiffections  of  speech,  either 
of  a  temporary  character  immediately  following  the  attack,  or 
as  a  continued  impairment  or  failure  in  development  of  the 
faculty  ;  (4)  the  frequency  of  the  occurrence  of  fits  immediately 
after  the  attacks,  lasting  for  a  short  period,  but  not  continued 
through  life  ;  (5)  the  defective  or  perverted  moral  state,  as  seen 
in  various  grades,  from  mere  disobedience,  to  propensities 
peculiar,  dangerous,  or  even  homicidal ;  and  sometimes, 
though  rarely,  habits  of  a  degraded  nature ;  (6)  the  small 
mental  capacity,  with  failure  to  improve  much  by  the  ordinary 
educational  methods ;  (7)  the  attachments,  antipathies,  and 
peculiarities,  which  were  in  the  most  cases  retained  through 
life :  also  an  absolute  inability  to  compete  with  their  fellow- 
beings,  or  to  aid  their  own  survival. 

Of  other  accidental  causes  which  operate  directly  or  in- 
directly on  the  nerve-centres,  we  may  mention  head-injuries, 
injuries  to  the  peripheral  nerves,  diseases  of  the  throat,  nose,  or 
ears,  digestive  disturbances,  and  the  presence  of  intestinal 
worms.  The  last  named  factor  is  believed  to  produce 
eclampsia,  epilepsy,  chorea,  hemiplegia,  and  paraplegia  in 
children.  The  occurrence  of  an  attack  of  mania  in  connection 
with  the  presence  of  intestinal  worms  is  thought  by  Spitzka  to 
demonstrate,  that  the  mania  is  a  psychical  equivalent  of  a 
reflex  epilepsy. 

Febrile  and  other  acute  disorders  also  determine  the  onset 


506  THE  FAOTOES  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

of  an  attack  of  insanity.  Of  febrile  diseases,  scarlet,  typhoid, 
and  rheumatic  fevers,  and  measles,  are  apt  to  be  attended  by  the 
graver  mental  disturbances.  Spitzka  believes,  that  the  psychi- 
cal results  are  due  to  the  specific  disease-germ  and  its  direct 
noxious  influence  on  the  nerve-centres,  and  only  indirectly  b}^ 
the  profound  nutritive  disturbance.  This  opinion  is  based 
upon  the  following  series  of  facts  : — (1)  Analogous  affections, 
such  as  the  progressive  sopor  following  diphtheria,  are  accom- 
panied by  evidences  of  microparasitic  invasion  of  the  nerve- 
centres  ;  (2)  the  psychical  results  of  post-febrile  insanity  are 
different  from  those  resulting  from  simple  nutritive  disturb- 
ance ;  (3)  the  organic  nervous  diseases  exceptionally  following 
essential  and  exanthematous  fever  are  usually  multilocular, 
and  indicate  the  operation  of  an  irritant  distinct  from  a  mere 
deprivation  of  nutriment. 

Masturbation  is  regarded  by  some  writers  as  an  important 
getiological  factor;  by  others,  however,  it  is  regarded  mainly 
as  a  symptom.  Infantile  masturbators  are  liable  to  become 
melancholic,  stuporose,  and  demented ;  or  they  may  be 
impulsive,  with  maniacal  outbursts,  and  even  delirious. 
According  to  Spitzka,  imperative  conceptions,  morbid  fears, 
and  folie  du  chute  are  frequent  symptoms. 

Fuherty,  from  the  age  of  14  or  15,  proves  itself  to  be  a. 
dangerous  period  of  life  to  certain  individuals,  and  more 
especially  to  those  who  have  inherited  a  tendency  to  neurosis. 
The  mental  characteristics  at  this  period  are  undergoing  a. 
process  of  evolution,  which  is  particularly  fraught  with  the 
danger  of  becoming  excessive  in  special  directions  and  with 
a  proportionate  degree  of  dissolution  in  other  directions.  The 
intellectual  advance  of  the  male  is  apt  to  tend  to  specialisation, 
whilst  the  emotional  life  of  the  female  is  apt  to  develop  at  the 
expense  of  the  intellect  and  the  power  of  control.  Both  at 
puberty  and  adolescence  the  mental  characteristics  are  apt  to 
become  morbidly  intensified.  According  to  Clouston,  of  those 
who  become  insane  during  puberty  or  adolescence  78  per  cent, 
are  maniacal,  while  in  the  remaining  22  per  cent,  the  prevail- 
ing symptoms  are  melancholic,  delusional  (paronoic),  or 
stuporose.  One  prevailing  feature  of  all  the  cases  is  the 
tendency  to   remission  and  periodic  recurrence.     It   is    com- 


PERIODS  OF  LIFE.  507 

paratively  seldom  that  the  maniacal  attacks  approach  delirium. 
In  melancholiacs  it  is  common  to  find  stupor  also.  Hysterical 
attacks  sometimes  occur  in  females,  rarely  in  males.  Sexual 
vice  or  self-abuse  may  be  a  symptom  or  a  cause. 

Menstrual  irregularity  is  frequently  assigned  as  a  cause  of 
the  mental  attack,  but  possibly  the  irregularity  is  sometimes 
merely  a  symptom  or  an  associated  affection.  It  is  readily 
imaginable  that  menstrual  derangements  may  interfere  with 
the  activities  of  the  brain,  and,  conversely,  that  cerebral  derange- 
ments may  affect  the  menstrual  flux.  Bevan  Lewis  has  noted 
the  almost  constant  impoverishment  of  the  blood  in  adolescent 
and  pubescent  insanity. 

The imerperal  period  is  attended  by  such  novel  relationships, 
both  physiological  and  mental,  that  the  tendency  to  morbid 
reaction  becomes  very  powerful,  especially  in  those  with  an 
hereditary  predisposition.  Under  the  term  '''puerperal"  in- 
sanity, we  are  accustomed  to  class  the  mental  affections  occur- 
ring during  the  periods  of  gestation,  parturition,  the  puerperal 
state,  and  lactation.  In  addition  to  the  factors  of  heredity,  we 
have  to  note  the  various  physical  causes,  such  as  debility  con- 
sequent upon  labour,  suppression  of  the  lochia  or  the  milk,  and 
the  exhaustion  from  prolonged  lactation.  Former  attacks  of 
insanity  predispose  to  puerperal  insanity.  Certain  it  is,  that  an 
attack  of  piierperal  insanity  is  likely  to  be  repeated  with  subse- 
quent births.  The  fact,  that  some  women  break  down  mentally 
with  every  child-birth  may,  in  great  part,  be  attributed  to 
development  of  the  element  of  expectancy.  We  have  already 
mentioned  many  of  the  more  or  less  striking  mental  peculiari- 
ties during  the  puerperium,  so  that  it  is  unnecessary  to  revert 
to  them. 

Some  attacks  of  puerperal  insanity  appear  to  be  traceable 
to  blood-poisoning,  which  may  arise  from  external  factors,  such 
as  alcohol,  or  from  internal  factors  associated  with  the  sup- 
pression of  lochia  or  of  milk.  During  the  period  of  lactation, 
there  is  generally  marked  jDhj^sical  exhaustion,  commonly  due 
to  prolonged  suckling.  It  must  not  be  forgotten,  however, 
that  the  uterus  may  be  subinvoluted,  or  there  may  be  meteor- 
rhagia  or  leucorrhoea,  which  may  act  as  exciting  factors. 

The  menopause  proves  itself  to  be  a  critical  epoch  in  the 


bOS  THE  FACTOES  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

mental  life  of  many  women,  and  at  this  period  intellectual  and 
moral  perturbations  ai'e  liable  to  develop.  The  factors  which 
give  rise  to  the  morbid  manifestations  may  be  associated  with 
the  physiological  suppression  of  the  menses,  or  with  other 
causes.  In  brief,  we  may  say,  that  the  predisposing  factors  are 
heredity,  or  previous  attacks  of  insanity ;  the  exciting  factors 
may  arise  in  connection  with  the  physiological  changes  occur- 
ring at  this  period,  or  as  the  result  of  accidental,  physical,  or 
mental  causes.  With  regard  to  the  physiological  suppression 
of  the  menses,  there  may  arise  some  doubt  as  to  whether  the 
physiological  change  determines  the  mental  attack,  or  whether 
the  mental  attack  exaggerates  the  physiological  change.  In 
some  cases,  also,  it  must  be  remembered,  that  the  physiological 
change  and  the  mental  affection  may  be  merely  coincidental, 
and  not  necessarily  causal. 

In  old  age  the  process  of  involution  may  originate  with 
slowly  developing  constitutional  changes,  or  with  atheromatous 
degeneration  of  the  vascular  system,  and  an  increasing  atrophy 
of  all  the  organs.  The  abnormal  mental  manifestations  may 
appear  to  be  entirely  functional,  or  they  may  be  intermediate 
between  functional  and  organic  psychoses.  In  regard  to  the 
functional  psj^choses,  there  is  little  to  differentiate  them  from 
the  psychoses  of  earlier  life.  The  senile  person  is  as  liable  to 
be  affected  with  hypochondriasis,  melancholia,  mania,  or  delu- 
sional insanity,  as  the  youth.  The  psychoses  associated  with 
organic  senile  degeneration  of  the  brain  are  usually  characterised 
by  their  progressive  nature.  The  manifestations  may  be  due 
to  arterial  degeneration,  or  to  disintegration  and  atrophy  of  the 
nerve-structures.  Clinically,  we  have  to  note,  that  an  attack 
of  melancholia,  mania,  convulsions,  epilepsy,  or  dementia,  msij 
be  connected  with  interstitial  or  gross  cerebral  change,  such  as 
occur  in  chronic  cerebral  atrophy  associated  with  sclerosis, 
haemorrhage,  or  softening  from  thrombi. 

Bodily  Diseases  may  give  rise  to,  or  they  may  be  sym- 
ptomatic of,  or  merely  associated  with,  morbid  mental  manifesta- 
tions. The  brief  consideration  of  these  bodily  affections  will 
now  engage  our  attention. 

Affections  of  the  uterus  and  its  appendages  may  be  directly 
associated  with  mental  disorder.    Eegis  believes,  that  on  account 


BODILY  DISEASES.  509 

of  the  direct  connections  that  unite  the  sexual  to  the  cerebral 
life,  there  is  not  a  single  affection  of  the  genito-urinary 
apparatus  that  may  not  in  time  affect  the  brain  and  cause 
mental  disorder.  Certain  it  is.  that  affections  of  the  sexual 
organs  in  the  female  are  very  commonly  associated  with  mental 
disturbances.  "Women  suffering  from  uterine  disease  are  apt 
to  become  depressed,  hysterical,  maniacal,  and  sometimes  even 
dangerously  impulsive  or  suicidal.  In  males,  on  the  other 
hand,  sexual  disturbances  are  not  so  commonly  the  primary 
factors  in  determining  the  mental  disease.  In  this  relationship 
it  must  be  remembered  that  onanism,  seminal  emissions,  and 
disease  of  the  urethra,  may  result  from,  or  be  symptomatic  of, 
mental  affections.  Thus,  for  example,  the  senile  dement  may 
exhibit  a  tendency  to  onanism  or  other  sexual  perversion  as  a^ 
symptom  of  brain  decay.  Some  females  complain  bitterly 
about  imaginary  outrages  supposed  to  have  been  committed 
during  the  night.  These  delusions  ^nay  or  may  not  be 
associated  with  some  existing  morbid  condition  of  the  genital 
organs.  Wigglesworth  found,  that  of  109  women  examined 
2'ost  mortem  42  had  healthy  sexual  organs ;  whereas  67  had 
more  or  less  serious  alterations  :  in  22  of  these  cases  the  disease 
appeared  to  be  merely  associated  with  the  insanity ;  the 
remainder  suffered  from  absence  of  uterus,  conical  cervix  with 
pinhole  os.  retroversion,  retroflexion,  prolapsus,  increased 
volume  of  uterus,  fibroma,  chronic  peritonitis,  uterine  cancer, 
or  diseases  of  the  ovaries  and  tubes.  The  supposed  relative 
preponderance  of  uterine  lesions  in  the  insane  has  given  rise  to 
the  opinion  that  all  females  ought  to  be  examined  in  this 
respect  when  insane.  This,  however,  is  absurd  and  unwarrant' 
able.  ^\e  ought,  nevertheless,  to  be  always  keenly  ali\'e  to  the 
fact,  that  there  does  exist  a  strong  sympathetic  relation,  and 
that  not  infrecpiently  delusions  of  sexual  persecution  are 
associated  with  uterine  lesions. 

Diseases  of  the  urinarij  system  do  not  give  rise  to  any 
characteristic  mental  symptoms.  The  brain  may  be  affected 
by  urtemic  intoxication,  or  vascular  lesions  niay  occur  in 
association  with  kidney  disease,  biit  there  is  no  characteristic 
connection  between  the  evolution  of  the  psychic  symptoms  and 
the  renal  disease.     The  physical  characters  of  the   urine  may 


510  THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

exhibit  departures  from  the  normal  in  cases  of  insanity ;  but 
these  departures  add  little  to  our  knowledge  of  the  factors  of 
causation.*  The  attempt  to  estimate  the  amount  of  phosphorus 
excreted  in  the  urine  has  proved  to  be  a  very  seductive  line  of 
research ;  but  the  relation  of  the  amounts  excreted  and  the 
chemical  changes  occiirring  in  the  brain  are  far  from  being 
satisfactorily  established.f 

Disorders  of  the  Digestive  A'pfaratus. — We  have  already 
referred  to  the  important  role  played  by  the  visceral  organs  in 
the  promotion  of  the  emotions.  A  healthy  process  of  assimila- 
tion is  essential  to  the  feeling  of  well-being  in  every  individual. 
Perversion  of  the  process  is  apt  to  affect  the  organism  as  a 
whole,  and  the  mind  readily  takes  its  colouring  from  the  nature 
of  the  visceral  stimuli.  The  insane  are  particularly  liable  to 
digestive  disturbances ;  and  often  their  delusions  are  not  only 
intimately  associated  with  such  disturbances,  but  one  is  glad 
to  find  them  susceptible  of  amelioration  under  careful  dietetic 
treatment.  Bad  teeth,  defective  mastication,  indigestion,  and 
constipation,  are  not  uncommonly  found  in  connection  with 
delusions  as  to  poison  or  harmful  substances  in  the  food. 

Of  the  more  important  factors  in  connection  with  disordered 
visceral  states,  we  have  to  note  : — (1)  Defective  development  or 
malformation  of  the  teeth  and  jaws,  as  seen  in  idiots  and 
imbeciles.  The  teeth  of  congenital  idiots  are  usually  crowded 
together  and  somietimes  overlapping  one  another,  or  they  are 
deficient  in  enamel  and  prone  to  decay.  The  jaws  are  frequently 
naiTOw  and  the  palate  arched.  (2)  Excessive  salivation,  as 
seen  in  children  who  have  adenoid  growths  in  the  nasopharynx. 
It  also  occurs  in  certain  forms  of  idiocy  and  in  mental  stupor. 
Sometimes  it  is  associated  with  cerebral  or  peripheral  nervous 
aifections,  neurasthenia,  hysteria,  and  epilepsy.  Diminution  in 
the  quantity  of  saliva  occurs  in  some  forms  of  melancholia  and 
in  acute  delirium.  (3)  Some  cases  have  been  recorded  in  which 
the  apparently  insane  belief,  that  there  was  inability  to  swallow, 

*  Blyth  and  Hyslop,  "  Urine  of  the  Insane '' — "  Tuke's  Dictionary,"  p.  1340. 

t  Edes  ("Archives  of  Medicine,"  vol.  x.  No.  1,  1883)  compares  this  pro- 
.cedure  to  that  of  measuring  the  rise  of  water  at  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi 
to  tell  where  there  has  been  a  thunderstorm  in  Minnesota  (James,  "  Prin- 
ciples of  Psychology,"  vol.  i.  p.  102). 


BODILY  DISEASES.  511 

was  found  to  be  associated  with  dilatation  or  an  actual  diverti- 
culum of  the  cesophagvis.  The  globus  hystericus  is  not  infre- 
quently misinterpreted  by  an  insane  person,  and  the  abnormal 
sensations  attributed  to  other  causes.  One  patient  in  Bethlem 
used  to  think  that  she  was  being  strangled,  the  delusion  in  this 
case  probably  arising  in  connection  with  the  effects  of  a  former 
injury  to  the  throat  due  to  a  large  dose  of  hartshorn.  (4) 
Dyspepsia,  gastritis,  ulceration,  the  presence  of  a  foreign  body 
in,  or  cancer  of,  the  stomach,  may  actually  determine  the  local 
pain,  which  is  misinterpreted,  and  the  sensations  attributed  to 
the  presence  of  a  devil,  animal,  or  other  object.  In  taking  all 
these  possible  factors  into  account,  it  must  be  remembered,  that 
although  the  local  disease  may  engage  the  attention  of  the 
patient,  it  does  not  necessarily  determine  the  misinterpretation 
of  the  object  of  attention.  The  false  concept  is  often  due  to 
cerebral  and  mental  factors,  of  which  as  yet  we  know  little  or 
nothing. 

Duodenal  catarrh,  functional  perversions  of  the  liver,  spleen, 
or  pancreas,  peritonitis,  helminthiasis,  and  constipation,  have 
been  noted  as  associated  with  mental  disturbances.  We  are 
not  in  a  position  to  state  that  disease  of  one  region  or  of  one 
organ  always  produces  a  characteristic  mental  reaction.  The 
most  we  can  say  is,  that  in  a  person  already  insane,  a  bodily 
disease  may  determine  the  direction  of  the  attention  and  be  the 
object  of  misinterpretation.  Undoubtedly,  derangement  of  any 
abdominal  organ  may  influence  some  individuals  both  morally 
and  intellectually ;  but  the  mental  perversion  is  probably  due 
to  a  neurotic  and  unstable  brain,  which  is  predisposed  to  be 
affected  sympathetically.  That  is  to  say,  the  mental  perversion 
is  dependent  directly  upon  the  brain,  which  itself  is  sympa- 
thetically affected  by  the  bodily  disorder  and  not  upon  the  local 
bodily  disorder  which,  as  we  know  from  ordinary  medical 
experience,  may  have  little  or  no  effect  upon  the  operations  of 
mind.  Several  male  patients  have  been  admitted  to  Bethlem 
wdth  the  delusion  that  they  were  pregnant.  The  delusion  dis- 
appeared with  a  free  action  of  the  bowels  ;  but  the  mind  did 
not  necessarily  regain  its  balance.  Such  instances  serve  to 
illustrate,  that  bodily  diseases  may  determine  the  diredion  of 
the   thoughts,  and   in   a   manner,   therefore,  the   type  of  the 


512  THE  FACTOES  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

delusion ;  but  the  true  cause  of  the  misinterpretation  may  be 
due  to  factors  cerebral  and  mental,  which  require  a  much  more 
subtle  explanation.  Therefore  it  must  not  be  thought,  that 
bodily  diseases  necessarily  always  determine  the  direction  of  the 
thoughts.  In  fact,  some  organic  visceral  diseases  are  associated 
with  insane  ideas  which  bear  no  physical  relation  to  the-  idea  of 
discomfort  or  pain.  In  some  instances  constipation  may  be 
the  result  of  delusions.  Thus,  some  patients  voluntarily  refuse 
to  evacuate  the  contents  of  their  bowels  owing  to  the  belief,  that 
they  are  commanded  by  God  not  to  do  so ;  others  refuse  because 
they  wish  to  retain  their  excretions  and  in  some  way  or  other 
bring  about  a  fatal  result.  Many  authors  believe  that  constipa- 
tion is  an  invariable  accompaniment  of  melancholia.  Un- 
doubtedly, in  that  disease  there  is  diminution  of  the  secretions 
and  deficiency  in  peristaltic  action  of  the  alimentary  canal. 

Diseases  of  the  heart  and  circulatory  apioajratus  have  long 
been  noted  as  factors  in  the  production  of  morbid  mental  states. 
The  mind  is  so  readily  influenced  by  the  conditions  of  the 
cerebral  circulation  that  we  cannot  but  recognise  how  intimate 
must  be  the  relation  between  the  two  sets  of  processes.  We 
are  not  aware  that  insanity  is  more  often  attended  by  heart 
disease  than  is  sanity  ;  nor  can  we  say,  that  any  particular  form 
of  vascular  affection  occurs  more  frequently  among  the  insane 
than  among  the  sane.  The  mitral  valve  is  more  commonly 
affected  than  the  aortic,  and  cardiac  hypertrophy  is  frequent. 
Atheromatous  conditions  are  frequentl}^  found  in  senescence. 
In  order  that  the  brain  may  discharge  its  functions  satisfac- 
torily it  is  essential,  that  the  arteries,  veins,  and  capillaries  be 
healthy,  that  there  be  no.  obstruction  to  the  circulation  in  the 
cranial  cavit}^,  that  the  movements  of  the  cerebro-spinal  fluid  be 
unimpeded,  and  that  the  blood  itself  be  adequate  in  amount 
and  efficient  in  quality.  In  heart  disease  any  of  the  above 
conditions  may  be  deficient,  and,  as  a  consequence,  there  may 
be  impaired  nutrition,  access  of  poison  to  the  cerebral  cells,  or 
even  total  destruction  of  the  brain-tissue. 

Mickle*   believes,  that    special    forms    of  cardiac   valvular 
lesions  are  attended  by  fairly-well  defined  mental  symptoms. 
Mitral   regurgitation    is    attended    by    some    depression   with 
*  "  Goulstonian  Lectures,"  1888. 


CARDIAC  DISEASE.  513 

delusions  of  suspicion  and  persecution  ;  not  uncommonly  the 
patients  are  morose  and  sullen.  With  mitral  stenosis  the 
patients  are  excitable  and  impulsive,  discontented,  querulous, 
and  frequentl}^  have  delusions  as  to  ill-usage,  or  as  to  their 
food  being  poisoned.  With  aortic  regurgitation  there  would 
appear  to  be  associated  restlessness  and  sleeplessness,  together 
with  misinterpretation  of  internal  sensations,  sometimes  delu- 
sions of  exaltation,  and  at  times  loquacity  and  general  excite- 
ment. Aortic  stenosis  is  sometimes  attended  by  impulsiveness, 
violence,  and  delusions  as  to  persecution  and  poison.  When 
the  aortic  valve  becomes  atheromatous  there  is  a  tendency  to 
rapid  mental  decay.  When  mitral  and  aortic  diseases  are  asso- 
ciated there  may  be  also  a  gross  cerebral  lesion,  with  dementia 
and  degradation  of  the  bodily  functions  generally.  With 
hj^pertrophy  and  dilatation  of  the  heart  there  may  be  depres- 
sion or  delusions  as  to  persecution.  Degeneration  of  the 
cardiac  muscle  is  sometimes  attended  with  irritability,  rest- 
lessness, and  ideas  of  persecution. 

The  relative  frequency  of  the  various  forms  of  cardiac 
disease  occurring  in  association  with  different  mental  mani- 
festations is  a  subject  of  interest,  but  we  are  unable  to  explain 
the  nature  of  the  mental  disturbance  solely  from  the  considera- 
tion of  the  cardiac  disease.  Were  the  cardiac  disease  the  sole 
cause  of  the  mental  disorder,  the  wards  of  general  hospitals 
ought  to  provide  us  with  innumerable  data  upon  which  to  base 
our  conclusions.  Since  no  one  individual  reacts  to  circum- 
stances in  precisely  the  same  way  as  any  other  individual,  it  is 
impossible,  without  full  consideration  of  the  life-history,  habits, 
and  mental  characteristics,  to  do  more  than  conjecture  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  mental  reaction  which  may  occur^  in  association 
with  any  bodily  disease.  From  a  clinical  point  of  view  we 
know  that,  in  an  insane  person,  vague  ideas  of  fear,  sleepless- 
ness, and  subacute  forms  of  excitement,  are  commonl}^  associated 
with  cardiac  disease. 

The  numerous  investigations  upon  the  character  of  the  pulse 
in  insanity  have  only  taught  us,  that  there  may  be  low  or  high 
tension,  and  that  the  variations  bear  some  relationship  to  the 
general  physical  condition  of  the  patient.  The  blood  has  also 
been  subjected  to  much  analytical  examination.     We  may  say 

8H 


ol4  THE  FACTORS   OF  THE   INSANITIES. 

briefly,  that  it  may  or  may  not  be  deficient  in  quantity  or 
quality  according  to  the  physical  condition  of  the  patient  at  the 
time  of  the  examination.  An  excess  of  bile  or  uric  acid  may  be 
associated  with  depression  or  irritability  respectively ;  but  the 
condition  of  the  serum,  fibrin,  and  globules  bears  no  constant 
relationship  to  the  mental  state.  Deterioration  of  the  blood 
may  be  attended  by  any  form  of  mental  disease  ;  or,  conversely, 
mental  disease  may  be  associated  with  any  form  of  blood 
deterioration.  It  is  obvious,  also,  that  poor  blood  is  not  neces- 
sarily associated  with  insanity.  In  general  paralysis  absence 
of  rouleaux,  and  increase  of  the  colourless  blood-corpuscles  at  the 
expense  of  the  red,  have  been  noted,  especially  in  the  later 
stages  ;  but  similar  conditions  are  found  in  other  degenerative 
diseases,  and  do  not  necessarily,  therefore,  bear  any  obviously 
constant  relationship  to  the  mental  symptoms.  Hitherto,  this 
line  of  research  has  not  yielded  much  towards  the  solution  of 
the  main  question — viz.,  the  direct  relation  of  the  blood  to  the 
mind.  The  only  conclusion  at  which  we  can  arrive  is,  that  in 
some  instances  blood-deterioration  and  mental  diseases  are  asso- 
ciated, or  possibly  they  are  mutually  causal  factors ;  but,  at  the 
same  time,  it  must  be  remembered,  that  each  condition  is  rela- 
tively more  frequent  by  itself  than  in  association  with  the  other. 
Phthisis  is  regarded  as  bearing  a  fairly  definite  relationship 
to  morbid  mental  states.  Phthisical  patients  are  liable  to 
become  insane,  and,  conversely,  insane  patients  are  liable  to 
become  phthisical.  Beyond  the  characteristic  hopefulness  of 
phthisis,  however,  there  is  no  definite  or  obvious  clinical 
relationship.  The  irritabilitj^  and  the  tendency  to  find  griev- 
ances upon  the  slightest-  pretext  are  in  no  wise  more  commonly 
associated  with  phthisis  than  with  other  exhaustive  diseases  of 
the  body.  Idiots  and  imbeciles  are  particularly  prone  to 
become  phthisical,  and,  according  to  Ireland,  t^\'o-thirds  of 
them  die  of  it.  Some  authors  believe,  that  there  is  a  distinct 
form  of  jDhthisical  insanitj^  This,  however,  is  by  no  means 
satisfactorily  established.  Undoubtedly,  mental  diseases  which 
are  attended  by  bodily  exhaustion  and  malnutrition  predispose 
to  the  occurrence  of  phthisis.  In  such  cases  the  mental 
symptoms  obviously  appear  before  the  phthisis.  Sometimes 
many  of  the  symptoms  of  phthisis  are  absent  when  insanity  is 


FEBRILE  AFFECTIONS.  515 

present,  or  the  functional  processes  of  the  two  diseases  may 
alternate.  On  the  physical  side  the  symptoms  are  usually 
those  of  phthisis,  and  on  the  psychical  side  those  commonly 
associated  with  exhaustive  diseases.  Other  diseases  of  the 
respirator}^  system  may  cause  such  exhaustion  of  the  bodily 
functions  that  insanity  supervenes,  or  vice  cersd  :  or  the 
symptoms,  bodily  and  mental,  may  alternate. 

Fehrile  Affections.* — The  occurrence  of  insanit}^  as  a  com- 
plication of,  or  as  a  sequel  to,  acute  febrile  disease  has  long- 
been  noted.  The  mental  disorder  may  occur  as  the  earliest 
symptom,  but  more  commonh"  it  appears  during  a  later  stage 
of  the  fever,  especially  during  the  period  of  convalescence.  The 
intensit}^  of  the  fever  bears  no  constant  relation  in  the  produc- 
tion of  insanity.  Nasse  classified  the  mental  affections  origin- 
ating in  fever  according  as  they  are  the  immediate  result  of  the 
fever  itself,  as  they  constitute  a  prolongation  of  the  delirium 
when  the  fever  has  subsided,  or  as  they  arise  during  convales- 
cence. The  specific  infectious  fevers,  intermittent  fevers,  and 
long  agues  are  apt  to  be  followed  by  insanity.  Erysipelas, 
articular  rheumatism,  acute  angina,  diphtheria,  erythema 
nodosum,  miliary  roseola,  purpura,  febrile  urticaria,  guttural 
herpes,  and  other  acute  febrile  diseases  are  also  sometimes 
followed  b}^  insanit}'. 

There  does  not  seem  to  be  any  definite  relation  between  the 
different  forms  of  insanity  and  the  nature  of  the  febrile  disease. 
One  point  of  clinical  interest  to  be  noted  is,  that  after  typhoid, 
typhus,  smallpox,  scarlatina,  cholera,  diphtheria,  influenza, 
or  malaria  there  may  be  physical  symptoms  A\'hich,  ^\'hen 
associated  with  insanity,  closely  simulate  general  parah'sis  of 
the  insane.  The  general  constitutional  disturbances  and  de- 
generation of  the  tissues  of  the  bodj^  (especially  of  the  cerebro- 
spinal system),  which  occur  in  pellagra,  are  frequently  attended 
by  morbid  mental  states.  These  mental  states,  however,  have 
nothing  unusual  or  characteristic  in  their  nature  to  distinguish 
them  from  those  of  other  exhaustive  diseases.  Influenza  has 
frec^uently  proved  itself  to  be  a  determining  cause  of  insanitj-. 
and  this  more  readily  in  individuals  who  are  predisposed  to 
neurosis. 

*  Hyslop,  "  Diet,  of  Psych.  Med.,^"  p.  985. 


516  THE  FACTORS   OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

Si/philis  may  or  nia}"  not  cause  insanit}^.  Some  individuals 
may  have  sypliilopliobia  as  a  symptom  without  any  actual 
syphilitic  affection.  Others  may  have  contracted  syphilis  and 
break  down  mentally  in  consequence  of  dread  of  the  results. 
Savage*  describes  the  following  relationships  between  syphilis 
and  morbid  mental  states : — (1)  Insane  dread  of  syphilis ; 
(2)  insane  dread  of  results  of  syphilis ;  (3)  syphilitic  fever, 
delirium,  and  mania ;  (4)  acute  syphilis  leading  to  mental 
decaj' ;  (5)  syphilitic  cachexia  and  dyscrasia,  and  mental  dis- 
order ;  (6)  syphilitic  neuritis  (optic),  with  suspicion,  or  mania : 
(7)  syphilitic  ulceration,  disfigurement,  and  morbid  self-con- 
sciousness ;  (8)  congenital  syphilis,  cranial,  sensory,  or  nerve- 
tissue  defects  ;  (9)  congenital  syphilis,  with  epilepsj^,  or  idioc}?- ; 
(10)  infantile  syphilis  ma}^  be  acquired.  (11)  Constitutional 
s}3)hilis  (a)  vascular  or  fibrous ;  (h)  epilepsy ;  (c)  hemiplegia  ; 
(d)  local  palsies;  (e)  general  paralysis,  cerebral,  spinal  (spastic 
and  tabetic),  peripheral.  (12)  Locomotor  ataxy  (a)  with  insane 
crisis,  (h)  with  insane  interpretation  of  the  ordinary  sjanptoms. 

That  sj-philitic  affections  of  the  nervous  system  may  cause 
insanity  is  a  statement  which  requires  no  justification.  There 
is  much  diflTerence  of  opinion,  however,  as  to  the  part  played  by 
syphilis  in  the  production  of  general  paralysis.  Our  experience 
in  Bethlem  leads  us  to  believe,  that  more  than  half  the  general 
paralytics  admitted  to  the  hospital  owe  their  disease  to 
syphilitic  factors.  Savage  believes,  that  at  least  seventy  per 
cent,  of  his  private  cases  of  general  paralj^sis  have  clear 
histories  of  constitutional  syphilis.  Clinically,  we  have  also 
to  note  that  sj^philis  sometimes  gives  rise  to  a  pseudo-general 
paralysis  m  ^^'hich,  during  the  early  stages,  the  symptoms  mat 
be  identical  with  those  of  general  paralysis ;  but  subsequently 
there  is  an  arrest  or  protraction  of  the  sjanptoms  in  the  pseudo- 
form,  so  that  the  patient  may  live  for  many  years. 

The  syphilitic  disease  may  manifest  itself  in  lesions  of  the 
bones  of  the  cranium,  the  membranes,  blood-vessels,  brain- 
substance,  cerebral  nerves,  or  of  the  organs  of  special  sense. 
The  skull  bones  may  be  absorbed  owing  to  gummatous  infiltra- 
tions, or  small  areas  of  caries  -with  exfoliation  may  occur.  The 
dura  mater  and  the  pia  arachnoid  may  be  thickened  and 
*  ''  Tuke's  Dictionary,"  p.  1253. 


EPILEPSY.  517 

affected  by  various  inflammatory  deposits,  or  there  may  be 
gummata.  The  middle  and  inner  coats  of  the  arteries  may 
show  rhe  characteristic  endarteritis.  Peri  -  arteritis  and 
inflammatory  deposits  ronnd  the  smaller  arteries  also  occur. 
Tlie  brain-siibstance  may  be  affected  by  means  of  an  extension 
of  the  disease  from  the  membranes,  or  as  the  result  of  deficient 
blood-supply.  Ihe  nerve-structures  of  the  cortex  are  apt  to 
degenerate  in  proportion  to  the  amount  of  overgrowth  of  the 
neuroglia  substance.  The  cerebral  nerves  and  the  organs  of 
special  sense  may  be  implicated  symmetrically  or  otherwise. 
The  nerve-fibres  may  become  atrophied  and  fail  to  perform 
their  functions. 

Diseases  of  the  nervoiis  system  may  be  the  predisposing  or 
exciting  factors  of  an  attack  of  insanity.  Epilei'Sy  may  depend 
upon  general  nervous  instability,  and  this  in  turn  may  be  due 
to  cerebral  lesions.  It  is  important  to  remember  that  injury 
or  disease  which  leads  to  insanity  in  one  individual  may  lead  to 
epilepsy  in  another.  In  neurotic  families  it  is  not  uncommon 
to  find  one  child  epileptic  and  another  insane.  The  children  of 
neurotic  parents  are  particularly  liable  to  suffer  from  convul- 
sions which  may  become  epileptic  in  character,  and  when 
habitual,  the  mental  development  is  apt  to  be  arrested. 
Morbid  mental  symptoms  may  precede  or  follow  an  epileptic 
fit.  When  they  precede  the  fit  they  may  be  in  the  form 
of  sensory  perversions  (illusions  or  hallucinations),  delusions. 
or  maniacal  outbreaks  :  when  they  follow  the  fit  they  may 
appear  as  confusion,  melancholia,  irritability,  suspicion,  hallu- 
cinations, false  accusation,  moral  perversion,  and,  not  uncom- 
monly, mania,  or  epileptic  fnror,  with  suicidal  or  homicidal 
impulses.  When  there  is  imperfect  loss  of  consciousness  with 
automatic  action,  the  condition  is  termed  masked  epilepsy. 
The  patient  does  not  fall  doAvn,  and  in  some  cases  actions  are 
performed  automatically.  Sometimes  violent  emotion,  with 
violent  or  vicious  acts,  take  the  place  of  the  automatic  act. 
JacJcsonian  epileptic  attacks  differ  from  ordinary-  epileptic 
attacks  in  that  the  spasm  progresses  in  a  definite  direction. 
Consciousness  may  be  lost  late  in  the  paroxysm,  and  temporary 
paralysis  or  aphasia  may  follow  the  seizures.  This  variety  is 
mostly  due  to  cortical  irritative  or  degenerative  lesions. 


518  THE  FACTOES   OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

Epilepsy  includes  all  paroxj'snial  sensori-motor  discharging 
lesions  of  the  nervous  system.  The  affection  may  involve  am^ 
or  all  parts  of  the  cerebro-spinal  sj^stem — i.e.,  the  "  lowest, 
middle,  or  highest  levels"  of  Hughlings-Jackson.  Nutritive 
molecular  changes  in  pai-ts  of  the  nervous  system  are  apt 
to  cause  discharging  lesions,  which  necessarily  vary  according 
to  the  importance  and  complexit}^  of  the  functional  provinces 
involved.  Discharging  lesions  involving  the  highest  centres 
throw  the  organ  of  the  mind  more  or  less  out  of  gear.  In  the 
severe  forms  of  epilepsy  the  discharging  lesion  may  begin  in 
the  cerebral  cortex  and  extend  to  the  lower  levels  of  evolution. 
Jn  minor  epilepsies,  on  the  other  hand,  some  part  or  parts  of 
the  anatomical  substratum  of  thought,  ni&j  alone  be  affected, 
so  that  the  temporar}'  defects  of  consciousness  are  the  sole 
manifestations.  The  analogy  between  what  happens  in  epilepsy 
and  in  maniacal  and  uncontrolled  mentation  is  thought  by  some 
authors  to  be  well-nigh  complete.  They  assume,  that  in  both 
conditions  the  mental  symptoms  are  due  to  excessive  cerebra- 
tion. Of  this  view  we  shall,  however,  have  to  speak  again,  so 
we  now  return  to  the  consideration  of  other  neuroses  which 
may  be  factors  in  the  causation  of  insanit3^ 

Hysteria  has  its  physical  basis  in  an  (apparentlj^-)  functional 
disorder  of  any  or  all  parts  of  the  cerebro-spinal  system.  The 
sjanptoms  vary  according  to  "the  functional  provinces  mainl}- 
involved.  The  mental  characteristics  are  usually  manifested 
in  paroxj^^sms  with  or  without  uncontrollable  physical  sj'm- 
ptoms.  B}^  some  authors  it  is  assumed,  that  hj^steria  is 
an.  affection  of  functional  provinces  which  are  often  actuallj^ 
controllable  by  the  iTifluence  of  other  and  higher  centres.  This, 
however,  is  an  hypothesis  which  is  scarcely  susceptible  of  veri- 
fication. The  bodil}^  and  mental  causes  which  lead  to  hysteria 
ma}'  also  lead  to  insanity;  or  insanity  may  supervene  upon 
listeria.  There  is  no  hard  and  fast  line  of  demarcation  between 
hysteria  and  mania :  the  one  shades  imperceptibly  into  the 
other.  In  both  there  may  be  sensor}^  or  motor  disturbances 
with  morbid  perception  and  misinterpretation  of  their  import. 

Chorea  is  commonly  attended  hj  mental  hebetude,  in- 
attention, loss  of  memory,  and  hallucinations  of  sight  of  an 
unpleasant  nature.     The   mental  sjanptoms  may  precede   the 


SPINAL  DISEASES.  519 

actual  choreic  paroxj^sms.  Choreic  insanity  may  be  of  any 
type,  and  it  exhibits  nothing  that  is  characteristic.  It  maj'" 
appear  in  children,  in  pregnant  Avomen.  or  in  old  age. 

Mi/Xf.edema  is  usualh^  followed  by  insanity.  During  the 
earlier  stages  of  the  disease  there  is  languor,  indifference,  and 
impaired  memory.  Sometimes  there  is  irritability  with 
hallucinations  or  delusions.  The  insane  symptoms  may  be 
those  of  acute  or  chronic  mania,  melancholia  with  suspicion 
and  self-accusation,  or  dementia.  The  insanity  may  be  due 
either  to  morbid  self-consciousness  as  to  their  changed  apj^ear- 
ance.  or  to  the  morbid  state  of  the  vaso-motor  nerves  which 
directly  affect  the  cerebrum.  WhitA^^ell*  has  noted  the 
occurrence  of  inflated  globose  and  curiously  distorted  nuclei, 
Aacuolated  in  almost  every  conceivable  way,  in  the  cells  of  the 
third  and  fourth  layers  of  the  cerebral  cortex. 

Exophthalmic  ffoUre  is  supposed  to  be  closely  allied  to  the 
neuroses.  Sometimes  lesions  of  the  sympathetic  ganglia  have 
been  observed.  The  pathology  of  the  affection  is  at  present 
undecided.  It  has  been  regarded  in  turn  as  a  scrofulous 
dyscrasia,  a  neurosis  of  the  sympathetic,  a  disease  of  psj'chical 
origin,  and  as  a  paralysis  of  the  vaso-motor  centres  and  cervical 
ganglia.  The  disease  is  not  uncommonly  associated  with 
mental  symptoms.  It  may  occur  in  association  with  melan- 
cholia, acute  mania,  delusional  insanity,  and  even  general 
paralysis.  The  exophthalmic  symptoms  may  occur  syn- 
chronoiTsly  with  the  mental  attack,  and  they  may  return 
with  each  recurrence  of  the  insanity.  It  is  more  frequent 
in  women  than  in  men.  In  one  case  admitted  to  Bethlem  the 
mental' symptoms  arose  in  connection  with  the  change  in  aspect 
of  the  patient :  painful  self-consciousness  gradually  changed 
to  ideas  of  persecution.  Another  case  began  with  exaltation 
and  excitement :  two  others  were  first  depressed,  then  melan-' 
cholic.  with  refusal  of  food,  impulsive  violence,  and  dirt}^  habits. 
Exophthalmic  goitre  has  been  observed  as  occurring  temporarily 
from  sudden  shock.  Sometimes  it  is  associated  with  epilepsy, 
paralytic  affections,  hemian^esthesia,  or  even  with  aphasia. 

Spinal  affections  may  precede,  occur  in  connection  with,  be 
sjnnjDtomatic  of,  or  follow,  various  forms  of  mental  disease. 
*  "Brit,  Med.  Joiirn.,^'  Feb.  27,  1892. 


520  THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

Insanity  Avitliont  paralj'sis  is  not  attended  by  spinal  changes. 
Traumatisms,  slow  compressing  lesions,  cornnal  or  cokimnar 
lesions,  indiscriminate  lesions,  or  functional  defects  of  the 
spinal  cord  ma}'  be  associated  ^A'ith  insane  sjanptoms  of  a 
temporar}^  nature,  or  they  may  be  associated  with  cerebral 
lesions  and  progressive  mental  deterioration. 

To  describe  the  various  spinal  diseases  which  may  be 
associated  with  insanity  would  necessitate  an  account  of  all 
the  extra  and  intra-medullarjr  lesions  dependent  upon  recog- 
nisable organic  causes,  and  also  of  the  various  intrinsic  or 
functional  defects,  such  as  the  toxic  spinal  paralyses,  inter- 
mittent, hj-sterical;  ideational,  and  reflex  paraplegias,  etc. 
It  must  suffice  for  us  to  remember,  that  the  spinal  lesions  may 
be  primary  or  secondary  to  cerebral  lesions.  Beyond  this 
general  statement  we  cannot  venture.  There  is  no  more 
definite  relationship  between  system  lesions  of  the  spinal  cord 
and  insanity  than  there  is  between  lesions  of  other  systems  and 
the  mind.  Every  variety  of  spinal  disease  may  occur  in  the 
insane,  and  every  variety  of  spinal  disease  msij  occur  without 
insanity.  There  are  no  special  mental  sjanptoms  of  spinal 
lesions,  and  there  are  no  special  spinal  symptoms  of  mental 
diseases.  In  general  paralysis  we  meet  with  nearly  every 
variety  of  spinal  degeneration,  but  there  is  no  constancy  in  the 
relationship. 

Affections  of  the  sym2''at]ietic  are  but  imperfectly  understood. 
The  intimate  relationship  between  all  parts  of  the  cerebral 
cortex  and  the  exquisite  mutual  dependence  of  the  various 
parts  of  the  nervous  s^^stem — cerebral,  spinal,  and  sympathetic 
— on  each  other,  render  t-his  subject  one  of  extreme  intricacy 
and  difficulty.  The  sjmipathetic  system  is  undoubtedly  affected 
in  many  morbid  cerebral  states.  Whether  the  affection  is  de- 
veloped as  a  reflex  irritation,  or  whether  the  sympathetic  system 
possesses  a  special  pathology  of  its  own  and  acts  as  a  primary 
factor  in  determining  the  morbid  cerebral  state,  'we  are  unable  to 
decide.  The  intimate  relations  existing  between  headache, 
insomnia,  epilepsy,  or  other  cerebral  affections,  and  the  regula- 
tion of  the  vascular  tone  through  the  sympathetic,  lead  one  to 
suppose  that  possibly  the  sympathetic  plaj^s-a  very  prominent 
part    in    the   production    of  many    changes    of   structure    and 


INTOXICANTS.  521 

lesions  of  nutrition  in  the  cerebrum.  It  is  generally  believed, 
that  the  influence  of  the  sympathetic  is  brought  about 
secondarily  by  reflex  irritation  from  some  other  organ  in 
the  body. 

Cerebral  affections  have  already"  been  in  part  considered  :  but 
in  order  to  render  the  physiological  part  of  our  subject  more 
complete  it  is  necessary  that  we  should  briefly  enumerate  some 
of  the  causes  of  paralyses  of  encephalic  origin.  Among  these 
causes  we  have  to  note,  traumatisms,  meningeal.  cerel:)ral  and 
cerebellar  haemorrhages,  occhisions  of  vessels  by  tlyombosis  or 
embolism,  tumours  of  the  brain  and  its  meninges  (e.;/..  tubercle. 
scrofula,  cancer,  gliomata,  sarcomata,  myxomata,  tumours  of 
the  pituitary  body,  and  exostoses),  abscesses  within  the  cranium, 
meningo-encephalitis,  disseminated  sclerosis,  aneurysms,  hydatid 
cysts,  cysticerci,  simple  cysts,  and  congenital  or  early  infantile 
pathological  states  of  the  brain.  The  signs  and  symptoms  of 
these  various  affections  do  not  form  part  of  our  subject :  and  as 
we  have  already  discussed  their  value  from  the  point  of  view  of 
localisation  of  mental  phenomena,  we,  therefore,  now  pass  to 
the  consideration  of  those  intoxicants  which  act  as  factors  in 
the  production  of  mental  diseases. 

Intoxicants. — Alcohol. — The  effects  of  alcohol  upon  the 
exquisite  structures  of  the  brain,  and  consecjuently  upon  the 
mental  faculties  which  these  structures  subserve,  have  been  so 
widely  investigated  that  the  subject  need  only  be  briefly 
referred  to  here.  The  derangements  due  to  alcohol  may  be 
mainly  sensory,  motor,  or  intellectual.  Alcohol  may  produce 
a  temporary  disturbance  of  the  intellect  hj  means  of  its  direct 
poisoning  influence  on  the  brain,  or  it  maj'  cause  structural 
alterations  of  the  brain  which  are  characterised  by  progressive 
weakening  of  the  mental  faculties  and  finally  dementia.  The 
symptoms  of  direct  poisoning  and  slow  decay  of  the  brain  and 
mind  need  not  be  dwelt  upon. 

Alcohol  may  be  absorbed  through  the  serous,  mucous,  or 
respiratory  surfaces,  and  may  leave  the  system  unchanged.  It 
produces  changes  in  the  blood  which  lead  to  profound  nutri- 
tional disturbances  in  the  brain  and  sj'mpathetic  sj'stem.  The 
action  of  alcohol  upon  the  cerebrum  is  so  wide-sjjread  and  so 
variable  that  any  mental  symptom  may  appear.     Bevan  Lewis 


522  THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

says,  "The  symptoms  of  implication  of  special  cerebral  territories 
too  often  dovetail  and  overlap  for  any  trustworthj^  clinical 
classification  to  be  adopted  ;  and  still  more  frecjnently  if  the 
history  be  one  of  progressive  invasion  of  one  territor}^  after 
another.  The  more  characteristic  forms,  however,  under  which 
cerebral  alcoholism  presents  itself  to  our  notice  in  asylums  for 
the  insane,  are  the  following  : — (1)  Purely  sensorial  type — 
(a)  common  sensibility ;  (b)  visceral ;  (c)  special.  (2)  Primary 
amnesic  forms.  (3)  Premature  senility,  especiall}^  implicating 
motor  areas  of  cortex.  (4)  Delusional  forms  with  vascular 
lesions  in  basal  ganglia  and  medullated  tracts  of  the  cerebrum. 
(5)  Motorial  types." 

Andriezen*  believes,  that  while  cases  of  the  extensive  and 
generalised  type  of  alcoholic  insanity  are  by  no  means  rare,  the 
majority  of  the  alcoholic  insane  are  those  who  belong  to  the 
other  class  in  which  the  main  morbid  stress  and  evolution  of 
the  sjniiptoms  develop  in  this  or  that  "  intensive  and  specialised 
w^ay."  He  also  believes,  that  changes  occur  in  the  anatomico- 
physiological  connections  between  the  neurons.  "  Change  of  a 
very  striking  and  unmistakable  character  occurs  in  the 
ultimate  protoplasmic  expansions  and  '  contact-granules ' 
situated  upon  them  on  the  one  hand,  and  in  the  ultimate  naked 
fibrils  (collaterals  and  terminals)  which  everywhere  come  into 
relation  with  such  protoplasmic  termini  and  granules  on  the 
other.  Beginning  with  a  softening  and  swelling  of  these 
contact  granules,  and  also  of  the  protoplasmic  twigs  on  which 
they  are  situated,  the  earliest  noticeable  changes  are  a  coales- 
cence of  these  into  small  irregular  '  composites '  of  such, 
recognisable  here  and  thei'e  as  a  local  coarseness.  As  the 
changes  progress  in  coarseness  and  extent,  they  can  now  be 
more  easily  recognised  as  commencing  moniliform  swellings 
along  the  course  of  the  terminal  protoplasmic  twigs."  These 
early  dynamical  changes  in  the  field  of  conjunction  are  held  to 
represent,  on  the  psychical  side,  the  diminished  capacity  of  the 
neurons  to  be  excitable  to  presentative  sensorial  stimulations ; 
the  diminished  permeability  in  the  path^^-ays  of  nerve-currents 
issuing  from  one  neuron  hj  its  nervous  processes  and  its 
terminals  to  another  neuron  in  the  cortical  area,  having  its 
*  "Brain,"  p.  666,  1894. 


INTOXICANTS.  523 

psychical  counterpart  a  slowness  in  the  arousing  of  associated 
images,  and  delay  of  reaction  time. 

These  observations  are  of  great  interest  to  cerebral  pathology, 
and  did  the  associated  mental  sjnnptoms  present  any  uniformity 
they  would  be  valuable  to  mental  physiology.  It  is  more 
particularly  in  the  early  stages  of  alcoholism  that  all  kinds 
of  mental  manifestations  are  possible,  and  swellings  of  the 
"  contact  granules  "  may  serve  to  explain  delay  in  the  passage 
of  nerve-currents,  and  therefore  also  delay  in  the  phj^siological 
manifestations ;  but  these  swellings  afford  us  no  explanation 
as  to  the  origin  of  the  hallucinations  or  the  delusions  so 
commonly  met  with  in  the  alcoholic  insane.  They  may 
possibly  serve  to  throw  some  light  upon  the  amnesic  defects  as 
manifested  in  the  slowness  in  arousing  associated  images,  but 
they  do  not  account  for  the  positive  mental  affections  which 
are  characterised  by  emotional  or  intellectual  perversions. 
Lesions  of  the  spinal  cord  may  serve  to  delay  sensation  or 
reflex  action,  and  the  description  of  such  lesions  might  suffice 
to  account  for  the  delay.  Such  a  description,  however,  would 
furnish  us  with  no  explanation  of  the  ultimate  plwsiological 
factors  associated  ■\\itli  the  mentation.  Similarl}',  lesions  of  the 
"  fields  of  conjunction  '"  in  the  cortex  afford  us  no  ultimate  data 
for  the  explanation  of  morbid  psychical  manifestations.  Here, 
as  in  other  instances,  we  must  have  recourse  to  physiological 
hypothesis  as  to  the  ultimate  material  elements  concerned  with 
mind,  and  by  so  doing  we  can  only  speculate  about  the  un- 
known and  unknowable.  The  most  that  pathology  has  done 
in  this  instance  is  to  partly  verify  the  opinion  as  to  the  co- 
existence in  time  between  the  events,  the  physical  and  mental 
series. 

Lead  poisoninij  is  not  infrequently  attended  by  symptoms 
which  somewhat  resemble  those  of  general  parah'sis.  Saturnine 
cases  may  exhibit  symptoms  of  mania,  melancholia,  dementia, 
or  pseudo-general  paralysis.  Regis  notes  the  frequency  of 
nightmares,  terrilying  hallucinations,  and  ideas  of  persecution 
with,  also,  very  marked  tremor  of  the  limbs.  The  pseudo- 
general  paralytic  symptoms  generalh^  appear  after  the  delirious 
symptoms  of  the  lead  intoxication  have  passed  off.  Under 
appropriate  treatment  the  disease  proves  itself  to  be  essentially 


o24  THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

curable.  The  presence  of  neuralgic  pains,  convulsions,  cramps, 
headache,  delirium,  stupor,  amaurosis,  paralysis  of  the  extensor 
muscles  of  the  wi-ist,  anesthesia  of  the  affected  part,  fatty  de- 
generation of  the  muscles,  and  the  other  special  symptoms  of 
lead  poisoning  render  a  diagnosis  possible.  The  lead  appears 
to  act  primarily  on  the  muscles,  then  on  the  nerves,  and  lastly 
on  the  nerve-centres. 

Morphinomania  resembles  in  its  effects  the  symptoms  of 
the  other  toxic  insanities.  The  abuse  of  morphia  is  usually 
attended  by  well-known  mental  and  physical  perversions,  which 
sooner  or  later  become  symptomatic  of  cerebral  degeneration. 
Sudden  withdrawal  of  the  drug  is  also  apt  to  be  attended  by  a 
characteristic  train  of  symptoms  which  may  range  from  mere 
irritability  to  maniacal  delirium.  The  fact  that  morphia  produces 
an  exaltation  of  the  mental  faculties,  a  greater  brilliancy  of 
the  imagination,  and  an  aptitude  for  study,  has  proved  itself 
to  be  the  cause  of  the  mental  ruin  of  no  few  individuals. 

Other  toxic  agents,  such  as  belladonna,  hyoscyamus,  stra- 
monium, absinth,  ether,  chloroform,  chloral,  cocaine,  haschisch, 
nicotine,  etc.,  when  taken  in  large  quantities  are  apt  to  cause 
cerebral  disorders  and  various  psychical  symptoms,  but  space 
will  not  allow  of  their  consideration. 

Immediate  Factors. — Hitherto  we  have  devoted  our 
attention  to  the  consideration  of  bodily  factors  which  act  upon 
the  brain  either  directly  or  indirectly ;  it  now  remains  for  us 
to  refer  to  some  of  the  more  immediate  brain  factors  them- 
selves. The  mechanism  of  cortical  functional  hypereemia  is, 
as  we  have  already  seen,  only  imperfectly  determined,  and 
we  do  not  as  yet  know  -how  functional  hyperasmia  is  im- 
mediately brought  about.  The  theory,  that  the  special  func- 
tional activities  concerned  with  mental  events  are  attended 
by  a  special  functional  hyperemia  is  supported  upon  the 
crudest  and  most  slender  grounds.  We  are  told  that  the  cortex 
of  a  man's  brain  bulges  through  a  hole  in  his  skull  when  a 
mental  stimulus  is  applied,*  and  that  with  the  occurrence  of 
activities  within  definite  brain-areas  there  is,  or  ought  to  be,  a 
sudden  rapid  change  of  blood-supply  to  those  areas,  t 

*  "Pathology" — "  Tiike's  Dictionary,"  p.  896. 
t  Meynert,  "  Psychiatry,"  p.  214. 


FUNCTIOXAL  HYPER.EMIA.  525 

Let  lis  for  a  moment  consider  these  siippositions  a  little  more 
closely.  It  is  assumed,  that  in  the  ordinary  course  of  psychical 
events  the  immediate  sul^stratum  of  physical  activity  rests 
somewhere  Avithin  one  or  more  of  the  exceedingly  minute 
cortical  cells,  or  in  the  ramifications  of  its  processes.  If  now 
we  take  for  illustration  an  ■•  idea  " — which  presumably  derives 
its  component  parts  through  association  paths  from  several 
areas — it  seems  reasonable  to  assume,  that  with  the  activities 
within  these  different  areas  there  is  a  corresponding  functional 
hypera?mia.  This  necessitates  a  rapid  change  of  circulation  in 
several  areas  at  once. 

In  fact,  if  the  theory  is  to  be  complete,  the  hypera?mia  must 
follow  the  mind  through  all  its  variations.  This  may  be  the 
case  for  all  we  know  to  the  contrary  ;  but  it  is  scarcely  credible 
that  any  psychical  act  taking  place,  presiimably  within  a 
structure  so  minute  as  a  nerve-fibril,  should  also  determine  a 
hyperEemia  which  would  make  the  cortex  of  the  brain  l^ulge 
through  a  hole  in  the  skull.  Undoubtedly,  the  vascular  supply 
of  the  brain  is  arranged  so  as  to  favour  the  rapid  production  of 
hypera?niia ;  but  surely  the  extreme  rapidity  of  thought  is 
not  entirely  and  immediately  dependent  upon  a  mechanism 
which  lumbers  along  in  its  wake,  causing  here  and  there  a 
turgescence  or  bulging  of  the  A's'hole  structures  ?  That  the 
linely  molecular  activities  of  the  nerve-substance  require  such 
a  vastly  disproportionate  blood-supply  is  scarcely  credible. 
Such  a  relationship  between  the  visible  hyperEemia  and  the 
molecular  activity  would  appear  to  be  proportionate  to  the 
relationship  between  an  Atlantic  wave  and  the  activities  in 
coccoliths  and  coccosj)heres  embedded  in  the  Bathybius  of  the 
sea-bottom. 

Interference  with  the  nutrition  of  the  nervous  tissues,  it 
long  continued,  is  followed  by  a  series  of  changes  in  those 
tissues.  In  idiopathic  brain  disordei's  there  is  supposed  to  be 
primarily  an  abnormal  supply  of  blood  to  the  brain.  This. may 
pass  on  to  a  sub-inflammatory  condition,  in  which  more 
leucocytes  are  deposited  than  in  the  normal  state  between  the 
adventitia  and  muscular  coat,  or  there  may  be  proliferation  of 
the  connective  tissue  cells  of  the  vessel.  Should  these  leucocytes 
and  connective  tissue  cells  break  down,  the  debris  occupies  the 


526  THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

perivascular  spaces,  and  thereby  implicates  the  lymphatic  cir- 
culation. Retention  of  the  waste  products  tends  to  affect  the 
functional  integrity  of  the  nerve-cells  and  of  their  processes  and 
fil3res.  The  actual  degeneration  of  the  cell  protoplasm  is 
supposed  to  be  due  to  toxic  action  from  within  and  deprivation 
of  proper  nutriment  from  without. 

The  pathological  appearances  of  inflammatory  action  in  the 
skull,  membranes,  and  blood-vessels  are  fully  described  by 
Bevan  Lewis,  Batty  Tuke,  Sims  Woodhead,  and  others.  The 
neuroglia  and  connective  tissue  cells  have  also  been  very 
carefully  described  by  these  authors.  Finally,  the  numerous 
and  elaborate  investigations  upon  the  pathology  of  the  nerve- 
cells  have  furnished  us  with  so  much  valuable  material  that  a 
mere  dilettante  consideration  of  them  would  only  prove  unsatis- 
factory to  the  student,  and  hardly  do  justice  to  the  importance 
of  the  subject. 

We  propose,  therefore,  merely  to  consider  the  factors  of  the 
insanities  in  so  far  as  they  are  dissolutions,  or  reversals  of 
evolution.  To  Hughlings- Jackson*  we  are  indebted  for  a 
forcible  conception  as  to  the  pathogenesis  of  maladies  of  the 
nervous  s^^stem.  He  assumes,  that  in  every  insanitj^  there  is 
morbid  affection  of  more  or  less  of  the  highest  cerebral  centres, 
or,  synonymously,  of  the  highest  level  of  evolution  of  the 
cerebral  sub-system,  or,  again  synonjnnously,  of  the  anatomical 
substrata  or  phj^sical  basis  of  consciousness.  There  may  be 
discoverable  disease  destructive  of  nervous  elements,  or  there 
may  be  loss  of  fiinction  from  some  undiscovered  pathological 
process  inferred  from  symptoms.  In  every  insanit}^  more  or 
less  of  the  highest  cerebral  mechanism  is  out  of  function, 
temporarily  or  permanently,  from  some  pathological  process 
whatever  it  may  be.  In  studjdng  the  insanities  as  dissolutions 
we  have  to  take  into  account  not  only  the  depths  of  dissolution 
of  the  highest  cerebral  centres,  but  also  the  evolution  going  on 
in  the  undamaged  remainder  of  them — the  mentation  remain- 
ing possible  when  various  centres  have  been  mutilated  in 
different  degrees. 

*  "  Factors  of  the  Insanities  " — "  Medical  Press  and  Circular,"'  Dec.  9, 1874  ; 
ibid.,  Aug.  30,  1893  ;  ibid.,  .June  13,  1894;  "Transactions  Ophthalmic  Soc, ' 
vol.  vi. 


PAXHOGEXESIS.  527 

In  every  form  of  iiisanitj^  (dementia  excepted)  there  is  a 
double  symptomatic  condition- — viz.,  a  negative  and  a  positive 
condition.  The  negative  is  dne  to  disease  (negative  lesion)  ; 
whilst  the  positive  is  the  outcome  of  activities  of  the  healthy 
structures  remaining.  Disease,  therefore,  only  causes  the 
physical  condition  corresponding  to  the  negative  mental 
element.  The  positive  s3'mptoms  vary  inverseh'  with  the 
depth  or  extent  of  the  negative  lesion.  For  illustration, 
Hughlings-Jackson  takes  the  case  of  a  general  paralytic  who 
believes  he  is  Emperor  of  Europe.  "  The  delusion  arises 
during  activity  of  perfectly  healthy  nervous  arrangements, 
presumably  those  of  the  posterior  lobes  and  those  left  intact 
of  the  anterior."  The  disease  of  the  anterior  lobes  he  regards 
as  responsible  for  the  patient's  not  knowing  that  he  is  X.Y.,  a 
clerk  in  the  city.  This  illustration  we  believe  to  be  unfor- 
tunate, inasmuch  as  general  paralj^tics  at  one  moment  may 
state  that  they  are  kings  or  emperors,  but  at  the  same  time 
they  do  practicalh'  recognise  that  they  are  X.Y.  Similarly, 
general  paralytics  construct  schemes  for  the  distrilnition  of 
fabulous  wealth,  but  immediately  afterwards  beg  for  tobacco, 
and  tell  you,  with  perfect  accuracy,  that  they  possess  only  a 
few  pounds  sterling,  or  that  they  are  bankrupt.  Moreover, 
they  almost  invariably  answer  to  their  names  (especially  during 
the  eai'ly  stages),  and  make  a  sharp  distinction  between  their 
real  and  ideal  existence.  This,  however,  does  not  really  interfere 
with  the  validity  of  the  hypothesis. 

Illusions,  delusions,  extravagant  conduct,  and  abnormal 
emotional  states  in  an  insane  person  may  signify  evolution,  and 
not  dissolution.  The  positive  mental  states  are  held  to  imply 
the  coexistence  of  negative  mental  states,  defe.ctive  perception, 
less  reasoning  power,  less  adaptation  to  present  surround- 
ings, and  absence  of  the  finest  emotions.  The  examples  given 
are,  (a)  any  illusion  implies,  that  a  thing  is  not  recognised  as  it 
would  have  been  before  the  insanity,  and  this  means,  that  there 
is  a  coexisting  negative  element ;  Qj)  any  delusion  implies,  that 
the  patient  does  not  believe  as  he  would  have  done  before  he 
underwent  dissolution,  and  this  means,  that  there  is  a  co- 
existing negative  mental  element. 

Whilst    admittinp'    the    difficulties    in     demonstratino-    the 


■528  THE  FACTORS  OF  THE  INSANITIES. 

physical  nature  of  the  negative  lesions,  we  agree  \Yith  Conolly, 
Avho  defined  insanity  from  the  psj^chical  standpoint  as  "  an 
impairment  of  one  or  more  of  the  faculties  of  the  mind,  accom- 
panied with,  or  inducing,  a  defect  in  the  comparing  faculty.'' 
The  psychical  elements  of  the  comparing  faculty  are  derived 
from  experience.  Hence,  the  negative  lesion  woiild  in  realit}^ 
consist  in  the  deprivation  of  the  individual  of  some  part  of  his 
experience,  and  this  (from  the  negative  point  of  view)  would 
mean  merely  a  defective  or  perverted  memory.  The  negative 
lesion  Avould,  therefore,  imply  an  interference  with  the  material 
residues  of  experience.  But  this  alone  does  not  explain  the 
nature  of  the  positive  symptoms.  In  popular  language,  the 
fact,  that  one  batsman  "retires  hurt"  from  the  cricket  field,  does 
not  necessitate  "tall"  scoring  of  the  undamaged  remainder. 
Similarly  with  the  general  paralytic,  the  existence  of  a  negative 
lesion  does  not  account  for  the  exaltation  of  his  ideas  and  his 
delusions  of  grandeur.  Undoubtedly,  the  exaltation  and  the 
delusions  are  the  work  of  the  undamaged  remainder,  but  this 
is  no  explanation  of  how  they  originate. 

In  conclusion,  we  may  state,  that  hitherto  brain  pathology 
has  only  served  to  demonstrate,  (1)  that  part  or  parts  of  the 
complex  process  of  our  mental  experience  may  be,  by  the 
existence  of  negative  lesions,  rendered  inert  or  incapable  of 
revival  in  consciousness.  (2)  That  mental  and  physical  pheno- 
mena do  bear  time  relationship  to  each  other ;  perversions  of 
the  latter  are  in  some  cases  attended  by  altered  mental  time 
reactions  (as  compared  with  normal  psychical  reactions).  (3) 
We  have  no  loliysiological  data  which  give  the  faintest  solution  to 
the  problem  as  to  hoiv  the  .positive  activities  of  the  mind,  both 
normal  and  morbid,  come  to  exhibit  such  endless  diversities  and 
infinitely  varied  relations. 


529 


APPE^^DIX    A. 

HYPXOTISM. 

The  phenomena  of  hypnosis,  in  spite  of  having  been  sub- 
jected to  scientific  treatment,  are  still  very  obscure.  The 
observed  facts  in  cases  of  hypnosis  consist  of  various  physio- 
logical and  psychological  manifestations  which  are  regarded  as 
causally  connected  with  each  other.  Before  entering,  however, 
upon  any  question  of  their  causal  relations,  it  is  necessary  that 
we  should  briefly  review  some  of  the  more  important  facts 
observed  on  the  physical  and  mental  sides  respectively. 

Mesmer  (1734)  first  studied  artificially-induced  sleep.  He 
attributed  the  effects  to  the  action  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  and 
"  animal  magnetism"  was  regarded  as  the  special  agency  of  the 
phenomena.  Deleuze  (1825)  believed,  that  a  magnetic  influence 
(magnetic  fluid)  belonging  to  the  vital  principle  passed  from 
one  person  to  another.  Braid  (1842)  first  attributed  the 
phenomena  to  the  laws  of  nerve-action.  Since  then.  Charcot. 
Luys,  Doumontpallier,  Binet,  Fere,  Liebeault,  Bernheim,  Forel, 
Moll,  Dessoir.  Sperling,  Preyer,  Baierlacher,  Tuke,  Bramwell. 
and  others  have  contributed  many  observations  A\hich  throw 
some  light  upon  the  subject. 

Methods  of  induci/vj  hi/jjuotic  sleep. — (1)  Braid  made  the  siib- 
ject  fix  his  eyes  on  a  bright  object  placed  a  little  above  the  ej-es 
opposite  the  middle  line  of  the  forehead,  so  that  visual  fatigue 
quickly  followed,  the  eyes  being  directed  in  convergent 
strabismus.  (2)  Lasegue  pressed  lightly  upon  the  eyeballs 
with  his  fingers.  (3)  Pitres  pressed  upon  special  regions  oi' 
the  body  (zones  hypnogenes).  (4)  Monotonous  sensory  impres- 
sions produced  by  passes,  etc.,  will  induce  the  hypnotic  state. 

34 


530  APPENDIX  A. 

(5)  Bj'-  the   psychological    principle    of    suggestion.      (6)   By 
combinations  of  any  of  these  methods. 

Operators  vary  in  their  power  of  inducing  hypnotic  sleep. 
Subjects  also  vary  in  the  extent  to  which  they  can  be  h^^pno- 
tised.  Children  under  three  or  four  years  of  age  are  difficult  to 
hypnotise.  The  power  of  attention,  of  concentrating  the  con- 
sciousness upon  the  matter  in  question,  renders  a  person  more 
susceptible  to  hypnotism.  Hysterical  individuals  are  readily 
hypnotised.  Idiots  and  imbeciles  are  unusually  hard  to  hj^pno- 
tise.  Similarly,  insane  persons  are  often  difficult  to  affect  in 
this  way.  Hitherto  we  have  had  (in  England)  little  success  in 
hypnotising  insane  patients.  The  English  race  does  not  appear 
to  be  very  susceptible  to  hypnotic  suggestion.  Robertson*  tried 
to  induce  hypnotic  sleep  in  some  insane  patients  at  Morningside 
As3dum,  and  he  met  with  a  certain  amount  of  success.  Our 
experience  at  Bethlem,  however,  has  not  proved  so  satisfactory. 
Drs.Percj^  Smith  f  and  A.  T.  Myers  found,  that  of  twenty-one 
cases  in  which  hypnotic  suggestion  was  tried,  only  two  were 
certainly  hypnotised.  In  one  case,  however,  the  suggestions 
made  were  not  acted  upon ;  and  in  the  other,  although  sug- 
gestions seemed  at  first  to  be  in  a  very  small  degree  successful, 
the  effect,  instead  of  increasing,  diminished  rather  rapidly. 
Where  any  improvement  Avas  noticeable  in  the  other  cases,  the 
resTilts  gained  were  attributable  more  to  the  large  amount  of 
personal  attention  devoted  to  each  case  than  to  any  hypnotic 
influence. 

In  order  to  awaken  the  subjects,  it  is  customary  to  blow  on 
their  eyelids,  or  to  rouse  them  in  some  vigorous  manner. 

Symiotoms  of  the  liypiotic  state. — The  different  phenomena 
have  been  divided  by  Charcot,  and  with  the  approval  of  Richer, 
Tamburini,  and  Seppili,  into  three  fundamental  types- -the 
catalei?tic,  the  lethargic,  and  the  somnambulistic.  In  the  cata- 
leiotic  state  the  limbs  retain  the  positions  in  which  they  are 
placed  for  a  considerable  time,  and  without  effort.  In  the 
lethargic  state  the  subject  is  insensible  to  the  most  painful 
stimuli;  the  muscles  which  are  relaxed  are  found  to  possess 
the   power    of   contracting    in    a    definite    way   under    gentle 

*  "  Journ.  Ment.  Science,"  Jan.  1893. 
t  Ifjid.,  April,  1890. 


HYPNOTISM.  531 

mechanical  applications.  His  intelligence  seems  to  be  abolished, 
and  he  does  not  respond  to  questions  or  react  to  suggestions, 
although  he  may  realise  them  when  he  awakes.  The  phenome- 
non of  neuro-muscular  hyper-excitability  proves  itself  to  be 
the  most  interesting  feature  of  the  lethargic  state.  Charcot 
has  demonstrated,  that  if  in  the  subjects  of  la  grande  hysterie 
one  compresses  a  superficial  nerve,  there  follows  a  contraction 
of  the  muscle  it  supplies.  This  contraction  is  sometimes  very 
intense  ;  the  muscles  become  rigid  and  stiff,  and  would  be  torn 
sooner  than  bend.  In  order  to  cause  this  rigidity  to  disappear, 
pressure  is  made  upon  the  antagonistic  muscles  of  the  contracted 
ones.*  The  somnamhulistic  state  can  be  induced  by  rubbing 
the  vertex  of  a  person  in  the  lethargic  state.  The  explanation 
of  this  is  unknown.  The  remarkable  neuro-muscular  excita- 
bility is  retained,  but  in  a  somewhat  transformed  state. 
According  to  Charcot  and  Gilles  de  la  Tourette,  it  is  no  longer 
by  hard  pressure  or  friction  of  the  muscles  or  compressing  the 
nerves  that  it  is  brought  about ;  it  is,  on  the  contrary,  a  simple, 
superficial,  purely  cutaneous  stimulation  which  makes  the 
underljdng  muscles  contract.  These  observers  state,  that  lightly 
pressing  anything  over  the  skin — the  movement  of  the  stratum 
of  surrounding  air — is  sufficient  to  produce  this  effect. 

The  mental  condition  during  hypnosis  is  very  varied.  Sub- 
jectively considered,  the  experiences  as  to  sensation,  concep- 
tion, memory,  and  volition  are  of  great  interest.  In  previous 
pages  we  have  discussed  the  relationship  of  hypnosis  to  memory 
(p.  349)  and  to  volition  (p.  424) ;  it  now  remains,  therefore,  for 
us  to  give  a  brief  account  of  sensations  peculiar  to  it.  Except 
in  the  early  stages  of  hypnosis,  there  is  usually  insensitiveness  to 
pain.  At  the  suggestion  of  the  operator,  however,  it  is  possible 
to  produce  hyper-algesia.  Ordinarj^  tactile  sensibility  may  re- 
main unaffected.  The  sense  of  smell  may  be  absent,  so  that 
strong  ammonia  or  pepper  produces  no  reaction  ;  or  there  may 
be  hypergesthesia,  and  a  vastly  heightened  sensibility  of  the 
olfactory  nerve.  Visual  sensations  are  partiall}^  affected  in  the 
early  stages  :  in  the  later  states  the  sense  of  sight  may 
become  preternaturally  acute.  There  may  be  anaesthesia  or 
hyperaesthesia  of  the  sense  of  hearing.  Sometimes  the  subject 
*  "  Hypnotism  " — "  Tuke's  Dictionary,"'  p.  608. 


532  APPENDIX   A. 

hears  what  is  said  to  him  hj  the  operator  and  by  no  one  else. 
Taste  is  generally  suspended,  or,  by  suggestion,  the  subject 
imagines  various  tastes. 

Consciousness,  objectively  considered,  may  appear  to  be 
present  and  normal ;  or  there  may  be  an  abnormal  susceptibility 
to  psychical  impressions.  In  the  deep  stages  of  hypnotism, 
however,  the  mind  is  much  more  markedly  obedient  to  the 
suggestions  of  the  operator.  Some  individuals  when  hypno- 
tised have  the  peculiar  experience  that  they  exist  in  duplicate. 
The  one  self  is  fully  aware  of  what  the  other  self  is  doing. 
This  condition  of  duplicate  consciousness  is  not  uncommon  in 
insane  individuals.  Hack  Tuke*  recorded  the  case  of  a  patient 
several  j'-ears  ago  in  Bethlem  Hospital,  who,  having  lost  himself 
— i.e.,  the  self  he  was  most  familiar  with — used  to  seek  for 
himself  under  the  bed.  Hack  Tuke  believed,  that  the  explana- 
tion of  this  division  of  consciousness  was  to  be  sought  in  the 
relation  between  the  tA^^o  halves  of  the  brain,  or  between 
difierent  centres  in  the  entire  cortex.  One  patient  now  in 
Bethlem  used  to  say  that  his  body  did  not  belong  to  him,  and 
complained  bitterl}^  of  the  false  position  in  which  he  was 
placed  by  an  apparatus  which  was  no  part  of  himself.  Such 
instances  are  not  uncommon,  but  their  physiological  explana- 
tion is  still  a  matter  of  conjecture. 

Suggestion. — As  we  have  already  said,  the  susceptibility  to 
outside  suggestions  is  one  of  the  most  noticeable  features  of 
the  hyjonotic  state.  Some  observers  maintain,  that  the  hypno- 
tised subject  is  at  the  mercy  of  ever}^  suggestion,  however 
absurd,  and  every  crotchet,  however  wild  and  impractical. 
This,  however,  is  not  strictly  true.  The  hypnotised  subject  is 
not  necessarily  always  passive  ;  or,  as  Charcot  says,  "  the  sub- 
ject's credulity  has  its  limits."  Moreover,  it  has  been  found  im- 
possible to  make  a  subject  commit  an  actual  crime.  A  state  of 
ecstasy  can  be  induced  by  suggestion.  Hallucinations  and 
delusions  are  readily  induced,  and  they  may  persist  for  some 
time  after  the  subject  is  awake. 

Theories  as    to    the    htjpiotic   state  :  (1)  Theory   of    animal 
ma,gnetism  is   now  almost  entirely  given  up,   or,  at  any  rate, 
scarcely  ever  referred  to.     (2)  Theory  of  neurosis.     Charcot  and 
*  "  Sleep  Walking  and  Hypnotism,"  p.  82. 


H  VPXOTISM.  533 

his  colleagues  at  the  Salpetriei'e  maintain,  that  hypnotism  is  a 
neurotic  manifestation  which  has  been  evolved,  in  a  vast 
majority  of  cases,  on  a  soil  prepared  by  hysteria,  with  which  it 
has  many  points  in  common.  They  also  believe,  that  '"sugges- 
tion "  is  an  important  element,  but  that  it  is  not  more  im- 
portant than  that  which  must  be  assigned  to  somatic  phenomena. 
They  argue,  that  although  the  ps^'chical  phenomena  are  sus- 
ceptible of  being  stimulated,  the  same  cannot  be  said  of  the 
physical  ones  which  are  completely  independent  of  the  will  of 
the  subject  in  the  hypnotic  state.  (3)  The  theory  of  suggestion 
denies  the  neurosis  theor}'.  It  assumes,  that  the  bodil}^  S3nn- 
ptoms  are  the  result  of  expectation  and  training.  In  proof  of 
this  we  have  the  fact,  that  all  the  neurotic  manifestations  ma}^ 
be  induced  by  suggestion.  Many  of  the  physical  symptoms 
are  due  to  the  methods  employed  at  the  Salpetriere.  Simple 
verbal  suggestion,  as  employed  at  Nanc}^,  is  but  seldom 
attended  by  any  of  the  classical  lethargic,  cataleptic,  or  som- 
nambulistic states,  except  when  induced  by  the  influence  of  the 
operator. 

Although  the  theory  of  suggestion  has  at  the  present  day 
the  greatest  number  of  supporters,  we  must  not  forget  that  the 
psvchical  factor  "  suggestion  "  does  not  explain  the  occurrence 
of  the  extraordinaiy  bodily  states,  or  of  the  subject's  increased 
susceptibility  to  the  suggestions.  We  agree  with  Ladd,  *  that 
the  principle  of  suggestion  is  definitely  a  psycAoZo^ica^  principle, 
and  nothing  else ;  but  we  cannot  say,  that  the  psychological 
principle  of  suggestion  is  explanatory  of  any  of  the  physical 
manifestations.  The  phenomena  of  the  hypnotic  state  are  both 
bodily  and  mental.  No  psychological  principle  can  account 
for  any  physical  state,  and  no  bodily  state  can  account  for  the 
psychical  phenomena.  The  suggestion  theory  is  regarded  as 
satisfactory  when  it  refers  to  psychical  phenomena,  although 
even  there  it  does  not  explain  the  increased  susceptibility  to 
suggestion.  Or,  as  Professor  James f  j^^sth^  remarks,  "the 
suggestion-theory  may  therefore  be  approved  as  correct,  pro- 
vided we  grant  the  trance-state  as  its  pre-requisite.  The  three 
states  of  Charcot,  the  strange  reflexes  of  Heidenhain.  and  all 

-::   u  Philosophy  of  Mind,"  p.  277. 

t  "  Principles  of  Psychology,"  vol.  ii.  p.  601. 


534  APPENDIX  A. 

the  other  bodily  phenomena  which  have  been  called  direct  con- 
sequences of  the  trance-state  itself,  are  not  such.  They  are 
products  of  suggestion,  the  trance-state  having  no  particular 
outward  symptoms  of  its  own ;  but  without  the  trance-state 
there,  those  particular  suggestions  could  never  have  been  suc- 
cessfully made." 

Post-hypnotic  suggestions  are  those  suggestions  given  to  a 
subject  during  the  hypnotic  state  with  the  intention  of  making 
the  effects  last  in  the  waking  state.  The  therapeutic  bearings 
of  hypnotism  are  manifold.  Among  the  sane,  the  condition 
has  been  utilised  to  correct  morbid  habits  and  cravings.  Some 
individuals  have  acquired  considerable  talent  in  special  direc- 
tions by  the  aid  of  hypnotism.  Thus,  one  person  who  suflfered 
from  nervousness  and  a  certain  amount  of  hesitancy  in  his 
speech  was  enabled  to  overcome  both  defects  by  post-hypnotic 
suggestion.  He  now  displays  considerable  talent  as  a  public 
speaker. 

Among  the  insane,  it  has  been  employed,  as  a  sleep  producer, 
as  a  sedative  in  excitement,  to  dispel  fleeting  delusional  states 
and   the  minor   psychoses,   to  overcome  morbid   resistance  of 
patients,  and  as  a  substitute  for  mechanical  restraint.* 
*  Eobertson,  ■' Joum.  Ment.  Science,"  p.  11,  1893. 


535 


APPENDIX  B. 

PSYCHO-PHYSIOS. 

Experimental  psychology  has  as  its  aim  the  investigation  of 
the  general  laws  with  regard  to  the  relation  of  processes  of 
stimulation  and  sensation  :  it  also  includes  the  consideration 
of  the  processes  which  intervene  between  stimulation  on  the 
one  hand  and  the  complex  processes  of  mental  action  on  the 
other. 

In  practical  psycho-physics  attention  has  been  more  par- 
ticularly directed  to  the  questions  of  absolute  and  compara- 
tive sensibility.  The  methods  whereby  stimuli  are  measured 
in  relation  to  sense-impressions  are,  according  to  Fechner*: — 
(1)  The  method  of  ascerfaining  differences  of  sensation  irhich  are 
just  distingidshahle.  This  may  be  done — e.g.,  by  comparing  the 
difference  between  two  weights  :  if  the  difference  be  great,  it  is 
easily  distinguished  ;  if  not  great  enough,  it  will  with  difficult)^ 
be  distinguished,  or  perhaps  not  at  all.  The  method  con- 
sists in  finding  that  difference  which  just  becomes  appreciable, 
and  this  difference  is  reciprocal  to  the  sensibility — i.e.,  if  the 
appreciable  difference  is  great,  the  sensibility  is  small,  and 
vice  versa.  (2)  The  method  of  rigid  and  wrong^  cases.  This  con- 
sists in  testing  the  sensibility — e.g.,  by  weights  or  light, 
constantly  varying  the  amount  of  the  former  and  the  intensity 
of  the  latter.  Cases  in  which  the  difference  is  correctly  appre- 
ciated are  called  "  right  cases "' ;  those  in  which  it  is  not 
recognised  or  appreciated  are  called  "  wrong  cases."  From 
these  results  is  ascertained  the  mean  difference,  which,  as 
before,  is  reciprocal  to  the  sensibility.  The  method  yields 
very  good  results,  but  a  considerable  number  of  observations 
*  "Elemente  der  Psychophysik,"  1889. 


536  APPENDIX  B. 

must  be  made.  (3)  The  method  of  ascertaining  the  mean  error. 
It  consists — e.g.,  in  trying  to  find  from  a  number  of  weights 
one  -^A'hich  is  equal  to  a  given  weight  previously  determined,  or 
to  draw  a  line  equal  to  a  given  line.  The  difference  between 
the  actual  weight  or  line,  and  those  erroneously  chosen  or 
drawn  by  the  person  making  the  experiment,  as  being  equal 
to  the  former,  serves  to  determine  the  mean  error,  which  again 
is  reciprocal  to  the  sensibility.* 

Mental  operations  are  regarded  as  measurable  quantitatively 
as  to  their  degree,  duration,  and  number.  By  degree  is  meant 
the  intensity,  vividness,  and,  according  to  some  authors,  the 
distinctness  of  the  impression  or  idea.  (The  amount  of  con- 
scious effort — attention — involved  is  also  taken  into  account.) 
By  duration  is  meant  the  length  of  time  involved  in  sensation, 
perception,  ideation,  secjuences  of  ideas,  memory,  etc.  The 
duration  of  mental  operations  is  rendered  susceptible  to  mea- 
surement by  means  of  external  arrangements.  By  number  is 
meant  the  stages  or  steps  involved  in  mental  operations  ;  or 
the  estimation  of  the  number  of  operations  involved  in  a 
sequence   of  ideas  or  train  of  thought. 

The  various  ^^sycho-jjliysical  lines  of  investigation  are  as  follows, 
after  excluding  all  distractions: — (1)  Test  the  discriminative 
sensibility  of  the  skin  with  compasses,  or  by  the  Eesthesiometer. 
(2)  Test  the  sense  of  locality  hj  touching  different  parts  of  the 
body.  (3)  Test  the  temperature  sense  as  to  the  discrimination  of 
differences  at  various  regions.  (4)  Test  the  sensibility  to  heat 
and  cold  by  applying  metal  points  suitably  warmed  or  cooled. 
(5)  Test  the  discriminative  power  of  motion  by  drawing  a  point 
up  or  down,  the  skin  of  a  limb,  to  determine  whether  the 
direction  can  be  recognised.  (6)  Test  the  pressure  sense  by 
placing  weights  successively  on  the  same  spot,  the  patient  to 
detect  the  difference  between  an}^  pair  of  weights. 

With  regard  to  the  senses  of  sight,  hearing,  taste,  smell, 
etc.,  it  is  unnecessary  to  repeat  the  enumeration  of  the  various 
data  which  have  to  be  determined.  Enough  has  already  been 
said  in  i-egard  to  them  when  we  discussed  sensations  and 
their  perversions. 

*  See  also  Wundt,  "  Grundziige  der  Physiologischen  Psychologie  " ;  and 
Miiller,  "  Bibliothek  f  iir  Wissenschaft  und  Litteratur,"  vol.  xxiii. 


rSYCIIO-PHYSICS.  537 

Beadion  time  is  the  time  which  elapses  between  the  apjoli- 
cation  of  a  stimulus  and  a  conscious  reaction.  The  psychical 
process  involves  a  greater  length  of  time  than  does  a  simple 
reflex  act.  Reaction  time  is  usually  measured  by  causing  the 
person  experimented  on  to  indicate  by  means  of  an  electric 
signal  the  moment  when  the  stimulus  is  applied.  The  reaction 
time  is  supposed  to  consist  of  the  following  events  : — (1)  The 
duration  of  the  percepiioyi — i.e.,  when  we  become  conscious  of 
the  impression.  (2)  The  duration  of  the  time  required  to  direct 
the  attention  to  the  impression— ?!.e.,  the  duration  of  appercep- 
tion. And  (3)  the  duration  of  the  voluntary  impndse,  together 
with  (4)  the  time  required  for  conducting  the  impulse  in  the 
afferent  nerves  to  the  centre  ;  and  (5)  the  time  for  the  impulse 
to  travel  outwards  in  the  motor  nerves.* 

There  is  much  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  mental  processes 
involved  in  reaction  time  experiments.  The  apperception  pro- 
cess is  now  generally  regarded  as  equivalent  to  the  process  of 
attention  or  of  focussing  the  object.  We  do  not  agree  with 
those  observers  who  maintain,  that  the  reaction  of  which  the 
time  is  measured  is  practically  a  reflex  action  pure  and  simple, 
and  not  a  psychic  act.  It  is  impossible  to  eliminate  the 
psychic  element  from  consideration,  and  its  existence  is  most 
assuredh^  a  pre-requisite.  The  facility  of  reaction  will  vary 
directly  with  the  development  of  the  cerebral  mechanism  ;  but, 
without  the  psychic  pre-requisite  what  becomes  of  the  reaction  ? 
The  very  nature  of  the  experiment  is  dependent  upon  the 
existence  of  a  will  which  is  freed  from  all  distractions.  Ex- 
pectant attention  helps  to  facilitate  the  reflex  action,  but  it  does 
not  form  the  only  psychic  element  to  be  considered  in  reaction 
time  expei"iments — i.e.,  expectancy  is  a  pre-requisite,  and  con- 
scious volition  is  a  requisite,  in  all  time-reaction  experiments. 
Expectant  attention  facilitates  the  process  of  conscious  guidance; 
it  does  not  determine  the  actual  activity  itself. 

The  instriTments  employed  to  test  reaction  time  are : — ( 1)  The 
••Bowditch  Xeuromoebimeter,"  or  "nerve-reply  measurer,'  which 
has  been  employed  by  Warren. f  (2)  The  "Hipp  Chrononoscope," 

*  Landois  and  Stirling,   "  Text  Book  of  Human  Physiology,''  3rd  edit, 
p. 685. 

t  "  Journ.  of  Physiology,"'  vol.  viii.,  1887. 


538  APPENDIX  B. 

which  is  recommended  by  Jastrow.*  (3)  The  "  A-form  Ohrono- 
scope "  introduced  by  Galton.f  (4)  Marey's  Chronograph  has- 
also  been  nsed.:!: 

In  order  to  measure  the  simple  reaction  time  with  tactile, 
auditory,  and  visual  sensations,  the  discrimination  time,  and 
the  choice  or  volition  time.  Waller  §  uses  a  clockwork  and 
cylinder  covered  with  smoked  paper,  a  chronograph,  and 
Marey's  tympana.  The  reaction  times  are  taken,  according  to 
Waller's  methods,  as  follows  : — 

To  measure  the  simple  reaction  time  with  tactile,  auditory,  and  visual 
sensations. — 

Tactile. — The  subject,  blindfolded,  places  a  finger  on  a  lever.  The 
operator  taps  the  finger.  The  subject  responds  by  pressing  the  lever 
as  soon  as  he  feels  the  tap.  The  interval  between  the  two  marks  on  the 
smoked  cyhnder  gives  the  measure  of  the  reaction  time  to  a  tactile 
stimulus. 

Auditory. — The  subject,  blindfolded,  places  his  hand  ready  to  press 
the  lever.  The  operator  strikes  the  lever  so  as  to  make  a  sharp  sound. 
The  subject  responds  by  pressing  the  lever  as  soon  as  he  hears  the  sound. 
Reaction  time  as  before. 

Visual. — (The  butt-end  of  the  lever  is  painted  white,  the  rest  of  the 
apparatus  and  the  movements  of  the  operator  are  hidden  by  a  screen.) 
The  lever  is  depressed  quickly  and  quietly.  The  subject  responds 
as  soon  as  he  sees  the  white  end  move  down.     Reaction  time  as  before. 

Take  an  average  of  the  observations  in  each  case. 

To  measure  the  discrimination  time.— A  double  lever  is  now  used. 

Tactile. — The  subject,  blindfolded,  places  the  index-finger  of  each 
hand  on  each  lever,  it  being  agreed  that  he  is  to  react  only  to  a  touch 
on  one  side ;  sometimes  one,  sometimes  the  other,  finger  is  tapped  by 
the  operator.  Take  the  average  of  ten  responses  made  in  succession 
without  mistake. 

Auditory. — A  single  lever  is  struck,  now  with  a  small  bell,  now  with 
a  bit  of  wood.  The  subject,  blindfolded,  has  to  answer  only  to  one 
or  other  of  these  two  sounds.    Take  average  as  before. 

Visual. — (The  butt-ends  of  the  two  levers  are  painted  of  different 
colours.)  The  subject  has  to  signal  the  movement  of  one  or  other  of 
them  as  agreed  upon.    Average  as  before. 

The  result  =  simple  reaction  time. 
-\-  discrimination  time. 

To  m,easure  the  volition  time. — 

Repeat  the  previous  series  of  observations,  but  with  the  understand- 
*  "American  Journ.  of  Psychology,"  Dec,  1891. 
t  "Journ.  of  the  Anthropol.  Institute,"  Aug.,  1889. 
X  Cf.  "  La  Methode  graphique,"  part  ii.,  chap.  II. 
§  "Tuke's  Dictionary,"  p.  1021. 


PSYCHO-PHYSICS.  539 

ing  that  the  left-hand  is  to  be  used  to  signal  touch,  sound,  or  sight  in 
connection  with  the  left-hand  lever,  and  the  right-hand  for  differing 
stimuli  of  these  three  kinds  in  connection  with  the  right-hand  lever. 
Average  to  be  taken  as  before. 

The  result  =  simple  reaction  time. 

-|-  discrimination  time. 

-|-  choice  or  volition  time. 

Reaction  time  in  the  sane. — According  to  Jastrow,*  the 
influences  affecting  reaction  time  may  be  (a)  objective,  or  aSect- 
ing  the  condition  of  the  experiment ;  and  (b)  suhjective,  or 
affecting  the  attitude  of  the  reactor.  The  objective  influences 
are  due  to  the  nature  of  the  impression,  the  intensity  of  the 
stimulus,  and  the  mode  of  reaction  required.  The  subjective 
influences  are  derived  from  the  subject's  foreknowledge  of  the 
experiment,  the  effects  of  distraction,  the  direction  of  the 
attention,  practice  and  fatigue,  individual  variations,  and  varia- 
tions under  abnormal  conditions.  The  influences  affecting  com- 
plex reactions  are  merely  extensions  of  those  already  named. 

Reaction  time  in  the  insane. — According  to  Bevan  Lewis, 
in  the  earlier  stages  of  general  parahisis  the  reaction  time  to 
visual  stimuli  is  uniformly  delayed,  and  later  on  both  visual  and 
acoustic  stimuli  show  a  retardation  in  the  response.  In  chronic 
alcoholic  insanity  there  is  delay  in  reaction  time  for  both  acoustic 
and  optic  stimuli.  In  epileptic  insanity  there  is  also  delay  which 
tends  to  exceed  the  retardation  in  either  general  paralysis  or 
in  chronic  alcoholic  insanity.  Bevan  Lewis  says,  "  It  will  be 
apparent,  from  the  observations  on  healthy  subjects,  that,  whereas 
from  twelve-hundredths  to  eighteen-hundredths  of  a  second 
formed  the  limit  of  variability  for  acoustic  stimuli,  and  fifteen- 
hundredths  to  twenty-two  hundredths  for  visual  stimuli,  in 
the  insane  the  former  is  only  exceptionally  below  twenty- 
hundredths,  and  the  latter  rises  from  twenty-four-hundredths 
to  thirty-hundredths  of  a  second. f 

The  fundamental  outcome  of  these  time-reaction  experiments 
would  appear  to  be,  that  some  people  react  more  readily  than 
others,  and  that  bodily  or  mental  perversions  may  further  or 
retard  the  reaction.  The  practical  A'alue  of  such  investigations 
will  doubtless  be  proved  in  future. 

*  "  Tuke's  Dictionary,"  p.  10(38. 

t  "Text  Book  of  Mental  Diseases,"  1889,  p.  136. 


541 


INDEX. 


Aboulia,  449,  4o4 

Accommodation  pho.si)henes,  267 

Acquired  idiocy  and  imbecility,  501 

^Esthetic  feelings,  387 

After-images,  326,  332 

After-vibrations,  272 

Agenesis  of  cortical  elements,  500 

Ageusia,  265 

Agoraphobia,  272,  450 

Agrammatism,  305 

Akataphasia,  438 

Akusis,  273 

Albumin  in  nerve-substance,  58 

Alcohol,  477,  521 

Alexia,  434 

Allbutt,    Clifford,    on    congenital 

syphilis,  476 
Alliteration,  437 
Allochiria,  279 
Althann,  84 
Amnesic  states,  341 

and  aj)hasia,  362 

in  hy]3nosis,  349 

partial,  361 

periodic,  346 

senile,  359 
Anaesthesia,  278 
Analgia,  279 
Anarthria,  365 
Anatomy  of  cortex,  24 
Andriezen,  40,  41,  42,  43,  359,  417, 
522 


Angular  gyrus,  visual  centre  in,  95 
Anencephalus,  499 
Animistic  theory,  15 
Anosmia,  266 
Anxietas  tibiarum,  283 
Aphasia,  ataxic,  364 
commissural,  364 
sensorial,  364 

transient,  439 
Aphemia,  437 
Api^erception,  205 
Appetites,  morbid,  453 
Apselaphesia,  279 
Arnold,  ^2 

Arterioles  of  cortex,  65 
Association  fibres,  107 
Association  school,  17 
Atavism,  475 
Ataxaj)hasia,  365 
Atomistic    hylozoism,   theory  of. 

161 
Attention,  291 

adjustment  6f,  299 

and  genius,  300 

morbid  condition  of,  301 

neural  processes,  of,  294 

psycho-physical  theory  of,  293 

reflex,  297 

voluntary,-  298 
Auhert,  189 
Auditory  centres,  99,  100 

paths,  100 
Automatic  actions,  47,  420 
Azam,  on  memory,  347,  348 


,542 


INDEX. 


B. 


Baginsky,  503 

Baillarger,  26,  261,  263,  288 

Bain,  17,  164,  293,  294,  388,  392, 
425 

Baldioin,  3,  17,  338 

Ball,  249,  320,  321,  322 

Baratoux,  247 

Bastian,  57,  91,  109,  125,  126,  137, 
191,  274,  283,  293,  362,  425,  435 

Baxt,  45 

Beach,    Fletcher,     on    congenital 
syphilis,  476 

Beaunis,  234,  349,  350 

Bechtereiv,  190,  433 

Beevor,  101,  106,  108,  125 

Belief,  319 

Bell's  law,  115 

Berkley,  34  > 

Bernhardt,  rill 

Bernstein,  62,  81 

Bibra,  59 

Billod,  449 

Binet,  234 

Blandford,  275,  276 

Bleuler,  243,  245 

Bloch,  217 

Blood,  in  insanity,  513 

Bodily  diseases  as  causes  of  in- 
sanity, 508 

Boll,  58 

Bolton,  185 

Boulimia,  399 

'Bradyphasia,  365 

Braid,  327 

Brain,  double,  312 
movements,  76 
vascular  supply,  63 

Bratmoell,  361,  352,  424,  440 

Brierre  de  Boismont,  263 

Broca,  26,  101,  312,  364 

Browne,  Crichton,  426 

Brown-Sequard,  312 

Bruce,  73 

"Bucket,    theory"    of   hallucina- 
tions, 256 


Burckhardt,  76,  77,  78,  87 
Buret,  209 


C. 


Caja,l,  Ramon  y,  26,  26,  28,  32,  63, 

64,  65,  315 
Calderwood,  155, 158 
Campbell,  438 
Carpenter,  6,  420,  449 
Carter,  43 

Catalepsy  during  hypnosis,  630 
Caudate  neuroglia  fibre-cells,  40 
Cells,  relation  between,  38 
Cerebral   affection   and  insanity, 
520 

arteries,  structure  of,  67 

cortex,  27 

fluid,  regulation  of  pressure  of, 
70 

localisation,  92,  104 
value  of,  109 
Cerebration,  unconscious,  165 
Cerebrin,  60 
Cerebro-spinal  fluid,  73 
Chabalier,    on    secondary    sensa- 
tions, 247 
Charcot,  63,  64,  92,  126 
Chemical  properties  of  nerve-sub- 
stance, 56 
Choice,  410 
Cholesterin,  60 
Chorea,  518 

demonomania,  489 
Chossat,  59 

Christian,  on  hallucinations,  269 
Cingulum,  108 
Climate,  influence  of,  496 
Clouston,  445,  452,  476 
Coccitas  verbahs,  434 
Cohnheim,  65 

Collective  hallucinations,  268 
Colour  bhndness,  200 

sensation,  201 
Colours,  simple  and  mixed,  199 
Common  sensation,  189 


INDEX. 


543 


Comte,  loU 
Conception,  304 

phj^siologieal,  310 

psycho-physical    theories    of, 
308 
Conduct,  440 

in  the  sane,  443 
insane,  443 
Conductivity  of  nerve-cell,  44 
nervous  impulse,  o2 
Congenital  idiocy,  oOO 

syphilis,  476 
Consanguinity,  laws  of,  474,  477 
Consciousness,  12o 

in  lower  centres,  141 

the  accompaniment  of  nerve- 
action,  315 
Control  of  feelings,  444 
thought,  444 

loss  of,  445 

self,  444 
Cornu'inder,  59 
Cortex,  anatomj'^  of,  24 

arteries  of,  65 
Cortical  structures,  arrangement 

of,  25 
Coupland,  149,  154,  171,  176,  392, 

409 
Courtier,  234 
Cramer,  -I^i 
Cranioschisis,  500 
Cretineux,  407 
Cretinism,  407 

semi,  407 
Cyclops,  499 
Cyples,  146,  158 
Cysterna  ambiens,  71 

chiasmatis,  71 

coi-poris  callosi,  71 

intercruralis,  71 

magna     cerebello-medullaris, 
71 


D. 


Dancing  mania,  489 
Danileu'ski,  57 


Darkscheiritsch,  95 
Darivin,  155,  388,  462 
Deaf-mutism,  436 
Deafness,  psychical,  100 
De  Crozant,  278 
Degeneration  and  genius,  465 

instances  of,  466 

theory  of,  468 

objections  to,  469 
Deiters,  32 
Dejerine,  25,  91,  125 
Deliberation,  410 
Delusional  insanity,  329 
Delusions,  329 

origin  of,  330 
Dendi'ons,  31 
Descartes,  153 
Desire,  nature  of,  412 
Diabetes,  479 
Diakanoic,  60 
Biemerbrock,  138 
Digestion,  disorders  of,  510 
Disgust,  feelings  of,  401 
Dispositions,  inherited,  471 
Bonders,  75,  203 
Double-brain,  312 
Doubt,  insanity  of,  320 
Doini,  Langdon,  476 
Dreams,  286,  290 
Drechsel,  58,  60 
Drohisch,  335 
Dualism  theory,  18 
Duchenne,  284 
Buret,  63,  64,  65. 


Ecker,  25 
Eckhard,  45 

Eclampsic  imbecility,  501 
Effort,  feeling  of,  388,  425 
Emotions,  375 

disorders  of,  393 

theory  of,  375 
Empirical  psychology,  14 
Encephalocele,  500 


544 


INDEX. 


Endemic  cretinism,  502 

insanity,  491 
Engelmann,  37 
Entoptical  pulse,  267 
Epidemic  insanity,  481,  491 
Epilepsy,  impulses  in,  453 

Jacksonian,  517 

masked,  517 
Epileptic  idiocy,  501 
Esquirol,  263,  449 
Eulenherg,  284 
Eivalcl,  36,  58 
Exner,  139,  152. 
Exophthalmic  goitre,  519 
Expression,  movements  in,  389 

physical,  389 
External  factors  in  development, 

480 
Eye-movements,  96 


r. 


F(aret,  342 

Fear,  morbid  states  of,  403 
Febrile  affections  and  insanity,  515 
Fechner,  153,  293,  294,  396 
Fechner's  law,  179,  180 
Feeling,  373 

eesthetic,  404 

connected  with  hope  and  fear, 
403 

disorders  of,  393 

inner  sense,  400 

intellectual,  404 

in  the  insane,  402 

of  shame,  reproach,  etc.,  404 

physiological  theory  of,  387 

rational,  405 

relation  to  knowing,  374 

tone  of,  383 

varieties  of,  390 
Ferrier,  25,  92,  99,  102,   105,  111, 

123,  125,  136,  239,  388,  425,  427 
Fibrse  proprise,  107 
Fibre-cells,  40 
Fick,  200 


First  impressions,  333 

Fischer,  57 

Flechsig,  91,  93,  99,  106 

Flourens,  112,  113,  463 

Fluid,  cerebro-spinal,  73 

Folie  a  deux,  491 

Fore-brain,  130 

Forgetfulness,  340 

Fossa  Sylvii,  71 

Fouilee,  294 

Fournie,  260 

Foveas  glandulares,  75 

Fox,  Long,  82,  83,  84 

Franklin,  theory  of   colour-vision, 

202 
Frohlich,  266 
Fromann,  37,  38 
Frontal  lobe,  126 
Fulminating  psychoses,  447 
Functional   hypersemias,   81,   525,. 

526 
Functions  of  nerves,  49 


G. 


Galton,  243,  271 
Gamgee,  57,  59,  60 
Gasquet,  493 
Geigel,  85 
Generic  ideas,  317 
Genius  and  attention,  300 
and  degeneration,  465 
nature  of,  462 
Geoghegan,  59 
Gibson,  88 

Globus  hystericus,  511 
Goldschneider,  186,  218,  220,  222, 

285 
Golgi,  25,  26,  33,  34,  53 
Goller,  203 

Goltz,  83,  113,  125,  126,  134,  312 
Gotch,  53,  126 
Gout  and  insanity,  476 
Go^vers,  3,  100,  113,  135,  174,  175, 

278 
Grand  mal.  342 


INDEX. 


545 


Gh-ashey,  86,  87 

Gratiolef,  2o,  93 

Griesinger,  166,  260,  276,  449 

Growth  and  develoi^ment,  455 

Gruher,  243 

Gudden,   inferior  commissure   of, 

95 
Guislain,  278,  449,  475 
Gustatory  jpath,  102 


H. 


Hagen,  504 

Haig,  85 

Hall,  Stanley,  219,  220 

Hallucinations,  248 

by  physical  suggestion,  268 

collective,  268 

in  dreams,  286 

in  sane  persons,  276 

neural  process  in,  254 

pathology  of,  274 

psycho-motor,  277 

varieties  of,  260 
Hamilton,  93,  94,  107 
Hamilton,  Sir  W.,  168,  392 
Happiness,  feeling  of,  397 
Harris,  420 
Hartmann,  4,  209 
Haslam,  273 
Head,  52,  281 
Plearing,  99 

centre  for,  99 

perversions  of,  270 

sensation  of,  191 
Heart,  diseases  of,  512 
Heidenheim,  125 
Heitzmann,  37 
Helmholtz,  o'2,  194,  209,  222,  231, 

240 
Henoch,  504 
Henri,  234 
Henschen,  134 
Herbart,  17,  21,  392 
Hereditary  neuroses,  473 


Hering,  76,  201 

Hermann,  49,  175 

Heuhner,  63,  64,  65 

Hirsch,  469 

Hitsig,  91,  116,  125,  134 

Hodgson,  17,  392 

Hoffding,  113,  182 

HopiJe-Seyler,  60 

Horsley,  28,  53,  91,  93,  94,  105, 106, 

125,  126. 
Horu'icz,  374,  384 
Houdin,  198 
Hubnoff,  125 

Hughlings- Jackson,   28,   101,   121, 
123,  126,  128,  142,  162,  342,  354, 
425,  502,  518,  526 
Hume,  17 
Hunter,  490 
Huxley,  20,  162,  465 
llydrencephalocele,  500 
Hydrocephalus,  500 
Hypakusis,  273 
Hjrpalgia,  279 
Hypersesthesia,  279 
Hyperakusis,  272 
Hyperalgia,  279 
Hyperattention,  301 

results  of,  302 
Hypergeusia,  265 
Hypermnesia,  366 
Hyperosmia,  266 
Hyperpselaphesia,  279 
Iljrpertrophic  idiocy,  501 
Hypnagogic  illusions  and  halluci- 
nations, 287 
Hypnosis,  629  - 

amnesia    and    aphasia     in, 
440 

history  of,  529 

memory  in,  349 

mental  state  in,  531 

methods  of,  529. 

symptoms  of,  530 

volition  in,  424 
Hypogeusia,  265 
Hypopselaphesia,  279 
Hyposmia,  266 

35 


546 


INDEX. 


Idiocy,  449 

Illusions,  active,  230,  239 

definitions  of,  228 

in  dreams,  286 

of  perception,  229 

passive,  229,  230 
Images,  latent  mental,  337 

primary  and  revived,  338 
Imagination,  323 

a  constructive  process,  324 

images,  326 

morbid  conditions  of,  329 

neural  process  of,  326. 
Imbecility,  499 
Impulses,  epileptiform,  452 

excessive,  451 

general,  452 

homicidal,  453 

morbid,  450 

nerve,  50 

sexual,  452 

suicidal,  453 
Inattention,  302 
Incisures  of  Schmidt,  36 
Infancy,  disorders  of,  499 
Inflammatory  idiocy,  501 
Inherited  dispositions,  473 
Inhibition,  427 

theories  of,  428,  429,  431 
Insanity  of  doubt,  320 

delusional,  329 
Instincts,  375 
Intemperance,  477 
Intercellular  connections,  53 
Internal  factors  of  development, 

460 
Intoxicants,  521 

Invariable   concomitance    theory, 

148 
Ireland,   282,   312,   406,   436,   475, 

514. 
Irradiation  of  functions,  115 
Irresolution,  448 


J. 


James,  9,  11,  19,  21,  91,  126,  140, 
160,  163,  175,  210,  214,  220,  231, 
236,  239,  250,  254,  258,  284,  307, 
318,  356,  375,  423,  426,  462,  533 

Jastrow,  539 

Joly,  463 

Judgment,  317 

degree  of  perfection  of,  318 


K. 

Kammler,  189 
Kant,  392 
Kiesoiv,  184,  186 
Kincesthesia,  283,  442 
Kirchhoff,  110,  114,  141 
Klinke,  283 
Kolliker,  53 
Koppe,  271 
Krxpelin,  368,  369 
Krause,  67,  82 
Krolin,  186 
Kuhne,  36,  68 
Kupffer,  36 
Kussmaul,  364 


L. 


Ladd,  10,  12,  18,  49,  111,  147,  187, 
199,  207,  213,  221,  224,  384,  442, 
633 

Laihlin,  198 

Landois,  279 

Lange,  376 

Langendorff,  186 

Langer,  73 

Latent  mental  images,  337 

Laycock,  121 

Lead  poisoning,  523 

Lecithin,  60 

Legrain,  438,  478 

Lehmann,  243 

Leibnitz,  21,  378 


INDEX. 


547 


Lejjsms,  243 

Lethargic  state  in  hypnosis,  530 

Leubuscher,  449 

Leuhossek,  192 

Lewinski,  220,  284 

Lewis,  Bevan,  25,  26,  28,  29,  30,  38, 

39,  40,  42,  43,  68,  70,  72,  91,  344, 

359,  400,  453,  521,  539 
Lewy,  86 
Ley'dig,  37 
Lichtenfels,  266 
Lichtheim,  434 
Liebernieister,  74 
Liebreich,  61 
Linea  terminalis,  71 
Lipj)s,  222 

Local  memories,  142 
Locahsation,  cerebral,  104 

of  mental  faculties.  111,  211 
Logorrhoea,  437 
Lotze,  21,  212,  384,  385 
Lower  centres,  consciousness  in. 

141 
Luciani,  91,  139 
Ludwig,  425 
Lussana,  246 
Luys,  368 
Lycanthropy,  482 
Lyman,  288,  289 
Lymph-cisterns,  71 
Lymphatic  system,  70,  72 


M. 


Magnan,  342 
Majendie,  foramen  of,  78 
Marinotti,  26 
Masturbation,  506 
^Materialistic  theory,  17 
Material  monad  theory,  121 
Maudsley,  355,  368,  453,  463 
Maury,  289,  483 
McDowall,  267 

Mechanical  restraint,  394,  451 
Medullated  fibres,  34 


Meissner,  32 
3Iellus,  103 
Memory,  332 

active,  333 

in  general  paralysis,  358 

in  hypnotic  states,  349 

in  organic  brain  disease,  358 

in  stupor,  344 

local,  142 

methods  of  cultivating,  334 

passive,  333 

projier,  332 

psycho-physical  theory  of,  335 

secondary,  332 
Mendoza,  247 
Meniere's  disease,  272 
Meningocele,  500 
Menopause,  607 
Menstruation,  507 
Mental  automatism,  342 

faculties,  111 

pathology,  6 

physiology,  6 
Mercier,  15,  147,  315,  386,  392,  429, 

441,  446 
Merkel,  187 
Meschede,  408 
3Ieyer,  59,  75,  240 
Meynert,  57,  65,  70,  80,  82,  87,  91, 
101,  106,  109,  115,  120,  127,  130, 
144,  389,  419 
Michelson,  185 
Blickle,  270,  278,  438,  512 
Microcephalus,  500 
Microkinesis,  456 
Micropsychosis,  459 
Mill,  J.  S.,  113,  152,  155,  156 
Mills,  17,  100,  500 
Mimicry  of  disease,  490 
Mind,  149 

evolution  of,  154 

methods  of  study  of,  149 

stuff  theory,  159,  163 
subjectivity  of,  143 
Misery,  394,  397 
Moelli,  91 
Moizard,  504 


548 


INDEX 


Monakoiv,  91 
Money,  504 
Monism,  19 
Monoideism,  290 
Monomania,  380 
Moon,  influence  of,  495 
Moral  defects,  406 

insanity,  405 
Morel,  453 

Morphinomania,  524 
Mosso,  76,  88 

Motions  and  sensation,  172 
Motor  nerves,  102 
3Iott,  91,  92 
Movements,  432 

in  the  insane,  432 

of  eye,  96 

of  speech,  436 
Milller,  60,  258,  388,  425 
Multiple  monadism,  21 
3Iunk,  91,  96,  100,  113,  117,  125, 

127,  144 
Munsterherg,   156,   217,   222,    293, 

419,  427 
Muscular  sense,  190 

perversions  of,  282 
sensation,  perception  of,  220 
Mutism,  436 
Myelocele,  500 
Myxoedema,  519 


N. 


Nansen,  37 

Nasse,  271 

Nativistic  theory  of  perception,  208 

Natural  selection,  adequacy  of,  472 

Naunyn,  76 

Negative  after-images,  327 

variation,  52 
Neigliclc,  246 
Nerve-cell,  28 

conductivity  of,  44 

physiology  of,  43,  144 

processes,  31 

sizes,  29 


Nerve-elements,  energy,  175 

impulse,  50 

nutrition  of,  79 

substance,  chemical  properties 
of,  56 
sp.  gr.  of,  57 
Nerve-fibres,  classes  of,  49 

functions  of,  49 

non-medullated,  34 

structure  of,  34 
Nerves,  motor,  102 

sensory,  90 
Nervous  discharge,  430 

resistance,  430 
Neuralgia,  279 

Neural  infei^ence  scheme,  128 
Neiu'oglia  cell  elements,  40 
Neuro-keratin,  58,  59 
Neurons,  31 

Neuroses  inherited,  475 
Newbold,  323 
Newington,  344 
Msbet,  464,  465 
Nordau,  140 
Nothnagel,  139 

Nuclein  in  nerve-substance,  68 
Nutrition  of  nerve-elements,  79 


0. 


Object,  consciousness,  151,  380 
Occasionalists  theory,  15 
Occupation,  influence  of,  495 
Olfactory  centre,  101 
Optic  fibres,  96 
Original  capacities,  461 
Ormond,  16 


Pacchionian  granulations,  73 
Pain,  laws  of,  378 
Panic,  450 
Parageusia,  265 


INDEX. 


549 


Paragraphia,  365 
Parakusis,  273 
Paralgia,  '279 
Paralytic  idiocy,  oOl 
Paramnesia,  368,  369 
Parapliasia,  365 
Parens,  60 
Parosmia,  266 
Passu,  234 
Pauihan,  388 
Perception,  205 

abnormal  conditions  of,  226 

illusions  of,  229 

of  nmscular  sensation,  220 

of  spatial  order,  210 

of  A'isual  space,  221 

physiological  conditions  of,  206 
theories  of,  208 

special  channels  of,  215 
Pericellular  sac,  72 
Perivascular  channel  of  His,  67,  71 

system,  68 
Perroud;  247 
Petit  mal,  342 
Petroirsky,  58,  60 
Pettingen,  195 
Philippe ,  234 
Phonisms,  243 
Photisms,  243 
Phrenology,  109 
Phthisis,  475,  514 
Physical  environment,  495 
Physiological  psychology,  9,  12 
Pierce,  217 
Pinel,  453 

Pleasure,  laws  of,  378 
Pollak,  59 
Polyideism,  296 
Polyzoism,  21 
Porencei)halus,  500 
Post-hypnotic  suggestion,  534 
Praefrontal  lobes,  134 
Pre-established  harmony,   theory 

of,  15 
Presentationism,  156 
Presentative  feelings,  391 

representative  feelings,  391 


Pressure  phosphenes,  267 

spots,  189 
Preyer,  217 
Projection  cell,  33 

system,  106 
Prosencephalon,  absence  of,  499 
Protagon,  61 
Protoplasmic  cell,  42 
Psychical  deafness,  100 
Psychological  process  of  inference, 

131 
Psychology,  3 

empirical,  14 
Psychopathic  epidemics,  481 
Psycho-physical  parallelism,  11 
Psycho-physics,  535 

,    instruments  employed  in,  537 

lines  of  investigation,  536 

methods,  535 

reaction  time,  537,  539 
Puberty,  506 
Puerperium,  507 

Pulsatory  movements  of  brain,  77 
Pulse  in  insanity,  513 
Purkinje,  198 


Q. 


Quantitative  relation  between 
blood  and  cerebro-spinal  fluid, 
74 

Quinke,   on    Pacchionian   glands. 


R. 


Ranvier,  nodes  of,  35 
Ratiocinative    method,   value   of, 

133 
Recepts,  317 
Recollection,  333 
Reflex  action,  45,  419 

attention,  297. 
Pegis,  279,  523 
Regression,  law  of,  353 
Reid,  392 


550 


INDEX. 


Keligion   as  a  cause  of  insanity, 

493 
Religious  impostors,  487 

pilgrimages,  487 
Remalc,  35 
Rendu,  92 

Representative  feelings,  391 
Reproach,  feelings  of,  404 
Re-representative  feelings,  391 
Resolution,  410 
Retinal  shadows,  267 
Retsius,  25,  40,  192 
Revington,  475 
Reymond,  92 
Rheumatism,  476 
Ribot,  293,  301,  335,  342,  343,  345, 

353,  369,  449 
Ritti,  269 
Robertson,  530 
Romanes,  239 


S. 


Sachs,  500 

Salivation,  510 

Sandford,  203 

Savage,  240,  265,  267,  273,  276, 279, 

343,  344,  476,  516 
Schafer,  30,  37,  43,  50,  53,  91,  93, 

96,  99,  106,  125,  134,  187,  192 
Schiff,  125,  385 
Schlossberger,  59 
Schneider,  374 
Schopenhauer,  209,  374 
Schrader,  112 
Schreiber,  76 
Schidtze,  37 
Schwann,  35 
Scrofula,  475 
Seasons,  influence  of,  495 
Seglas,  277 
Senile  amnesia,  359 
Sensation,  170 

analysis  of,  170 

and  i)erception,  171 

characters  of,  177 

excentric  projection  of,  212 


Sensation,  function  of,  183 

local  characters  of,  183 

maximum  intensity  of,  179 

motions  affecting,  172 

of  special  senses,  184 

quality  of,  182 

secondary,  243 
Sense  feelings,  391,393 
Sensory  paths,  90 

perversions,  225 
origin  of,  225 
Sentiments,  aesthetic,  393 

intellectual,  393 

moral,  393 
Seppili,  91 

Shame,  feelings  of,  404 
Shaiv,  269,  277 
Sherrington,  98,  99,  103,  107 
Shuttleivorth,  476,  477 
Sight,  93,  196 

perversions  of,  267 
Silbermann,  503 
Simon,  497 
Skae,  453 
Smell,  101,  185 

centre  for,  101 

perversions  of,  334 
Smith,  R.  Percy,  630 
Social  environment,  480 
Sollier,  378 
Soltmann,  503 
Somnambulism,  530 
Spatial  order,  perception  of,  210 
Specific    gravity     of     nerve-sub- 
stance, 57 
Spectral  illusions,  483 
Si^eculative  manias,  489 
Speech,  after  sunstroke,  439 

defects  of,  437 

during  fatigue,  438 

in  general  paralysis,  439 

in  the  insane,  437 

mechanism  of,  433 

movements,  436 
Spencer,  Herbert,  9,  124,  155,  160, 
206,  209,  334,  374,  382,  385,  391, 
406,  462 


INDF.X. 


551 


Spina  bifida,  oOO 

Spinal  affections,  ol9 

Spiritual  tlieory,  15 

Spitska,  1>{)9,  500,  506 

Stammering,  437 

Starr,  91 

Steinbach,  198 

Steinbriigge,  246 

Steiner,  111,  113 

Stellate  fibre-cells,  41 

Stewart,  335 

Stumpf,  217,  222 

Stuttering,  437 

Subarachnoidal  space,  73 

Subject-consciousness,  151,  380 

Suggestion,  334,  533 

Sully,  151,  205,  229,  238,  293,  300, 

305,  375,  411,  412,  4:6 
Sunstroke,  504,  505 
Surditas  verbalis,  434 
Sympathy,  393,  401 ,  490 
Syphilis,  476,  516 
congenital,  476 


T. 


Tactile  corpuscles,  187 
Tactual  i)erception,  277 
Tamhurini,  491 
Tarantism,  489 
Taste,  102,  184 

centre,  102 

perversions  of,  265 
Taylor,  453 
Teeth  in  insanity,  510 
Telepathic  hallucinations,  268 
Temperaments,  378,  394 
Temperature  sense,  189 

spots,  189 
Thane,  96 
Thelohan,  234 
Thovipson,  475 
Thudicum,  61 
Tigretier,  489 

Time  relationshix^s  of  sensations, 
380 


Tinnitus  aurium,  272 
Tone  of  feeling,  379,  380 
Tonnini,  491 
Touch,  centre  for,  92 
sensations  of,  185 
Traumatic  idiocy,  502 
Trigonum  olfactorium,  101 
Tripier,  91 
Trollard,  75 
Tuke,  Baity,  23,  88,  268 
Tuke,  Hack,  6,  248,  269,  277,  290, 

405,  490,  495,  532 
Tumultus  sermonis,  365 
Turner,  25 
Tyndall,  9 


U. 

Unconscious  cerebration,  165 
Urbantachitsch,  on  secondary  sen- 
sations, 247 
Urinary  system,  diseases  of,  509 
Uterus,  diseases  of,  508 


V. 

Van  der  Kolk,  475 

Vascular  supply  of  brain,  63 

Vaso-motor  centre,  81 

Velocity  of  blood  circulation,  85 

Venous  circulation,  74 

Verbigeration,  437 

Veyssiere,  92 

Vicq  d'Azyr,  108 

Vierordt,  198  . 

Vignier,  235 

Visual  ai)paratus,  95 

centre,  95 

space,  perception  of,  221 
Voigt,  59 
Volition,  409 

a  delayed  reflex,  411 

during  hypnosis,  424 

nature  of,  412 

psycho-physical  j)rocess  of,  417 
Volkmann,  221,  222,  236,  373,  395 


552 


INDEX. 


Voluntary  action,  421,  442 
Von.Jaksch,  58,  69 
Von  Kries,  200,  217 
Vulpian,  111 

W. 

Wallace,  15o 

Waller,  115,  118,  119, 126,  131,  145, 

156,  425,  538 
Ward,  156,  157,  164,  172,  176,  257, 

294,  374 
Warner,  456 

Water  in  nerve-substance,  67 
Weber,  170,  179,  182,  184,  185,  219 
Weisbach,  57 
Weismann,  472 
Wernicke,  106,  364,  433 
Westphal,  439 
Wiglesworth,  477 
Will,  409 

as  a  delayed  reflex,  411 

definition  of,  409 

freedom  of,  413 

impairment  of,  448 


'A 


Will,  nature  of,  412 

psycho-physical  processes  of, 
417 
Willis,  circle  of,  77 
Winslow,  367 
Witchcraft,  484 
Woakes,  83 
Word-blindness,  365 

deafness,  100,  366 
Worm-Muller,  59 

Wundt,  19,  91,  125,  130,  156,  180, 
184,  201,  205,  209,  219,  222,  292, 
294,  374,  377,  386,  392,  425 
Wyllie,  363 


Young-Helmholts  theory  of  colour 


vision,  201 


Z. 


Ziehen,  14,  46,  173,  175,  179,  182, 
261,  289,  292,  295,  308,  331,  379, 
415,  421,  433 


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